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    Click to Expand/Collapse Option Complete text
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionTitle
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter I
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter II
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter III
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter IV
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter V: De substantia
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VI: De quantitate
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VII: De relativis ved ad aliquid
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VIII: De quali et qualitate
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter IX: De facere et pati
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter X: De oppositis
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XI
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XII: De priore
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XIII: De his quae simul sunt
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XIV: De motu
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XV: De habere
(25) Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ’ ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται· 
 
(8,1) DE QUALI ET QUALITATE: Qualitatem uero dico secundum quam quales quidam dicimur. 
 
By ’quality’ I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such. 
ἔστι (26) δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων.  ἓν μὲν οὖν (27) εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν.  διαφέρει δὲ (28) ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ μονιμώτερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι·  (29) τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί·  ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπι(30)στήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ (31) μετρίως τις ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ,  ἐάνπερ μὴ μεγάλη μετα(32)βολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου·  ὡσαύτως (33) δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή· οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ (34) ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ’ εὐ(35)μετάβολον.  διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ (36) μεταβάλλοντα,  οἷον θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος (37) καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα·  διάκειται μὲν γάρ (38) πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ (39) θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γιγνόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νο(9a1)σεῖν·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μή τις καὶ αὐ(2)τῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη (3) καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, 
                     
(2) Est autem qualitas eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur.  Et una quidem (3) species qualitatis habitus affectioque dicantur.  Differt autem (4) habitus affectione quod permanentior et diuturnior est;  tales uero (5) sunt scientiae uel uirtutes;  scientia enim uidetur esse permanentium (6) et eorum quae difficile moueantur, si quis uel mediocriter scientiam (7) sumat,  nisi forte grandis permutatio facta sit uel ab aegritudine uel (8) ab aliquo huiusmodi;  similiter autem et uirtus, et iustitia uel (9) castitas et singula talium non uidentur facile posse moueri neque (10) facile permutari.  Affectiones uero dicuntur quae sunt facile mobiles (11) et cito permutabiles,  ut calor et infrictio et aegritudo et sanitas et (12) alia huiusmodi;  affectus est enim quodammodo circa eas homo, cito (13) autem permutatur ut ex calido frigidus fiat et ex sanitate in (14) aegritudinem;  similiter autem et in aliis, nisi forte in his quoque (15) contingit per temporis longitudinem in naturam cuiusque translata et (16) insanabilis uel difficile mobilis, quam iam quilibet habitudinem (17) uocet. 
                     
Quality is a term that is used in many senses.  One sort of quality let us call ’habit’ or ’disposition’.  Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established.  The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits,  for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace,  unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such cause.  The virtues, also, such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to vice.  By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite.  Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions.  For a man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well.  So it is with all other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: 
ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν (4) ἤδη προσαγορεύοι.  φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα βούλονται ἕξεις (5) λέγειν ἅ ἐστι πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ δυσκινητότερα·  τοὺς γὰρ (6) τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ πάνυ κατέχοντας ἀλλ’ εὐκινήτους ὄντας (7) οὔ φασιν ἕξιν ἔχειν,  καίτοι διάκεινταί γέ πως κατὰ τὴν (8) ἐπιστήμην ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον.  ὥστε διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως (9) τῷ τὸ μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερόν τε καὶ (10) δυσκινητότερον. 
         
(18) Manifestum est autem quoniam haec uolunt habitus nominari,  quae sunt (19) diuturniora et difficile mobilia;  namque in disciplinis non multum (20) retinentes sed facile mobiles dicunt habitum non habere,  quamuis sint (21) ad disciplinam peius meliusue dispositi.  Quare differt habitus (22) affectione, quod hoc quidem facile mobile est, illud uero diuturnius (23) et difficile mobile. 
         
in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit.  It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace;  for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such and such a ’habit’ as regards knowledge,  yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge.  Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter. 
—εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ (11) διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις·  οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες (12) καὶ διάκεινταί πως κατὰ ταύτας,  οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ (13) πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν. 
     
(24) Sunt autem habitus etiam affectiones, affectiones uero non necessario (25) habitus;  qui enim retinent habitum et quodammodo affecti sunt ad ea (26) uel peius uel melius;  qui autem affecti sunt, non omnino retinent (27) habitum. 
     
Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits.  For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed;  but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit. 
(14) Ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος καθ’ ὃ πυκτικοὺς ἢ δρομι(15)κοὺς ἢ ὑγιεινοὺς ἢ νοσώδεις λέγομεν,  καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα (16) κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται.  οὐ γὰρ τῷ (17) διακεῖσθαί πως ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων λέγεται, ἀλλὰ (18) τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως (19) ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν·  οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ λέγονται (20) οὐ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν (21) τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως,  ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται τῷ δύναμιν (22) ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ῥᾳ(23)δίως, νοσώδεις δὲ τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ μηδὲν (24) πάσχειν.  ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλα(25)κὸν ἔχει·  τὸ μὲν γὰρ σκληρὸν λέγεται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν (26) τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳδίως διαιρεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν τῷ ἀδυναμίαν (27) ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου. 
             
(28) Aliud uero genus qualitatis est secundum quod pugillatores uel (29) cursores uel salubres uel insalubres dicimus,  et simpliciter (30) quaecumque secundum potentiam naturalem uel impotentiam (31) dicuntur.  Non enim quoniam sunt affecti aliquo modo, unumquodque (32) huiusmodi dicitur sed quod habeant potentiam naturalem uel facere quid (33) facile uel nihil pati;  ut pugillatores uel cursores dicuntur non quod (34) sint affecti sed quod habeant potentiam hoc facile faciendi,  salubres (35) autem dicuntur eo quod habeant potentiam naturalem ut nihil a (36) quibuslibet accidentibus patiantur, insalubres uero quod habeant (37) impotentiam nihil patiendi.  Similiter autem et durum et molle sese (38) habent;  durum enim dicitur quod habeat potentiam non citius secari, (39) molle uero quod eiusdem ipsius habeat impotentiam. 
             
Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly:  in fact it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity.  Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind.  Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease.  Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity.  Similarly with regard to softness and hardness.  Hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason of the lack of that capacity. 
(28) Τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ (29) πάθη·  ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιάδε οἷον γλυκύτης τε καὶ πικρότης καὶ (30) στρυφνότης καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, ἔτι δὲ θερμότης (31) καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία.  ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὗ(32)ται ποιότητές εἰσιν φανερόν·  τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα ποιὰ (33) λέγεται κατ’ αὐτάς·  οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέ(34)χθαι λέγεται γλυκύ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητα δε(35)δέχθαι· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. 
         
(40) Tertium uero genus qualitatis est passibiles qualitates et (41) passiones.  Sunt autem huiusmodi ut dulcedo uel amaritudo et omnia his (42) cognata, amplius calor et frigus et albedo et nigredo.  Et quoniam hae (43) qualitates sunt, manifestum est;  quaecumque enim ista susceperint (44) qualia dicuntur secundum ea;  ut mel, quoniam dulcedinem suscepit, (45) dicitur dulce, et corpus album quod albedinem susceperit; similiter (46) autem sese habet etiam in caeteris. 
         
A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections.  Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities.  It is evident that these are qualities,  for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence.  Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases. 
παθητικαὶ (36) δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς ποι(9b1)ότητας πεπονθέναι τι·  οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ πεπονθέναι τι (2) λέγεται γλυκύ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν·  ὁμοίως (3) δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ (4) ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα πεπον(5)θέναι τι,  τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρη(6)μένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότη(7)τες λέγονται·  ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν (8) ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (9) αἱ ἄλλαι. 
         
(47) Passibiles uero qualitates dicuntur non quo ea quae illas susceperint (48) qualitates aliquid patiantur;  neque enim mel, quoniam aliquid passum (49) sit, idcirco dicitur dulce, nec aliud aliquid huiusmodi;  similiter (50) autem his et calor et frigus passibiles dicuntur non quo ea quae eas (51) suscipiunt qualitates aliquid patiantur  sed quoniam singulum eorum (52) quae dicta sunt secundum sensus qualitatum passionis perfectiua sunt, (53) passibiles qualitates dicuntur;  dulcedo enim passionem quandam (54) secundum gustum efficit, et calor secundum tactum; similiter autem et (55) alia. 
         
The term ’affective quality’ is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are affected in any way.  Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance.  Similarly heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected.  What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an ’affection’ in the way of perception.  For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities. 
λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χροιαὶ (10) οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς εἰρημένοις παθητικαὶ ποιότητες (11) λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πάθους γεγενῆσθαι. 
 
(56) Albedo autem et nigredo et alii colores non similiter his quae dicta (57) sunt passibiles qualitates dicuntur sed hoc quod hae ipsae ab (58) aliquibus passionibus innascuntur. 
 
Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they themselves are the results of an affection. 
ὅτι μὲν (12) οὖν γίγνονται διὰ πάθος πολλαὶ μεταβολαὶ χρωμάτων, δῆ(13)λον·  αἰσχυνθεὶς γάρ τις ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο καὶ φοβηθεὶς (14) ὠχρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων· 
   
(59) Quoniam ergo fiunt propter aliquam passionem multae colorum (60) mutationes, manifestum est;  erubescens enim aliquis rubicundus (61) factus est et timens pallidus et unumquodque talium. 
   
It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections.  When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. 
ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις φύσει (15) τῶν τοιούτων τι παθῶν πέπονθεν, τὴν ὁμοίαν χροιὰν (16) εἰκός ἐστιν ἔχειν αὐτόν·  ἥτις γὰρ νῦν ἐν τῷ αἰσχυνθῆ(17)ναι διάθεσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατὰ φυσι(18)κὴν σύστασιν ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ’ ἂν διάθεσις, ὥστε φύσει καὶ (19) τὴν χροιὰν ὁμοίαν γίγνεσθαι. 
   
(62) Quare uel si quis naturaliter aliquid talium passionum passus est, (63) similem colorem eum habere oportet;  quae enim affectio nunc ad (64) uerecundiam circa corpus facta est, et secundum naturalem (65) constitutionem eadem affectio fit, quare naturaliter color similis (66) fit. 
   
So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin.  For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a man’s natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. 
—ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιού(20)των συμπτωμάτων ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παρα(21)μονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε ποιότητες λέγονται·  εἴτε (22) γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία (23) γεγένηται, ποιότης λέγεται, —ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λε(24)γόμεθα,—  εἴτε διὰ νόσον μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα [τὸ αὐτὸ] (25) συμβέβηκεν ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποκαθ(26)ίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ αὐ(27)ταὶ λέγονται,  —ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα.— 
       
(67) Quaecumque igitur talium casuum ab aliquibus passionibus difficile (68) mobilibus et permanentibus principium ceperunt, qualitates dicuntur;  (69) siue enim [uel] secundum naturalem substantiam pallor aut nigredo (70) facta est, qualitas dicitur (quales enim secundum eas dicimur),  siue (71) propter aegritudinem longam uel propter aestum contingit uel nigredo (72) uel pallor, et non facile praeterit et in uita permanet, qualitates et (73) ipsae dicuntur  (similiter enim quales secundum eas dicimur). 
       
All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective qualities.  For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them,  not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life.  For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these. 
(28) ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων (29) γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται·  οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοί τινες (30) κατὰ ταῦτα·  οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι (31) ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι (32) ὠχρίας,  ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι·  ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ (33) τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.  —ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις (34) καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέ(35)γεται.  ὅσα τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει εὐθὺς ἀπό τινων πα(36)θῶν γεγένηται ποιότητες λέγονται,  οἷον ἥ τε μανικὴ (10a1) ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύ(2)τας λέγονται, ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί.  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι (3) ἐκστάσεις μὴ φυσικαί, ἀλλ’ ἀπό τινων ἄλλων συμπτωμάτων (4) γεγένηνται δυσαπάλλακτοι ἢ καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητοι, ποιό(5)τητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα·  ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται.  (6) ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ καθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται,  (7) οἷον εἰ λυπούμενος ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν·  οὐ γὰρ λέγεται (8) ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος ὤν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλ(9)λον πεπονθέναι τι·  ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, (10) ποιότητες δὲ οὔ. 
                           
(74) Quaecumque uero ex his quae facile soluuntur et cito transeunt fiunt, (75) passiones dicuntur;  non enim dicimur secundum eas quales;  neque enim (76) qui propter uerecundiam rubicundus factus est rubicundus dicitur, nec (77) cui pallor propter timorem uenit pallidus  sed magis quod aliquid (78) passus sit;  quare passiones huiusmodi dicuntur, qualitates uero (79) minime.  Similiter autem his et secundum animam passibiles qualitates (80) et passiones dicuntur.  Quaecumque enim mox in nascendo ab aliquibus (81) passionibus fiunt, qualitates dicuntur,  ut dementia uel ira uel alia (82) huiusmodi; quales enim secundum eas dicimur, id est iracundi et (83) dementes.  Similiter autem et quaecumque alienationes non naturaliter (84) sed ab aliquibus aliis casibus factae sunt difficile praetereuntes et (85) omnino immobiles, etiam huiusmodi qualitates sunt;  quales enim (86) secundum eas dicimur.  Quaecumque enim ex his quae citius praetereunt (87) fiunt, passiones dicuntur,  ut si quis contristatus iracundior est;  non (88) enim dicitur iracundus qui in huiusmodi passione iracundior est sed (89) magis aliquid passus;  quare passiones quidem huiusmodi dicuntur, (90) qualitates uero minime. 
                           
Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections:  for we are not said to be such virtue of them.  The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale.  He is said rather to have been affected.  Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities.  In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul.  That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality.  I mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these.  Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities,  for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such.  Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities.  Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed:  he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected.  Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections. 
(11) Τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ (12) ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις εὐθύτης (13) καὶ καμπυλότης καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὅμοιόν ἐστιν·  καθ’ ἕκα(14)στον γὰρ τούτων ποιόν τι λέγεται· τῷ γὰρ τρίγωνον ἢ τε(15)τράγωνον εἶναι ποιόν τι λέγεται, καὶ τῷ εὐθὺ ἢ καμπύλον.  (16) καὶ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν δὲ ἕκαστον ποιόν τι λέγεται. 
     
(91) Quartum uero genus qualitatis est forma et circa aliquid constans (92) figura; ad haec quoque rectitudo uel curuitas, et si quid his simile (93) est;  secundum enim unumquodque eorum quale quid dicitur; quod enim est (94) triangulum uel quadratum quale quid dicitur, et quod est rectum uel (95) curuum.  Et secundum figuram uero unumquodque quale dicitur. 
     
The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and such.  each of these defines a thing as being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved;  in fact a thing’s shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it. 
τὸ δὲ (17) μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξειε (18) μὲν ἂν ποιὸν σημαίνειν,  ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα (19) εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποιὸν διαιρέσεως·  θέσιν γάρ τινα μᾶλλον (20) φαίνεται τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον δηλοῦν·  πυκνὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ (21) τὰ μόρια σύνεγγυς εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, μανὸν δὲ τῷ διεστάναι (22) ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων·  (23) καὶ λεῖον μὲν τῷ ἐπ’ εὐθείας πως τὰ μόρια (24) κεῖσθαι, τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν.  — (25) ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἄν τις φανείη τρόπος ποιότητος, ἀλλ’ (26) οἵ γε μάλιστα λεγόμενοι σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν. 
           
(96) Rarum uero et spissum uel asperum uel lene putabitur quidem qualitatem (97) significare,  uidentur autem aliena esse huiusmodi a qualitatis (98) diuisione;  quandam enim quodammodo positionem uidetur partium (99) utrumque monstrare;  spissum quidem eo quod partes sibi ipsae (100) propinquae sint, rarum uero quod distent a se inuicem;  et lene (101) quidem quod in rectum sibi partes iaceant, asperum uero cum haec (102) quidem pars superet, illa uero sit inferior.  Et fortasse alii quoque (103) appareant qualitatis modi sed qui maxime dicuntur hi sunt. 
           
Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms indicating quality:  yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class different from that of quality.  For it is rather a certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms.  A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts;  smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others.  There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated. 
(27) Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ (28) ταύτας παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ’ αὐ(29)τῶν. 
 
(104) Qualitates ergo sunt haec quae dicta sunt, qualia uero quae secundum (105) haec denominatiue dicuntur, uel quomodolibet ab his. 
 
These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way. 
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρ(30)ωνύμως λέγεται,  οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος ὁ λευκὸς καὶ ἀπὸ (31) τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὁ (32) δίκαιος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.  ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ διὰ (33) τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παρ(34)ωνύμως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι·  οἷον ὁ δρομικὸς ἢ ὁ πυκτικὸς (35) ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενος ἀπ’ οὐδεμιᾶς ποιότητος (10b1) παρωνύμως λέγεται·  οὐ γὰρ κεῖται ὀνόματα ταῖς δυνάμεσι (2) καθ’ ἃς οὗτοι ποιοὶ λέγονται,  ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καθ’ (3) ἃς πυκτικοὶ ἢ παλαιστρικοὶ οἱ κατὰ διάθεσιν λέγονται,  —πυ(4)κτικὴ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται καὶ παλαιστρική, ποιοὶ δὲ ἀπὸ (5) τούτων παρωνύμως οἱ διακείμενοι λέγονται.—  ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ (6) ὀνόματος κειμένου οὐ λέγεται παρωνύμως τὸ κατ’ αὐτὴν (7) ποιὸν λεγόμενον,  οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος·  τῷ γὰρ (8) ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ (9) τῆς ἀρετῆς·  οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.  ποιὰ οὖν (10) λέγεται τὰ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων λεγόμενα (11) ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν. 
                       
(106) In pluribus quidem et paene in omnibus denominatiue dicuntur,  ut ab (107) albedine albus et a grammatica grammaticus et a iustitia iustus, (108) similiter autem et in caeteris.  In aliquibus uero propterea quod (109) qualitatibus nomina non sunt posita impossibile est ab his (110) denominatiue dici,  ut cursor uel pugillator, si secundum potentiam (111) naturalem dicitur, a nulla qualitate denominatiue dicitur;  neque (112) enim positum est nomen illis potestatibus: secundum quas isti quales (113) dicuntur,  quemadmodum etiam in disciplinis secundum quas uel (114) pugillatores uel palaestrici secundum affectionem dicuntur  (115) (pugillatoria enim disciplina dicitur et palaestrica, quales uero ab (116) his denominatiue qui ad eas sunt affecti dicuntur).  Aliquando autem et (117) posito nomine denominatiue non dicitur id quod secundum ipsam quale (118) quid dicitur,  ut a uirtute probus dicitur;  hoc enim quod habet (119) uirtutem probus dicitur sed non denominatiue a uirtute;  non est autem (120) hoc in multis.  Qualia ergo dicuntur quaecumque ex his quae dictae sunt (121) qualitatibus denominatiue dicuntur uel quolibet alio ab ipsis modo. 
                       
In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the quality.  Thus the terms ’whiteness’, ’grammar’, ’justice’, give us the adjectives ’white’, ’grammatical’, ’just’, and so on.  There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a name that is derivative.  For instance, the name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality;  for those capacities have no name assigned to them.  In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers.  Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called ’boxing’ or ’wrestling’ as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the science.  Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a derivative.  For instance, the upright man takes his character from the possession of the quality of integrity,  but the name given him is not derived from the word ’integrity’.  Yet this does not occur often.  We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it. 
(12) Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οἷον δι(13)καιοσύνη ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον καὶ λευκότης μελανίᾳ καὶ τἆλλα (14) ὡσαύτως,  καὶ τὰ κατ’ αὐτὰς δὲ ποιὰ λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ (15) ἄδικον τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι.  οὐκ ἐπὶ πάν(16)των δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον· τῷ γὰρ πυῤῥῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύ(17)ταις χροιαῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν. 
     
(122) Inest autem et contrarietas secundum qualitatem, ut iustitia (123) iniustitiae contrarium est et albedo nigredini et alia similiter;  et (124) secundum eas qualia quae dicuntur, ut iustum iniusto et album (125) nigro.  Non autem hoc in omnibus est; rubeo enim et pallido et (126) huiusmodi coloribus nihil est contrarium cum qualitates sint. 
     
One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on.  The things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is black.  This, however, is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries. 
—ἔτι ἐὰν (18) τῶν ἐναντίων θάτερον ᾖ ποιόν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσται ποιόν.  τοῦ(19)το δὲ δῆλον προχειριζομένῳ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας,  οἷον εἰ ἔστιν (20) ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον, ποιὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, (21) ποιὸν ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀδικία·  οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγο(22)ριῶν ἐφαρμόζει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε πρός τι (23) οὔτε πού, οὐδ’ ὅλως τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιόν·  (24) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐναν(25)τίων. 
         
(127) Amplius: si ex contrariis unum fuerit quale, et reliquum erit (128) quale.  Hoc autem manifestum est omnia alia praedicamenta proferenti,  (129) ut si est iustitia iniustitiae contrarium, qualitas est autem (130) iustitia, nihilo minus qualitas erit iniustitia;  nullum enim aliud (131) praedicamentum conuenit iniustitiae, nec quantitas nec relatio nec ubi (132) nec omnino aliquid huiusmodi, nisi sola qualitas;  similiter autem et (133) in aliis secundum qualitatem contrariis. 
         
If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality.  This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the names used to denote the other categories;  for instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality:  neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice.  So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of quality. 
(26) Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά·  (27) λευκὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, καὶ (28) δίκαιον ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.  καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπίδοσιν λαμβά(29)νει, —λευκὸν γὰρ ὂν ἔτι ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι·—  οὐ (30) πάντα δέ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα·  δικαιοσύνη γὰρ δικαιοσύνης (31) εἰ λέγεται μᾶλλον ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις,  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (32) ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων.  ἔνιοι γὰρ διαμφισβητοῦσι περὶ (33) τῶν τοιούτων·  δικαιοσύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ (34) φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεσθαι, οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγιείας,  (35) ἧττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου ὑγίειάν φασι, καὶ δικαιοσύ(11a1)νην ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου,  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γραμματικὴν καὶ τὰς (2) ἄλλας διαθέσεις.  ἀλλ’ οὖν τά γε κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμενα ἀναμ(3)φισβητήτως ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον·  γραμματι(4)κώτερος γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου λέγεται καὶ δικαιότερος καὶ (5) ὑγιεινότερος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. 
                       
(134) Suscipit autem qualitas magis et minus;  album et enim magis et minus (135) alterum altero dicitur, et iustum alterum altero magis.  Et idem ipsum (136) sumit intentionem (album enim cum sit, contingit illud fieri albius);  (137) hoc autem in omnibus non est sed in pluribus;  dubitabit enim quis an (138) iustitia magis esse iustitia dicatur;  similiter autem et in aliis (139) affectionibus.  Quidam uero in hoc dubitant;  dicunt enim iustitiam (140) iustitia non nimis magis uel minus dici, nec sanitatem sanitate;  minus (141) autem habere alterum altero sanitatem dicunt, et iustitiam minus (142) alterum altero habere,  similiter et grammaticam et alias (143) disciplinas.  Sed secundum eas qualia quae dicuntur indubitate (144) suscipiunt magis et minus;  magis enim grammaticus alter altero dicitur (145) et iustior et sanior, et in aliis similiter. 
                       
Qualities admit of variation of degree.  Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the case with reference to justice.  Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter.  Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions.  For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties might ensue,  and this is true with regard to all those qualities which are dispositions.  There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here.  They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves,  but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities,  and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions.  However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them;  for one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on. 
τρίγωνον δὲ καὶ (6) τετράγωνον οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλ(7)λων σχημάτων οὐδέν· 
 
(146) Triangulum uero et quadratum non uidetur magis suscipere, nec aliquid (147) aliarum formarum. 
 
The qualities expressed by the terms ’triangular’ and ’quadrangular’ do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have to do with figure. 
τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὸν τοῦ τρι(8)γώνου λόγον καὶ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου πάνθ’ ὁμοίως τρίγωνα ἢ (9) κύκλοι εἰσίν, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐπιδεχομένων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου (10) μᾶλλον ῥηθήσεται·  οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τετράγωνον τοῦ ἑτε(11)ρομήκους κύκλος ἐστίν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν τοῦ κύκλου (12) λόγον.  ἁπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφότερα τὸν τοῦ (13) προκειμένου λόγον, οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.  (14) οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ ποιὰ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.  (15) Τῶν μὲν οὖν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν ἴδιον ποιότητος, ὅμοια δὲ (16) καὶ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεται· 
         
(148) Quaecumque enim definitionem trianguli suscipiunt et circuli, omnia (149) similiter triangula uel circuli sunt, de his autem quae non suscipiunt (150) nihil magis alterum altero dicitur;  nihil enim quadratum magis quam (151) parte altera longior forma circulus est; nullum enim ipsorum suscipit (152) circuli rationem.  Simpliciter autem, si utraque non suscipiunt (153) propositi rationem, non dicitur alterum altero magis.  Non igitur omnia (154) qualia suscipiunt magis et minus.  Ex his ergo quae dicta sunt nihil (155) est proprium qualitatis. 
         
For those things to which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree;  the square is no more a circle than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate.  In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree.  Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree.  Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature. 
ὅμοιον (17) γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ καθ’ ὃ ποιόν (18) ἐστιν.  ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη ποιότητος τὸ ὅμοιον ἢ ἀνόμοιον (19) λέγεσθαι κατ’ αὐτήν. 
   
(156) Simile autem et dissimile secundum solas dicuntur qualitates; simile (157) enim alterum alteri non est secundum aliud nisi secundum hoc quod (158) quale est.  Quare proprium erit qualitatis secundum eam simile et (159) dissimile dici. 
   
One thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality.  thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality. 
(20) Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποι(21)ότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι (22) συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι·  τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις τῶν πρός (23) τι εἶναι.  σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ γένη (24) πρός τι λέγεται, τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδέν·  ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπι(25)στήμη, γένος οὖσα, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς (26) γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται.—  τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδὲν αὐτὸ ὅπερ (27) ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται,  οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς (28) γραμματικὴ οὐδ’ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα (29) κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὗται πρός τι λέγεται·  οἷον ἡ γραμ(30)ματικὴ λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς γραμματική, (31) καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς μουσική·  ὥστε (32) αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι. 
               
(160) At uero non decet conturbari ne quis nos dicat de qualitate (161) propositionem facientes multa de relatiuis interposuisse;  (162) habitudines enim et affectiones eorum quae sunt ad aliquid esse (163) diximus.  Paene enim ea quae sunt in omnibus his generibus ad aliquid (164) dicuntur, eorum uero quae sunt singulatim nihil;  scientia enim, quae (165) genus est, hoc ipsum quod est alterius dicitur (alicuius enim scientia (166) dicitur),  singulorum uero nihil hoc ipsum quod est alterius dicitur,  (167) ut grammatica non dicitur alicuius grammatica nec musica alicuius (168) musica sed si forte secundum genus proprium et istae dicuntur (169) alicuius;  ut grammatica alicuius dicitur scientia, non alicuius (170) grammatica, et musica alicuius scientia, non alicuius musica;  quare (171) singula non sunt relatiua. 
               
We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many relative terms.  We did say that habits and dispositions were relative.  In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not.  Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something.  But particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained.  The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera;  thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the music of something.  Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. 
λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ (33) ταῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα·  ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν,  —ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ (34) λεγόμεθα τῷ ἔχειν τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά·—  ὥστε (35) αὗται ἂν καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστα, καθ’ ἅς (36) ποτε καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα· αὗται δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.— 
       
(172) Dicimur autem quales secundum singula;  haec enim et habemus  (scientes (173) enim dicimur quod habemus singulas scientias);  quare haec erunt etiam (174) qualitates, quae singulatim sunt, secundum quas et quales dicimur; (175) haec autem non sunt eorum quae sunt ad aliquid. 
       
And it is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are said to be such and such.  It is these that we actually possess:  we are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch.  Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative. 
(37) ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνει τὸ αὐτὸ ποιὸν καὶ πρός τι ὄν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον (38) ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι. 
 
(176) Amplius si contingat idem et quale esse et relatiuum, nihil est (177) inconueniens in utrisque hoc generibus annumerare. 
 
Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads. 
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Enhet: Det humanistiske fakultet   Utviklet av: IT-seksjonen ved HF
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