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Aristoteles: Categoriae

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Click to Expand/Collapse OptionTitle
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter I
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter II
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter III
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter IV
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter V: De substantia
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VI: De quantitate
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VII: De relativis ved ad aliquid
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter VIII: De quali et qualitate
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter IX: De facere et pati
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter X: De oppositis
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XI
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XII: De priore
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XIII: De his quae simul sunt
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XIV: De motu
Click to Expand/Collapse OptionChapter XV: De habere
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθε ἀντιτίθεσθαι, ῥητέον.]  (17) Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ (18) ὡς τὰ πρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, (19) ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις.  ἀντίκειται δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν (20) τοιούτων, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ὡς μὲν τὰ πρός τι οἷον τὸ διπλά(21)σιον τῷ ἡμίσει, ὡς δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οἷον τὸ κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ,  (22) ὡς δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν οἷον τυφλότης καὶ ὄψις, (23) ὡς δὲ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις οἷον κάθηται —οὐ κάθηται. 
       
(10,1) DE OPPOSITIS: Quotiens solent opponi, dicendum est.  Dicitur autem alterum alteri (2) opponi quadrupliciter, aut ut ad aliquid, aut ut contraria, aut ut (3) habitus et priuatio, aut ut affirmatio et negatio.  Opponitur autem (4) unumquodque istorum, ut sit figuratim dicere, ut relatiua ut duplum (5) medio, ut contraria ut bonum malo,  ut secundum priuationem et habitum (6) ut caecitas et uisus, ut affirmatio et negatio ut sedet -- non sedet. 
       
We must next explain the various senses in which the term ’opposite’ is used.  Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives.  Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word ’opposite’ with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions ’double’ and ’half’; with reference to contraries by ’bad’ and ’good’.  Opposites in the sense of ’privatives’ and ’positives’ are’ blindness’ and ’sight’; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions ’he sits’, ’he does not sit’. 
(24) Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ (25) τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτά·  (26) οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ διπλάσιον (27) λέγεται·  καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρός τι (28) ἀντίκειται, καὶ λέγεταί γε ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ (29) τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ·  καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δὲ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ (30) ἀντικείμενον λέγεται τὴν ἐπιστήμην· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τινὶ (31) λέγεται ἐπιστητὸν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. 
       
(7) Quaecumque igitur ut relatiua opponuntur, ea ipsa quae sunt (8) oppositorum dicuntur, aut quomodolibet aliter ad ea;  ut duplum medii, (9) hoc ipsum quod est, dicitur duplum;  et scientia scibilis rei scientia (10) ut ad aliquid opponitur, et dicitur scientia, hoc ipsum quod est, (11) scibilis;  et scibile, hoc ipsum quod est, ad oppositum dicitur, (12) scilicet scientiam (scibile enim aliqua scientia scibile dicitur). 
       
(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being indicated by the preposition ’of’ or by some other preposition.  Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double of something.  Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same sense;  and the thing known also is explained by its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge. 
(32) Ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντι(33)κειμένων ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται· 
 
(13) Quaecumque ergo opponuntur ut ad aliquid, ea ipsa quae sunt (14) oppositorum uel alio quolibet modo ad se inuicem dicuntur. 
 
Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other. 
τὰ δὲ ὡς (34) τὰ ἐναντία, αὐτὰ μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα λέ(35)γεται, ἐναντία μέντοι ἀλλήλων λέγεται·  οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγα(36)θὸν τοῦ κακοῦ λέγεται ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον, οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν (37) τοῦ μέλανος λευκόν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον.  ὥστε διαφέρουσιν αὗται (38) αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἀλλήλων. 
     
(15) Illa uero quae ut contraria, ipsa quidem quae sunt nullo modo ad (16) inuicem dicuntur, contraria uero sibi inuicem dicuntur;  neque enim (17) bonum mali dicitur bonum sed contrarium; nec album nigri album sed (18) contrarium.  Quare differunt istae oppositiones inuicem. 
     
(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other.  The good is not spoken of as the good of the bad, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black.  These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. 
—ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τοιαῦτά ἐστιν (12a1) ὥστε ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἀναγκαῖον (2) αὐτῶν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον·  [ὧν δέ (3) γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον (4) πάντως.]  οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου πέφυκε (5) γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦ ζῴου (6) σώματι ἢ νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν·  καὶ περιττὸν δὲ καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθ(7)μοῦ κατηγορεῖται, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον τῷ ἀριθμῷ (8) ὑπάρχειν ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον·  καὶ οὐκ ἔστι γε τούτων οὐδὲν (9) ἀνὰ μέσον, οὔτε νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας οὔτε περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου.  ὧν (10) δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ (11) μέσον·  οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, (12) καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι, — (13) οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἤτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν·—  καὶ φαῦλον δὲ καὶ (14) σπουδαῖον κατηγορεῖται μὲν καὶ κατ’ ἀνθρώπου καὶ κατ’ (15) ἄλλων πολλῶν,  οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν (16) ἐκείνοις ὧν κατηγορεῖται·  οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἤτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπου(17)δαῖά ἐστιν.  καὶ ἔστι γέ τι τούτων ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον τοῦ μὲν (18) λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα (19) χρώματα,  τοῦ δὲ φαύλου καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ οὔτε φαῦλον οὔτε (20) σπουδαῖον.  ἐπ’ ἐνίων μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ μέσον, (21) οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρόν·  ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ (22) ὀνόματι μὲν οὐκ εὔπορον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δὲ (23) ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὁρίζεται, (24) οἷον τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε (25) ἄδικον.  (26) Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταὐτόν τι, οἷον (27) ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν·  καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἐν (28) ᾧ πέφυκεν ἡ ἕξις γίγνεσθαι, περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἑκάτερον (29) αὐτῶν.  ἐστερῆσθαι δὲ τότε λέγομεν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ἕξεως (30) δεκτικῶν, ὅταν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν (31) ἔχειν μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχῃ·  νωδόν τε γὰρ λέγομεν οὐ τὸ μὴ (32) ἔχον ὀδόντας, καὶ τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ (33) ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν·  τινὰ γὰρ ἐκ γενετῆς οὔτε ὄψιν (34) οὔτε ὀδόντας ἔχει, ἀλλ’ οὐ λέγεται νωδὰ οὐδὲ τυφλά. 
                                     
(19) Quaecumque uero contrariorum talia sunt ut in quibus nata sunt fieri (20) et de quibus praedicantur, necessarium sit alterum ipsorum inesse, (21) nihil eorum medium est  (quorum autem non est necessarium alterum (22) inesse, horum omnium est aliquid medium);  ut aegritudo et sanitas in (23) corpore animalis nata est fieri, et necesse est alterum ipsorum inesse (24) animalis corpori, aut aegritudinem aut sanitatem;  et par quidem et (25) impar de numero praedicatur, et necesse est horum alterum numero (26) inesse, uel par uel impar;  et non est horum aliquid medium, neque (27) aegritudinis neque sanitatis, neque imparis neque paris.  Quorum autem (28) nor est necessarium alterum inesse, horum est aliquid medium;  ut album (29) et nigrum in corpore natum est fieri, et non est necesse alterum eorum (30) inesse corpori (non enim omne corpus uel album uel nigrum est);  et (31) probum et improbum dicitur quidem de homine et de aliis pluribus,  non (32) est autem necesse alterum inesse his de quibus praedicatur;  non enim (33) omnia aut proba sunt aut improba.  Et est aliquid horum medium, ut albi (34) et nigri uenetum uel pallidum uel quicumque alii colores sunt,  foedi (35) uero et pulchri quod neque pulchrum est neque foedum.  In aliquibus (36) quidem medietatibus posita sunt nomina, ut albi et nigri uenetum et (37) pallidum;  in aliquibus uero non est nomine assignare medietatem, (38) utriusque uero negatione definitur, ut nec bonum nec malum, nec iustum (39) nec iniustum.  (40) Priuatio uero et habitus dicuntur quidem circa idem aliquid, ut uisio (41) et caecitas circa oculum;  uniuersaliter autem dicere est in quo (42) nascitur habitus fieri, circa hoc dicitur utrumque eorum.  (43) Priuari uero tunc dicimus unumquodque habitus susceptibilium, quando (44) in quo natum est inesse uel quando natum est habere nullo modo habet.  (45) Edentulum enim dicimus non qui non habet dentes, nec caecum qui non (46) habet uisionem sed qui, quando contigit habere, non habet  (multa enim (47) ex natiuitate neque dentes habent neque uisionem sed non dicuntur (48) edentula neque caeca). 
                                     
Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate,  but those in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate.  Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal.  Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers.  Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these two pairs.  On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate.  Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black.  Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many other things,  but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of which they are predicated:  it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad.  These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between;  the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the other.  Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black;  in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.  (iii) ’privatives’ and ’Positives’ have reference to the same subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye.  It is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular ’positive’ is natural.  We say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present.  We do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should.  For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind. 
(35) τὸ δὲ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν οὐκ ἔστι στέρησις καὶ (36) ἕξις·  ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, στέρησις δὲ ἡ τυφλότης, (37) τὸ δὲ ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδὲ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι (38) τυφλότης·  στέρησις γάρ τις ἡ τυφλότης ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τυφλὸν (39) εἶναι ἐστερῆσθαι, οὐ στέρησίς ἐστιν. 
     
(49) Priuari uero et habere habitum non est habitus et priuatio;  habitus (50) enim est uisus, priuatio uero caecitas, habere autem uisum non est (51) uisus, nec caecum esse caecitas  (priuatio enim quaedam est caecitas, (52) caecum uero esse priuari, non priuatio est). 
     
To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the corresponding ’privative’ or ’positive’.  ’Sight’ is a ’positive’, ’blindness’ a ’privative’, but ’to possess sight’ is not equivalent to ’sight’, ’to be blind’ is not equivalent to ’blindness’.  Blindness is a ’privative’, to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a ’privative’. 
ἔτι εἰ ἦν ἡ τυφλότης (40) ταὐτὸν τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι, κατηγορεῖτο ἂν ἀμφότερα κατὰ (41) τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ τυφλὸς μὲν λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τυφλότης (12b1) δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐδαμῶς λέγεται. 
 
(53) Nam si idem esset caecitas et caecum esse, utraque de eodem (54) praedicarentur; nunc uero minime sed caecus quidem dicitur homo, (55) caecitas uero nullo modo dicitur. 
 
Moreover, if ’blindness’ were equivalent to ’being blind’, both would be predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness. 
ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα (2) δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν ὡς στέρησις καὶ (3) ἕξις· ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός·  ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυ(4)φλότης τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῷ (5) ὄψιν ἔχειν ἀντίκειται. 
   
(56) Opponi quidem et ista uidentur, priuari scilicet et habere habitum, (57) quemadmodum priuatio et habitus; idem enim modus est oppositionis;  () 
   
To be in a state of ’possession’ is, it appears, the opposite of being in a state of ’privation’, just as ’positives’ and ’privatives’ themselves are opposite.  There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight. 
(οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν (6) καὶ ἀπόφασιν κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις·  (7) ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατάφασις (8) λόγος ἐστὶ καταφατικὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις λόγος ἀποφατι(9)κός,  τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν ἐστι (10) λόγος.  λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κα(11)τάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις·  καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς (12) ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός·  (13) ὡς γάρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν (14) ἀπόφασιν ἀντίκειται, οἷον τὸ κάθηται—οὐ κάθηται,  οὕτω (15) καὶ τὸ ὑφ’ ἑκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ καθῆσθαι—μὴ (16) καθῆσθαι.) 
             
(58) Non est autem nec quod sub affirmatione uel negatione est negatio uel (59) affirmatio;  affirmatio enim oratio est affirmatiua et negatio oratio (60) negatiua,  eorum uero quae sunt sub affirmatione uel negatione nihil (61) est oratio.  Dicuntur autem et ista sibi opponi ut affirmatro et (62) negatio;  nam etiam in his modus oppositionis idem est;  quemadmodum (63) enim affirmatio ad negationem opponitur, ut sedet - non sedet,  sic (64) res quae sub utrisque est sibi opponitur sedere et non sedere. 
             
That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial.  By ’affirmation’ we mean an affirmative proposition, by ’denial’ a negative.  Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propositions;  yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial,  for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same.  For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions ’he sits’, ’he does not sit’,  so also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting. 
—ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς (17) τὰ πρός τι, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντι(18)κειμένου·  ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ’ ἄλλως (19) οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται· ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τυφλότης (20) λέγοιτ’ ἂν τυφλότης ὄψεως, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μὲν ὄψεως ἡ (21) τυφλότης λέγεται, τυφλότης δὲ ὄψεως οὐ λέγεται.  ἔτι τὰ (22) πρός τι πάντα πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τυ(23)φλότης εἴπερ ἦν τῶν πρός τι, ἀντέστρεφεν ἂν κἀκεῖνο πρὸς (24) ὃ λέγεται·  ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει·  οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἡ ὄψις (25) τυφλότητος ὄψις. 
         
(65) Quoniam autem priuatio et habitus non sic opponuntur ut ad aliquid, (66) manifestum est; neque enim dicitur hoc ipsum quod est oppositi;  uisus (67) enim non est caecitatis uisus, nec alio ullo modo ad ipsum dicitur; (68) similiter autem nec caecitas dicitur caecitas uisus sed priuatio uisus (69) caecitas dicitur <...>.  Amplius omnia quaecumque ad aliquid dicuntur (70) conuersim dicuntur, quare etiam caecitas, si esset eorum quae sunt ad (71) aliquid, conuerteretur illud ad quod dicitur;  sed non conuertuntur;  (72) neque enim dicitur uisus caecitatis. 
         
It is evident that ’positives’ and ’privatives’ are not opposed each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by reference to the other;  sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight.  Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative.  But this is not the case.  Sight is not called the sight of blindness. 
(26) Ὅτι δὲ οὐδ’ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρη(27)σιν λεγόμενα καὶ ἕξιν ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.  τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναν(28)τίων, ὧν μηδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν οἷς πέφυκε (29) γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἀεί·  (30) τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τῷ (31) δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν,  οἷον ἐπὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περιττοῦ (32) καὶ ἀρτίου·  ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ (33) ὑπάρχειν θάτερον·  οὔτε γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν (34) εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν, οὔτε θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρόν, —τούτων γὰρ (35) ἀνὰ μέσον τι οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν·—  ἔτι δὲ καὶ τού(36)των ἦν τι ἀνὰ μέσον ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν (37) τῷ δεκτικῷ,  εἰ μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει,  οἷον τῷ (38) πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ λευκῇ·  —ἐπὶ δὲ (39) τούτων ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ οὐχ (40) ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν·  οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν εἶναι (41) οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα μέλαιναν·—  ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη (13a1) τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν,  ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύ(2)σει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει,  καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐχ (3) ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν. 
                           
(73) Quoniam autem neque ut contraria opponuntur ea quae secundum (74) priuationem et habitum dicuntur, ex his manifestum est.  Quorum enim (75) contrariorum nihil est medium, necesse est, in quibus nata sunt fieri (76) aut de quibus praedicari, alterum ipsorum inesse semper;  horum enim (77) nihil erat medium, quorum necesse erat alterum inesse eorum (78) susceptibili,  ut in aegritudine et sanitate et impari atque (79) pari.  Quorum autem est aliquid medium nunquam necesse est omni inesse (80) alterum;  nam neque album aut nigrum necesse est omne esse eorum (81) susceptibili, nec frigidum nec calidum (nihil enim prohibet aliquam (82) ipsorum inesse medietatem);  erat etiam istorum medietas, quorum non (83) necesse esset alterum inesse eorum susceptibili,  nisi forte (84) aliquibus naturaliter contigerit unum ipsorum inesse,  ut igni (85) calidum esse et niui album  (in his autem necesse est definite unum (86) ipsorum inesse, et non hoc aut illud;  neque enim potest ignis esse (87) frigidus nec nix esse nigra);  quare non necesse est omnibus eorum (88) susceptibilibus alterum horum inesse  sed solis his quibus (89) naturaliter unum inest,  et his definite unum, non autem hoc aut (90) illud. 
                           
That those terms which fall under the heads of ’positives’ and ’privatives’ are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts:  Of a pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated;  for it is those, as we proved,’ in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate.  Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances.  But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity.  It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot,  for something intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject.  We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain.  Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white,  it is necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the subject;  for fire cannot be cold, or snow black.  Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities,  but only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property.  Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must be present. 
ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέ(4)τερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές·  οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ ἀναγ(5)καῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν,  —τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς (6) ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχειν λέγεται,  ὥστε οὐκ ἂν (7) εἴη ταῦτα τῶν τοιούτων ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον·—  (8) ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὧν τι ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον·  ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ποτε παντὶ (9) τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν·  ὅταν γὰρ ἤδη πε(10)φυκὸς ᾖ ἔχειν ὄψιν, τότε ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ἔχον ὄψιν ῥηθήσεται,  (11) καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως θάτερον, ἀλλ’ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν,  (12) —οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ὄψιν ἔχον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὁπό(13)τερον ἔτυχεν·—  ἐπὶ δέ γε τῶν ἐναντίων, ὧν ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον τι, (14) οὐδέποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν,  ἀλλὰ τισίν, (15) καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἕν.  ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κατ’ οὐδέτερον (16) τῶν τρόπων ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ (17) ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα. 
                       
(91) In priuatione uero et habitu neutrum uerum est eorum quae dicta sunt,  (92) neque enim semper eorum susceptibili necesse est alterum ipsorum (93) inesse;  quod enim nondum natum est habere uisum neque caecum neque (94) uisum habere dicitur,  ()  ()  ()  ... habens uisum dicitur;  et horum non (95) definite alterum sed aut hoc aut illud  (neque enim necesse est aut (96) caecum aut habentem uisum esse sed aut hoc aut illud);  in contrariis (97) uero, quorum est medietas, numquam necesse est omni alterum inesse  (98) sed aliquibus, et his definite unum.  Quare manifestum est quoniam (99) secundum neutrum modum quemadmodum contraria opponuntur [ita sibi (100) sunt] ea quae sunt secundum priuationem et habitum opposita. 
                       
In the case of ’positives’ and ’privatives’, on the other hand, neither of the aforesaid statements holds good.  For it is not necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or the other;  that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to see.  Thus ’positives’ and ’privatives’ do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate.  On the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate.  For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject.  For when a thing has reached the stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind,  and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent;  for it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the other.  Yet in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject,  but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense.  It is, therefore, plain that ’positives’ and ’privatives’ are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which contraries are opposed. 
—ἔτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ (18) δεκτικοῦ δυνατὸν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι,  εἰ μή (19) τινι φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, (20) οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι·  καὶ γὰρ (21) τὸ ὑγιαῖνον δυνατὸν νοσῆσαι καὶ τὸ λευκὸν μέλαν γενέσθαι (22) καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμόν, καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίου γε φαῦλον καὶ ἐκ (23) φαύλου σπουδαῖον δυνατὸν γενέσθαι·  —ὁ γὰρ φαῦλος εἰς βελ(24)τίους διατριβὰς ἀγόμενος καὶ λόγους κἂν μικρόν γέ τι ἐπι(25)δοίη εἰς τὸ βελτίω εἶναι·  ἐὰν δὲ ἅπαξ κἂν μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν (26) λάβῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἢ τελείως ἂν μεταβάλοι ἢ πάνυ πολλὴν ἂν (27) ἐπίδοσιν λάβοι·  ἀεὶ γὰρ εὐκινητότερος πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίγνεται, (28) κἂν ἡντινοῦν ἐπίδοσιν εἰληφὼς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ᾖ,  ὥστε καὶ πλείω (29) εἰκὸς ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν·  καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον τε(30)λείως εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἀποκαθίστησιν, ἐάνπερ μὴ χρόνῳ (31) ἐξείργηται·—  ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως ἀδύνα(32)τον εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι·  ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως (33) ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίγνεται μεταβολή,  ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς στε(34)ρήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀδύνατον·  οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενόμενός (35) τις πάλιν ἔβλεψεν,  οὔτε φαλακρὸς ὢν κομήτης ἐγένετο,  οὔτε (36) νωδὸς ὢν ὀδόντας ἔφυσεν. 
                           
(101) Amplius in contrariis, cum sit eorum susceptibile, potest fieri in (102) alterna mutatio,  nisi cui naturaliter unum insit, ut igni calido esse;  (103) quod enim sanum est potest aegrescere, et album nigrum fieri, et (104) frigidum calidum, et ex probo improbum et ex improbo probum fieri (105) potest  (improbus enim in meliorem consuetudinem sermonemque perductus (106) uel parum sese dabit in melius;  sin uero uel semel paruam intentionem (107) sumat, manifestum est quoniam aut perfectissime permutetur aut (108) magnam sumat intentionem;  semper enim mobilior ad uirtutem fit, si (109) quamlibet a principio sumpserit intentionem,  quare erit possibile (110) maiorem illum intentionem sumere;  et hoc saepius factum perfecte in (111) contrariam habitudinem consistere, nisi tempore prohibeatur).  In (112) priuatione uero et habitu impossibile est ad inuicem fieri mutationem;  (113) ab habitu enim ad priuationem fit permutatio,  a priuatione uero ad (114) habitum impossibile est;  neque enim factus aliquis caecus rursus (115) uidit,  nec caluus rursus crinitus factus est,  nec edentulus dentes (116) creauit. 
                           
Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity,  unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire.  For it is possible that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good.  The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may make some advance, however slight,  and if he should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any rate make very great progress;  for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement was at first.  It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made in the past;  and as this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time.  In the case of ’positives’ and ’privatives’, however, change in both directions is impossible.  There may be a change from possession to privation,  but not from privation to possession.  The man who has become blind does not regain his sight;  the man who has become bald does not regain his hair;  the man who has lost his teeth does not grow a new set. 
(37) Ὅσα δὲ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται, φανε(13b1)ρὸν ὅτι κατ’ οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ἀντίκειται·  (2) ἐπὶ μόνων γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ (3) ψεῦδος αὐτῶν εἶναι.  οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀναγκαῖον (4) ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς εἶναι θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν (5) πρός τι, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ στερήσεως·  οἷον ὑγίεια (6) καὶ νόσος ἐναντία, καὶ οὐδέτερόν γε οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός (7) ἐστιν·  ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ὡς τὰ πρός τι (8) ἀντίκειται,  καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν οὐδέτερον οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦ(9)δος·  οὐδέ γε τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ (10) τυφλότης·  ὅλως δὲ τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων (11) οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν·  πάντα δὲ τὰ εἰρη(12)μένα ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται. 
                 
(117) Quaecumque uero ut affirmatio et negatio opponuntur, manifestum est (118) quoniam secundum nullum modum eorum qui dict sunt opponuntur;  in his (119) enim solis necesse est hoc quidem esse uerum illud uero falsum.  Nam (120) neque in contrariis necesse est semper alterum esse uerum, alterum (121) uero falsum, nec in relatiuis, neque in habitu et priuatione;  ut (122) sanitas et aegritudo contraria sunt sed neutrum ipsorum neque uerum (123) neque falsum est;  similiter autem et duplum et medium quae ut ad (124) aliquid opponuntur,  non est eorum alterum falsum alterum uerum;  nec (125) uero ea quae secundum habitum et priuationem sunt, ut uisus et (126) caecitas.  Omnino autem nihil eorum quae secundum nullam complexionem (127) dicuntur aut uerum aut falsum est;  omnia autem quae diximus sine (128) complexione dicuntur. 
                 
(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct,  for in this case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the other false.  Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor in the case of ’positives’ and ’privatives’, is it necessary for one to be true and the other false.  Health and disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false.  ’Double’ and ’half’ are opposed to each other as correlatives:  neither of them is true or false.  The case is the same, of course, with regard to ’positives’ and ’privatives’ such as ’sight’ and ’blindness’.  In short, where there is no sort of combination of words, truth and falsity have no place,  and all the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words. 
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δό(13)ξειεν ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν ἐναν(14)τίων λεγομένων,  —τὸ γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν Σωκράτη τῷ νοσεῖν Σω(15)κράτη ἐναντίον ἐστίν,—  ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ (16) θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος εἶναι·  ὄντος μὲν γὰρ (17) Σωκράτους ἔσται τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος, μὴ ὄντος δὲ (18) ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ·  οὔτε γὰρ τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη οὔτε τὸ (19) ὑγιαίνειν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους.  (20) ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως μὴ ὄντος γε ὅλως (21) οὐδέτερον ἀληθές,  ὄντος δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ θάτερον ἀληθές·  (22) τὸ γὰρ ὄψιν ἔχειν Σωκράτη τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι Σωκράτη ἀντί(23)κειται ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις,  καὶ ὄντος γε οὐκ ἀναγ(24)καῖον θάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος,  —ὅτε γὰρ μήπω (25) πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ,—  μὴ ὄντος δὲ ὅλως τοῦ (26) Σωκράτους καὶ οὕτω ψευδῆ ἀμφότερα, καὶ τὸ ὄψιν αὐτὸν (27) ἔχειν καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι. 
                     
(129) At uero magis hoc uidetur contingere in his quae secundum complexionem (130) dicuntur  (sanum enim esse Socratem et aegrotare Socratem contraria (131) sunt)  sed nec in his quoque necesse est semper alterum uerum esse, (132) alterum autem falsum;  cum enim sit Socrates, est hoc quidem uerum (133) illud uero falsum, cum autem non sit, utraque falsa sunt;  nam neque (134) aegrotare neque sanum esse uerum est cum ipse Socrates non sit (135) omnino.  In priuatione uero, cum non sit, neutrum uerum est,  et cum (136) sit, non semper alterum uerum est;  uisum enim habere Socratem et (137) caecum esse Socratem opponuntur ut habitus et priuatio  et cum sit, (138) non est necesse alterum uerum esse uel falsum  (quando enim non est (139) natus ut habeat, utraque falsa sunt),  cum autem non sit omnino (140) Socrates, sic quoque utraque falsa sunt, et habere eum uisum et eum (141) esse caecum. 
                     
At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic.  ’Socrates is ill’ is the contrary of ’Socrates is well’,  but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other false.  For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both will be false;  for neither ’Socrates is ill’ nor ’Socrates is well’ is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.  In the case of ’positives’ and ’privatives’, if the subject does not exist at all, neither proposition is true,  but even if the subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false.  For ’Socrates has sight’ is the opposite of ’Socrates is blind’ in the sense of the word ’opposite’ which applies to possession and privation.  Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and the other false,  for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are false,  as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent. 
ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς καταφάσεως (28) καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἀεί, ἐάν τε ᾖ ἐάν τε μὴ ᾖ, τὸ μὲν ἕτε(29)ρον ἔσται ψεῦδος τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀληθές·  τὸ γὰρ νοσεῖν Σωκρά(30)τη καὶ τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη, ὄντος τε αὐτοῦ φανερὸν ὅτι (31) τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος,  καὶ μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίως·  (32) τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μὴ ὄντος ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ μὴ νοσεῖν ἀλη(33)θές·  ὥστε ἐπὶ μόνων τούτων ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀεὶ θάτερον αὐ(34)τῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ὅσα ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφα(35)σις ἀντίκειται. 
         
(142) In affirmatione uero uel negatione semper, uel si sit uel si non sit, (143) alterum ipsorum uerum, alterum falsum erit;  aegrotare enim Socratem et (144) non aegrotare Socratem, cum sit idem ipse, manifestum est quoniam (145) alterum eorum uerum uel falsum est,  cum non sit, similiter  (namque (146) aegrotum esse, cum non sit, falsum est, non aegrotare uero uerum (147) est).  Quare in solis his erit semper alterum ipsorum uerum esse uel (148) falsum, quaecumque ut affirmatio et negatio opponuntur. 
         
But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or not, one is always false and the other true.  For manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions ’Socrates is ill’, ’Socrates is not ill’, is true, and the other false.  This is likewise the case if he does not exist;  for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true.  Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false. 
 
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