καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν.
SOCRATES. “Et videtur autem, O Simmia, plurimis hominibus cui nichil dulce talium neque participare eis haut dignum esse vita frui, sed prope tendere ad defungi qui minime sollicitus est voluptatum que per corpus sunt.”
"Putant vero plerique, o Simmia, eum hominem cui nihil talium dulce (7) sit neque illis fruatur, revera vivere existimandum non esse, sed pene mortuum, cum vo(8)luptates corporis non percipiat."
Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that to him who has no sense of pleasure and no part in bodily pleasure, life is not worth having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.
τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν;
πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει (65b) κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ;
οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἆρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν;
καίτοι εἰ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἵ γε ἄλλαι·
πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν;
SOCRATES. “Quid vero circa prudencie possessionem?
Utrum impedimentum corpus necne, si quis hoc ipsum in questione commune assumat?
Quemadmodum hoc tale quidem dico: utrum habet veritatem aliquam visusque et auditus hominibus,
sive talia et poete nobis semper ruminant, quoniam neque audimus sincere nichil neque videmus?
Eciam si isti circa corpus sensus non sinceri sunt neque evidentes, incassum autem et alii;
universi quippe hiis deteriores sunt. Vel tibi non videntur?”
"Quid autem circa sapientiae (9) ipsius acquisitionem?" inquit Socrates.
"Vtrum impedimento est corpus, si quis ipsum (10) socium ad investigandum assumpserit, necne?
Quale utique tale aliquid dico. Habentne (11) visus et auditus veritatem in hominibus aliquam?
An talia quaedam ipsi quoque poetae (12) semper canunt, nihil nos audire, nihil videre syncerum?
Atqui si ii corporis sensus syn(13)ceri certique non sunt, neque etiam alii;
quippe cum ceteri omnes his quodammodo dete(14)riores sint. An non tibi videntur?"
What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?
--is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper?
I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them?
Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses?
and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?
--for you will allow that they are the best of them?
λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή,
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα,
καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ᾽ ἁπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος.
SOCRATES. “Raciocinatur nempe tunc potissimum, cum nichil horum ipsam contristaverit, neque auditus neque visus neque dolor neque certe aliqua voluptas;
immo quociens maxime ipsa secundum se ipsam fit permittens valere corpus,
et ad quantum potest non communicans ipsi neque contingens affectat rei veritatem.”
"Ratiocinatur autem tunc o(18)ptime, quando horum nihil eum perturbat neque auditus neque visus neque dolor neque vo(19)luptas;
sed quammaxime seipsum in se recipiens deferit corpus,
neque quicquam quoad (20) fieri potest cum illo communicans neque attingens ipsum quod vere est affectat."
And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her--neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure,
--when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it,
when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being?
ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν;
λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ (65e) τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν·
ἆρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται,
ἢ ὧδε ἔχει· ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον;
SOCRATES. “Immo alio quodam sensu quam qui per corpus pertigisti ad illa?
Dico sane de cundis, quemadmodum de magnitudine, sanitate, robore, et aliorum uno sermone universorum substancia, quod contingit unumquodque esse.
Ergo per corpus eorum veritas consideratur,
vel ita se habet; quisquis maxime nostrum et perspicacissime preparetur ipsum unumquodque perspicere de quo intendit, hic utique proxime accedat ad cognoscendum singulum?”
"An alio quodam sensu corporis attigisti?
(26) Loquor autem de omnibus, veluti de ipsa magnitudine, de sanitate, de robore ipso, ac (27) summatim de ceterorum omnium essentia, id est, quod unumquodque sit,
nunquid per (28) corpus quod in his verissimum est perspicitur?
An ita se res habet? Quicunque nostrum (29) maxime et syncerissime cogitare mente se comparat ipsum quod aggreditur cogitan(30)dum, hic proxime ad cognitionem ipsius accedit?"
Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense?
--and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything.
Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs?
or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of each thing which he considers?
ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειεν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον,
μήτε τιν᾽ ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε [τινὰ] ἄλλην (66a) αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ,
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτῇ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων,
ἀπαλλαγεὶς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὤτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος,
ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωνῇ;
ἆρ᾽ οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις [καὶ] ἄλλος ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος;
SOCRATES. “Ergo igitur ille quoque hoc efficiet sincerissime, quisquis quam maxime ipso mentis intellectu eat in unumquodque,
numquam visum apponens in intelligendo, neque quem alium sensum attrahens quempiam cum raciocinacione,
sed ipsa per se ipsam pura intelligeneia fruens ipsum per se ipsum purum unumquodque conatur aucupari existencium,
sequestratus quam maxime ab oculisque et auribus et, ut dictum dicatur, ab universo corpore,
tamquam perturbante et non permittente animam possidere veritatemque et prudeneiam cum communicet?
Itaque nonne hic est, o Simmia, si quis eciam alius, adeptus veritatem?”
"Nonne igitur ille purissime (31) faceret, quicunque ipsa mentis excogitatione quammaxime se ad unumquodque confer(32)ret,
neque visum in excogitando adhibens, neque sensum prorsus ullum ratiocinationi con(33)iungens:
sed ipsa secundum seipsam mentis excogitatione syncera utens, ipsum per se (34) quodlibet syncerum existens studeret venari,
ab oculis, ab auribus, et ut summatim di(35)cam, a toto corpore liber,
utpote perturbante animum neque permittente veritatem sapien(36)tiamque assequi, siquando in communionem recipiatur?
An non hic erit, o Simmia, siquis (37) unquam alius ipsius quod vere est compos?"
And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each with the mind alone,
not introducing or intruding in the act of thought sight or any other sense together with reason,
but with the very light of the mind in her own clearness searches into the very truth of each;
he who has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and, so to speak, of the whole body,
these being in his opinion distracting elements which when they infect the soul hinder her from acquiring truth and knowledge
--who, if not he, is likely to attain the knowledge of true being?
(66b) οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἄττα λέγειν,
ὅτι “κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπός τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς [μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει],
ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν·
φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές.
“Nonne igitur necesse” inquit “ex omnibus hiis constare opinionem talem quamdam vere philosophis, ut eciam ad invicem talia quedam dicant,
quoniam ‘nititur quemadmodum via irregressibilis quedam nos efferre cum racione in contemplatu;
quoniam, quamdiu corpus habuerimus et conglutinata fuerit nostra anima cum huiusmodi malo, numquam adipiscemur sufficienter quod exoptamus;
dicimus autem hoc esse verum.
Nonne igitur", inquit, "ex his omnibus necessario sequitur opinionem eiusmo(39)di legitimis philosophis usque adeo constare debere, ut ad se invicem ita loquantur?
'Ne(40)cessaria iam ratione concluditur nos quadam rationis ipsius via ad id considerando per(41)duci,
videlicet donec corpus habemus, animusque noster tanto malo erit admixtus, nun(42)quam nos id quod desideramus verum ad votum consecuturos.
[]
And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the following?
‘Have we not found,’ they will say, ‘a path of thought which seems to bring us and our argument to the conclusion,
that while we are in the body, and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire will not be satisfied?
and our desire is of the truth.
μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν (66c) τροφήν·
ἔτι δέ, ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν.
ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς,
ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν.
καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι.
διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται,
τὰ δὲ χρήματα (66d) ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ·
καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα.
τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον πάντων ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι,
ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὖ πανταχοῦ παραπῖπτον θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει,
ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τἀληθές.
Decies autem millena quippe nobis vacaeionum impedimenta exhibet corpus propter necessarium alimentum;
amplius eciam, si qui morbi acciderint, impediunt nostram eius quod est aucupacionem.
Amoribusque et concupiscenciis et timoribus et ydolis omnifariis et nugis implet nos plurimis,
ut dicatur quam vere; revera ab eo neque sapere nobis advenit umquam nullatenus.
Et enim prelia et sediciones et pugnas nichil aliud prebet quam corpus et huius concupiscencie.
Quia propter pecuniarum possessionem universa et prelia nobis fiunt,
pecunias sane compellimur possidere propter corpus, servi facti huius cure;
et exinde impedimentum vacacionis agimus philosophiam circa propter cuncta hec.
Novissimum autem omnium quoniam, si que nobis eciam vacacio fiat ab eo, et convertamur ad considerandum quid,
in questionibus iterum undique illapsum tumultum prestat et turbacionem et stupefacit,
ut non possimus sub eo perspicere veritatem.
Impedimenta enim pe(43)ne innumerabilia corpus praebet propter necessariam eius alimoniam.
Praeterea mor(44)bi nobis hinc incidentes investigationem veritatis impediunt:
amoribus, cupiditatibus, (45) timoribus, multiplicibusque imaginibus, multis denique nugis nos implet,
ut verissime di(46)catur nihil pensi unquam ac veri nobis afferre.
Nam ad bella, ad seditiones, ad pugnas (47) nihil aliud quam corpus multiplex eiusque cupiditas impellit.
Omnia enim pecuniarum (48) gratia fiunt.
Pecunias autem quaerere cogimur corporis gratia usui eius inservientes,
atque (49) ita fit ut propter haec omnia a philosophiae studiis abstrahamur.
Extremum vero omnium (50) est, quod siquid ab ipso otii nobis contingat, nosque ad considerandum aliquid conferamus,
(51) investigantibus nobis rursus ubique sese opponens tumultu quodam perturbat animum (52) et quasi percutiens reddit attonitum,
adeo ut hoc obstaculo impediti verum perspicere (53) nequeamus.
For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food;
and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after true being:
it fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless foolery,
and in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at all.
Whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body?
wars are occasioned by the love of money,
and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body;
and by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy;
and, last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some speculation,
the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion in our enquiries,
and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the truth.
ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, (66e) ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα·
καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν·
τότε (67a) γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ᾽ οὔ.
καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι,
ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως,
ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς·
καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης,
ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι᾽ ἡμῶν (67b) αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές·
μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ”.
τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.
ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως;
Sed procul dubio nobis demonstratum est quoniam, si debemus umquam pure quid scire, e recedendum ab eo et ipsa anima considerandum ipsas res;
et tandem, ceu videtur, nobis erit quod concupiscimus equidem, et dicimus amatores esse prudencie quando defuncti erimus, velut sermo significat, superstitibus vero minime.
Si enim non possibile quoque cum corpore quicquam elimate cognoscere, duum alterum, seu numquam est adipisci scienciam seu qui expirarunt;
tunc enim ipsa secundum ipsam erit anima extra corpus, prius vero minime.
Et in quo utique vitales auras carpserimus, ita, ut videtur, proxime erimus sciencie,
si quam maxime nichil confederemur corpori neque communicemus, quantum non omnis necessitas, neque refarciamur ipsius natura,
sed emundemur ab eo, quousque deus ipse absolverit nos.
Et sic utique sinceri sequestrati a corporis stoliditate,
ut competens, cum talibus nempe erimus atque cognoscemus per nos ipsos universitatem sinceram; hoc autem est fortassis verum;
non mundo enim mundum contingere fas est.'
Huiusmodi reor, O Simmia, necesse esse ad invicem dicereque et opinari cunctos qui recte amplectuntur disciplinam;
vel non videtur tibi siccine?”
Ceterum nobis revera demonstratum est, siquando optamus pure aliquid in(54)telligere, recedere a corpore oportere atque ipso animo res ipsas considerare.
Atque tunc, ut (496,1) apparet, compotes evademus eius quod affectamus, cuiusve amatores profitemur nos (2) esse scilicet sapientiae, cum videlicet mortui fuerimus, quemadmodum significat ratio, (3) dum autem vivemus, nequaquam.
Nempe si nihil cum corpore pure discerni potest, e (4) duobus autem alterum: aut nullo modo possumus scientiam consequi, aut post mortem.
Tunc (5) enim animus ipse per seipsum erit seorsum a corpore, prius vero nequaquam.
Atque (6) dum vivimus, ita ut videtur, proxime ad scientiam accedemus,
si quamminimum cum (7) corpore commercium habuerimus neque quicquam cum illo communi caverimus,(8) nisi quantum summa cogat necessitas, neque huius natura replebimur,
sed ab eius conta(9)gione cavebimus, quoad deus ipse nos solvat.
Atque ita puri et a corporis insania libera(10)ti,
ut consentaneum est, cum talibus erimus cognoscemusque per nos ipsos syncerum quod(11)libet, id est forsitan ipsum verum.
Nam impuro quidem purum attingere nefas est.'
Ta(12)lia equidem, o Simmia, iudico necessarium esse omnes discendi cupidos loqui invicem atque (13) opinari.
An non tibi videtur?"
It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body--the soul in herself must behold things in themselves:
and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, not while we live, but after death;
for if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things follows--either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death.
For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the body and exist in herself alone.
In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge
when we have the least possible intercourse or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature,
but keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us.
And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body
we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth.’
For the impure are not permitted to approach the pure.
These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking.
You would agree; would you not?
οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἥ γε (67c) ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἡγεῖταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην.
“Num ergo” inquit Socrates “si hoc vera, O dilecte, plurima spes abeunti quo ego vado sufficienter ibi, sicubi alibi, consequi istud ob quod nobis multa negociositas in preterita vita facta est; quas ob res peregrinacio que nunc michi preordinata cum optima spe fit, et alii viro qui existimat sibi instrui mentem tamquam mundificatam.”
"Si (14) haec igitur vera sunt, o amice, magna spes est eunti illuc quo nunc ego proficiscor, (15) sicubi et ibi sufficienter eius rei se compotem fieri, cuius gratia tantum nos negocium (16) in superiori vita suscepimus. Hanc ergo migrationem praesentia mihi iniunctam bona (17) spe suscipio, similiterque quivis alius qui modo putavit praeparatam sibi mentem tanquam (18) purificatam."
But, O my friend, if this is true, there is great reason to hope that, going whither I go, when I have come to the end of my journey, I shall attain that which has been the pursuit of my life. And therefore I go on my way rejoicing, and not I only, but every other man who believes that his mind has been made ready and that he is in a manner purified.
κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ (67d) ἔπειτα μόνην καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος;
SOCRATES. “Mundificacio esse igitur numquid non hoc contingit, quod dudum in sermone dicitur, separare quam maxime a corpore animam et assuefacere ipsam secundum se ipsam ab undique ex corpore colligique et coartari, et habitare iuxta quod possibile et in nunc presenti et in deinceps solam secundum se ipsam, absolutam tamquam vinculis a corpore?”
"Purificatio vero", inquit, "nonne in hoc con(19)stitit, quod iamdudum dicebamus, videlicet ut quammaxime possumus seiungamus a cor(20)pore animum? hoc est, et in praesenti tempore et in futuro a corpore tanquam a vinculis (21) resolutum."
And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself from all sides out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;--the release of the soul from the chains of the body?
λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς,
καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· ἢ οὔ;
SOCRATES. “Solvere vero ipsam, ut dicimus, affectant semper precipue et soli philosophantes rede,
et meditacio ipsum hoc est philosophorum, solucio et separacio anime a corpore; necne?”
"Solvere vero ipsum quemadmodum confitemur, (23) omni tempore maxime ac soli student qui recte philosophantur.
Atque haec ipsa philo(24)sophorum meditatio est animum a corpore solvere atque separare. Nonne ita?"
And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the soul.
Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?
οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα (67e) παρασκευάζονθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κἄπειθ᾽ ἥκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν; γελοῖον·
SOCRATES. “Non igitur, quod in principio dicebam, ridiculum profecto erit virum preparantem se ipsum in vita, scilicet cum proximus sit. morti ita vivere, et deinceps adveniente ipsi eam moleste ferre? Nonne ridiculum?”
"Quamobrem, ut in principio dicebam, ridiculum foret si vir (26) qui se in vita sic comparavit, ut quamproxime ad mortem accederet, ea deinde adveniente (27) perturbaretur. Nonne ridiculum?"
And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet repining when it comes upon them.
τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνῄσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν.
ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει.
εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληνται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγνομένου εἰ φοβοῖντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη,
εἰ μὴ (68a) ἅσμενοι ἐκεῖσε ἴοιεν, οἷ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπίς ἐστιν οὗ διὰ βίου ἤρων τυχεῖν--ἤρων δὲ φρονήσεως--ᾧ τε διεβέβληντο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς;
ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ὑέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἑκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς Ἅιδου μετελθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαί τε ἐκεῖ ὧν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι·
φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ (68b) ἀξίως λόγου ἢ ἐν Ἅιδου, ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθνῄσκων καὶ οὐχ ἅσμενος εἶσιν αὐτόσε;
οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ᾖ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, φιλόσοφος·
σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐκεῖ.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος;
SOCRATES. “Revera igitur, O Simmia,” infit “recte philosophantes defungi student, et defundum ire incassum ipsis hominum terribile.
Ex hiis autem considera:
si enim accusent quoque undique corpus, ipsam vero secundum se ipsam affectant animam habere, hoc autem facto si formident et indigne ferant, nonne plurima fatuitas erit,
si non gratulabundi illuc eamus, guo abeuntibus spes extat illius quod per vitam desiderabant consequi - desiderabant sane prudenciam,- cui derogabant ab ipso sequesttari coexistente ipsis?
Vel humanis quoque pueris et filiis et uxoribus obeuntibus multi certe sponte voluerunt in Avernum venire ab hac ducti spe que est videre quid ibi que optabant et cohabitare.
Prudenciam igitur quis vere amplectens, et sumens plurimum ipsam hanc spem nusquam alibi adipisci hanc digne sermone quam apud inferos, indignabitur utique moriens et non letabundus ibit illuc?
Existimari sane decet, si revera fuerit, o dilecte, philosophus.
Certissime quippe ipsi hec videhuntur, neutiquam alibi pure consequi prudenciam nisi ibi.
Sin autem hoc ita se habet, quod modo dicebam, nonne plurima temeritas erit si metuat mortem qui talis?”
"Revera igitur", inquit, "re(28)cte philosophantes mortem commentantur atque ab ea minime omnium perterrentur.
(29) Ita vera considera.
Cum enim corpus quidem ubique aspernentur, animum vero ipsum (30) cupiant secundum seipsum habere, nonne summa esset absurditas, si tunc quando id e(31)venit expavescant molesteque serant,
neque libenter illuc proficiscantur, quo cum perve(32)nerint spes est eo quidem quod amabant in vita potiri, amabant autem sapientiam, eo (33) autem cuius commercium moleste ferebant liberari?
An vero amatis et mulieribus (34) et filijs defunctis multi iam sponte voluerunt ad inferos proficisci, sperantes eos ibi vi(35)sere cum eisque versari quos amaverant.
Sapientiae autem verus amator vehementer in (36) hanc ipsam spem adductus non aliter eam pro dignitate ulla se comparaturum quam si (37) moriatur, imminentem mortem aegre feret ac non libenter hinc illuc emigrabit?
Arbi(38)trari quidem, o amice, oportet, si vere philosophus sit,
magnopere apud ipsum hanc opi(39)nionem valere, ut non alibi puram sapientiam posse assequi speret quam in futura post (40) mortem vita.
Si autem hoc ita se habet, nonne quemadmodum modo dicebam, praeter (41) rationem foret omnino si mortem vir eiusmodi formidaret?"
And the true philosophers, Simmias, are always occupied in the practice of dying, wherefore also to them least of all men is death terrible.
Look at the matter thus:
--if they have been in every way the enemies of the body, and are wanting to be alone with the soul, when this desire of theirs is granted, how inconsistent would they be if they trembled and repined,
instead of rejoicing at their departure to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they desired--and this was wisdom--and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy.
Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them.
And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy?
Surely he will, O my friend, if he be a true philosopher.
For he will have a firm conviction that there and there only, he can find wisdom in her purity.
And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were afraid of death.
οὐκοῦν ἱκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τοῦτο ἀνδρός, ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ᾽ (68c) ἦν φιλόσοφος ἀλλά τις φιλοσώματος;
ὁ αὐτὸς δέ που οὗτος τυγχάνει ὢν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἕτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα.
SOCRATES. “Numquid non igitur sufficiens tibi argumentum” inquit “hoc viri, quem si videris graviter ferre cum debeat mori, quoniam nullo modo erat philosophus, sed quidam philosomatos?
Ipse quoque hic existit et philochrimatos atgue philotimos, sive alterum horum sive utrumque.”
"Sufficiens ergo coniectura erit," inquit, "siquem videris moleste (43) mortem ferre, eum non esse philosophum, sed φιλοσώματον quendam, id est, corporis a(44)matorem,
atque eundem ferme φιλοχρήματον et φιλότιμον, id est pecuniarum honorumque cu(45)pidum, ac talem ut alterum horum affectet aut utrunque."
And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body,
and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power, or both?
ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὀνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει;
SOCRATES. “Ergo igitur” infit, “O Simmia, nonne que nominatur fortitudo sic dispositis maxime congruit?”
(46) "Proinde quae, o Simmia, fortitudo nominatur, an non viris eiusmodi maxime (47) convenit?"
And is not courage, Simmias, a quality which is specially characteristic of the philosopher?
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἣν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀνομάζουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἆρ᾽ οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλιγωροῦσίν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν;
SOCRATES. “Nonne et ea quam multi nominant sobrietatem, scilicet circa concupiscencias non obstupescere sed parvipendenter habere et ornate, igitur nonne hiis solis competit maxime corpus flocci pendentibus atque in philosophia degentibus?”
"Nonne et temperantia, cuius plerique aiunt officium esse nequaquam (48) prosternere se libidinibus, sed parvipendere illas modestiamque servare, his duntaxat con(49)venit qui corpus despiciunt maxime atque in philosophia vivunt?"
There is temperance again, which even by the vulgar is supposed to consist in the control and regulation of the passions, and in the sense of superiority to them--is not temperance a virtue belonging to those only who despise the body, and who pass their lives in philosophy?
τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν;
οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν·
ἀκολασίᾳ τινὶ σώφρονές εἰσιν;
καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην·
φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων κρατούμενοι.
καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν (69a) τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι,
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοις ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν.
τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ᾧ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο, τῷ τρόπον τινὰ δι᾽ ἀκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσωφρονίσθαι.
SOCRATES. Quid vero venusti eorum?
Nonne idem perpeciuntur?
Incestu quodam celibes sunt?
Eciam dicimus impossibile esse, verumptamen ipsis contingit huic similis esse passio, scilicet circa hunc fatuum celibatum;
formidantes quippe aliis voluptatibus privari et anhelantes ad illas, ab aliis abstinent tenti ab aliis;
vocant itaque incestum a voluptatibus subiugari.
Verumptamen accidit ipsis tentis a voluptatibus vincere alias voluptates.
Hoc autem simile est ei quod nunc disserebatur, modo quodam per incontinenciam ipsos continere.”
"Quid autem? Qui inter eos (2) moderati dicuntur", inquit,
"nonne simili quodam pacto affecti sunt,
intemperantia videli(3)cet quadam temperati?
Quanquam impossibile id esse dicimus, verumtamen illis evenit (4) affectio quaedam huic similis in isthac eorum fatua temperantia.
Timentes enim ne alijs (5) careant voluptatibus easque appetentes a caeteris abstinent, ab alijs superati,
etsi vocant in(6)temperantiam a voluptatibus superari.
Verumtamen accidit eis ut superati a voluptatibus (7) alias superent voluptates.
Iam vero id illi simile est quod modo dicebatur, scilicet quodam (8) modo per intemperantiam fieri temperaturos."
And are not the temperate exactly in the same case?
They are temperate because they are intemperate
--which might seem to be a contradiction,
but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance.
For there are pleasures which they are afraid of losing; and in their desire to keep them, they abstain from some pleasures, because they are overcome by others;
and although to be conquered by pleasure is called by men intemperance,
to them the conquest of pleasure consists in being conquered by pleasure.
And that is what I mean by saying that, in a sense, they are made temperate through intemperance.
ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, [καὶ] μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα,
ἀλλ᾽ ᾖ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις,
(69b) [καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντa1)] καὶ μετὰ τούτου [ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενa1)] τῷ ὄντι ᾖ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετή, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων·
χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως [καὶ] ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ᾖ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ,
τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ᾖ (69c) κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ᾖ.
καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἅιδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.
εἰσὶν γὰρ δή, [ὥς] φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, “ναρθηκοφόροι (69d) μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι”·
οὗτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς.
ὧν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατά γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προυθυμήθην γενέσθαι·
εἰ δ᾽ ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καί τι ἠνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.
ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐγώ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ (69e) χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ᾽ ἀγανακτῶ,
ἡγούμενος κἀκεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἑταίροις· [τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει]·
εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι.
SOCRATES. “O felix Simmia; numquid enim non hec recta ad virtutem, immo voluptates pro voluptatibus et molestias pro molestiis atque timorem pro timore commutari, et maiora pro minoribus velut nummismata;
ceterum si illud solum nummisma rectum, pro quo oportet universa hec commutari, prudencia;
et pro hac quidem cuncta, et cum hac emptaque et vendita revera erit et fortitudo et iusticia et sobrietas, et universaliter vera virtus, cum prudencia, et eorum que assunt et eorum que absunt, et voluptatum et formidinum et aliorum omnium huiuscemodi;
disterminata certe a prudencia et commutata pro invicem, nonne adumbrata descripcio quedam erit huiusmodi virtus, et procul ambiguo servilisque atque nichil sanum neque verum habens,
utique verum est certissime, purgacio est quedam talium omnium et sobrietas et iusticia et fortitudo, et ipsa prudencia nonne expurgacio quedam erit?
Atque nituntur eciam qui cerimonias nobis constituerunt non maligni quidam esse,
immo revera dudum enigmatizari quoniam quicumque non lustratus et inexpiatus in Avernum abierit in ceno iacebit, et expiatus atque lustratus iliuc migrans cum diis habitabit.
Sunt denim, ut aiunt qui circa cerimonias, ‘ferularum baiuli quidem multi, bachi quidem pauci';
hii autem sunt iuxta meam opinionem non alii quam philosophantes vere.
De quibus et ego utique secundum possibile nichil pretermisi in vita, immo omnifariam affectavi fieri;
si vero recte affectavi et quid emolumenti tulimus, illuc venientes evidentissime cognoscemus, si deus voluerit, paulo posterius, ut michi videtur.
Ista ergo ego” inquit, “O Simmia et Cebes, respondeo quam convenienter vos deserens et qui hiccine sunt e dominos non graviter fero neque indignor,
arbitratus eciam ibi haut minus quam hic dominisque bonis adherere atque amicis; plurimis autem incredulitatem prestat.
Si quid igitur vobis probabilior sum in responsione quam Atheniensium iudicibus, bene utique se habeat.”
"Animad(9)vertendum est, o beate Simmia," inquit, "ne haec haudquaquam recta sit ad virtutem via, vo(10)luptates videlicet voluptatibus, dolores doloribus, et metum metu, et maius minori tan(11)quam nummos commutare,
sed ille duntaxat rectus fit nummus, cuius gratia haec omnia (12) oporteat commutari atque venundari, scilicet sapientia, prudentia,
pro qua et cum qua (13) omnia empta ac vendita revera sit et fortitudo et temperantia et iustitia ac summatim (14) vera virtus, cum sapientia, sive prudentia, et accedentibus et recentibus voluptati(15)bus et timoribus caeterisque eiusdem.
Sinautem a sapientia segregata invicem (16) commutatur, adumbratio quaedam sit eiusmodi virtus ac revera servilis, nihil sani verique (17) possidens,
virtutis autem veritas in horum omnium purificatione revera consistat, et tem(18)perantia et iustitia et fortitudo et sapientia ipsa sit purificatio quaedam.
Quamobrem (19) hi qui mysteria nobis constituerunt, minime contemnendi videntur,
sed revera iamdudum (20) occulte nos admonere, quicunque non expiatus neque initiatus migrabit ad inferos eum ia(21)cere in luto, quicunque vero purgatus atque initiatus illuc accesserit, cum dijs habitare.
Sunt (22) enim quemadmodum dicunt, 'thyrsigeri quidem multi, Bacchi vero pauci.'
Hi vero, ut (23) equidem opinor, non alij sunt quam qui recte philosophati sunt.
Quorum quidem in num(24)mero esse me neque inferiorem quidem omni studio pro viribus conatus sum.
An vero re(25)cte contenderim aliquidque profecerim, cum illuc pervenerimus, certe sciemus si deus vo(26)luerit paulo post, ut mihi videtur.
Haec igitur mea excusatio est, o Simmia et o Cebes, quam (27) videlicet ob causam cum vos eosque qui hic sunt dominos relinquam, merito non aegre fe(28)ram neque perturber.
Spero enim me et illic non minus quam hic bonos dominos amicosque (29) inventurum. Multi vero id minime credunt.
Si igitur defensio mea vobis magis quam (30) Atheniensibus iudicibus persuasit, bene res se habet."
Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is not the exchange of virtue.
O my blessed Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all things ought to be exchanged?--and that is wisdom;
and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her?
But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her;
but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them.
The founders of the mysteries would appear to have had a real meaning,
and were not talking nonsense when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods.
For ‘many,’ as they say in the mysteries, ‘are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,'
--meaning, as I interpret the words, ‘the true philosophers.’
In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place;
--whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world
--such is my belief. And therefore I maintain that I am right, Simmias and Cebes, in not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world,
for I believe that I shall equally find good masters and friends in another world. But most men do not believe this saying;
if then I succeed in convincing you by my defence better than I did the Athenian judges, it will be well.
