Σωκράτης
καλοῦσιν δέ γε ταύτην διάμετρον οἱ σοφισταί:
ὥστ᾽ εἰ ταύτῃ διάμετρος ὄνομα, ἀπὸ τῆς διαμέτρου ἄν, ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὦ παῖ Μένωνος, γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ διπλάσιον χωρίον.
SOCRATES. Vocantque istam sophiste dyametrum.
Qua de causa si huic dyametros nomen, a dyametro utique, ut tu dicis, o puer Menonis, fiet duplum spatium.
SO. Hanc vero diametrum sophistae nuncupant;
et si huic nomen est diametrus, a diametro, ut ipse ais o Puer, duplum spatium nasceretur.
SOCRATES: And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal.
And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno’s slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?
Σωκράτης
καὶ νῦν μέν γε αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται:
εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις ἀνερήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς (85d) ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων.
SOCRATES. Et nunc equidem ipsi quasi sompnium modo renovantur opiniones iste.
Si vero quis eum interroget pluries eadem hec et pluribus modis, nosti quod ad ultimum nullo minus diligenter sciet de istis.
SO. Nunc igitur huic opiniones tales quasi per somnium suscitatæ sunt.
quod si quis interroget hunc talia quædam sæpe et multa, certo scies hunc ista, siquis alius novit, perfecte cogniturum.
SOCRATES: And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, as in a dream;
but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in different forms, he would know as well as any one at last?
Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ εἶχεν, ἀεὶ καὶ ἦν ἐπιστήμων:
εἰ δὲ ἔλαβέν ποτε, οὐκ ἂν ἔν γε τῷ νῦν βίῳ εἰληφὼς εἴη. ἢ (85e) δεδίδαχέν τις τοῦτον γεωμετρεῖν;
οὗτος γὰρ ποιήσει περὶ πάσης γεωμετρίας ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἁπάντων.
ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις τοῦτον πάντα δεδίδαχεν; δίκαιος γάρ που εἶ εἰδέναι, ἄλλως τε ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ σῇ οἰκίᾳ γέγονεν καὶ τέθραπται.
SOCRATES. Igitur si semper habuit, semper erat etiam sciens.
Si vero recepit aliquando, non uti que in presenti vita accepit; aut docuit quis hunc geometricare?
Hic namque faciet de omni geometria eadem ista et ceteris doctrinis universis.
Est itaque qui hunc omnia docuerit? Iustus nimirum es scire, aliterque et quoniam in tua domo genitus est et educatus.
SO. Et si habuit semper, sciens semper extitit.
sin quandoque percipit, hac in vita nequaquam. nemo enim hunc geometrica docuit,
cum in cæteris omnibus quæcumque vel ad geometriam, vel alias disciplinas pertinent, hæc eadem sit facturus.
Ast ne aliquis a quo hic illa omnia didicerit? Verisimile est te illum cognoscere, pręsertim cum penes te et natus et nutritus fuerit.
SOCRATES: But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have known;
or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry;
for he may be made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge.
Now, has any one ever taught him all this? You must know about him, if, as you say, he was born and bred in your house.
Σωκράτης
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ λαβών, οὐκ ἤδη τοῦτο (86a) δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ εἶχε καὶ ἐμεμαθήκει;
SOCRATES. Sin autem non in presenti vita accipiens non novit, hoc clarum, quoniam in alio aliquo tempore habuit et addidicit.
SO. Sin autem utpote in præsenti vita minime adeptus, haud novit, patet eum alio quodam in tempore habuisse atque didicisse.
SOCRATES: But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then he must have had and learned it at some other time?
Σωκράτης
εἰ οὖν ὅν τ᾽ ἂν ᾖ χρόνον καὶ ὃν ἂν μὴ ᾖ ἄνθρωπος, ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι, αἳ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται, ἆρ᾽ οὖν τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον μεμαθηκυῖα ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.
SOCRATES. Si igitur, quando fuerit tempore et quocumque non homo fuerit, inerunt ipsi vere opiniones, questiones excitate scientie fiunt. Ergo igitur semper tempore erudita fuerit anima eius? Liquidest quippe quoniam omni tempore est vel non est homo.
SO. Ergo siquando tempus sin in quo homo non fuit, inerunt tamen ipsi opiniones veræ, quæ sciscitando expergefactæ, scientiæ fiunt, certe per omne tempus hæc hominis animus sciet. nam omne per tempus, aut est, aut non est homo.
SOCRATES: And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?
(86b) Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀεὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ εἴη,
ὥστε θαρροῦντα χρὴ ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος νῦν—τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ μεμνημένος—ἐπιχειρεῖν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι;
SOCRATES. Igitur si semper veritas nobis eorum, queque sunt, est in anima, immortalis utique erit anima.
Eapropter confidentem oportet, quod minus est sciens modo - hoc autem est quod non reminiscens - aggredi querere et recordari.
SO. Nonne igitur si semper rerum omnium veritas in animo est, immortalis extitit?
Quamobrem audacter et magna cum fiducia oportet, quæ in præsentia minime scimus, hoc et minime recordamur, ut reminiscamur inquirere.
SOCRATES: And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then the soul is immortal.
Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what you do not know, or rather what you do not remember.
Σωκράτης
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐμοί, ὦ Μένων.
καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διισχυρισαίμην:
ὅτι δ᾽ οἰόμενοι δεῖν ζητεῖν ἃ μή τις οἶδεν βελτίους ἂν εἶμεν καὶ ἀνδρικώτεροι καὶ ἧττον ἀργοὶ ἢ εἰ οἰοίμεθα ἃ μὴ ἐπιστάμεθα μηδὲ (86c) δυνατὸν εἶναι εὑρεῖν μηδὲ δεῖν ζητεῖν,
περὶ τούτου πάνυ ἂν διαμαχοίμην, εἰ οἷός τε εἴην, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ.
SOCRATES. Nescio quomodo, etenim ego michi, o Menon.
Et equidem alia non utique pro hac sententia instarem.
Quoniam autumantes oportere querere que minime quis novit, potiores uti que simus et viriliores et minus desidiosi, quam si arbitremur, que nequaquam scimus, non possibile esse invenire nec oportere querere:
super hoc omnino decertarem, si possibilis essem, et verbo et opere.
SO. Mihi quoque o Meno.
atque cætera non admodum contendo,
quod autem qui quæ nesciunt inquirenda putant, meliores arrectioresque, et pigri ad vestigandum minus sint, quam qui quæ nesciunt, etiam non quæri posse putant,
isthuc vero et verbis, et si queam, re ipsa contendam.
SOCRATES: And I, Meno, like what I am saying.
Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident.
But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know;
--that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.
Σωκράτης
βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ὁμονοοῦμεν ὅτι ζητητέον περὶ οὗ μή τις οἶδεν, ἐπιχειρήσωμεν κοινῇ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρετή;
SOCRATES. Vis ergo, quandoquidem consentimus, quoniam querendum de quo minime quis novit, conemur communiter querere, quid sit virtus?
SO. Vis ne igitur postque confessi sumus ignota perscrutari licerer, quid virtus sit, communiter vestigemus?
SOCRATES: Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together into the nature of virtue?
Μένων
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὐ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε ἐκεῖνο ἂν ἥδιστα, ὅπερ ἠρόμην τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ σκεψαίμην καὶ ἀκούσαιμι, πότερον ὡς διδακτῷ ὄντι αὐτῷ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν, (86d) ἢ ὡς φύσει ἢ ὡς τίνι ποτὲ τρόπῳ παραγιγνομένης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀρετῆς.
MENON. Penitus revera. Necnon, o Socrates, sed ego quidem illud libentissime, quod indagavi primum et contemplatus sum, audirem itaque: utrum tamquam docibili existenti ei deceat intendere, an quasi natura sive velut aliquocumque modo adveniente hominibus virtute.
ME. Quam maxime; gratius tamen mihi esset audire prius, quod in principio disputationis interrogavi, quomodo virtuti incumbendum sit, velut ei quæ doctrina percipiatur, vel quę natura potius insit, vel quę alio quopiam pacto hominibus parant.
MENO: By all means, Socrates. And yet I would much rather return to my original question, Whether in seeking to acquire virtue we should regard it as a thing to be taught, or as a gift of nature, or as coming to men in some other way?
Σωκράτης
ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἐγὼ ἦρχον, ὦ Μένων, μὴ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεψάμεθα πρότερον εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή, πρὶν ὅτι ἐστὶν πρῶτον ἐζητήσαμεν αὐτό:
ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, ἐμοῦ δὲ ἐπιχειρεῖς τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεις, συγχωρήσομαί σοι—τί γὰρ χρὴ ποιεῖν;
—ἔοικεν οὖν σκεπτέον (86e) εἶναι ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ὃ μήπω ἴσμεν ὅτι ἐστίν.
εἰ μή τι οὖν ἀλλὰ σμικρόν γέ μοι τῆς ἀρχῆς χάλασον, καὶ συγχώρησον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αὐτὸ σκοπεῖσθαι, εἴτε διδακτόν ἐστιν εἴτε ὁπωσοῦν.
λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὧδε, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποῦνται, ἐπειδάν τις ἔρηται αὐτούς, οἷον περὶ χωρίου, εἰ οἷόν τε ἐς τόνδε τὸν κύκλον τόδε τὸ χωρίον (87a) τρίγωνον ἐνταθῆναι,
εἴποι ἄν τις ὅτι ‘οὔπω οἶδα εἰ ἔστιν τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ μέν τινα ὑπόθεσιν προὔργου οἶμαι ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα τοιάνδε:
εἰ μέν ἐστιν τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον τοιοῦτον οἷον παρὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ γραμμὴν παρατείναντα ἐλλείπειν τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ παρατεταμένον ᾖ, ἄλλο τι συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ ἄλλο αὖ, εἰ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ταῦτα παθεῖν.
ὑποθέμενος οὖν ἐθέλω (87b) εἰπεῖν σοι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ τῆς ἐντάσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν κύκλον, εἴτε ἀδύνατον εἴτε μή.’
οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἡμεῖς, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἴσμεν οὔθ᾽ ὅτι ἐστὶν οὔθ᾽ ὁποῖόν τι, ὑποθέμενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν, ὧδε λέγοντες:
εἰ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων ἀρετή, διδακτὸν ἂν εἴη ἢ οὐ διδακτόν;
πρῶτον μὲν δὴ εἰ ἔστιν ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷον ἐπιστήμη, ἆρα διδακτὸν ἢ οὔ, ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀναμνηστόν
—διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν (87c) ὁποτέρῳ ἂν τῷ ὀνόματι χρώμεθα—ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα διδακτόν; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο διδάσκεται ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἐπιστήμην;
SOCRATES. Sed si ego imperarem, o Menon, non solum michi ipsi sed et tibi, non utique indagaremus prius, sive docibile sive non docibile virtus, antequam quid sit primo scrutati essemus ipsum.
Quoniam vero tui ipsius non conaris imperare, ut nempe liber (sis), michique intendis imperare atque imperas, indulgebo tibi; quid namque con venit facere?
Videtur igitur considerandum esse, quale quid sit quod nondum novimus quid sit.
Sin autem quid ergo immo modicum michi imperium laxa, et permitte ex ypotesi hoc contemplari, sive docibile est sive qualitercumque.
Dico utique ex ypotesi hoc modo, quemadmodum geometre frequenter speculantur, quotienscumque quis interrogaverit eos, velut de superficie, an possibile in hunc equidem circulum hanc superficiem triangulam collocare.
Dicat autem quis quoniam: “Nondum novi, utrum sit istud tale, sed quasi quandam ypotesim opere pretium reor habere ad rem talem quoque:
Si est hec superficies huiusmodi, ut ad datam eius lineam extendentem relinqui tali superficiei, qualis uti que ipsa proposita fuerit, aliud quid michi acciderit; videtur et aliud item, si (im)possibile est hoc pati.
Ponens ergo volo dicere tibi, quid accidit de collocatione in circulo, sive impossibile sive minime.”
Sic autem et de virtute nos, quoniam quidem nescimus neque quid sit neque quale quid, ponentes ipsum consideremus, sive docibile sit an non docibile, sic dicentes:
“Si quale quid est eorum, qui circa animam sunt, virtus, docibile utique sit vel non docibile?
Primum equidem si est alteriusmodi quam quale scientia, igitur docibile vel non - seu quod nunc diximus recordabile,
differat sane nichil nobis utrocumque nomine utamur - sed putas docibile? An hoc equidem omni constans, quia nichil aliud docetur homo quam scientiam?”
SO. Atque si tibi o Meno quemadmodum mihi ipsi imperarem, haud prius utrum doceant nec ne virtus perscrutaremur, atque quid ipsa sit indagassemus.
Postque vero nec tu te tibi dominari contendis ut liber vivas, ac me ut tuo arbitratu respondeam obsecras, iam utique respondebo.
Vident igitur considerandum esse quale sit quod nondum quid est cognovimus.
Attamen paulisper a proposito tuo declina, idque ex suppositio ne considerare permitte, doctrinane an alio pacto virtus possideant.
Ex permisso autem sic dico, quamadmodum geometræ sępe discuntur, postque illos quis inter rogavit; veluti de spatio, ut possit ne in hoc circulo triquentrum hoc spacium expandi
ubi si quis dixerit, nondum se nosse an hoc huiusmodi sit, permissionem arbitror talem conducere.
Si enim est hoc spatio deficiat, quantum ipsum est protensum, aluid quiddam eventurum puto; et aliud item, si talia quędam pati nequeat.
Ex permissione igitur disputare decrevi de iis quem contingunt circa expansionem illius in circulum, an fieri possit nec ne.
Sic et nos de virtute, quonima nec quid, nec quale sit novimus, permisso hoc, utrum doceri possit in hunc modum quæremus.
Si virtus est aliquid eorum quæ circa animum versantur, doceri potest, an non.
Principio si aliud est quam scientia, num doceri poterit an non? vel potius, ut modo diximus, memoria revocari?
nihil referat apud nos utro nomine utamur. sed an doceri poterit? an id ominbus manifestum, quod peter scientiam nihil homo docentur?
SOCRATES: Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained ‘what it is.’
But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of controlling yourself,--such being your notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible.
And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of which I do not as yet know the nature.
At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question ‘Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,’ to be argued upon hypothesis?
As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable being inscribed in a certain circle (Or, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in a certain circle.),
will reply: ‘I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion:
If the figure be such that when you have produced a given side of it (Or, when you apply it to the given line, i.e. the diameter of the circle (autou).), the given area of the triangle falls short by an area corresponding to the part produced (Or, similar to the area so applied.), then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other;
and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle’: --that is a geometrical hypothesis.
And we too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis:
as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not?
Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,--in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, ‘remembered’?
For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?
Σωκράτης
τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, δεῖ σκέψασθαι πότερόν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἀλλοῖον ἐπιστήμης.
SOCRATES. Istud autem post hoc, ut videtur, perspici oportet, utrum sit scientia virtus, seu alteriusmodi a scientia.
SO. Posthac investigandum censeo utrum virtus scientia, aut alium quiddam sit.
SOCRATES: The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species?
Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης, τάχ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη τις:
εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν ὃ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη περιέχει, ἐπιστήμην ἄν τιν᾽ αὐτὸ ὑποπτεύοντες εἶναι ὀρθῶς ὑποπτεύοιμεν.
SOCRATES. Itaque si quid est bonum et illud disparatum a scientia, fors utique erit virtus non scientia quedam.
Si vero nichil est bonum, quod non scientia contineat scientiam sane quid ipsum suspicantes esse recte suspicamur.
SO. Si quidem est aliquod seorsum a scientia bonum, nonne virtus forsitan scientia nulla erit?
sin autem nullum bonum est quin scientia comprehendatur, scientiam esse virtutem suspicantes, recte utique suspicabimur?
SOCRATES: Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good;
but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?
Σωκράτης
σκεψώμεθα δὴ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀναλαμβάνοντες ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ.
ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή: ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα. (88a) οὐχί;
SOCRATES. Speculemur autem singulum assumentes, qualia sunt que nobis prosunt.
Sanitas dicimus et robur et pulchritudo atque divitie utique, hec dicimus et huiusmodi commoda, nonne?
SO. Consideremus rursus in singulis qualia sint quæ nobis prosunt;
sanitas ne et robur, foramque atque divitiæ, cæteraque huiusmodi conferre dicuntur?
SOCRATES: Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit us.
Health and strength, and beauty and wealth--these, and the like of these, we call profitable?
Σωκράτης
σκόπει δή, ὅταν τί ἑκάστου τούτων ἡγῆται, ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅταν τί, βλάπτει;
ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ὀρθὴ χρῆσις, ὠφελεῖ, ὅταν δὲ μή, βλάπτει;
SOCRATES. Intuere vero, quando quid unicuique horum precedat, prodest nobis, et quando quid, obest.
Igitur nonne quotiens rectus usus, prodest; quotiens autem minime, obest?
SO. Vide itaque quo duce hæc obsint, quove prosint.
nonne cum rectus usus præest, iuvant, contra vero nocent?
SOCRATES: And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse?
Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?
Σωκράτης
ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ (88b) τοιαῦτα;
SOCRATES. Amplius sane et secundum animam consideremus. Sobrietatem quid vocas et iustitiam et fortitudinem et discibilitatem et memoriam atque magnidecentiam et cuncta huiusmodi?
SO. Præterea quæ circa animum versantur consideremus. Temperantiam aliquid vocas, et iustitiam, et fortitudinem, docilitatemque, et memoriam, et magnificentiam, et huiusmodi reliquam?
SOCRATES: Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnanimity, and the like?
Σωκράτης
σκόπει δή, τούτων ἅττα σοι δοκεῖ μὴ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμης, εἰ οὐχὶ τοτὲ μὲν βλάπτει, τοτὲ δὲ ὠφελεῖ;
οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ᾽ οἷον θάρρος τι:
οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῇ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῷ, ὠφελεῖται;
SOCRATES. Speculate sane horum, que tibi videntur haud (scientia) esse, verum aliud a scientia; seu nonne interdum obsunt interdumque proficiunt?
Veluti fortitudo, si non sit prudentia fortitudo atqui qualis ausus quidam;
nonne quotiens absque mente audeat homo, leditur; quotiens vero cum mente, proficitur?
SO. Adverte quæso. quæqunque ex iis scinetiæ nequaquam esse videntur, sed aliud quiddam præter scientiam, nonne interdum iuvant, interdum lædunt,
veluti fortitudo remota prudentia? num fortitudo alium est quam audacia quædam;
cum ratione quiquam audet, iuvatur, cum absque ratione, læditur?
SOCRATES: And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful;
as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only a sort of confidence?
When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?
Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν συλλήβδην πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιχειρήματα καὶ καρτερήματα ἡγουμένης μὲν φρονήσεως εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τελευτᾷ, ἀφροσύνης δ᾽ εἰς τοὐναντίον;
SOCRATES. Nonne igitur una cuncta anime argumenta et perseverantie ducente quoque prudentia in bonitatem consummantur, imprudentia nempe in contrarium?
SO. Ut ergo summatim dicam, omnes animæ impetus, atque omnes declinationes ducente prudentia ad beatudinem tendunt, imprudentia vero ad conrarium.
SOCRATES: And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite?
Σωκράτης
εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τί ἐστιν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὠφελίμῳ εἶναι, φρόνησιν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι,
ἐπειδήπερ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὰ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ οὔτε ὠφέλιμα οὔτε βλαβερά ἐστιν, προσγενομένης δὲ φρονήσεως (88d) ἢ ἀφροσύνης βλαβερά τε καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται.
κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὠφέλιμόν γε οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν φρόνησιν δεῖ τιν᾽ εἶναι.
SOCRATES. Si ergo virtus eorum que in anima quid est et necessarium ipsum commodum esse, prudentiam oportet ipsum esse,
quandoquidem omnia, que secundum animam ipsa quidem secundum seipsa neque commoda nec noxia sunt, accedente profecto prudentia vel imprudentia nocivaque et utilia fiunt.
Secundum autem hanc rationem commodam existentem virtutem prudentiam quandam esse oportet.
SO. Quapropter si virtus aliquid est eorum quę consistunt in animo, necessariosque utilis est, prudentiam hanc esse oportet;
quippe cum omnia quę sunt circa animum, ipsa quidem secundum seipsa, nec commoda, nec incommoda sint; adiuncta vero prudentia, velimprudentia, statim aut utilia, aut noxia fiant.
Hac itaque ratione virtutem cum maxime omnium conferat, prudentiam quandam esse constat.
SOCRATES: If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence,
since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly;
and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?
Σωκράτης
καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, πλοῦτόν τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τοτὲ δὲ βλαβερὰ εἶναι, ἆρα οὐχ ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ ψυχῇ ἡ φρόνησις ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐποίει, ἡ δὲ ἀφροσύνη βλαβερά,
οὕτως αὖ (88e) καὶ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ ὀρθῶς μὲν χρωμένη καὶ ἡγουμένη ὠφέλιμα αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, μὴ ὀρθῶς δὲ βλαβερά;
SOCRATES. Et quidem etiam cetera, que nunc diximus, divitiasque et similia, tunc vero bona tunc autem nociva esse, itaque non quasi alii anime prudentia ducens utilia ea que sunt anime effecit, necnon imprudentia noxia,
ita rursus etiam hiis anima recte usa et ducens utilia ipsa reddit, non recte quoque nociva?
SO. Quinetiam in aliis quæ modo dicebamus, opulentiam atque similia tum utilia esse, tum noxia; nonne quem admodum prudentia cæteris animi viribus et officiis præsidens utilia reddit, imprudentia vero ontraria,
sic et illis animus recte utens atque ducens boan efficit, non recte autem mala?
SOCRATES: And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly;
just as the things of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?
Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντων εἰπεῖν ἔστιν,
τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνηρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς εἰς φρόνησιν, εἰ (89a) μέλλει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι:
καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη τὸ ὠφέλιμον: φαμὲν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφέλιμον εἶναι;
SOCRATES. Ad hunc modum de cunctis dicere est:
homini nempe universa reliqua ex anima dependere, ea vero que anime ex prudentia, si debeant bona fieri.
Et hac ratione prudentia utique erit quod est commodum, dicimusque virtutem esse commodum?
SO. Quamobrem omnino afferendum est
cætera quidem humana omnia referri ad animum; quæ vero in anima sunt, ad prudentiam, si modo bona futura sunt;
eaque ratio ne prudentia ipsum utile erit, virtutem vero utilem esse dudum diximus.
SOCRATES: And is not this universally true of human nature?
All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good;
and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits--and virtue, as we say, is profitable?
(89b) Σωκράτης
καὶ γὰρ ἄν που καὶ τόδ᾽ ἦν: εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, ἦσάν που ἂν ἡμῖν οἳ ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις,
οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκείνων ἀποφηνάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἂν ἐν ἀκροπόλει, κατασημηνάμενοι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ χρυσίον, ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοιντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοιντο ταῖς πόλεσι.
SOCRATES. Etenim et hoc esset: si natura efficerentur, essent aliqui qui agnoscerent iuvenum bonos naturis.
Quos nos utique assumentes illis, demonstrantibus custodiremus utique in turre, designantes multo magis quam aurum, quatenus nullus eos corrumperet,
sed cum pervenirent in etatem, utiles redderentur urbibus.
SO. Id præterea contingeret, si natura boni fierent; adessent profecto nobis qui filios nostros natura bonos dignosserent,
eosque nos illorum indiciis selectos in arce quadam conservaremus, multo magis quam aurum custoditus, ne quis corrumpat,
mox ubi adoleverit, utiles essent Reipub. cives.
SOCRATES: If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great men;
and on their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in order that no one might tamper with them;
and when they grew up they would have been useful to the state?
Μένων
δοκεῖ μοι ἤδη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι: καὶ δῆλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὅτι διδακτόν ἐστιν.
MENON. Videtur michi iam necessarium et clarum esse, o Socrates, secundum ypotesim, siquidem scientia est virtus, quoniam docibile est.
ME. Necessarium id apparet. Ac secundum sentiantiam nostram sequitur, ut si virtus est scientia, doctrina percipiant.
MENO: There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is taught.
Σωκράτης
ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἄρτι μόνον δέῃ αὐτὸ δοκεῖν καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα, εἰ μέλλει τι αὐτοῦ ὑγιὲς εἶναι.
At non in presenti solum oporteat ipsum videri bene dici, immo et in presenti et in futuro, si debeat quid ipsius integrum esse.
SO. At non in pręterito solum, sed in pręsenti etiam et futuro tempore tale videri debet, siquid in eo synceri futurum est.
SOCRATES: Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only just now, but always.
Σωκράτης
ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ, ὦ Μένων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διδακτὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐ καλῶς λέγεσθαι:
ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, σκέψαι ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἰκότως ἀπιστεῖν.
τόδε γάρ μοι εἰπέ: εἰ ἔστιν διδακτὸν ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, μὴ μόνον ἀρετή, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ διδασκάλους καὶ μαθητὰς εἶναι;
SOCRATES. Ego tibi dicam, o Menon. Nam docibile ipsum esse siquidem scientia est, haud contrapono ne non bene dici.
Quod autem non sit scientia, intende si tibi videor competenter ambigere.
Hoc enim michi dic: si est docibilis quelibet res - non solum virtus - num necesse ipsius et doctores et discipulos esse?
SO. Dicam tibi o Meno, virtutem quidem doceri posse, siquidem scientia est, nequaque reiicio quasi minus recte sit dictum;
atque vero scientia sit, vide an non merito diffidam.
Age, id mihi responde. Si quid doceri potest, non de virtute solum, sed quolibet alio loquor, an non illius præceptores, discipulosque esse aliquos necesse est.
SOCRATES: I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught;
but I fear that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge:
for consider now and say whether virtue, and not only virtue but anything that is taught, must not have teachers and disciples?
(89e) Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν τοὐναντίον αὖ, οὗ μήτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἶεν, καλῶς ἂν αὐτὸ εἰκάζοντες εἰκάζοιμεν μὴ διδακτὸν εἶναι;
SOCRATES. Igitur econtrario item, cuius neque doctores neque discipuli fuerint, bene utrque ipsum ymaginati ymaginemur non docibile esse?
SO. Ac contra, cuius nec doctores extant, nec auditores, si id doceeri non posse coniiciamus, nonne probabiliter coniectabimus?
SOCRATES: And conversely, may not the art of which neither teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of being taught?
