ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι (18) σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον (βουλεύονται γὰρ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ (19) περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ (20) τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν),
ληπτέον ἂν εἴη τὰ στοι(21)χεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἁπλῶς. ἔστω δὴ ἀγα(22)θὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ᾖ αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἄλλο (23) αἱρούμεθα, καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν (24) ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν, καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ (25) ἀποδοίη,
ومن اجل انّ المشير انّما غرضه المقدّم في فكره النافعات فقد يشير ليس في العاقبة لكن في الاتي تكون في العاقبة وهي النافعات عند الأفعال ، والنافع يعدّ خيرا،
ثمّ انّه ان كانت في الخير وفي النافع مرسلا حروف واصول فاّن الخير هو الذي يختار من اجل نفسه والذي يختار غيره من اجله والذي يتشوّق اليه الكّل اي من ذوى الحّس او الفهم
Now the political or deliberative orator’s aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing.
We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts about Goodness and Utility in general. We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason;