—ἔτι τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν (7) θάτερον ᾖ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι·
(8) ὑγιαινόντων γὰρ ἁπάντων ὑγίεια (9) μὲν ἔσται, νόσος δὲ οὔ·
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λευκῶν ὄντων ἁπάν(10)των λευκότης μὲν ἔσται, μελανία δὲ οὔ.
ἔτι εἰ τὸ Σωκράτη (11) ὑγιαίνειν τῷ Σωκράτη νοσεῖν ἐναντίον ἐστίν,
μὴ ἐνδέχεται (12) δὲ ἅμα ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν,
οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῦ (13) ἑτέρου τῶν ἐναντίων ὄντος καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι·
ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ (14) Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη.
(8) Amplius in contrariis non est necesse, si alterum fuerit, et reliquum (9) esse;
sanis enim omnibus, sanitas quidem erit, aegritudo uero minime;
(10) similiter et albis omnibus albedo quidem erit, nigredo uero non (11) erit.
Amplius, si Socratem sanum esse et Socratem aegrotare (12) contrarium est,
et non contingit simul eidem utraque inesse,
numquam (13) continget, cum alterum contrariorum sit, reliquum esse;
nam cum sit (14) sanum esse Socratem, non erit aegrotare Socratem.
In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one exists the other should also exist:
for if all become healthy there will be health and no disease,
and again, if everything turns white, there will be white, but no black.
Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well,
and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time,
both these contraries could not exist at once:
for if that Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.
Complete text