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Aristoteles: Categoriae

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Click to Expand/Collapse OptionTitle
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter I
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter II
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter III
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter IV
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter V: De substantia
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VI: De quantitate
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VII: De relativis ved ad aliquid
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VIII: De quali et qualitate
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter IX: De facere et pati
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter X: De oppositis
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XI
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XII: De priore
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XIII: De his quae simul sunt
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XIV: De motu
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XV: De habere
(36) Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν (37) ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον·  οἷον (38) τὸ μεῖζον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς γὰρ μεῖ(39)ζον λέγεται,—  καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἑτέρου λέγεται τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐ(6b1)στίν, —τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον λέγεται·—  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα (2) τοιαῦτα.  ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τι οἷον ἕξις, διά(3)θεσις, αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις·  πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα (4) τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι·  ἡ (5) γὰρ ἕξις τινὸς ἕξις λέγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη (6) καὶ ἡ θέσις τινὸς θέσις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως.  πρός τι (7) οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσ(8)οῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον·  οἷον ὄρος μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον, (9) —πρός τι γὰρ μέγα λέγεται τὸ ὄρος,—  καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον (10) λέγεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσαύτως πρός τι λέ(11)γεται.  ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀνάκλισις καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ ἡ καθέ(12)δρα θέσεις τινές, ἡ δὲ θέσις τῶν πρός τι·  τὸ δὲ ἀνακε<κλ>ίσθαι (13) ἢ ἑστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ θέσεις, παρωνύ(14)μως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων θέσεων λέγεται. 
                       
(7,1) DE RELATIVIS VEL AD ALIQUID: Ad aliquid uero talia dicuntur quaecumque hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum (2) dicuntur, uel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud,  ut maius hoc ipsum quod (3) est ad aliud dicitur (aliquo enim maius dicitur),  et duplex ad aliud (4) dicitur hoc ipsum quod est (alicuius enim duplex dicitur);  similiter (5) autem et quaecumque alia talia sunt.  At uero sunt etiam et haec ad (6) aliquid, ut habitus, affectio, scientia, sensus, positio;  haec enim (7) omnia quae dicta sunt hoc ipsum quod sunt aliorum dicuntur et non (8) aliter;  habitus enim alicuius habitus est, et scientia alicuius (9) scientia, et positio alicuius positio, et alia quidem similiter.  Ad (10) aliquid ergo sunt quaecumque id quod sunt aliorum dicuntur uel (11) quomodolibet aliter ad aliud;  ut mons magnus dicitur ad montem alium (12) (magnum enim ad aliquid dicitur),  et simile alicui simile dicitur, et (13) omnia talia similiter ad aliquid dicuntur.  Est autem et accubitus et (14) statio et sessio positiones quaedam, positio uero ad aliquid est;  (15) iacere autem uel stare u el sedere ipsa quidem non sunt positiones, (16) denominatiue uero ex his quae dictae sunt positionibus nominantur. 
                       
Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing.  For instance, the word ’superior’ is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant.  Similarly, the expression ’double’ has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant.  So it is with everything else of this kind.  There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude.  The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way.  Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned.  Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition ’of’ or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation.  Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something.  Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference.  It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term.  To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes. 
(15) Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, οἷον (16) ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν, καὶ ἐπι(17)στήμη ἀγνοίᾳ.  οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρός τι ὑπάρχει ἐναντίον· (18) τῷ γὰρ διπλασίῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τῷ τρι(19)πλασίῳ οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί.  —δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλ(20)λον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρός τι·  ὅμοιον γὰρ (21) μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, καὶ ἄνισον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον (22) λέγεται, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν·  (23) τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον (24) τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τινὶ ἄνισον.  οὐ πάντα (25) δὲ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ διπλάσιον (26) οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διπλάσιον οὐδὲ τῶν τοι(27)ούτων οὐδέν. 
           
(17) Inest autem et contrarietas in relatione, ut uirtus malitiae (18) contrarium est, cum sit utrumque ad aliquid, et scientia (19) inscientiae.  Non autem omnibus relatiuis inest contrarietas; duplici (20) enim nihil est contrarium, neque uero triplici neque ulli (21) talium.  Videntur autem et magis et minus relatiua suscipere;  simile (22) enim magis et minus dicitur, et inaequale magis et minus dicitur, cum (23) utrumque sit relatiuum  (simile enim alicui simile dicitur et inaequale (24) alicui intequale).  Non autem omnia suscipiunt magis et minus; duplex (25) enim non dicitur magis et minus duplex, nec aliquid talium. 
           
It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary, ignorance.  But this is not the mark of all relatives; ’double’ and ’triple’ have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.  It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree.  For ’like’ and ’unlike’, ’equal’ and ’unequal’, have the modifications ’more’ and ’less’ applied to them, and each of these is relative in character:  for the terms ’like’ and ’unequal’ bear ’unequal’ bear a reference to something external.  Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such as ’double’ admits of this modification. 
(28) Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται,  οἷον (29) ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου λέγεται δοῦλος καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δού(30)λου δεσπότης λέγεται,  καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον (31) καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλασίου ἥμισυ, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος μεῖζον (32) καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μείζονος ἔλαττον·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν (33) ἄλλων·  πλὴν τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν,  οἷον (34) ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν (35) ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ (36) τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει αἰσθητόν.  οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐνίοτε οὐ δόξει (37) ἀντιστρέφειν,  ἐὰν μὴ οἰκείως πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀποδοθῇ (38) ἀλλὰ διαμάρτῃ ὁ ἀποδιδούς·  οἷον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ (39) ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ·  οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ (7a1) πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθος,  —οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὄρνις, ταύτῃ (2) τὸ πτερὸν αὐτῆς λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ᾗ πτερωτόν ἐστιν· πολλῶν (3) γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων πτερά ἐστιν ἃ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὄρνιθες·—  ὥστε ἐὰν (4) ἀποδοθῇ οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει,  οἷον τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτοῦ (5) πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ πτερωτόν.  —ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνο(6)ματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον,  ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ (7) οἰκείως ἂν ἀποδοθείη·  οἷον τὸ πηδάλιον πλοίου ἐὰν ἀπο(8)δοθῇ, οὐκ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις,  —οὐ γὰρ ᾗ πλοῖον (9) ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ τὸ πηδάλιον λέγεται·  ἔστι γὰρ πλοῖα ὧν οὐκ (10) ἔστι πηδάλια·  — διὸ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· τὸ γὰρ πλοῖον οὐ λέγε(11)ται πηδαλίου πλοῖον.  ἀλλ’ ἴσως οἰκειοτέρα ἂν ἡ ἀπόδοσις (12) εἴη, εἰ οὕτω πως ἀποδοθείη τὸ πηδάλιον πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδά(13)λιον ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως, —ὄνομα γὰρ οὐ κεῖται·  — καὶ ἀντι(14)στρέφει γε, ἐὰν οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ· τὸ γὰρ πηδαλιωτὸν (15) πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν.  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, (16) οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ οἰκειοτέρως ἂν ἀποδοθείη κεφαλωτοῦ ἢ ζῴου (17) ἀποδιδομένη·  οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ζῷον κεφαλὴν ἔχει· πολλὰ γὰρ (18) τῶν ζῴων κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἔχει.  οὕτω δὲ ῥᾷστα ἂν ἴσως τις (19) λαμβάνοι οἷς μὴ κεῖται ὀνόματα,  εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ (20) τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντιστρέφουσι τιθείη τὰ ὀνόματα,  ὥσπερ (21) ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπὸ τοῦ πτεροῦ τὸ πτερωτὸν καὶ ἀπὸ (22) τοῦ πηδαλίου τὸ πηδαλιωτόν.  πάντα οὖν τὰ πρός τι, ἐάν(23)περ οἰκείως ἀποδιδῶται, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται·  ἐπεί, (24) ἐάν γε πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ (25) λέγεται, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει.  —λέγω δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμολο(26)γουμένως πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγομένων καὶ ὀνομάτων αὐτοῖς (27) κειμένων οὐδὲν ἀντιστρέφει, ἐὰν πρός τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων (28) ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται·  οἷον ὁ δοῦλος (29) ἐὰν μὴ δεσπότου ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπου ἢ δίποδος ἢ (30) ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία (31) ἡ ἀπόδοσις. 
                                                           
(26) Omnia autem relatiua ad conuertentia dicuntur,  ut seruus domini seruus (27) dicitur et dominus serui dominus,  et duplum dimidii duplum et (28) dimidium dupli dimidium, et maius minore maius et minus maiore minus;  (29) similiter autem et in aliis;  sed casu aliquotiens differt secundum (30) locutionem,  ut scientia scibilis rei dicitur scientia et scibile (31) scientia scibile, et sensus sensibilis sensus et sensibile sensu (32) sensibile.  At uero aliquotiens non uidebitur conuertere  nisi (33) conuenienter ad quod dicitur assignetur sed peccet is qui assignat;  ut (34) ala si assignetur auis, non conuertitur ut sit auis alae;  neque enim (35) conuenienter prius assignatum est ala auis;  neque enim in eo quod (36) auis, in eo eius ala dicitur sed in eo quod alata est (multorum enim (37) et aliorum alae sunt, quae non sunt aues);  quare si assignetur (38) conuenienter, et conuertitur;  ut ala alati ala, et alatum ala (39) alatum.  Aliquotiens autem forte et nomina fingere necesse erit,  si non (40) fuerit positum nomen ad quod conuenienter assignetur;  ut remus nauis (41) si assignetur, non erit conueniens assignatio  (neque enim in eo quod (42) est nauis, in eo eius remus dicitur;  sunt enim naues quarum remi non (43) sunt);  quare non conuertitur; nauis enim non dicitur remi.  Sed forte (44) conuenientior assignatio erit si sic quodam modo assignetur, remus (45) remitae remus, uel aliquo modo aliter dictum sit (nomen enim non est (46) positum);  conuertitur autem si conuenienter assignetur (remitum enim (47) remo remitum est).  Similiter autem et in aliis, ut caput conuenientius (48) assignabitur capitati quam si animalis assignetur;  neque enim in eo (49) quod animal est caput habet (multa enim sunt animalium capita non (50) habentia).  Sic autem facilius fortasse sumetur quibus nomen non est (51) positum,  si ab his quae prima sunt et [ab] his ad quae conuertuntur (52) nomina ponuntur,  ut in his quae praedicta sunt ab ala alatum, a remo (53) remitum.  Omnia ergo quae ad aliquid dicuntur, si conuenienter (54) assignentur, ad conuertentia dicuntur.  Nam, si ad quodlibet aliud (55) assignentur et non ad illud dicantur, non conuertuntur.  Dico autem (56) quoniam neque in his quae confesse conuersim dicuntur et in quibus (57) nomen est positum, nihil conuertitur, si ad aliquid eorum quae sunt (58) accidentia assignetur et non ad illud dicatur;  ut seruus si non domini (59) assignetur sed hominis uel bipedis uel alicuius talium, non (60) conuertitur (non enim erit conueniens assignatio). 
                                                           
All relatives have correlatives:  by the term ’slave’ we mean the slave of a master, by the term ’master’, the master of a slave;  by ’double’, the double of its hall; by ’half’, the half of its double; by greater’, greater than that which is less; by ’less,’ less than that which is greater.  So it is with every other relative term;  but the case we use to express the correlation differs in some instances.  Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception.  Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist.  This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated.  If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be reciprocal,  for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings.  The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature.  If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal,  for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as being such because of its wings.  Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words,  if no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained.  If we define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate,  for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat qua boat,  as there are boats which have no rudders.  Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word ’boat’ cannot be said to find its explanation in the word ’rudder’.  As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like ’ruddered’ as the correlative of ’rudder’.  If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the ’ruddered’ thing is ’ruddered’ in virtue of its rudder.  So it is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is ’headed’, than as that of an animal,  for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since many animals have no head.  Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is related, when a name does not exist,  if, from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally connected,  as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word ’winged’ from ’wing’ and from ’rudder’.  All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative.  I add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent.  Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant significance.  The term ’slave,’ if defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact. 
—ἔτι ἐὰν μὲν οἰκείως ἀποδεδομένον ᾖ πρὸς (32) ὃ λέγεται, πάντων περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συμ(33)βεβηκότα ἐστίν,  καταλειπομένου δὲ τούτου μόνου πρὸς ὃ (34) ἀπεδόθη οἰκείως, ἀεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται·  οἷον εἰ ὁ (35) δοῦλος πρὸς δεσπότην λέγεται, περιαιρουμένων ἁπάντων (36) ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ,  οἷον τὸ δίποδι (37) εἶναι, τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικῷ, τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ, καταλειπο(38)μένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ δεσπότην εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὁ δοῦλος (39) πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται·  ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέ(7b1)γεται.  ἐὰν δέ γε μὴ οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ πρὸς ὅ ποτε λέγε(2)ται, περιαιρουμένων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων καταλειπομένου δὲ (3) μόνου τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη, οὐ ῥηθήσεται πρὸς αὐτό·  ἀπο(4)δεδόσθω γὰρ ὁ δοῦλος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ πτερὸν ὄρνιθος, (5) καὶ περιῃρήσθω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δεσπότῃ αὐτῷ εἶναι·  οὐ (6) γὰρ ἔτι ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ῥηθήσεται, —μὴ γὰρ ὄντος (7) δεσπότου οὐδὲ δοῦλός ἐστιν·— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ὄρνιθος περι(8)ῃρήσθω τὸ πτερωτῷ εἶναι·  οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ πτερὸν τῶν (9) πρός τι· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος πτερωτοῦ οὐδὲ πτερὸν ἔσται τινός.—  (10) ὥστε δεῖ μὲν ἀποδιδόναι πρὸς ὅ ποτε οἰκείως λέγεται· κἂν (11) μὲν ὄνομα ᾖ κείμενον ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίγνεται, μὴ ὄν(12)τος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως ὀνοματοποιεῖν.  οὕτω δὲ ἀποδιδο(13)μένων φανερὸν ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα (14) ῥηθήσεται. 
                     
(61) Amplius, si conuenienter assignetur ad id quod dicitur, omnibus (62) aliis circumscriptis quaecumque accidentia sunt,  relicto uero solo (63) illo ad quod assignatum est, semper ad ipsum dicetur;  ut si seruus ad (64) dominum dicitur, circumscriptis omnibus quae sunt accidentia domino,  (65) ut esse bipedem uel scientiae susceptibilem uel hominem, relicto uero (66) solo dominum esse, semper seruus ad illud dicetur;  seruus enim domini (67) seruus dicitur.  Si autem non conuenienter reddatur ad id quod dicitur (68) circumscriptis omnibus aliis, relicto uero solo ad quod redditum est, (69) non dicetur ad illud;  assignetur enim seruus hominis et ala auis, et (70) circumscribatur ab homine esse dominum;  non enim iam seruus ad hominem (71) dicitur (cum enim dominus non sit, seruus non est); similiter autem et (72) de aui, circumscribatur alatam esse;  non enim iam erit ala ad aliquid (73) (cum enim non sit alatum, nec ala erit alicuius).  Quare oportet (74) assignare ad id quod conuenienter dicitur; et si sit nomen positum, (75) facilis erit assignatio; si autem non sit, fortasse erit necessarium (76) nomen fingere.  Quod si ita reddantur, manifestum est quoniam omnia (77) relatiua conuersim dicuntur. 
                     
Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct,  then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist.  If the correlative of ’the slave’ is said to be ’the master’, then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said ’master’,  such as ’biped’, ’receptive of knowledge’, ’human’, should be removed, and the attribute ’master’ alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same,  for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave.  On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have disappeared.  For suppose the correlative of ’the slave’ should be said to be ’the man’, or the correlative of ’the wing is the bird’; if the attribute ’master’ be withdrawn from’ the man’,  the correlation between ’the man’ and ’the slave’ will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute ’winged’ be withdrawn from ’the bird’, ’the wing’ will no longer be relative;  for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that ’the wing’ has no correlative.  Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names.  When the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent. 
(15) Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι.  καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν (16) τῶν πλείστων ἀληθές ἐστιν·  ἅμα γὰρ διπλάσιόν τέ ἐστι (17) καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν,  καὶ δού(18)λου ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ (19) ἄλλα.  καὶ συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος (20) διπλασίου οὐκ ἔστιν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος μὴ ὄντος οὐκ (21) ἔστι διπλάσιον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα (22) τοιαῦτα.  —οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν πρός τι ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ (23) τὸ ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι·  τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης (24) πρότερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προϋπαρ(25)χόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν· ἐπ’ (26) ὀλίγων γὰρ ἢ ἐπ’ οὐδενὸς ἴδοι τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ τὴν (27) ἐπιστήμην γιγνομένην.  ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συν(28)αναιρεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐ συν(29)αναιρεῖ·  ἐπιστητοῦ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, —οὐ(30)δενὸς γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται ἐπιστήμη,  — ἐπιστήμης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν (31) κωλύει ἐπιστητὸν εἶναι·  οἷον καὶ ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγω(32)νισμὸς εἴγε ἔστιν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν (33) οὐδέπω, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἔστιν.  ἔτι ζῴου μὲν ἀναιρεθέν(34)τος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τῶν δ’ ἐπιστητῶν πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται (35) εἶναι.  —ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔχει·  (36) τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πρότερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως δοκεῖ εἶναι·  τὸ (37) μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἡ δὲ (38) αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ.  αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις περὶ (39) σῶμα καὶ ἐν σώματί εἰσιν,  αἰσθητοῦ δὲ ἀναιρεθέντος ἀνῄ(8a1)ρηται καὶ σῶμα, —τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν καὶ τὸ σῶμα,—  σώ(2)ματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀνῄρηται καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις,  ὥστε συν(3)αναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν αἴσθησιν.  ἡ δέ γε αἴσθησις τὸ (4) αἰσθητὸν οὔ· ζῴου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος αἴσθησις μὲν ἀνῄ(5)ρηται, αἰσθητὸν δὲ ἔσται, οἷον σῶμα, θερμόν, γλυκύ, (6) πικρόν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν αἰσθητά.  ἔτι ἡ μὲν (7) αἴσθησις ἅμα τῷ αἰσθητικῷ γίγνεται, —ἅμα γὰρ ζῷόν τε (8) γίγνεται καὶ αἴσθησις,  — τὸ δέ γε αἰσθητὸν ἔστι καὶ πρὸ (9) τοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι,  —πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, (10) ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸ ζῷον συνίσταται, ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ὅλως (11) εἶναι ἢ αἴσθησιν,  — ὥστε πρότερον ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθητὸν (12) εἶναι δόξειεν. 
                                               
(78) Videtur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura.  Et in aliis quidem (79) pluribus uerum est;  simul enim est duplum et dimidium, et cum sit (80) dimidium duplum est,  et cum sit seruus dominus est; similiter autem (81) his et alia.  Simul autem haec auferunt sese inuicem; si enim non sit (82) duplum non est dimidium, et si non sit dimidium duplum non est; (83) similiter et in aliis quaecumque talia sunt.  Non autem in omnibus (84) relatiuis uerum uidetur esse simul naturaliter;  scibile enim (85) scientia prius esse uidebitur; namque in pluribus subsistentibus iam (86) rebus scientias accipimus; in paucis enim uel in nullis hoc quisque (87) perspiciet, simul cum scibili scientiam factam.  Amplius scibile (88) sublatum simul aufert scientiam, scientia uero non simul aufert (89) scibile;  nam, si scibile non sit, non est scientia,  si scientia uero (90) non sit, nihil prohibet esse scibile;  ut circuli quadratura si est (91) scibile, scientia quidem eius nondum est, illud uero scibile (92) est.  Amplius animali quidem sublato non est scientia, scibilium uero (93) plurima esse contingit.  Similiter autem his sese habent et quae in (94) sensu sunt;  sensibile enim prius sensu esse uidetur;  sublatum enim (95) sensibile simul aufert sensum, sensus uero sensibile non simul (96) aufert.  Sensus enim circa corpus et in corpore sunt;  sensibili ergo (97) sublato aufertur corpus (sensibilium enim et corpus est),  cum autem (98) corpus non sit sublatus est sensus;  quare simul aufert sensibile (99) sensum.  Sensus uero sensibile non; sublato enim animali sublatus est (100) sensus, sensibile autem permanet, ut corpus, calidum, dulce, amarum, (101) et alia omnia quaecumque sunt sensibilia.  Amplius sensus quidem simul (102) cum sensato fit (simul enim animal fit et sensus),  sensibile uero ante (103) est quam esset sensus  (ignis enim et aqua et alia huiusmodi, ex quibus (104) ipsum animal constat, ante sunt quam animal sit omnino uel sensus);  (105) quare prius quam sensus sensibile esse uidebitur. 
                                               
Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously.  This is for the most part true,  as in the case of the double and the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is a half.  Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general rule.  Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives.  Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously.  The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that of its object.  Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is not true.  It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to know.  Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist.  Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence.  Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge.  This is likewise the case with regard to perception:  for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception.  If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible.  For perception implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place.  Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing;  and if the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist.  Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception.  But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.  Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal.  But the perceptible surely exists before perception;  for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception.  Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception. 
(13) Ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν πότερον οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι (14) λέγεται,  καθάπερ δοκεῖ, ἢ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατά τινας (15) τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν.  ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀλη(16)θές ἐστιν·  οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ μέρη πρός τι λέγεται·  ὁ (17) γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινός τις ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ (18) ὁ τὶς βοῦς τινός τις βοῦς·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη·  ἡ (19) γὰρ τὶς χεὶρ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις χεὶρ ἀλλὰ τινὸς χείρ,  (20) καὶ ἡ τὶς κεφαλὴ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις κεφαλὴ ἀλλὰ (21) τινὸς κεφαλή.  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, (22) ἐπί γε τῶν πλείστων·  οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινὸς ἄν(23)θρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ βοῦς τινὸς βοῦς,  οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον τινὸς ξύλον, (24) ἀλλὰ τινὸς κτῆμα λέγεται.  ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων φα(25)νερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρός τι, ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ τῶν δευτέρων (26) οὐσιῶν ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν·  οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ τινὸς λέγεται (27) κεφαλὴ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τινὸς λέγεται χεὶρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν (28) τοιούτων, ὥστε ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι.  —εἰ (29) μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρός τι ὁρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται, ἢ τῶν πάνυ (30) χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ λῦσαι ὡς οὐδεμία οὐσία (31) τῶν πρός τι λέγεται·  εἰ δὲ μὴ ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὰ πρός τι (32) οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, ἴσως ἂν (33) ῥηθείη τι πρὸς αὐτά.  ὁ δὲ πρότερος ὁρισμὸς παρακολουθεῖ (34) μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς πρός τι, οὐ μὴν τοῦτό γέ ἐστι τὸ πρός τι (35) αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεσθαι.  ἐκ δὲ (36) τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν πρός τι, (37) κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἴσεται.  φανερὸν (38) μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν·  εἰ γὰρ οἶδέ τις τόδε τι ὅτι (39) τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πρός τι ταὐτὸ τῷ (8b1) πρός τί πως ἔχειν, κἀκεῖνο οἶδε πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει·  (2) εἰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅλως πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει, οὐδ’ εἰ (3) πρός τί πως ἔχει εἴσεται.  καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα δὲ δῆ(4)λον τὸ τοιοῦτον·  οἷον τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ἀφωρισμένως ὅτι ἔστι (5) διπλάσιον, καὶ ὅτου διπλάσιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἀφωρισμένως οἶ(6)δεν,  —εἰ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀφωρισμένων οἶδεν αὐτὸ διπλά(7)σιον, οὐδ’ εἰ ἔστι διπλάσιον ὅλως οἶδεν·—  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ (8) τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ὅτι κάλλιόν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτου κάλλιόν ἐ(9)στιν ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι διὰ ταῦτα,  (οὐκ ἀο(10)ρίστως δὲ εἴσεται ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι χείρονος κάλλιον· ὑπόληψις (11) γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο γίγνεται, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη·  οὐ γὰρ ἔτι εἴσεται (12) ἀκριβῶς ὅτι ἐστὶ χείρονος κάλλιον· εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, (13) οὐδέν ἐστι χεῖρον αὐτοῦ)·  ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, (14) ὃ ἂν εἰδῇ τις τῶν πρός τι ὡρισμένως, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ (15) λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἰδέναι.  τὴν δέ γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν (16) χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αἵ εἰσιν οὐσίαι αὐτὸ μὲν (17) ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένως ἔστιν εἰδέναι, πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται οὐκ (18) ἀναγκαῖον·  τίνος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ κεφαλὴ ἢ τίνος ἡ χεὶρ οὐκ (19) ἔστιν εἰδέναι ὡρισμένως·  ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι·  (20) εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τῶν πρός τι, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι (21) οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.  ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν περὶ (22) τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπε(23)σκεμμένον, τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι ἐφ’ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐκ (24) ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν. 
                                                               
(106) Habet autem dubitationem an ulla substantia ad aliquid dicatur,  (107) quemadmodum uidetur, an hoc quidem contingit secundum quasdam (108) secundarum substantiarum.  Nam in primis quidem substantiis uerum est;  (109) nam neque totae neque partes ad aliquid dicuntur;  nam aliquis homo non (110) dicitur alicuius aliquis homo, neque aliquis bos alicuius aliquis (111) bos.  Similiter autem et partes;  quaedam enim manus non dicitur (112) alicuius quaedam manus sed alicuius manus,  et quoddam caput non (113) dicitur alicuius quoddam caput sed alicuius caput.  Similiter autem et (114) in secundis substantiis, atque hoc quidem in pluribus;  ut homo non (115) dicitur alicuius homo, nec bos alicuius bos,  nec lignum alicuius (116) lignum sed alicuius possessio dicitur.  Atque in huiusmodi quidem (117) manifestum est quoniam non est ad aliquid; in aliquibus uero secundis (118) substantiis habet aliquam dubitationem;  ut caput alicuius caput (119) dicitur et manus alicuius manus dicitur et singula huiusmodi; quare (120) haec esse fortasse ad aliquid uidebuntur.  Si igitur sufficienter eorum (121) quae sunt ad aliquid definitio assignata est, aut nimis difficile aut (122) impossibile est soluere quoniam nulla substantia eorum quae sunt ad (123) aliquid dicitur;  si autem non sufficienter sed sunt ad aliquid quibus (124) hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodam modo habere, fortasse aliquid (125) contra ista dicetur.  Prior uero definitio sequitur quidem omnia (126) relatiua, non tamen hoc eis est quod sint ad aliquid quod ea ipsa quae (127) sunt aliorum dicuntur.  Ex his ergo manifestum est quod, si quis (128) aliquid eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definite sciet, et illud ad quod (129) dicitur definite sciturus est.  Si manifestum quidem etiam ex ipso est;  (130) nam si quis nouit quoniam hoc eorum quae sunt ad aliquid est, (131) relatiuis autem hoc est esse, ad aliquid quodammodo habere, et illud (132) nouit ad quod hoc aliquo modo habet;  nam si omnino nescit ad quod (133) aliquo modo habet, nec si ad aliquid quodammodo habet sciturus est.  Et (134) in particularibus hoc manifestum est;  ut, si hoc ad aliquid scit (135) definite quoniam duplum est, et cuius duplum est definite nouit  (nam (136) si nullius definite nouit illud esse duplum, nec si omnino duplum est (137) nouit);  similiter autem et hoc [ad] aliquid si nouit quoniam melius (138) est, et quo melius erit definite eum scire necesse est propter haec (139) ipsa quae dicta sunt  (non autem infinite quoniam hoc est peiore (140) melius, opinio enim iam fit huiusmodi, non scientia;  neque enim sciet (141) integre quoniam est peiore melius; nam fortasse contingit nihil eo (142) esse peius);  quare manifestum est quoniam necesse est quod quis (143) nouerit eorum quae sunt ad aliquid definite, etiam illud ad quod (144) dicitur sciturum esse definite.  Caput uero et manum et eorum singula (145) quae substantiae sunt, hoc ipsum quidem quod sunt potest sciri (146) definite, ad quod autem dicantur non necesse est;  cuius enim hoc caput (147) uel cuius haec manus non est dicere definite;  quare haec non erunt (148) eorum quae sunt ad aliquid;  quod si non sunt eorum quae sunt ad (149) aliquid, uerum erit nullam esse substantiam relatiuam.  Fortasse autem (150) difficile sit de huiusmodi rebus confidenter declarare nisi saepius (151) pertractata sint; dubitare autem de singulis non erit inutile. 
                                                               
It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative,  as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances.  With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility,  for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative.  The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to something external.  Similarly with the parts:  a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular person,  but as the hand or head of a particular person.  It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances;  the species ’man’ and the species ’ox’ are not defined with reference to anything outside themselves.  Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some one’s property, not in so far as it is wood.  It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion;  thus, such terms as ’head’ and ’hand’ are defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character.  Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no substance is relative.  If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found.  The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative.  From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative.  Indeed this is self-evident:  for if a man knows that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related.  For if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative.  This is clear, moreover, in particular instances.  If a man knows definitely that such and such a thing is ’double’, he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double.  For if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double.  Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more beautiful.  He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge.  For if he does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less beautiful.  It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also definitely to which it is related.  Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related.  It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant.  Thus these are not relatives,  and, this being the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in character.  It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage. 
 
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