ἐγὼ ἐρῶ, ἔφη.
γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς (82e) ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην,
ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὥσπερ διὰ εἱργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι᾽ αὑτῆς,
καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην,
καὶ τοῦ εἱργμοῦ τὴν δεινότητα κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν,
ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ (83a) εἴη τοῦ δεδέσθαι, --ὅπερ οὖν λέγω,
γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὕτω παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ,
ἐνδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστὴ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὤτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων,
πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι,
αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὑτὴν συλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἀλλ᾽ (83b) ἢ αὐτὴν αὑτῇ, ὅτι ἂν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τῶν ὄντων·
ὅτι δ᾽ ἂν δι᾽ ἄλλων σκοπῇ ἐν ἄλλοις ὂν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ἀληθές·
εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ὁρατόν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὁρᾷ νοητόν τε καὶ ἀιδές.
ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν [καὶ φόβων] καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται,
λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδάν τις σφόδρα ἡσθῇ ἢ φοβηθῇ [ἢ λυπηθῇ] ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ᾽ (83c) αὐτῶν ὧν ἄν τις οἰηθείη,
οἷον ἢ νοσήσας ἤ τι ἀναλώσας διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας,
ἀλλ᾽ ὃ πάντων μέγιστόν τε κακῶν καὶ ἔσχατόν ἐστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό.
“Ego dicam” ait.
“Cognoscunt siquidem” infit ille “amatores scienciarum quoniam assumens ipsorum animam philosophia mirabiliter ut iunctam corpori atque conglutinatam,
compulsam vera quasi per incarceracionem per hoc speculari que sunt et non ipsam per se ipsam,
et in omni impericia convolutam,
et carceris molestiam perspiciens quoniam per concupiscenciam extat,
utcumque precipue ipse vinctus adiutor fuerit ad vinciendum, - quod autem dico,
cognoscunt disciplinarum amatores quoniam ita assumens philosophia se habentem ipsorumanimam tranquille consolatur et solvere articulatur,
declarans quia fallacia quidem plena per oculos examinacio, fallacia vero per aures et alios sensus,
persuadens ex hiis discedere quantum non necesse ipsis frui,
ipsamque in se ipsam colligi atque coherceri precipiens, credereque nulli alii nisi se sibi, quoniam utique intelligat ipsa secundum se ipsam ipsum secundum se ipsum quod est:
aliquando vero per alia considcraverit in aliis existens, aliud nichil autumare verum;
esse profecto quod tale est sensibileque et visibile, quod autem ipsa videt intelligibileque et invisibile.
Huic tamen solucioni haut dignum ducens oportere contraire quam vere philosophi anima hactenus abstinet a voluptatibus et tristiciis et concupiscenciis atque timoribus quantum valet,
cogitans quoniam, ex quo plurimum exultet aut tristetur vel metuat sive concupiscat, nullum eatenus malum tolleravit eorum que quidem quis existimaverit,
quemadmodum egrotans seu in aliquo consumptus propter concupiscencias,
immo quod cunctorum maximum malorum et ultimum, hoc perpetitur et non mente discutit ipsum.”
“Dicam equidem.
Cognoscunt profecto viri scientiae cupidi, quem(7)admodum eorum animam suscipit revera ligatam in corpore atque implicatam,
ac per (8) ipsum quasi per carcerem quendam res considerare coactant, cumque per seipsam id non (9) faciat,
omni prorsus inscita involutam.
Cognoscunt praeterea, quemadmodum phil(10)losophia perspiciens quam callide corporeum vinculum astringat animam, quippe (11) cum per ipsam fiat concupiscentiam,
per quam devinctus animus adiuror sit ad seip(12)sum devinciendum.
Cognoscunt, inquam, viri scientiae cupidi, quemadmodum philoso(13)sophia eorum animam ita constitutam suscipiens paulatim instruit solvereque aggreditur,
(14) ostendens quam fallax oculorum, quam fallax aurium, caeterumque sensuum sit iudi(15)cium,
suadens ab his discedere, quatenus haerere illis summa non cogat necessitas,
seque (16) in seipsam revocare atque colligere, nec ulli credere praeterquam sibi, quatenus videlicet (17) ipsa per seipsam intelligat quodlibet eorum quae sunt,
existens per seipsum. Quod ve(18)ro ipsa per alia consideret existens in alijs, nihil existimare verum,
esse vero eiusmo(19)di quidem sensibile atque visibile, quod autem ipsa per se consideret, intelligibile atque in(20)visibile.
Huic ergo solutioni veri philosophi animus repugnandum non esse iudicans, (21) sic a voluptatibus, cupiditatibus, doloribus, timoribus, pro viribus abstinet,
iudicans (22) quando quis vehementer delectetur vel metuat vel doleat aut cupiat, haud tantum ab (23) his duntaxat pati malum, quantum quis forsan existimarit,
videlicet si propter concu(24)piscentias vel aegrotet quispiam, vel pecunias consumpserit,
sed quod malorum omnium (25) maximum, extremum, turpissimum est, perpeti neque tamen illud animadvertere.”
I will tell you, he said.
The lovers of knowledge are conscious that the soul was simply fastened and glued to the body
--until philosophy received her, she could only view real existence through the bars of a prison, not in and through herself;
she was wallowing in the mire of every sort of ignorance;
and by reason of lust had become the principal accomplice in her own captivity.
This was her original state; and then, as I was saying,
and as the lovers of knowledge are well aware, philosophy, seeing how terrible was her confinement, of which she was to herself the cause, received and gently comforted her and sought to release her,
pointing out that the eye and the ear and the other senses are full of deception,
and persuading her to retire from them, and abstain from all but the necessary use of them,
and be gathered up and collected into herself, bidding her trust in herself and her own pure apprehension of pure existence,
and to mistrust whatever comes to her through other channels and is subject to variation;
for such things are visible and tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is intelligible and invisible.
And the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able;
reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not merely the sort of evil which might be anticipated
--as for example, the loss of his health or property which he has sacrificed to his lusts--
but an evil greater far, which is the greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.