(4) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ συλ(5)λογίζεσθαι εἴτε πολιτικῷ συλλογισμῷ εἴθ’ ὁποιῳοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον (6) κατὰ τούτου ἔχειν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια·
μηδὲν γὰρ (7) ἔχων ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοις συνάγειν.
λέγω δ’ οἷον πῶς ἂν (8) δυναίμεθα συμβουλεύειν Ἀθηναίοις εἰ πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ (9) πολεμητέον, μὴ ἔχοντες τίς ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν, πότερον ναυ(10)τικὴ ἢ πεζικὴ ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ αὕτη πόση, καὶ πρόσοδοι τίνες ἢ (11) φίλοι καὶ ἐχθροί, εἶτα τίνας πολέμους πεπολεμήκασι καὶ πῶς, (12) καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα·
ἢ ἐπαινεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλα(13)μῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν (14) Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.
ἐκ γὰρ τῶν (15) ὑπαρχόντων ἢ δοκούντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες.
(16) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τί (17) ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν,
οἷον ὅτι τοὺς (18) Ἕλληνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον (19) συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας ἠνδραποδίσαντο, Αἰγινή(20)τας καὶ Ποτιδαιάτας, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, [καὶ] εἴ τι ἄλλο (21) τοιοῦτον ἁμάρτημα ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.
ὡς δ’ αὔτως καὶ οἱ κατ(22)ηγοροῦντες καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοπού(23)μενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται.
οὐδὲν δὲ διαφέρει περὶ (24) Ἀθηναίων ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεοῦ, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο (25) δρᾶν·
καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύοντα τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, καὶ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ (26) ψέγοντα, καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὰ (27) ὑπάρχοντα ἢ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον,
ἵν’ ἐκ τούτων (28) λέγωμεν, ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες εἴ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ὑπ(29)άρχει, κατηγοροῦντες δ’ ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι εἴ τι δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, (30) συμβουλεύοντες δ’ εἴ τι συμφέρον ἢ βλαβερόν.
The first thing we have to remember is this. Whether our argument concerns public affairs or some other subject, we must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject on which we are to speak and argue.
Otherwise we can have no materials out of which to construct arguments.
I mean, for instance, how could we advise the Athenians whether they should go to war or not, if we did not know their strength, whether it was naval or military or both, and how great it is; what their revenues amount to; who their friends and enemies are; what wars, too, they have waged, and with what success; and so on?
Or how could we eulogize them if we knew nothing about the sea—fight at Salamis, or the battle of Marathon, or what they did for the Heracleidae, or any other facts like that?
All eulogy is based upon the noble deeds——real or imaginary——that stand to the credit of those eulogized.
On the same principle, invectives are based on facts of the opposite kind: the orator looks to see what base deeds——real or imaginary——stand to the discredit of those he is attacking,
such as treachery to the cause of Hellenic freedom, or the enslavement of their gallant allies against the barbarians (Aegina, Potidaea, &c.), or any other misdeeds of this kind that are recorded against them.
So, too, in a court of law: whether we are prosecuting or defending, we must pay attention to the existing facts of the case.
It makes no difference whether the subject is the Lacedaemonians or the Athenians, a man or a god; we must do the same thing.
Suppose it to be Achilles whom we are to advise, to praise or blame, to accuse or defend; here too we must take the facts, real or imaginary;
these must be our material, whether we are to praise or blame him for the noble or base deeds he has done, to accuse or defend him for his just or unjust treatment of others, or to advise him about what is or is not to his interest.