Bibliotheca Polyglotta

Plato: Meno

Complete text

Ἄνυτος
ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥᾳδίως μοι δοκεῖς κακῶς λέγειν ἀνθρώπους. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἄν σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι: ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει ῥᾷόν ἐστιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ εὖ, ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ (95a) πάνυ: οἶμαι δὲ σὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι.

ANITUS. O Socrates, ex levi michi videris vituperare homines. Ego veto tibi consulerem, si velis michi acquiescere, vereri; quia forsan et in alia civitate facilius est malefacere horuinibus quam bene, in ista sane etiam plurimum, reorque te ipsum cognoscere.

ANY. O Socrates liberius atque decet, homines mihi vituperare videris. Itaque tibi consulo si modo parere vis, ut tibi caveas; forte eni alia in urbe leve est, vel iniuria, vel beneficio cives afficere, in hac autem grave nimium ac periculosum, neque id te fugere arbitror.

ANYTUS: Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men: and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful. Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that you know.

Σωκράτης
ὦ Μένων, Ἄνυτος μέν μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμάζω: οἴεται γάρ με πρῶτον μὲν κακηγορεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἔπειτα ἡγεῖται καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι εἷς τούτων. ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν ἐάν ποτε γνῷ οἷόν ἐστιν τὸ κακῶς λέγειν, παύσεται χαλεπαίνων, νῦν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ: σὺ δέ μοι εἰπέ, οὐ καὶ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν εἰσιν καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες;

SOCRATES. O Menon, Anitus nempe michi videtur irasci, et non admiror: putat namque me primo utique convitiare hos viros, dehinc arbitratur et ipse esse unus istorum. Verum hic utique, si quando noscet quale sit contumeliare, desineret irasci; nunc autem ignorat. Tu autem michi dic, nonne apud nos sunt honesti et boni viri?

SO. O Meno Anytus hic succensere mihi videtur, neque id miror. primum quia hos me viros vituperare censet, deinde se unum ex iis arbitrantur. Verum hic si quando didicerit quid sit hominibus detrahere, haud ulterius succensebit, in åræsentia vero ignorat. At ipse mihi dicas utrum apud nos clari, ac boni viri sint?

SOCRATES: O Meno, think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be in a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these gentlemen; and in the second place, he is of opinion that he is one of them himself. But some day he will know what is the meaning of defamation, and if he ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Penitus.

ME. Sunt certe.

MENO: Certainly there are.

(95b) Σωκράτης
τί οὖν; ἐθέλουσιν οὗτοι παρέχειν αὑτοὺς διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν διδάσκαλοί τε εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετήν;

SOCRATES. Quid igitur? Volunt isti exhibere ipsos magistros iuvenibus atque fateri doctores quidem esse, si docibile virtus?

SO. Volunt ne isti iuvenibus seipsos præceptores exponere? atque id profiteri? vel virtutem doceri posse fatentur?

SOCRATES: And are they willing to teach the young? and do they profess to be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught?

Μένων
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἂν αὐτῶν ἀκούσαις ὡς διδακτόν, τοτὲ δὲ ὡς οὔ.

MENON. Minime per Iovem, o Socrates, immo tunc equidem ab ipsis audies quia docibile, tunc veto nequaquam.

ME. Non per Iovem o Socrates, sed nunc ab illis doceri posse virtutem, nunc non posse audies.

MENO: No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; you may hear them saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the reverse.

Σωκράτης
φῶμεν οὖν τούτους διδασκάλους εἶναι τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οἷς μηδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται;

SOCRATES. Dicemus igitur istos doctores esse huius rei, quibus neque ipsum hoc confitendo promittitur?

SO. An hos dicimus huius rei magistros, inter quos nondum id convenit?

SOCRATES: Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation?

Μένων
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

MENON. Non michi videtur, o Socrates.

ME. Ne quaquam mihi videtur o Socrates.

MENO: I think not, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
τί δὲ δή; οἱ σοφισταί σοι οὗτοι, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται, δοκοῦσι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι ἀρετῆς;

SOCRATES. Quid autem? Sophiste tibi isti, qui soli spondent, videntur doctores esse virtutis?

SO. Quid vero, num sophistas, siquidem ii foli id prędicant, magistros virtutis existimas?

SOCRATES: And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?

(95c) Μένων
καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα ἄγαμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ἀκούσαις ὑπισχνουμένου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελᾷ, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων: ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς.

MENON. Et de Gorgia precipue, o Socrates, hoc admiror, quod nunquam ab ipso hoc audies pollicente, sed alios ridet, quotiens audiat promittentes. Atqui dicere putat oportere facere versutos.

ME. Gorgiam in hoc vehementer admiror et amo, quenunquam illum hoc pollicentem audias. Imo et alios ridet, quoties polliceri sentit; putat autem hoc duntaxat promittendum esse, eloquentes posse scilicet vehementesque dicendo homines reddi.

MENO: I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; but he thinks that men should be taught to speak.

Σωκράτης
οὐδ᾽ ἄρα σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ διδάσκαλοι εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Non itaque tibi videntur sophiste magistri esse?

SO. Non ergo sophistæ huius rei præceptores esse tibi videntur.

SOCRATES: Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πέπονθα: τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκοῦσιν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ.

MENON. Non habeo dicere, o Socrates. Etenim ipse quod non pauci passus sum: tunc equidem michi videntur, tunc vero minime.

ME. Ne scio quid dicam o Socrates. Nam mihi quoque idem quod plurimus accidit; nunc posse puto, nunc posse nego.

MENO: I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not.

Σωκράτης
οἶσθα δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοί τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς πολιτικοῖς τοῦτο δοκεῖ τοτὲ μὲν εἶναι διδακτόν, τοτὲ δ᾽ οὔ, (95d) ἀλλὰ καὶ Θέογνιν τὸν ποιητὴν οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγει;

At et Theognem poetam nosti, quoniam ipsa hec dicit?

SO. Nec soli tibi, cæterisque civibus evenit, ut interdum doceri virtutem credatis, interdum vero negetis, verum etiam poetæ Thognidi, eadem enim omnino dicit.

SOCRATES: And are you aware that not you only and other politicians have doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet says the very same thing?

Μένων
ἐν ποίοις ἔπεσιν;

SOCRATES. In quibus carminibus?

ME. Cuibusnam carminibus?

MENO: Where does he say so?

Σωκράτης
ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις, οὗ λέγει—

“καὶ παρὰ τοῖσιν πῖνε καὶ ἔσθιε,
καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν ἵζε, καὶ ἅνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.
ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ᾽ ἐσθλὰ διδάξεαι:
ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν (95e) συμμίσγῃς,
ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.” (Theognis 33-36 Bergk)

MENON. In elegiis, ubi dicit:

‘Et penes hos bibe ac comede, et cum istis
sede, atque operate hiis, quorum magna virtus.
A bonis quippe bona doceberis; si vero malls
e commiscearis, perdes et inherentem intellectum.’

Scis quoniam in hiis nempe quasi docibili existente virtute dicit?

SO. Elegis in hunc modum. Hos prope bibe et comede, cum iis una fedeto, iis obsequere, quorum magna potestas. a bonis enim bona perdisces. Quod si malis adhæseris, quam habes mentem proculdubio perdes. Vides iam quod in iis ata loquitur, quasi virtus disci possit?

SOCRATES: In these elegiac verses (Theog.):
‘Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.’
Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?

Μένων
φαίνεταί γε.

SOCRATES. Claret utique.

ME. Apparet.

MENO: Clearly.

Σωκράτης
ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,—

“εἰ δ᾽ ἦν ποιητόν, φησί, καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,”
λέγει πως ὅτι—
“πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον”

MENON. Et in aliis profecto paulum transiens.

‘Si vero esset factibilis’, in quit, ‘et imponi aptus viro intellectus’,
dicit quocumque modo quoniam
‘multa preruia et magna ferrent’

SO. At vero paulo post sic inquit. Si fana mens homini tradi posset, multam sane magnamque mercedem qui id efficerent reportarent,

SOCRATES: But in some other verses he shifts about and says (Theog.): ‘If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they’ (who were able to perform this feat) ‘would have obtained great rewards.’

“οὔ ποτ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,
(96a) πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν. ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
οὔ ποτε ποιήσεις τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ᾽ ἀγαθόν.” (Theognis 434-438 Bergk)

queuntes hoc efficere, et

‘non unquam ex bono patre genitus est malus,
credens fabulis sobriis. Verum docens
numquam facies malignum virum bonum.’

Perpendis quoniam ipse sibi iterum de eisdem contraria dicit?

neque bono ex patre filius malus esset prudentibus monitis imbutus; verum docendo nunquam ex malo bonum hominem facies. Cernis hunc circa eadem contraria sibiipsi statuere?

And again:--‘Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a bad man into a good one.’ And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.

Μένων
φαίνεται.

SOCRATES. Patet.

ME. Videtur.

MENO: Clearly.

Σωκράτης
ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν πράγματος, οὗ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι οὐχ ὅπως ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι ὁμολογοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλὰ πονηροὶ (96b) εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ φασι διδάσκαλοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ὁμολογούμενοι αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ τοτὲ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ διδακτὸν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ; τοὺς οὖν οὕτω τεταραγμένους περὶ ὁτουοῦν φαίης ἂν σὺ κυρίως διδασκάλους εἶναι;

MENON. Habes ergo dicere alterius cuiusque rei, cuius qui dicunt doctores esse non quomodo aliorum doctores confitentur, sed neque ipsi scire, verum mali esse circa ipsam hanc rem cui us dicunt doctores esse; neque confessi ipsi honesti et boni, nunc equidem aiunt ipsum docibile esse, nunc autem minime?

SOCRATES. Igitur sic attonitos super quolibet, dicas utique tu proprie doctores esse?

SO. Potes igitur indicare mihi rem, quancunque tandem, cuius qui se doctores scribunt, haud aliarum tamen doctores esse, aut eam rem tenere, sed prauos nullosque in eo cuius professores sunt, esse se fateantur; aut si se fateantur esse aliquos, rem tamen eam percipi posse, nunc quidem affirment, nunc negent; an tu, qui qua cunque in re ita ancipites sunt, eius rei doctores recte voces?

SOCRATES: And is there anything else of which the professors are affirmed not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they are professing to teach? or is there anything about which even the acknowledged ‘gentlemen’ are sometimes saying that ‘this thing can be taught,’ and sometimes the opposite? Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in such confusion?

Μένων
μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

MENON. Per Iovem non ego.

ME. Minime.

MENO: I should say, certainly not.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ μήτε οἱ σοφισταὶ μήτε οἱ αὐτοὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ὄντες διδάσκαλοί εἰσι τοῦ πράγματος, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοι γε;

SOCRATES. Igitur si neque sophiste, neque ipsi honesti ac boni cum sint, doctores sunt rei, liquet quoniam non alii?

SO. Ergo si neque sophistæ, neque boni clarique viri huius rei doctores sunt, multo minus cæteri erunt.

SOCRATES: But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers?

Μένων
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

MENON. Minime michi videtur.

ME. Certe.

MENO: No.

(96c) Σωκράτης
εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;

SOCRATES. Si minus doctores, neque discipuli?

SO. Si non sun preceptors, neque disciple etiam.

SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?

Μένων
δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν ὡς λέγεις.

MENON. Videtur michi sic se habere quemadmodum dicis.

ME. Sic ut ais mihi videtur.

MENO: Agreed.

Σωκράτης
ὡμολογήκαμεν δέ γε, πράγματος οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Confessi sumus quoque rei cuius neque magistri neque discipuli fuerint, hoc neque docibile esse.

SO. An non confessi sumus, illud cuius nec magistri neque discipuli sunt, doceri minime posse?

SOCRATES: And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples?

Μένων
ὡμολογήκαμεν.

Fassi sumus.

ME. Confessi sumus.

MENO: We have.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἀρετῆς οὐδαμοῦ φαίνονται διδάσκαλοι;

Igitur virtutis nullatenus apparent magistri?

SO. Et virtutis nusquam præceptores reperiuntur?

SOCRATES: And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα.

MENON. Sunt ista.

ME. Nusquam.

MENO: There are not.

Σωκράτης
εἰ δέ γε μὴ διδάσκαλοι, οὐδὲ μαθηταί;

SOCRATES. Sin autem doctores, neque discipuli?

SO. Si non præceptores neque discipuli etiam.

SOCRATES: And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?

Μένων
φαίνεται οὕτως.

MENON. Clarum.

ME. Sic apparet.

MENO: That, I think, is true.

Σωκράτης
ἀρετὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη διδακτόν;

SOCRATES. Virtus non itaque erit docibile?

SO. Virtus ergo doceri nequit.

SOCRATES: Then virtue cannot be taught?

(96d) Μένων
οὐκ ἔοικεν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκέμμεθα. ὥστε καὶ θαυμάζω δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν ποτε οὐδ᾽ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, ἢ τίς ἂν εἴη τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν ἀγαθῶν γιγνομένων.

MENON. Non videtur, si recte nos examinavimus. Unde et miror equidem, o Socrates, utrum unquam neque sint boni viri, vel quis utique erit modus notitie bonorum factotum.

ME. Sic videtur, si quidem nos recte diiudicavimus. Quam ob rem vehementer admiror o Socrates bonos ullos inter homines reperiri, et quæ sit ration qua boni fiunt, ambigo.

MENO: Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into existence?

Σωκράτης
κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ Μένων, ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι ἄνδρες, καὶ σέ τε Γοργίας οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευκέναι καὶ ἐμὲ Πρόδικος. παντὸς μᾶλλον οὖν προσεκτέον τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ζητητέον ὅστις ἡμᾶς ἑνί γέ τῳ τρόπῳ βελτίους (96e) ποιήσει: λέγω δὲ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν ἄρτι ζήτησιν, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἔλαθεν καταγελάστως ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης ἡγουμένης ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πράττεται τὰ πράγματα, ᾗ ἴσως καὶ διαφεύγει ἡμᾶς τὸ γνῶναι τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες.

SOCRATES. Articulamur, o Menon, egoque et tu nequam quidam esse viri, et te quoque Gorgias minus sufficienter erudiisse atque me Prodicus. Universo magis igitur applicandum est animum nobis ipsis et indagandum, qui nos uno modo potiores fecerit. Aio sane ista respiciens ad presentem questionem, quoniam nos latuit ridicule, quia non solum scientia ducent recteque et bene hominibus fiunt (res), aut fortassis etiam subterfugisse nos agnoscere, quo unquam modo fiant boni viri.

SO. Videmur o Meno ego simul et tu mali esse. videtur Gorgias quoque te, ac me Prodicus haud satis erudisse. Itaque maxime omnium revocanda nobis mens est nostra, quærendusque aliquis qui hoc uno modo meliores nos efficiat. Hæc autem dico ad superiorem inquisitionem respiciens. Num isthuc perridicule a nobis præteritum est, quod non solum scientia duce, recte negotia hominibus procedunt, quod quidem nisi concedatur, esse scilicet præter illam aliud quiddam, fortasse nualla extet ratio, qua viri boni fiant.

SOCRATES: I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge (episteme); --and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can be any good men at all.

Μένων
πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

MENON. Quid dicis istud, o Socrates?

ME. Quo pacto id (26) ais o Socrates.

MENO: How do you mean, Socrates?

Σωκράτης
ὧδε: ὅτι μὲν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας δεῖ ὠφελίμους εἶναι, (97a) ὀρθῶς ὡμολογήκαμεν τοῦτό γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι: ἦ γάρ;

SOCRATES. Ita: quia bonos viros decet commodos esse, recte fassi sum us hoc quoque; quoniam non aliter se ha beat, vel enim?

SO. Sic quod quidem bonos viros utiles esse oporteat, probe confessi sumus, cum nunquam se res aliter habeat, nonne?

SOCRATES: I mean that good men are necessarily useful or profitable. Were we not right in admitting this? It must be so.

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ne.

ME. Ita.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
καὶ ὅτι γε ὠφέλιμοι ἔσονται, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡμῖν ἡγῶνται τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τοῦτό που καλῶς ὡμολογοῦμεν;

SOCRATES. Et quoniam commodi erunt, si recte nobis digerant res; et hoc bene fatemur?

SO. Et quod utiles futuri sint, si recte agendis rebus præsint etiam probe inter nos convenit.

SOCRATES: And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action--there we were also right?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Etiam.

ME. Probe.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ φρόνιμος ᾖ, τοῦτο ὅμοιοί ἐσμεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὡμολογηκόσιν.

SOCRATES. Quod vero non sit recte duci, nisi prudens fuerit; hoc similes sumus non recte fassis.

SO. Quod vero nullus recte præesse possit, nisi sit prudens, haud satis recte ab utroque asseveratum esse constat.

SOCRATES: But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong.

Μένων
πῶς δὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις;

MENON. Qui vero recte dicis?

ME. Quomodo recte dicis?

MENO: What do you mean by the word ‘right’?

Σωκράτης
ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. εἰ εἰδὼς τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν εἰς Λάρισαν ἢ ὅποι βούλει ἄλλοσε βαδίζοι καὶ ἄλλοις ἡγοῖτο, ἄλλο τι ὀρθῶς ἂν καὶ εὖ ἡγοῖτο;

SOCRATES. Ego dico. Qt!is sciens viam in Larissam, sive quo velis aliorsum vadere - et alius opinetur aliud quid - recte utique et bene ducat?

SO. Dicam. qui iter vel Larissam, vel alio quovis novit, et eo vel ipse proficiscatur, vel alios ducat, nonne recte atque bene perduceret?

SOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Omnifariam.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Certainly.

(97b) Σωκράτης
τί δ᾽ εἴ τις ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ἐληλυθὼς δὲ μὴ μηδ᾽ ἐπιστάμενος, οὐ καὶ οὗτος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἡγοῖτο;

SOCRATES. Quid: si quis recte quidem opinans que est via - veniensque minime neque sciens - nonne et iste quoque recte ducat?

SO. Quid vero si quis recte opinatur quæ via ferat Larissam, nunquam temen profectus sit neque sciverit, nonne iste quoque recte duceret?

SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Prorsus.

ME. Valde.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
καὶ ἕως γ᾽ ἄν που ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχῃ περὶ ὧν ὁ ἕτερος ἐπιστήμην, οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν ἔσται, οἰόμενος μὲν ἀληθῆ, φρονῶν δὲ μή, τοῦ τοῦτο φρονοῦντος.

SOCRATES. Et quamdiu rectam opinionem habeat, de quibus alter scientiam, minime deterior dux erit, opinatus autem verum sentiensque minime, illo id sentiente.

SO. Et donec rectam de iisdem rebus opinionem habet, de quibus alter scientiam, dux erit nihilo deterior existimans quidem vera, sciens vero minime, quam is qui ista pernovit?

SOCRATES: And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth?

Μένων
οὐδὲν γάρ.

MENON. Minime enim.

ME. Nihilo ceret.

MENO: Exactly.

Σωκράτης
δόξα ἄρα ἀληθὴς πρὸς ὀρθότητα πράξεως οὐδὲν χείρων ἡγεμὼν φρονήσεως: καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ νυνδὴ παρελείπομεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς σκέψει ὁποῖόν τι εἴη, λέγοντες (97c) ὅτι φρόνησις μόνον ἡγεῖται τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν: τὸ δὲ ἄρα καὶ δόξα ἦν ἀληθής.

SOCRATES. Opinio igitur vera ad rectitudinem actus haud deterior dux prudentia; et hoc est quod nunc intermisimus in ea quidem que de virtute speculatione, quale quid sit; dicentes quoniam prudentia dumtaxat precedit et docet recte agere. Id igitur et opinio erat vera.

SO. Vera ergo opinio ad recte agendum nihilo minus quam prudentia valet. Atque id est quod in consideratione virtutis in superioribus prætermisimus, dum solam prudentiam recte agendi ducem affereremus. hæc autem erat opinio vera.

SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion.

Μένων
ἔοικέ γε.

MENON. Videturque.

ME. Videtur.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
οὐδὲν ἄρα ἧττον ὠφέλιμόν ἐστιν ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης.

SOCRATES. Non ergo minus commodum erit recta opinio scientia.

SO. Num igitur nihilo minus recta opinio, quam scientia confert?

SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?

Μένων
τοσούτῳ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων ἀεὶ ἂν ἐπιτυγχάνοι, ὁ δὲ τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν τοτὲ μὲν ἂν τυγχάνοι, τοτὲ δ᾽ οὔ.

MENON. Adeo sane, o Socrates, quoniam scientiam habens semper in venit, rectam profecto opinionem modo uti que attingit, modo vero minime.

ME. Hoc utique minus confert o Socrates, quod quiqunque scinetiam habet semper assequitur; qui vero rectam opinionem, interdum quidem consequitur, nonnunquam vero fallitur.

MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.

Σωκράτης
πῶς λέγεις; ὁ ἀεὶ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἀεὶ ἂν τυγχάνοι, ἕωσπερ ὀρθὰ δοξάζοι;

SOCRATES. Quid dicis? Semper habens rectam opinionem, non semper consequitur, donee recta opinetur?

SO. Quid ais? qui recta opinione incedit, nonne quamdiu opinatur recte, semper voti compos efficitur?

SOCRATES: What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?

Μένων
ἀνάγκη μοι φαίνεται: ὥστε θαυμάζω, ὦ Σώκρατες, (97d) τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος, ὅτι δή ποτε πολὺ τιμιωτέρα ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὀρθῆς δόξης, καὶ δι᾽ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕτερον, τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν.

MENON. Necesse michi videtur. Quas ob res miror, o Socrates, hoc ita se habente, quia certe multo pretiosior scientia recta opinione, et quia hoc utique alterum, illud vero alterum est ipsorum.

ME. Necessarium apparet. Quam ob rem miror, quare cum ita fit, scientia tamen longe admodum præstantior habeatur atque recta opinio; et cur utraque illarum aliud quiddam fit, dubito.

MENO: I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion--or why they should ever differ.

Σωκράτης
οἶσθα οὖν δι᾽ ὅτι θαυμάζεις, ἢ ἐγώ σοι εἴπω;

SOCRATES. Nosti igitur quare miraris, an ego tibi dicam?

SO. Nostin quam ob causam id mirereris? an ipse vis tibi dicam?

SOCRATES: And shall I explain this wonder to you?

Μένων
πάνυ γ᾽ εἰπέ.

MENON. Penitus dic.

ME. Dic prorsus.

MENO: Do tell me.

Σωκράτης
ὅτι τοῖς Δαιδάλου ἀγάλμασιν οὐ προσέσχηκας τὸν νοῦν: ἴσως δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν.

SOCRATES. Quia Dedali Statuis minime attendisti; fors autem non est penes vos.

SO. Quia Dædali statuas nunquam considerasti, forte vero neque apud vos extant.

SOCRATES: You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus (Compare Euthyphro); but perhaps you have not got them in your country?

Μένων
πρὸς τί δὲ δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

MENON. Ad quid sane hoc dicis?

ME. Quorsum hæc?

MENO: What have they to do with the question?

Σωκράτης
ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὲν μὴ δεδεμένα ᾖ, ἀποδιδράσκει καὶ δραπετεύει, ἐὰν δὲ δεδεμένα, παραμένει.

SOCRATES. Quoniam hec nisi vincta fuerinf, abfugiunt et abscedunt, si vero colligata, permanent.

SO. Quoniam hæ nisi ligentur, discedunt atque aufugiunt, ligatæ permanent.

SOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.

(97e) Μένων
τί οὖν δή;

MENON. Quid igitur?

ME. Quid tum?

MENO: Well, what of that?

Σωκράτης
τῶν ἐκείνου ποιημάτων λελυμένον μὲν ἐκτῆσθαι οὐ πολλῆς τινος ἄξιόν ἐστι τιμῆς, ὥσπερ δραπέτην ἄνθρωπον —οὐ γὰρ παραμένει—δεδεμένον δὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον: πάνυ γὰρ καλὰ τὰ ἔργα ἐστίν. πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δόξας τὰς ἀληθεῖς. καὶ γὰρ αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμένωσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα καὶ πάντ᾽ (98a) ἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται: πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς δήσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστίν, ὦ Μένων ἑταῖρε, ἀνάμνησις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δεθῶσιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι: καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης ἐστίν, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης.

SOCRATES. Eius formationum solutum possidere non multi alicuius dignum est pretia, quemadmodum transfugam hominem - haud enim permanebit - vinttum sane multo dignum. Prorsus quippe bona opera sunt. Ad quid igitur dico ista? Ad opiniones veras. Etenim opiniones vere, quanta vero tempore permanserunt, bona res et cuncta bona operantur; multo tempore nolentes permanere, at affugiunt ex anima hominis. Quare non multo digne sunt, donee quis eas vinxerit cause cogitatione. Hoc autem est, Menon dilecte, monumentum, velut in prioribus nobis concessum est. Cum vero colligentur, primum equidem scientie fiunt, deinceps manentes. Et propter hoc pretiosius scientia recta opinione.

SO. Ex eius operibus quod solutum est, haud magni fit, instar fugitivi hominis. neque enim permanet. ligatum vero admiratione dignum. pulcherrima enim opera sunt. Cuius hæc gratia dico? Verarum opinionum gratia; hæ quippe quosque stabiles perseverant, pulchra quædam opera sunt, omniaque bona perficiunt. Attamen diu consistere nolunt, sed ex hominis animo confestim aufugiunt, quapropter non multi precii sunt donec quis illas ratiotinatione a causis ducta liget. Hæc vero amice Meno reminiscentia est, ut supra inter nos convenit. Postque vero ligatæ sunt, primo quidem scientiæ fiunt, deinde perseverantes. proptereaque scientia recta opinione præstantior est, ab eaque vinculo quodam discrepat.

SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.

Μένων
νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικεν τοιούτῳ τινί.

MENON. Per Iovem, o Socrates, simile est huiusmodi cuidam.

ME. Per Iovem o Socrates congrua comparatio.

MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.

(98b) Σωκράτης
καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων: ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι—ὀλίγα δ᾽ ἂν φαίην—ἓν δ᾽ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα.

SOCRATES. Necnon et ego ut nesciens dico, verum ymaginans. Quoniam vero est alteriusmodi recta opinio et scientia, penitus michi videor istud ymaginari, - immo si quid aliud dicam scire, pauca vero dicam - unum ergo et hoc ex illis ponam que nescio.

SO. Quinetiam ipse non tanquam sciens, sed ut coniectans ita loquor. Quod vera est aliud quiddam vera opinio atque scientia haud omnino plane mihi coniicere videor. Sed et si quicquam aliud me scire faterer, quæ sane pauca sunt, unum hoc iis quæ scio adnumerem.

SOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one of them.

Μένων
καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις.

MENON. Et recte, o Socrates, dicis.

ME. Probe o Socrates loqueris.

MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.

Σωκράτης
τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι ἀληθὴς δόξα ἡγουμένη τὸ ἔργον ἑκάστης τῆς πράξεως οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἀπεργάζεται ἢ ἐπιστήμη;

SOCRATES. Quid, hoc non recte, quoniam vera opm10 ducens opus cuiusque actionis non deterius operatur quam scientia?

SO. Quid vero? nonne hoc quoque recte, quod vara opinio opus quodlibet ducens nihilo peius quam scientia illud affequitur.

SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?

Μένων
καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖς μοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

MENON. Et hoc videris michi verum dicere.

ME. Hoc quoque verum.

MENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are right.

(98c) Σωκράτης
οὐδὲν ἄρα ὀρθὴ δόξα ἐπιστήμης χεῖρον οὐδὲ ἧττον ὠφελίμη ἔσται εἰς τὰς πράξεις, οὐδὲ ἁνὴρ ὁ ἔχων ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ ὁ ἐπιστήμην.

SOCRATES. Non ergo recta opinio scientia deterius, neque minus utilis erit ad actiones, neque vir habens rectam opinionem quam qui scientiam.

SO. Nihil igitur vera opinio quam scientia deterior, nec minus ad actiones utilis est, ut neque vir veram opinionem habens atque scientia præditus.

SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge?

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα.

MENON. Sunt hec.

ME. Ita est.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
καὶ μὴν ὅ γε ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὠφέλιμος ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται εἶναι.

SOCRATES. Necnon bonus vir utilis nobis concessus est esse?

SO. Quinetiam virum bonum utilem esse conveniebat?

SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ne.

ME. Convenit.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνον δι᾽ ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἂν εἶεν καὶ ὠφέλιμοι ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἴπερ εἶεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ὀρθὴν δόξαν, τούτοιν δὲ οὐδέτερον φύσει ἐστὶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, (98d) οὔτε ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δόξα ἀληθής, †οὔτ᾽ ἐπίκτητα—ἢ δοκεῖ σοι φύσει ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτοῖν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Quoniam igitur haud solum per scientiam boni viri utique erunt et commodi urbibus, si fuerint, sed et per rectam opinionem, horumque neutrum natura est hominibus, neque est scientia neque opinio vera neque acquisitiva - an videtur tibi natura utrumlibet horum esse?

SO. Si igitur homines non per ipsam scientiam solum boni atque utiles civitatibus essent, si modo invenirentur, sed etiam per opinionem rectam; horum vero neutrum natura hominibus inest, neque scientia, neque vera opinio, neque etiam adventicia hæc sunt; num videtur istorum aliquod natura inesse?

SOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him--(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature?

Μένων
οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

MENON. Haud michi.

ME. Mihi nequaquam.

MENO: Not I.)

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ φύσει, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φύσει εἶεν ἄν.

SOCRATES. Itaque quandoquidem non natura, neque boni natura erunt quidem.

SO. Nonne postquam natura non insunt, neque boni etiam viri natura erunt?

SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good?

Μένων
οὐ δῆτα.

MENON. Nullatenus. -

ME. Non sane.

MENO: Certainly not.

Σωκράτης
ἐπειδὴ δέ γε οὐ φύσει, ἐσκοποῦμεν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν.

SOCRATES. Quoniam que non natura, consideramus post hoc an docibile est.

SO. Quoniam vero nequaquam natura, utrum doctrina considerabamus?

SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Etiam.

ME. Ita.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν διδακτὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναι, εἰ φρόνησις ἡ ἀρετή;

SOCRATES. Docibile itaque visum est esse, vel prudentia vel virtus?

SO. Et doctrina comparabilis visa est si sit prudentia virtus?

SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it was taught?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Sic.

ME. Est.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
κἂν εἴ γε διδακτὸν εἴη, φρόνησις ἂν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Licet si docibile esset, prudentia utique esse?

SO. Et si comparabilis per doctrinam, prudentia quoque visa est?

SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Funditus.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Certainly.

(98e) Σωκράτης
καὶ εἰ μέν γε διδάσκαλοι εἶεν, διδακτὸν ἂν εἶναι, μὴ ὄντων δὲ οὐ διδακτόν;

SOCRATES. Et si quidem doctores fuerint, docibile quoque esse; cum vero non sint, (non) docibile?

SO. Ac si præceptores essnt, doceri posse; si non, minime?

SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not?

Μένων
οὕτω.

MENON. Itaque.

ME. Sic est.

MENO: True.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡμολογήκαμεν μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διδασκάλους;

SOCRATES. At vero fassi sumus non esse illius doctores?

SO. Et præceptores eius esse communi consensu negavimus?

SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue?

Μένων
ἔστι ταῦτα.

MENON. Sunt ista.

ME. Negavimus.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ὡμολογήκαμεν ἄρα μήτε διδακτὸν αὐτὸ μήτε φρόνησιν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Concessimus igitur neque docibile ipsum neque prudentiam esse?

SO. Conclusimus itaque, neque doceri illam, meque prudentiam esse.

SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Penitus.

ME. Concluimus.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι;

SOCRATES. Atqui bonum ipsum confessi sumus esse?

SO. Præterea bonum ipsum esse concessimus.

SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good?

Μένων
ναί.

MENON. Ne.

ME. Concessimus.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
ὠφέλιμον δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγούμενον;

SOCRATES. Commodumque et bonum esse quod recte ducit? -

SO. Bonum autem et utile esse quod recte ducit.

SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Prorsus.

ME. Maxime.

MENO: Certainly.

(99a) Σωκράτης
ὀρθῶς δέ γε ἡγεῖσθαι δύο ὄντα ταῦτα μόνα, δόξαν τε ἀληθῆ καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἃ ἔχων ἄνθρωπος ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖται— τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης τινὸς ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἡγεμονίᾳ γίγνεται—ὧν δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

SOCRATES. Recteque ducere duo existentia hec sola: opinionemque veram et scientiam, que habens homo recte ducit. Que enim a casu fiunt, non humanus ducatus fit. Quo sane homo dux est ad rectum, duo ista, opinio vera et scientia.

SO. Recte denique ducunt duo hæ sola, vera opinio atque scientia, quibus homo præditus dux esse aliis vere potest. Quaæenim fortuna contingunt, imperio hominis nequaquam fiunt; quibus autem homo ad rectum dux est, duo hæc sunt, opinio vera, atque scientia.

SOCRATES: And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion--these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge.

Μένων
δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.

MENON. Videtur michi sic.

ME. Idem mihi videtur.

MENO: I think so too.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἔτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀρετή;

SOCRATES. Ergo quandoquidem minime docibile est, neque scientia adhuc fit virtus.

SO. Igitur cum virtus doctrina perci(27)pi nequat, nequaquam scientia est.

SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.

Μένων
οὐ φαίνεται.

MENON. Non apparet.

ME. Non apparet.

MENO: Clearly not.

(99b) Σωκράτης
δυοῖν ἄρα ὄντοιν ἀγαθοῖν καὶ ὠφελίμοιν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἀπολέλυται, καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν πολιτικῇ πράξει ἐπιστήμη ἡγεμών.

SOCRATES. Duo bus existentibus bonis et commodis alterum absolvitur, et non erit in civili actione scientia dux.

SO. Cum ergo duo sint bona atque utilia, alterum illorum reiicitur, scientia scilicet, neque illa in actioine civili principatum tenet.

SOCRATES: Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life.

Μένων
οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

MENON. Neutiquam michi videtur.

ME. Non ut mihi videtur.

MENO: I think not.

Σωκράτης
οὐκ ἄρα σοφίᾳ τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγοῦντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τε καὶ οὓς ἄρτι Ἄνυτος ὅδε ἔλεγεν: διὸ δὴ καὶ οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιούτους οἷοι αὐτοί εἰσι, ἅτε οὐ δι᾽ ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι.

SOCRATES. Non ergo sapientia aliqua neque sapientes existentes tales viri regebant civitates, qui circiter Themistoclem, et quos nunc Anitus iste dixit. Ideoque nequibant alios facere tales quales ipsi erant, quemadmodum neque per scientiam existentes tales.

SO. Non ergo sapientia quadam, neque ut sapientes civiles isti himines rempublicam administrant; cuiuimodi qui Themistoclis temporibus, et quos pauloante Anytus retulit, extiterunt. Unde nec cæteros tales quales ipsi sunt, reddere possunt, quippe qui scientia nulla huiusmodi sint præditi.

SOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like themselves--because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.

Μένων
ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγεις.

MENON. Videtur ita se habere, o Socrates, velut dicis.

ME. Ita ut ais esse videtur o Socrates.

MENO: That is probably true, Socrates.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ, εὐδοξίᾳ δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν (99c) γίγνεται: ᾗ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις: καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἐνθουσιῶντες λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.

SOCRATES. Ergo si non scientia, eudoxia reliquum fit. Qua politici viri freti civitates dirigunt non differentius se habentes ad sapere quam responsa[bi]lesque et divini augures; etenim isti inquiunt equidem vera et multa, sciunt profecto nichil eorum que aiunt.

SO. Si non scientia, restat ut opinione recta etnetes civiles viri civitates gubernet, ac haud secus ad prudentiam se habeant atque vates divinoque furore correpti. Etenim hi vera atque pluriam nunciant, nihil tamen eorum quæ intelligunt loquuntur.

SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know not what they say.

Μένων
κινδυνεύει οὕτως ἔχειν.

MENON. Laborat sic se habere.

ME. Sic esse videtur.

MENO: So I believe.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν, ὦ Μένων, ἄξιον τούτους θείους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἵτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσι καὶ λέγουσι;

SOCRATES. Nonne ergo, o Menon, dignum istos divos vocare viros, qui animum non habentes, plurima et maxima dirigunt eo rum que agunt et dicunt?

SO. Nonne igitur o Meno divinos huiusmodi viros appellare decet, qui mente nequaquam utentes multa tamen ac magna faciunt, et agendo et dicendo disponunt?

SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men ‘divine’ who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Omnino.

ME. Prorsus.

MENO: Certainly.

Σωκράτης
ὀρθῶς ἄρ᾽ ἂν καλοῖμεν θείους τε οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν (99d) χρησμῳδοὺς καὶ μάντεις καὶ τοὺς ποιητικοὺς ἅπαντας: καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαῖμεν ἂν θείους τε εἶναι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μηδὲν εἰδότες ὧν λέγουσιν.

SOCRATES. Recte utique nuncupabimus divos quos nunc diximus et augures et poeticos universos; et politicos non minus hiis dicemus quoque divos esse et deificari, inspiratos existentes et occupatos a deo, quotiens dirigunt dicentes multas et magnas res, nil scientes eorum que dicunt.

SO. Quam ob rem merito divinos vocabimus, quos modo prædiximus vates furentesque ac poeticos homines universos, civilesque homines non minus atque reliquos divinos existimabimus divino afflatos numine deosque penitus occupatos, quandoquidem remp. dirigunt, multa maximaque dicentes, quæ nequaquam intelligunt.

SOCRATES: Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say many grand things, not knowing what they say.

Μένων
πάνυ γε.

MENON. Omnifariam.

ME. Maxime.

MENO: Yes.

Σωκράτης
καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι: καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, ‘θεῖος ἀνήρ,’ φασίν, ‘οὗτος.’

SOCRATES. Atque mulieres, o Menon, bonos viros divos vocant; necnon Lacones quotiens quempiam preconio extollunt bonum virum: ‘tios vir,’ inquiunt, ‘iste.’

SO. Mulieres quoque o Meno bonos viros divinos nuncupant. Et Laconici quoties bonum quendam virum commendare volunt, Divinus hic vir aiunt.

SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine--do they not? and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say ‘that he is a divine man.’

(99e) Μένων
καὶ φαίνονταί γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρθῶς λέγειν. καίτοι ἴσως Ἄνυτος ὅδε σοι ἄχθεται λέγοντι.

MENON. Videntur, o Socrates, recte dicere.

SOCRATES. At forsan Anitus hic tibi molestatur dicenti.

ME. Et recte quidem loqui videntur o Socrates, quanquam Anytus hic tibi forte talia loquenti succenset.

MENO: And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our friend Anytus may take offence at the word.

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