Σωκράτης
ὦ Μένων, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Θετταλοὶ εὐδόκιμοι ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν καὶ ἐθαυμάζοντο ἐφ᾽ ἱππικῇ τε καὶ πλούτῳ, (70b) νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἑταίρου Ἀριστίππου πολῖται Λαρισαῖοι.
τούτου δὲ ὑμῖν αἴτιός ἐστι Γοργίας: ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἴληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστής ἐστιν Ἀρίστιππος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν.
καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν, ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐάν τίς τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς (70c) εἰδότας, ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὑτὸν ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὅτῳ οὐκ ἀποκρινόμενος.
ἐνθάδε δέ, ὦ φίλε Μένων, τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν: ὥσπερ αὐχμός τις τῆς σοφίας γέγονεν, καὶ κινδυνεύει (71a) ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν τόπων παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς οἴχεσθαι ἡ σοφία.
εἰ γοῦν τινα ἐθέλεις οὕτως ἐρέσθαι τῶν ἐνθάδε, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ: ‘ὦ ξένε, κινδυνεύω σοι δοκεῖν μακάριός τις εἶναι—ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴθ᾽ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ παραγίγνεται εἰδέναι—ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέω εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ διδακτὸν εἰδέναι, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετὴ τυγχάνω εἰδώς.’
(71b) ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Μένων, οὕτως ἔχω: συμπένομαι τοῖς πολίταις τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καταμέμφομαι ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν: ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τι εἰδείην;
ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἴτε καλὸς εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖός ἐστιν, εἴτε καὶ τἀναντία τούτων; δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι;
SOCRATES. O Menon, hactenus quidem Tessali laudabiles erant inter Grecos et ammirandi effecti sunt in re equestri et divitiis, nunc autem, ut michi videtur, etiam in sapientia, et non nullatenus tui amatoris Aristippi cives Larissei.
Huius rei uti que vobis causa est Gorgias; veniens siquidem in urbem amatores in sapientia sumpsit Aleuandorum quoque primos, de quibus tuus amator est Aristippus, necnon aliorum Tessalorum.
Quin etiam et hanc consuetudinem vos rite habere instituit, intrepide et magnificenter respondere, si quis quid percunctetur, vel ut convenit scientes; quemadmodum et ipse exhibens se rogare Grecorum volenti quidquid quis velit, et nemini cui non respondens.
Hic profecto, o dilecte Menon, econtra conversatus est; tamquam caligo quedam sapientie factus est; atque laborat ex hiis equidem locis ad vos transferri sapientia.
Si ergo quempiam velis interrogare eorum qui penes nos, nullus qui non rideat et dicat: “O peregrine, laboro tibi videri beatus quis esse; virtus igitur sive docibile sive quocumque modo inest, scire - hactenus indigeo sive docibile sive non docibile nosse, ut neque ipsum hoc, quod unquam prorsus virtus est, norim.”
Egoque ipse, o Menon, sic me habeo. Conindigeo civibus hac re, et meipsum redarguo quasi nescius de virtute universaliter. Qui autem non novi quid sit, quomodo utique quale quid sit sciam?
Videtur tibi possibile esse, qui Menona non novit universaliter quis est, hunc scire sive bonus sive dives sive etiam generosus est, vel etiam contraria horum? Videtur tibi possibile esse?
SO. Hactenus o Meno Thessalici homines inter græcos illustres, tum equestri facultate, tum etiam divitiis habiti sunt. Nunc autem, ut mihi videtur, sapientiæ quoque gloriam consequentur, præsertim amici tui Aristippi Larissæi concives.
Atque eius quidem rei autor vobis Gorgias extitit, qui in urbem vestram profectus amicos sibi ob sapientiam comparavit cum reliquos Thessalicorum optimates, tum maxime Alevandrum familiam, ex qua amicus tuus Aristippus originem ducit.
Quamobrem sic vos Gorgias assuefecit, ut intrepide et alto animo interrogantibus respondeatis, quemadmodum scientes decet. quippe et ipse concedebat Græcorum cuique rogare quicquid quisque vellet, ac singulis etiam respondebat.
Nobis vero o amice Meno contrarium contingit: siquidem sapientia nostra quoddammodo iam exaruit, atque ex iis locis ad vos divertisse videtur.
Itaque si quemnostrorum hominum hoc pacto perconteris, nemo erit qui non rideat. O hospes forte tibi beatus quidam videor, quem nosse existimas, utrum doctrina, an alia quadam ratione virtus hominibus comparetur. Ego vero usqueadeo ab hac cogitione absum, ut nec quid ipsa sit virtus intelligam.
Atque ipse quoque o Meno sic affectus sum; in eadem quippe paupertate animi qua et concives mei, versor, ac meipsum sępe accuso, utpote quid sit virtus penitus ignorans. Cum vero quid sit nesciam, quonam pacto qualis sit norim?
Num tibi fieri posse videtur, ut qui nullo modo quis Meno sit norit, utrum bonus, dives, generosus, ancontra sit norit?
SOCRATES: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus.
And this is Gorgias’ doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom.
And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him anything.
How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you.
I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: ‘Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think that I can answer your question. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not.’
And I myself, Meno, living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not know the ‘quid’ of anything how can I know the ‘quale’?
How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could?
Μένων
οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῶς (71c) οὐδ᾽ ὅτι ἀρετή ἐστιν οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἴκαδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;
MENON. Minime michi quidem; sed tu, o Socrates, vere neque quia virtus est scisti, verum hec de te domi nuntiabimus?
ME. Mihi quidem nequaquam. At vero ipse revera o Socrates, quid sit virtus ignoras. Ista de te domi renunciabimus?
MENO: No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly?
Σωκράτης
μὴ μόνον γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἄλλῳ πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ.
SOCRATES. Non solum, o dilecte, ceterum et quoniam neque alium aliquem conveni scientem, velut michi videor.
SO. Non id quæso solum Meno domi dices, verum etiam quod nullum unquam, ut mihi quidem videtur, isthuc scientem nactus sim.
SOCRATES: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have never known of any one else who did, in my judgment.
Σωκράτης
οὐ πάνυ εἰμὶ μνήμων, ὦ Μένων, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι πῶς μοι τότε ἔδοξεν.
ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἐκεῖνός τε οἶδε, καὶ σὺ ἃ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε: ἀνάμνησον οὖν (71d) με πῶς ἔλεγεν.
εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸς εἰπέ: δοκεῖ γὰρ δήπου σοὶ ἅπερ ἐκείνῳ.
SOCRATES. Haud omnino sum memor, o Menon; qua de re minime habeo dicere in presenti, quo pacto michi tunc visum est.
Atqui fors ille quidem novit, et tu que ille asseruit. Recordare itaque michi quid astruebat.
Quodsi volueris, ipse dic; videntur quippe tibi que illi.
SO. Haud satis o Meno memini, ideoque quid tum mihi visum fuerit, in præsentia referre nequeo.
Sed forte et ille novit, et tu quid ille docuerit, tenes;
quare si placet, ipse dicas. Nam tibi forsitan cum illo convenit.
SOCRATES: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time.
And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he said;
or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for I suspect that you and he think much alike.
Σωκράτης
ἐκεῖνον μὲν τοίνυν ἐῶμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἄπεστιν: σὺ δὲ αὐτός, ὦ πρὸς θεῶν, Μένων, τί φῂς ἀρετὴν εἶναι;
εἶπον καὶ μὴ φθονήσῃς, ἵνα εὐτυχέστατον ψεῦσμα ἐψευσμένος ὦ, ἂν φανῇς σὺ μὲν εἰδὼς καὶ Γοργίας, ἐγὼ δὲ εἰρηκὼς μηδενὶ πώποτε εἰδότι ἐντετυχηκέναι.
SOCRATES. Illum certe sinamus, quoniam et abest. Tu vero ipse, o pro diis, Menon, quid ais virtutem esse?
Dicito et ne invideas, quatenus fortunatissimum mendacium mentitus fuerim, si videaris tu quidem scius atque Gorgias, ego dixerim nullum umquam scientem convenisse.
SO. Eum igitur cum absit, omittamus. ipse vero o Meno, dic per deos obsecro quid esse virtutem existimes;
dic inquam, nec invideas, ut fortunati cuiusdam mendacii redarguar, siquidem tu et Gorgias id nosse videamini, ego vero nemini unquam hoc scienti occurrisse dicam.
SOCRATES: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is;
for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I have been just saying that I have never found anybody who had.
(71e) Μένων
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν.
πρῶτον μέν, εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν, ῥᾴδιον, ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐχθροὺς κακῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν εὐλαβεῖσθαι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον παθεῖν.
εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ οἰκεῖν, σῴζουσάν τε τὰ ἔνδον καὶ κατήκοον οὖσαν τοῦ ἀνδρός.
καὶ ἄλλη ἐστὶν παιδὸς ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἄρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἰ δὲ βούλει, (72a) δούλου.
καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀπορία εἰπεῖν ἀρετῆς πέρι ὅτι ἐστίν:
καθ᾽ ἑκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν, ὡσαύτως δὲ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἡ κακία.
MENON. Atqui non difficile, o Socrates, dicere.
Primum quidem, si velis viri virtutem, leve; quoniam hec est viri virtus: ydoneum esse bene civitati providere, atque providentem amicis benefacere inimicisque male, et se precavere nil tale tolerare.
Quod si volueris mulieris virtutem, haud molestum pertransire: quoniam decet eam domum bene dispensare, salva facientem que intrinsecus et obsequentem esse viro.
Et alia pueri virtus et femine ac masculi; necnon senioris viri, si vero velis liberi, si certe velis servi.
Atque alie permulte virtutes sunt. Quas ob res neutiquam hesitatio dicere de virtute quid.
Penes unamquamque siquidem actionum et etatum ad singulum opus unicuique nostrum virtus est, nec dissimiliter utique reor, o Socrates, et malitia.
ME. At o Socrates nequaquam difficile est id dicere;
et primo quidem si lubet quæ viri sit virtus. hæc plane est, ad civilium rerum administrationem sufficientem esse, iisque tractandis amicos iuvare, inimicos lædere, necnon diligenter cavere, ne quid ipse tale aliquando patiatur.
Quod si ulterius quæ sit mulieris virtus nosse requiris, neque id arduum erit. Est enim mulieris virtus, domum recte gubernare, dum curat domestica, viroque obedit.
Alia quoque virtus est pueri fæminæque et masculi, et viri iam ætate gravis, necnon liberi si velis, alia et alia servi.
Atque aliæ permultæ virtutes sunt. Quamobrem haud deest, quid de virtute dicamus.
Enimvero in unaquaque actione atque ætate ad unumquodque opus singulis hominibus virtus adest. Totidem præterea et de vitio o Socrates, ut arbitror, dici possent.
MENO: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question.
Let us take first the virtue of a man--he should know how to administer the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself.
A woman’s virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband.
Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue:
there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them;
for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates (Compare Arist. Pol.).
Σωκράτης
πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνηύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κείμενον.
ἀτάρ, ὦ Μένων, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν (72b) περὶ τὰ σμήνη, εἴ μου ἐρομένου μελίττης περὶ οὐσίας ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν, πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἔλεγες αὐτὰς εἶναι, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω μοι, εἴ σε ἠρόμην:
‘ἆρα τούτῳ φῂς πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς εἶναι καὶ διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, τῷ μελίττας εἶναι; ἢ τούτῳ μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ἄλλῳ δέ τῳ, οἷον ἢ κάλλει ἢ μεγέθει ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ τῶν τοιούτων;’ εἰπέ, τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω οὕτως ἐρωτηθείς;
SOCRATES. Plurima quadam felicitate videor frui, o Menon, si unam inquirens virtutem examen quoddam inveni virtutum a te positarum.
Quasi, o Menon, iuxta hanc ymaginem circa examina, si me rogante apis super essentia quid est, multas et omniformes diceres eas esse, quid utique responderes michi, si te interrogavero:
“Ergo in hoc inquis multas et omniformes esse et differentes ab invicem, in hoc quod apes sunt? Sive in hoc nempe haud discrepant, alio vero aliquo, velut aut pulchritudine vel magnitudine vel aliquo alio talium?” Dic, quid respondeas sic interrogatus?
SO. Non parum in hac venatione fortunatus sum o Meno; siquidem unam virtutem investigans, examen quoddam virtutum apud te habitantium repperi.
Verumtamen o Meno si eadem examinis similitudine percontanti mihi quæ sit apis substantia, multiplices earum esse substantias respondisses, ego vero iterum te rogam,
nunquid hoc quo apes sunt, an alio quopiam, veluti pulchritudine, vel magnitude, aut alio quopiam huiusmodi apum substantias diversas esse dicis, quid inquam sic interroganti potissimum responderes?
SOCRATES: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them (Compare Theaet.), which are in your keeping.
Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply:
But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me?
Μένων
τοῦτ᾽ ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ᾗ μέλιτται εἰσίν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας.
MENON. Hoc ego sane, quoniam neutique distant, prout apes sunt, altera ab altera.
ME. Quod eo quod apes sunt, minime differunt.
MENO: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.
(72c) Σωκράτης
εἰ οὖν εἶπον μετὰ ταῦτα: ‘τοῦτο τοίνυν μοι αὐτὸ εἰπέ, ὦ Μένων: ᾧ οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν εἰσιν ἅπασαι, τί τοῦτο φῂς εἶναι;’ εἶχες δήπου ἄν τί μοι εἰπεῖν;
SOCRATES. Ergo inquam post hec: “Hoc igitur michi o Menon, quo minime dissident at idem sunt cuncte; quid hec inquis esse? Haberes quidpiam michi dicere?”
SO. Et si ego posthæc rogem, quid ergo est o Meno, quid nihil inter se differunt, sed idem sunt cunctæ? habes quod respondeas?
SOCRATES: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno; tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike;--would you be able to answer?
Σωκράτης
οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν: κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν δι᾽ ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, εἰς ὃ καλῶς που ἔχει ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ ἐρωτήσαντι ἐκεῖνο δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει (72d) οὖσα ἀρετή: ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι λέγω;
SOCRATES. Ita profecto et de virtutibus: tamen etsi multe et omniformes sunt, unam utique quandam speciem eandem universe habent, propter quam sunt virtutes; in quam bene se habet respicientem eum qui respondet id demonstrate, quid contingit esse virtus. Seu non addiscis que dico?
SO. Eadem itaque ratione virtutes quanquam multæ atque variæ sunt, unum tamen speciem quandam in omnibus eandem habent qua virtutes existunt, in quam respicere decet eum, qui responsurus sit interroganti cuiquam quid virtus fit. Tenes quid dicam?
SOCRATES: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, ‘What is virtue?’ would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?
Σωκράτης
πότερον δὲ περὶ ἀρετῆς μόνον σοι οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὦ Μένων, ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ περὶ ἰσχύος ὡσαύτως; ἄλλη μὲν ἀνδρὸς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ὑγίεια, ἄλλη δὲ γυναικός;
ἢ ταὐτὸν πανταχοῦ εἶδός ἐστιν, ἐάνπερ ὑγίεια (72e) ᾖ, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν ᾖ;
SOCRATES. An de virtute dumtaxat sic tibi videtur, o Menon alia quidem viri esse, alia vero mulieris et ceterorum, sive etiam de sanitate et de magnitudine et de robore eodem modo; alia quidem viri videtur tibi esse sanitas, alia mulieris?
Sive eadem ubique species est, si quidem sanitas sit, seu in viro seu in alio quocumque sanitas?
SO. Utrum vero circa virtutem id solum o Meno tibi videtur, aliam quidem viri esse, aliam mulieris, et aliam reliquorum, an etiam circa sanitatem, magnitudinemque, et robur eodem modo, ut alia quidem viri sanitas sit mulieris alia?
an potius eadem ubique sanitatis species est, si quidem sanitas sit, seu viro, sive mulieri, sive alteri quiqunque adsit?
SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength?
Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?
Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ ἰσχύς; ἐάνπερ ἰσχυρὰ γυνὴ ᾖ, τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἰσχύϊ ἰσχυρὰ ἔσται;
τὸ γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ τοῦτο λέγω: οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι ἡ ἰσχύς, ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν γυναικί. ἢ δοκεῖ τί σοι διαφέρειν;
SOCRATES. Igitur et magnitudo et robur? Si robusta mulier sit, eadem specie et eodem robore robusta erit?
Hoc enim, quod est eadem, istud aio. Nichil differt ad robur esse, iuxta quod robur, sive in vira sit sive in muliere. An videtur tibi quid differre?
SO. Nonne igitur si quidem robusta sit fæmina, eadem specie roboris robusta erit?
Cum vero tandem dico, qua nihil differt, qua robur ut robur sit intelligo, seu viro, seu mulieri insit. Num tibi diferre quicquam videt?
SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man.
I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference?
(73a) Σωκράτης
ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἀρετὴ εἶναι διοίσει τι, ἐάντε ἐν παιδὶ ᾖ ἐάντε ἐν πρεσβύτῃ, ἐάντε ἐν γυναικὶ ἐάντε ἐν ἀνδρί;
SOCRATES. At virtus, ad hoc ut virtus sit, discrepabit quidquam, an in puero sit an in sene, an in vira an in muliere?
SO. Ergo et virtus, ut virtus sit, differt iuvenem, aut senem, aut virum, aut fæminam ornet?
SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?
Μένων
ἔμοιγέ πως δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο οὐκέτι ὅμοιον εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τούτοις.
MENON. Michi sane videtur, o Socrates, illud nondum simile aliis hiis.
ME. Mihi quidem o Socrates hoc cæreterorum simile nequaquam esse videt.
MENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the others.
Σωκράτης
τί δέ; οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὲν ἀρετὴν ἔλεγες πόλιν εὖ διοικεῖν, γυναικὸς δὲ οἰκίαν;
SOCRATES. Quid autem? Numquid non viri virtutem astruxisti civitatem bene disponere, mulieris vera domum?
Nonne viri virtutem esse dixisti, recte Rempub. gubernare, mulieris vero domum?
SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?
Σωκράτης
ἆρ᾽ οὖν οἷόν τε εὖ διοικεῖν ἢ πόλιν ἢ οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν, μὴ σωφρόνως καὶ δικαίως διοικοῦντα;
SOCRATES. Est igitur possibile bene disponere aut urbem aut domum aut aliud quidpiam, non sobrie ac iuste disponentem?
SO. An potest quicquam civitatem vel domum, aut aliquid aliud recte disponere, nisi temperate sive prudenter ac iuste disponat?
SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice?
Σωκράτης
τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρα ἀμφότεροι δέονται, εἴπερ μέλλουσιν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ καὶ ὁ ἀνήρ, δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης.
SOCRATES. Eorundem itaque utrique indigent, si debent boni esse, et mulier et vir, iustitie atque sobrietatis.
SO. Utrique igitur tam vir quam mulier indiget, si boni futuri sint, temperantia scilicet atque iustitia.
SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?
Σωκράτης
οὐκ ἂν δήπου, εἴ γε μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἦν αὐτῶν, τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν τρόπῳ ἀγαθοὶ ἦσαν.
SOCRATES. Non utique aliquo pacto, si non eadem virtus omnium est, eodem quoque modo boni essent.
Nunquam eadem ratione boni sint ni illorum virtus sit eadem?
SOCRATES: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless their virtue had been the same?
Σωκράτης
ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πάντων ἐστίν, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι τί αὐτό φησι Γοργίας εἶναι καὶ σὺ μετ᾽ ἐκείνου.
SOCRATES. Quandoquidem igitur eadem virtus omnium est, experior dicere ac reminisci, quid ipsum ait Gorgias esse, necnon tu cum illo.
Quoniam ergo eadem virtus est omnium, conare in memoriam reducere quidnam hoc esse Gorgias dixit, ac tu una consenseris.
SOCRATES: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.
Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴν ζητῶ γε. ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα καὶ παιδὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, καὶ δούλου, ἄρχειν οἵω τε εἶναι τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ δοκεῖ σοι ἔτι ἂν δοῦλος εἶναι ὁ ἄρχων;
SOCRATES. Ceterum sciscitor sane. Verum an pueri eadem virtus, o Menon, atque servi, principari sufficientes esse domino? An videtur tibi adhuc utique servus esse qui principatur?
SO. Requiro equidem, attamen eadem ne pueri et servi virtus erit o Meno pręesse posse domino, ac videt tibi etiam tum servus esse cum imperat?
SOCRATES: That is what I am seeking.
MENO: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.
SOCRATES: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave?
Σωκράτης
οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὦ ἄριστε: ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε σκόπει. ἄρχειν φῂς οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι. οὐ προσθήσομεν αὐτόσε τὸ δικαίως, ἀδίκως δὲ μή;
SOCRATES. Minime quippe congruum, o optime. Adhuc enim et hoc considera: principari inquis possibile esse. Nonne annectemus ad hoc iuste, iniuste certe minime?
SO. Necque enim isthuc optime vir fas esset, sed hoc rursus considera, utrum dominari posse aliquem putas, si iuste præesse dicamus; iniuste vero, nequaquam.
SOCRATES: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is ‘the power of governing;’ but do you not add ‘justly and not unjustly’?
Μένων
οἶμαι ἔγωγε: ἡ γὰρ δικαιοσύνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀρετή ἐστιν.
MENON. Puto ego quidem; nam iustitia, o Socrates, virtus est.
ME. Puto equidem, iustitia enim virtus est.
MENO: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.
(73e) Σωκράτης
πότερον ἀρετή, ὦ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετή τις;
SOCRATES. Utrum vel virtus, o Menon, vel virtus quedam?
SO. Utum virtus o Meno, an virtus quædam?
SOCRATES: Would you say ‘virtue,’ Meno, or ‘a virtue’?
Σωκράτης
ὡς περὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν. οἷον, εἰ βούλει, στρογγυλότητος πέρι εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν ἔγωγε ὅτι σχῆμά τί ἐστιν, οὐχ οὕτως ἁπλῶς ὅτι σχῆμα. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλα ἔστι σχήματα.
SOCRATES. Tamquam de alio quocumque. Ut, si velis, de rotunditate dicerem ego quoque, quoniam figura quedam est, non ita simpliciter quoniam figura. Eapropter sane sic dicerem, quoniam et alie sunt figure.
SO. Quemadmodum de quovis alio. ut ecce de rotunditate figuram quandam esse dicerem, non simpliciter figuram, ob eam sane causam ita loquerer, quia aliæ quoque figuræ præter rotunditatem sunt.
SOCRATES: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, is ‘a figure’ and not simply ‘figure,’ and I should adopt this mode of speaking, because there are other figures.
(74a) Σωκράτης
τίνας ταύτας; εἰπέ. οἷον καὶ ἐγώ σοι εἴποιμι ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχήματα, εἴ με κελεύοις: καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἰπὲ ἄλλας ἀρετάς.
SOCRATES. Quas istas? Dic. Quemadmodum et ego tibi dicam etiam alias figuras, si michi imperes; atque tu igitur michi die alias virtutes.
SO. At quas dicis alias explica obsecro. Equidem si me de aliis figuris interrogasses, utique respondissem, itaque tu quæ sint aliæ virtutes ostende.
SOCRATES: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you asked me.
Μένων
ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι.
MENON. Fortitudo igitur michi utique videtur virtus esse et sobrietas ac sapientia, necnon magnidecentia atque quam plurime.
ME. Fortitudo, temperantia, sapientia, magnificentia, cæteræque permultæ.
MENO: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues; and there are many others.
Σωκράτης
πάλιν, ὦ Μένων, ταὐτὸν πεπόνθαμεν: πολλὰς αὖ ηὑρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες, ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ νυνδή: τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν.
SOCRATES. Item, o Menon, idem toleravimus; multas adinvenimus virtutes unam investigantes, alio modo quam nunc quoque. Unam autem, que per omnes istas est, nequivimus reperire.
SO. In idem recidimus. Multas rursum virtutes, dum quærimus unam, invenimus, sed alio pacto; unam vero quæ per omnes diffunditur, reperire nequimus.
SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all.
Μένων
οὐ γὰρ δύναμαί πω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, (74b) μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.
MENON. Minime namque valeo quolibet pacto, o Socrates, vel uti tu queris, unam virtutem sumere de omnibus ceu in aliis.
ME. Nondum queo o Socrates, quod quæris, unam in omnibus virtutem quemadmodum in cæteris assequi.
MENO: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.
Σωκράτης
εἰκότως γε: ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ προθυμήσομαι, ἐὰν οἷός τ᾽ ὦ, ἡμᾶς προβιβάσαι. μανθάνεις γάρ που ὅτι οὑτωσὶ ἔχει περὶ παντός:
εἴ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ‘τί ἐστιν σχῆμα, ὦ Μένων;’
εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἴ σοι εἶπεν ἅπερ ἐγώ, ‘πότερον σχῆμα ἡ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι;’ εἶπες δήπου ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι.
SOCRATES. Competenter utique; verum ego studebo, si sufficiens fuero, nos preinstruere. Scis etenim, quoniam ita se habet de universo.
Si quis te roget hoc quod ego modo dicebam: ‘quid est figura, o Menon?’,
si ipsi diceres quia rotunditas, si tibi diceret que quidem et ego: ‘utrum scema rotunditas an scema quoddam?’, diceres uti que quoniam figura quedam?
SO. Non ab re quidem; at ego si modo potuero, perducere nos conabor. Videsne sic in cunctis contingere,
siquis a te petat idem quo modo dicebam, quid figura sit,
ac tu quod sit rotunditas responderes, et ille tibi quæ et ego inferret, utrum rotunditas sit figura, an figura quædam, an non illi diceres figuram quandam esse?
SOCRATES: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know that all things have a common notion.
Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure?
And if you answered ‘roundness,’ he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is ‘figure’ or ‘a figure;’ and you would answer ‘a figure.’
Σωκράτης
καὶ αὖ εἰ περὶ χρώματος ὡσαύτως ἀνήρετο ὅτι ἐστίν, καὶ εἰπόντος σου ὅτι τὸ λευκόν, μετὰ ταῦτα ὑπέλαβεν ὁ ἐρωτῶν: ‘πότερον τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμά ἐστιν ἢ χρῶμά τι;’ εἶπες ἂν ὅτι χρῶμά τι, διότι καὶ ἄλλα τυγχάνει ὄντα;
SOCRATES. Et rursus, si de colore similiter percunctetur quid est, atque dicente te quoniam ‘album’, post hec assumat percunctatus: ‘utrum candidum color est an color quidam?’, diceres nempe quatenus color quidam, nam et alia contingunt entia?
SO. Quin etiam si de colore similiter quid sit quærat, et tu quod albedo sit dicas, ac ille sic deinde roget, utrum albedo color sit, an color quidam, inferres ne colorem quendam ob hoc esse, quod alii quoque colores reperiantur?
SOCRATES: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other colours as well.
Σωκράτης
καὶ εἴ γέ σε ἐκέλευε λέγειν ἄλλα χρώματα, ἔλεγες (74d) ἂν ἄλλα, ἃ οὐδὲν ἧττον τυγχάνει ὄντα χρώματα τοῦ λευκοῦ;
SOCRATES. Et si tibi imperaret dicere ceteros colores, diceres utique alios, quos haud minus accidit esse colores quam candidum?
SO. Si iterum colores cæteros referre iusserit narrabis utique et alios multos, qui nihilo minus atque albedo colores sint?
SOCRATES: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?--you would have told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.
Σωκράτης
εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ μετῄει τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι ‘ἀεὶ εἰς πολλὰ ἀφικνούμεθα, ἀλλὰ μή μοι οὕτως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἑνί τινι προσαγορεύεις ὀνόματι, καὶ φῂς οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὅτι οὐ σχῆμα εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐναντία ὄντα ἀλλήλοις, ὅτι ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατέχει τὸ στρογγύλον ἢ τὸ εὐθύ, ὃ δὴ ὀνομάζεις σχῆμα (74e) καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον σχῆμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ εὐθύ;’ ἢ οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις;
SOCRATES. Si ergo velut ego pertransiret sermonem ac diceret quoniam: “semper in multa devenimus, atque minime michi sic. Immo quoniam quidem multa hoc uno appellabas vocabulo, atque ais nullum horum quod non figura esse, et eadem et contraria cum sint ad invicem, quoniam est istud nichilominus continet decusatum quam rectum, quod nominat scema, et nichilomagis inquis decusatum scema esse quam directum?” Nonne ita dicis?
SO. Quod si ille sic, ut ego nunc, sermone progrediatur, dicatque quod in multa semper residamus, quod ille fieri nequaquam permittat; cumque hæc multa uno nomine nuncupes, dicasque omnia figuram esse, inter se contraria sint licet; hoc autem quod non minus rotundum contineat quidem rectum, quam quidem figuram nominas, et nihilo magis rectum quam rotundum esse dicis?
SOCRATES: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that common nature which you designate as figure--which contains straight as well as round, and is no more one than the other--that would be your mode of speaking?
Σωκράτης
ἆρ᾽ οὖν, ὅταν οὕτω λέγῃς, τότε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς τὸ στρογγύλον εἶναι στρογγύλον ἢ εὐθύ, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ εὐθὺ ἢ στρογγύλον;
SOCRATES. Ergo igitur cum ita dicas, tunc non magis ais rotundum esse orbiculatum quam directum, neque rectum quam circulare?
SO. Cum ita dicas, inquam, nunquid rotundum magis rotundum quam rectum, aut rectum magis rectum quam rotundum esse dicis.
SOCRATES: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?
Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴν σχῆμά γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φῂς εἶναι τὸ στρογγύλον τοῦ εὐθέος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου.
SOCRATES. Verum figuram haud magis inquis esse decusatum quam rectum, neque alterum quam alterum.
SO. Verumtamen afferis rotundum nihil magis figuram esse quam rectum, neque rectum magis quam rotundum.
SOCRATES: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round?
