(8) ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐθενός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου (9) ἡ ῥητορική, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἡ διαλεκτική, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φα(10)νερόν,
καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρ(11)χοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις (12) τέχναις πάσαις
(οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ (13) μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ (14) τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὅμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς)·
(15) πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς τό τε πιθανὸν καὶ τὸ φαινό(16)μενον ἰδεῖν πιθανόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συλλο(17)γισμόν τε καὶ φαινόμενον συλλογισμόν·
ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ (18) οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει·
πλὴν ἐνταῦθα μὲν (19) ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (20) ῥήτωρ,
ἐκεῖ δὲ σοφιστὴς μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτι(21)κὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν.
فقد استبان اذا ان الريطورية ليست جنسا لشيء واحد مفرد لكنها بمنزلة الديالقطيقية وانها جد نافعة
وانه ليس عملها ان تقنع لكن ان تعرف المقنعات في كل امر من الامور كما يوجد في صناعات اخر
فان الطب ايضا ليس عمله ان يؤتى الشفاء لكن ان يبلغ من ذلك حيث يستطاع ان يبلغ وقد يشترك الضعفاء ايضا في الشفاء ولكن الشفاء بالصواب الصناعة
ثم في الريطورية ايضا مقنع وما يرى مقنعا كمثل ما الديالقطيقية مسلجس وما يُرى مسلجسا
فاما السوفسطي فليس بالقوة يكون سوفسطيا لكن بالمشيئة.
فليكن الريطوريون هاهنا اما بعض فمن جهة العلم واما بعض فمن جهة المشيئة.
فأما هناك فالسوفسطي من جهة المشيئة وأما الديالقطيقي فليس من جهة المشيئة لكن من جهة القوة
Iam ergo patuit quoniam rethorica non est alicujus unius generis singularis sed quoniam est ad modum dialectice, et quoniam ipsa est utilis valde,
et quoniam opus ejus non est ut persuadeat sed ut doceat persuasione in qualibet rerum, quemadmodum invenitur in aliis artibus.
Neque enim opus est medicine ut compleat medicationem, sed ut pertingat in hoc usque potest perveniri. Et jam quoque participant medicationem etiam imperfecti vel debiles, verumptamen medicatio secundum rectitudinem artis est.
Deinde in rethorica quidem etiam est persuasivum et quod videtur persuasivum, prout est in disputativa quod est sillo[68rb]gizans et quod videtur sillogizans.
Sophistica vero non est secundum facilitatem soph[36vb]istica sed secundum voluntatem.
Sit igitur quidem hic rethorice quiddam ex parte scientie et quiddam ex parte voluntatis.
Illic autem sophicus quidem ex parte voluntatis disputativa vero non ex parte voluntatis at ex parte facultatis.
Quoniam quidem igitur rethorica non sit alicuius generis determinati, sed quemadmodum dialetica, et quoniam utilis, manifestum est,
et quod non est opus ipsius probare, sed scire que sunt probabilia circa unumquodque, sicut et in aliis artibus
(non enim est medicine sanitatem facere, sed quousque contingit, usque ad hoc ducere; est enim et impossibiles assumere sanitatem tamen curare bene),
adhuc autem quod eiusdem est scire probabile et apparens probabile scire, quemadmodum et in dialetica sillogismum quidem et apparentem sillogismum;
sophistica enim non in potentia, sed in voluntate est;
verum hic est hic quidem secundum scientiam, hic vero secundum voluntatem rethor,
illic vero sophista quidem secundum voluntatem, dialeticus autem non secundum voluntatem, sed secundum potentiam.
Quod quidem igitur non est neque unius alicuius generis determinati rethorica, sed quemadmodum dialetica, et quia utilis, manifestum,
et quod non est opus ipsius persuadere, sed videre existentia persuasibilia circa unumquodque, sicut et in aliis artibus
(non enim est rnedicinalis sanitates efficere, sed usque quo contingit usque ad hoc perducere; est enim et eos qui non possunt recipere sanitatem tamen medicari bene),
ad hec autem quod eiusdem persuasibile videre et apparens persuasibile, sicut et in dialetica sillogismum et apparentem sillogismum;
sophistica enim non in potentia, sed in electione est;
verumptamen hic erit iste quidem secundum scientiam, ille autem secundum electionem rethor,
ibi autem sophysta quidem secundum electionem, dialeticus autem non secundum electionem, sed secundum potentiam.
It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful.
It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts.
For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health.
Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism.
What makes a man a ‘sophist’ is not his faculty, but his moral purpose.
In rhetoric, however, the term ‘rhetorician’ may describe either the speaker’s knowledge of the art, or his moral purpose.
In dialectic it is different: a man is a ‘sophist’ because he has a certain kind of moral purpose, a ‘dialectician’ in respect, not of his moral purpose, but of his faculty.