καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῆγόν τινες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοῶσάν (60b) τε καὶ κοπτομένην·
ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψέ τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἅμα,
ὡς ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔοικέ τι εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἡδύ·
ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν,
τὸ ἅμα μὲν αὐτὼ μὴ ᾽θέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δέ τις διώκῃ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον,
ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμμένω (60c) δύ᾽ ὄντε.
καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἴσωπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθεῖναι ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα,
ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο, συνῆψεν εἰς ταὐτὸν αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς,
καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ᾧ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον.
ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν· ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἡδύ.
Et illam abegerunt quidam Critonis vociferantemque atque cedentem se.
Socrates sane residens super lectum recurvavit tibiam et fricuit manu, et confricans simul:
“Quam admirabile” inquit, “O viri, videtur esse hoc quod appellant homines oblectabile;
quam admirabiliter natum est ad id quod videtur contrarium esse triste,
simul enim eidem non velle adesse homini; si quis enim persequatur alterum et adipiscatur, fere semper compelli suscipere et alterum,
velut ex una vertice counita duo existencia.
Et michi videtur, si perpendisset hec Esopus, fabulam certe composuisse, quatinus deus volens ipsa congregare repugnancia,
quando quidem non poterat, copulavit in idem ipsis vertices,
et ob hec cuicumque alterum affuerit consequetur postmodum et alterum.
Quemadmodum igitur et ipsi michi videtur, quoniam a compede erat in crure prius dolor, venire videtur, sequens oblectabile.”
Et illam quidem reduxerunt quidam Critonis domestici vociferantem atque plan(38)gentem.
Socrates autem sedens in lectica contraxit ad se crus manuque perfricuit atque (39) inter fricandum sic inquit:
“Quam mira videtur, o viri, haec res esse quam nominant homi(40)nes voluptatem
quamque miro naturaliter se habet modo ad dolorem ipsum, qui eius con(41)trarius esse videtur.
Quippe cum simul homini adesse nolint. Attamen si quis prosequi(42)tur capitque alterum, semper ferme alterum quoque accipere cogitur,
quasi ex eodem ver(43)tice sint ambo connexa.
Arbitror equidem Aesopum si haec animadvertisset fabulam (44) fuisse facturum, videlicet deum ipsum cum ipsa inter se pugnantia vellet conciliare
neque (45) id facere posset,in unum saltem eorum apices coniunxisse,
proptereaque cuicunque adest al(46)terum, eidem mox alterum quoque adesse.
Quod quidem mihi accidit in praesentia. Siqui(47)dem modo crus propter vincula afficiebatur dolore, sed huic succedere voluptas iam vi(48)detur.”
Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself.
And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, bent and rubbed his leg, saying, as he was rubbing:
How singular is the thing called pleasure,
and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it;
for they are never present to a man at the same instant, and yet he who pursues either is generally compelled to take the other;
their bodies are two, but they are joined by a single head.
And I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had remembered them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife,
and how, when he could not, he fastened their heads together;
and this is the reason why when one comes the other follows,
as I know by my own experience now, when after the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain pleasure appears to succeed.
ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβών, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ᾽ ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με.
περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν (60d) ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλω προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἤδη ἤροντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὔηνος πρῴην, ὅτι ποτὲ διανοηθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεῦρο ἦλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας.
εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐήνῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅταν με αὖθις ἐρωτᾷ--εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐρήσεται--εἰπὲ τί χρὴ λέγειν.
Itaque Cebes assumens “Per Iovem, O Socrate, inquit bene egisti in memoriam revocans michi.
De poematis que composuisti producens Esopi sermones et in Apollinem prohemium et alii quidam me iam percunctati sunt, quemadmodum et Evinus pridem, quid quandoque intellectu volvens, quando quidem huc venisti, finxisti hec, prius nichil umquam componens.
Si ergo quid tibi cure est habere me Evino respondere cum me iterum percunctatus fuerit - bene novi enim quoniam sciscitabitur,– dic quid oporteat me dicere.”
Ad haec Cebes, “per Iovem”, inquit, “o Socrates, opportune mihi id in memoriam re(49)vocasti.
Cum enim poemata composueris sermones intendens Aesopi scripto in Apol(50)linem prooemio, tum alij multi me interrogaverunt, tum Evenus pauloante, quonam con(51)silio postquam in carcerem devenisti ea feceris, quae prius feceras nunquam.
Si igitur tibi (52) curae est ut habeam quid respondeam Eueno, quando iterum ex me quaesierit, quod cer(53)to scio facturum, dic quaeso, quid ei sit respondendum.”
Upon this Cebes said: I am glad, Socrates, that you have mentioned the name of Aesop.
For it reminds me of a question which has been asked by many, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet--he will be sure to ask it again, and therefore if you would like me to have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to him:--he wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry, now that you are in prison are turning Aesop's fables into verse, and also composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.
λέγε τοίνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὦ Κέβης, τἀληθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῖς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος (60e) εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα--ᾔδη γὰρ ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη--
ἀλλ᾽ ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρώμενος τί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν.
ἦν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, “ὦ Σώκρατες”, ἔφη, “μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου”.
καὶ ἐγὼ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαί τε (61a) καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι,
καὶ ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος.
νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἥ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἑορτὴ διεκώλυέ με ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἔδοξε χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδη μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν·
ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι (61b) ποιήσαντα ποιήματα [καὶ] πιθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ.
οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα οὗ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία·
μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦ μυθολογικός,
διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὓς προχείρους εἶχον μύθους καὶ ἠπιστάμην τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.
ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Κέβης, Εὐήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρῶσθαι καί, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς τάχιστα.
(61c) ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον· κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι.
“Dic autem” inquit “ei, O Cebes, que vera sunt, quoruam nee illi volens e neque poematibus ipsius ex adverso insidians esse finxi hec - vidi quippe quam non facile esset,-
immo insompniis quibusdam attemptatus quid dicere et sanctificacione lustratus, si ergo sepe hanc musicam michi iniungat facere.
Erant siquidem quedam talia: crebro ad me veniens idem insomnium in preterita vita, aliud utique in alia specie visum, eadem quoque dicens: ‘O Socrate,’ ait ‘musicam fac et operare.'
Atque ego quidem in anteacto tempore quod operabar, hoc suspicabar ipsum michi precipere et superiniungere, quemadmodum currentibus imperantes,
et michi taliter insompnium, quod agebam illud precipere, musicam facere, ceu philosophia quoque existente maxima musica me profectoo hoc agente.
Nunc sane, quoniam causa acta erat et numinus solempnitas prohibuit memori, visum est oportere, si utique multociens me iubeat insompnium hanc, publicam musicam instituere, non incredulum esse sibi, immo facere;
tucius quippe esse rebar non abire prius, ante quam sanctificarer componens poemata obsequens insompnio.
Ita sane primum quidem in deum composui cuius erat presens immolacio;
ceterum vera post deum, cogitans quoniam poetam oporteat, si quidem debeat poeta esse, fingere fabulas sed non sermones - et ipse nonne erat mithologicus? -
ob hec utique quas ad manus habebam et sciebam fabulas Esopi, has composui quibus primis incidebam.
Hec igitur, o Cebes, Evino edissere et valere et, si sapiat, me sequi quam citissime;
migro quippe, ut videtur, hodie; iubent enim Athenei.”
“Vera”, inquit, “o Cebes, responde (54) me id effecisse non ut vel ipsi gratificarer vel cum ipsius carminibus decertarem – sciebam (493, 1) enim facile id non esse –
verum ut insomnia quaedam experirer me simul expians, num (2) forte haec sit ea musica quam saepius iam exercere me iubent.
Nam frequenter superio(3)ri tempore insomnium idem, licet alia atque alia forma sese mihi offerens, eadem semper (4) ita praecepit: 'Fac, o Socrates, musicam atque exerce'.
Ego igitur quod in superiori tempo(5)re faciebam, hoc mihi praeceptum arbitrabar, et quemadmodum currentes adhortari (6) solemus,
sic quod ipse antea faciebam, ad idem me insomnium cohortari putabam quasi (7) philosophia maxima musica foret.
Postquam vero facto iam de me iudicio, mori me in(8)terim dei festivitas inhiberet, censui oportere, si forte insomnium toties iubeat popula(9)rem hanc musicam exercere, non negligere eius praeceptum.
Tutius enim fore arbitra(10)tus sum, antequam e vita migrarem, expiare animum atque ut monet insomnium poe(11)mata facere.
Quamobrem primo equidem cecini deum ipsum, cuius tunc sacra cele(12)brabantur,
atque post deum iudicans oportere eum qui poeta futurus sit non sermones (13) sed fabulas facere, me vero non esse fabulatorem,
nonnullas ex fabulis Aesopi quas scie(14)bam promptioresque habebam ut in quanque prius incidi modulatus sum.
Haec igitur, o (15) Cebes, refer Eueno et valere iube. Atque consule ut si probe sapit, me sequatur.
Migro (16) enim hinc hodie. Sic enim Athenienses iubent.”
Tell him, Cebes, he replied, what is the truth--that I had no idea of rivalling him or his poems; to do so, as I knew, would be no easy task.
But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams ‘that I should compose music.’
The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying the same or nearly the same words: ‘Cultivate and make music,’ said the dream.
And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has been the pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music.
The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running.
But I was not certain of this, for the dream might have meant music in the popular sense of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me a respite,
I thought that it would be safer for me to satisfy the scruple, and, in obedience to the dream, to compose a few verses before I departed.
And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival,
and then considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put together words, but should invent stories, and that I have no invention,
I took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and which I knew--they were the first I came upon--and turned them into verse.
Tell this to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry;
and that to-day I am likely to be going, for the Athenians say that I must.
καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, οἷον παρακελεύῃ, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνῳ.
πολλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρί· σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ᾔσθημαι οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν σοι ἑκὼν εἶναι πείσεται.
Et Simmias: “Qualiter precipis” ait “hoc, O Socrate, Evino.
Multum enim iam frequentavi virum; fere igitur, ex quibus animadverto, nullatenus quidem ad te gratis ire persuadebirur.”
Tunc Simmias, “quale id est”, inquit, “o So(17)crates, quod Eueno mandas?
Saepe equidem cum illo fui et quantum de illo sentio, nul(18)lo pene modo libens ille tibi parebit.”
Simmias said: What a message for such a man!
having been a frequent companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never take your advice unless he is obliged.
ἤρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης· πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ᾽ ἂν τῷ ἀποθνῄσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἕπεσθαι;
Interrogabat igitur eum Cebes: “Quomodo istud dicis, O Socrate, minime fas esse sibi ipsi violenciam inferre, velle itaque morientem philosophum sequi?”.
Quaesivit igitur ab eo Cebes, “quonam id modo ais, o Socrates? Fas quidem non (23) esse seipsum violare, philosophum tamen optare morientem sequi?”
Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?
τί δέ, ὦ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόατε σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες;
SOCRATES. “Qui vero, O Cebes, non audivistis tu quoque et Simmias de huiuscemodi Filolao commorantes?”
“Quid, o Cebes”, in(24)quit, “nonne tu Simmiasque talia quaedam audivistis a Philolao, quo familiariter uteba(25)mini?”
Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are the disciples of Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοὼς φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν.
καὶ γὰρ ἴσως (61e) καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεῖ, ποίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἰόμεθα εἶναι·
τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοῖ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;
SOCRATES. “Verum et ego ex auditu de hiis dico; que itaque accidit audire invidia nulla exponere.
Et enim forsitan et maxime decet eum qui debet illuc peregrinari pervalde inspicere et mithologizare de peregrinacione que ibi, qualem aliquam eam arbitramur esse;
quid enim utique quis agat aliud in usque solis occasum tempore?”
“Atqui ego quoque de his rebus”, (26) inquit Socrates, “ex auditu loquor. Quae igitur forte ipse audivi, referre vobis nulla invi(27)dia prohibebit.
Etenim forte maxime decet illo migraturum considerare atque effingere (28) qualis fore putanda sit haec ipsas migratio.
Quid enim aliud usque ad solis occasum quis fa(29)ciat?”
My words, too, are only an echo; but there is no reason why I should not repeat what I have heard:
and indeed, as I am going to another place, it is very meet for me to be thinking and talking of the nature of the pilgrimage which I am about to make.
What can I do better in the interval between this and the setting of the sun?
κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὔ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ἤδη γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὅπερ νυνδὴ σὺ ἤρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ᾽ ἡμῖν διῃτᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν·
σαφὲς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα.
(62a) ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἔφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαις.
ἴσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον <ὂν> τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστὸν ἴσως σοι φαίνεται εἰ τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλον δεῖ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην.
CEBES. “Secundum quid igitur aliquando haut licitum esse ipsum se ipsum interimere, O Socrate?
Iam enim ego, quod nunc tu percunctatus es, eciam a Filolao audivi, quando penes nos dies agebat, iam quidem eciam ab aliis quibusdam, quoniam non oporteat hoc facere;
certum autem de hiis a nullo umquam quicquam audivi.”
“Immo satagere oportet” ait; “fors enim, et si audieris,
tamen mirabile tibi appareat, si hoc solum aliorum omnium simplex sit, et numquam contingit homini, quomodo et alia, est quando et quibus pocius mori quam vivere; quibus sane melius mori - mirandum forsitan tibi videtur si hiis hominlbus non sanctum est ipsos sibi ipsis bene facere, atqui alium convenit prestolari benefactorem.”
“Quam ob causam”, inquit Cebes, “o Socrates, nefas esse aiunt sibimet manus inferre?
(30) Iam enim quod modo quaerebas ego a Philolao audivi, cum apud nos versaretur, et ab (31) alijs insuper nonnullis non decere i facere.
Apertum tamen hac de re quicquam nihil (32) ab aliquo unquam audivi.”
“Sed attentione opus est”, inquit. “Nam et si audiveris,
mirum (33) tamen forte videri possit, si hoc solum ex alijs omnibus simplex sit, nec accidat unquam (34) homini quemadmodum caetera, quando et quibusdam melius mori quam vivere. Ita(35)que mirum tibi forte videbitur, si his quibus praestat mori, non liceat sibimet prodesse, (36) sed alium oporteat expectare qui prosit.”
Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held to be unlawful?
as I have certainly heard Philolaus, about whom you were just now asking, affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes:
and there are others who say the same, although I have never understood what was meant by any of them.
Do not lose heart, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will understand.
I suppose that you wonder why, when other things which are evil may be good at certain times and to certain persons, death is to be the only exception, and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.
(62b) καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτω γ᾽ εἶναι ἄλογον·
οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως γ᾽ ἔχει τινὰ λόγον.
ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἔν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ᾽ ἀποδιδράσκειν,
μέγας τέ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ῥᾴδιος διιδεῖν·
οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὖ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.
ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως;
SOCRATES. “Et enim utique” inquit “videbitur” Socrates “sic equidem esse irracionabile;
minime tamen, sed fortassis habet aliquam racionem.
Qui ergo in archanis dictus super hiis sermo, quasi in quadam custodia sumus homines, et non convenit se ipsum ex ea solvere neque aufugere,
magnus profecto quidam michi videtur et non facilis perspici.
Verumptamen sed hoc equidem michi videtur, O Cebes, bene dici, deos esse nostrum procuratores, atque nos homines unam possessionum deis esse.
Vel tibi non videtur ita?”
“Atqui videri quidem”, inquit Socrates, “potest id sic absurdum.
Fortas(38)se etiam quandam habet rationem.
Profecto sermo ille qui de his arcanis habetur, in qua(39)dam custodia esse homines, neque decere quenquam ex hac seipsum solvere neque aufuge(40)re,
magnus quidem mihi videtur neque cognitu facilis.
Veruntamen id mihi, o Cebes, re(41)cte apparet dictum, deos quidem curam habere nostri, nos vero homines unam quan(42)dam ex possessionibus esse deorum.
An non ita tibi videtur?”
I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying;
but there may not be any real inconsistency after all.
There is a doctrine whispered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door and run away;
this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand.
Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of theirs.
Do you not agree?
(62c) οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἴ τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἀποκτεινύοι, μὴ σημήναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνοις ἂν αὐτῷ καί, εἴ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν;
SOCRATES. “Nonne” inquit ille “et tu eciam tui ipsius possessionum si que ipsa se ipsam interemerit, non significante te quia velis ipsam mori, indigneris ipsi, et, si quam habeas animadversionem, punias utique?”
“Nonne igitur”, inquit, “et tu si quod ex mancipijs tuis seipsum perimeret, cum nul(44)lo modo id permisisses, irasceris utique illi? Et si potestatem haberes poena quadam affi(45)ceres?”
And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would you not punish him if you could?
ἴσως τοίνυν ταύτῃ οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ πρότερον αὑτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῖν παροῦσαν.
SOCRATES. “Forsitan autem hactenus haut irracionabile non prius se ipsum interficere oportere, ante quam necessitatem aliquam deus immittat, velut presentem sibi.”
“Forte igitur hac ratione haud praeter rationem est prius de(46)cere seipsum interficere quam deus necessitatem aliquam imposuerit, qualem nobis im(47)posuit in praesentia.”
Then, if we look at the matter thus, there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me.
ἀλλ᾽ εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται.
ὃ μέντοι νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν (62d) ἀποθνῄσκειν, ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι.
τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον·
οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὑτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος;
ἀλλ᾽ ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ᾽ ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον (62e) εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπό γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι·
ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν ἀεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὑτοῦ βελτίονι.
καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὐναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο·
τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνῄσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας χαίρειν.
“Immo convenienter” Cebes ait “istud videtur.
Quod tamen dixisti, philosophos facile utique velle mori, assimilabitur hoc, O Socrate, inconvenienti si quidem quod nunc diximus racionabiliter se habet, deum quidem procuratorem esse nostrum et nos ipsius possessiones esse.
Nam non indignari sapientissimos ex hac cura migrantes, in qua regunt eos qui quidem optimi sunt existencium rectores, dii, non habet racionem.
Nondum quippe ipse sui ipsius existimabitur melius providere liber factus;
sed menceps homo fors autumaverit hoc, fugiendum esse a domino, et minime cogitaverit e quoniam non expedit a bono fugere, sed quam maxime permanere; ideo quidem irracionabilissime fugiet;
mentis vero compos exoptat ubique esse penes se ipso meliorem.
Et ita, O Socrate, contrarium esse convenit quam quod nunc dicebatur;
nam prudentes moleste ferre obeuntes decet, imprudentesque gaudere.”
“Consentaneum id quidem apparet”, inquit Cebes.
“Quod vero dice(48)bas modo, philosophos perfacile velle mori, absurdum, o Socrates, videtur esse, si quidem (49) quod nunc diximus rationem habet, deum videlicet nostrum esse curatorem. Nos vero (50) in rebus eius positos esse.
Nullam enim id rationem habet, prudentissimos videlicet ho(51)mines non aegre ferre ab ea cura se amoveri quam sibi praestent dij optimi omnium re(52)rum gubernatores.
Nunquid enim putaretur vir prudens ipsum se melius esse curaturum (53) si liber evaserit.
Sed demens aliquis forsitan id putaret, fugiendum scilicet esse a domino, (54) neque cogitaret non esse id quod bonum est fugiendum, sed in eo maxime permanen(494, 1)dum. Ideoque absque ratione fugeret.
Qui vero mentem habet, semper apud eum qui sit meli(2)ore esse cupit.
Atque ita, o Socrates, contra omnino conveniens esse videtur quam quod (3) paulo ante dicebatur,
Sapientes quidem decere graviter mortem ferre, Insipientes ve(4)ro libenter.”
Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there seems to be truth in what you say.
And yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our guardian and we his possessions, with the willingness to die which we were just now attributing to the philosopher?
That the wisest of men should be willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the best of rulers, is not reasonable;
for surely no wise man thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of him.
A fool may perhaps think so--he may argue that he had better run away from his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and that there would be no sense in his running away.
The wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than himself.
Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now said;
for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at passing out of life.
ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ (63a) Kέβητος πραγματείᾳ,
καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἀεί τοι, ἔφη, [ὁ] Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τις εἴπῃ.
Audiens itaque Socrates exultasse quoque michi visum est Cebetis cavillacione,
et respiciens in nos: SOCRATES. “Semper certe” inquit “Cebes raciones quasdam rimatur, et non prorsus directe vult persuaderi quicquid quis dicat.”
Socrates igitur cum haec audisset, delectari visus est argutia Cebetis.
Conver(5)susque ad nos, “semper”, inquit, “hic Cebes rationes quasdam perscrutatur neque admodum (6) facile quod quivis dixerit vult admittere.”
The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates.
Here, said he, turning to us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not so easily convinced by the first thing which he hears.
καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης·
τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὑτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν;
καί μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥᾳδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς.
Et Simmias “Necnon,” ait “O Socrate, nunc eciam videtur quid michi et ipsi dicere Cebes;
quid enim profecto volentes viri sapientes quam vere dominos pociores se fugere, atque facile discedant ab eis?
Et michi videtur Cebes” ait “in te tendere verbum, quoniam tam facile fers et nos relinquens et rectores bonos, ut ipse fateris, deos.”
Tunc Simmias, “mihi quoque”, inquit, “nonnihil vi(7)detur Cebes dicere.
Quo enim consilio sapientes viri eos qui meliores revera quam ipsi sint (8) fugiant, illisque carere facile patiantur?
Atqui mihi videtur Cebes sermonem in te intende(9)re, quod tam facile et nos relinquas et deos, ut tu ipse fateris, principes bonos.”
And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does appear to me to have some force.
For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than himself?
And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods whom you acknowledge to be our good masters.
φέρε δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς.
ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ·
νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ᾽ (63c) ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς--καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην--ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο.
ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ᾽ εὔελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καί, ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς.
“Euge autem” inquit ille “experiar ad vos persuasibilius respondere quam ad iudices.
Ego enim” inquit, “O Simmia et Cebes, si utique non arbitrarer ventum ire primo ad deos alios sapientesque et bonos, deinceps ad homines qui iam migrarunt pociores eis qui hic, iniuste agerem revera non indignans morti.
Nunc vero bene nostis quoniam ad viros spero abiturum esse bonos - et hoc profecto nequaquam prorsus moleste ferrem, – quoniam utique ad deos dominos omnino bonos ventum ire, bene nostis quoniam, si quid aliud talium, graviter sustinerem et hoc.
Quare propter hoc non similiter indignor, immo bona spe ductus sum esse quid eciam defunctis et, velut utique eciam olim dicitur, longe melius bonis quam malis.”
“Age ergo”, inquit. “Conabor nunc apud vos (12) accuratius quam nuper apud Atheniensium iudices fecerim, me defendere.
Equidem, o Sim(13)mia atque Cebes, nisi me migraturum putarem, primum quidem ad deos alios sapientes (14) et bonos, deinde ad homines defunctos his qui hic sunt meliores, iniusta agerem non (15) moleste ferens mortem.
Nunc certe habetote sperare me ad viros bonos iturum, sed hoc (16) quidem haud omnino asseverarem. Quod vero ad deos dominos valde bonos iturus (17) sim, certum habetote siquid aliud eiusmodi et hoc utique me affirmaturum.
Propterea haud (18) similiter mortem moleste fero, sed bono animo sum speroque superesse aliquid his qui de(19)functi sunt atque ut iam dicitur multo melius bonis fore quam malis.”
Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did when before the judges.
For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in the first place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly (though I am not so sure of this last) to men departed, better than those whom I leave behind;
and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.
τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης;
(63d) κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἅμα σοι ἡ ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἅπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσῃς.
SIMMIAS. “Quid igitur” ait Simmias, “O Socrate? Utrum ipse sic habens mentem hanc in voto habes migrare, seu eciam nobis impercias?
Commune quippe videtur michi eciam nobis esse bonum hoc, et una tibi responsio erit, si que dicis nobis persuaseris.”
“Quidnam, o Socra(20)tes, cogitas?” inquit Simmias. “Nunquid ipse cum isthac sententia hinc abire? An nos quoque (21) participes eius relinquere?
Nempe commune nobis quoque id bonum arbitror esse debe(22)re. Praeterea ita demum te apud nos purgaveris, si quae dicis, nobis etiam persuaseris.”
But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said Simmias. Will you not impart them to us?
--for they are a benefit in which we too are entitled to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us, that will be an answer to the charge against yourself.
τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι;
φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν (63e) τῷ φαρμάκῳ·
εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς πίνειν τούς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας.
“Quid, O Socrate,” ait Crito “aliud quam dudum michi dicit qui debet dare farmacum quia oportet tibi dicere quam minimum disputare;
dicit siquidem calefieri magis disputantes, oportere autem nichil tale conferre e farmaco;
sin autem aliquociens compelli et bis et ter bibere quid tale facientes.
“Quidnam putas aliud, o Socrates”, inquit Crito, “quam quod iam(25)dudum mihi dicit is qui tibi venenum est daturus?
Iubet enim te moneri ut quamparcissi(26)me loquaris, dicens eos qui disputant nimium incalescere, nihil vero tale bibituris venenum (27) convenire.
Alioquin eos id fecerint, cogi interdum bis, quandoque ter venenum bi(28)bere."
Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:--the attendant who is to give you the poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not to talk much,
talking, he says, increases heat, and this is apt to interfere with the action of the poison;
persons who excite themselves are sometimes obliged to take a second or even a third dose.
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δὶς δώσων, ἐὰν δὲ δέῃ, καὶ τρίς.
ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μέν τι ᾔδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλά μοι πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει.
Et Socrates “Sine” inquit “valere ipsum; immo solum quod suum est struat, ut et bis daturus, si eciam oportuerit et ter.”
“Immo ferme novi” inquit Crito; “sed michi dudum causaciones dat.”
“Mitte ipsum”, inquit. “Tantum id quod officij eius paret, tanquam bis et si oportuerit ter (29) praebiturus.”
“Et antea quidem”, inquit Crito, “ferme id responsurum sciebam. Sed ille me (30) iamdudum stimulat.”
Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all.
I knew quite well what you would say, replied Crito; but I was obliged to satisfy him. Never mind him, he said.
ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων (64a) ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ.
πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.
κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.
εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ὃ πάλαι προυθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον.
“Sine ipsum” inquit Socrates; “sed vobis quidem iudicibus volo iam sermonem reddere, ceu michi videtur competenter vir vere in philosophia terens vitam confidit cum debeat mori et bone spei alumpnus esse illic maximis fretum ire bonis ex quo obierit.
Quomodo autem istud ita se habeat, o Simmia quidem et Cebes, ego experiar edisserere.
“Conantur siquidem quicumque sunt recte contingentes philosophiam latere alios quoniam nichil aliud ipsi articulantur quam defungi et defunctum ire.
Si ergo hoc verum, incongruum uti que erit animo gestire in omni vita nichil aliud quam hoc, veniente quoque ipso indignari quod olim preconcupierunt quidem et affectabant.”
"Mitte ipsum", inquit. "Ego vero, o iudices, rationem vobis iam redde(31)re volo ob quam mihi videatur vir qui per omnem vitam incubuerit philosophiae, me(32)rito magna cum fiducia imminentem expectare mortem atque bona spe esse se ibi postquam (33) hinc migraverit maxima bona reportaturum.
Quemadmodum igitur id ita se habeat, o (34) Simmia atque Cebes, conabor equidem aperire.
Quicunque philosophiam recte aliquan(35)do attigerunt, nimirum videntur latuisse ceteros homines quod nihil aliud ipsi commen(36)tarentur quam mori atque esse se mortuos.
Quod si id verum est, perabsurdum foret si cum ni(37)hil praeter hoc aliud per omnem vitam studuerint, hoc ipso adveniente quod iamdiu agi(38)tabant exercebantque, graviter ferrent."
And now, O my judges, I desire to prove to you that the real philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world.
And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain.
For I deem that the true votary of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is always pursuing death and dying;
and if this be so, and he has had the desire of death all his life long, why when his time comes should he repine at that which he has been always pursuing and desiring?
καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας, νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, (64b) οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνδὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι.
οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας--καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ--ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι, καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν.
Et Simmias ridens “Per Iovem” inquit, “O Socrate, non omnino me ridere volentem effecisti ridere.
Reor enim nonnullis ipsum hoc audientibus videri bene funditus dici adversus philosophantes – et concedere quoque eos qui apud nos sunt homines, et omnino – quoniam revera philosophantes morti se parant, et ipsos non latuit quoniam digni sunt istud pati.”
Hinc Simmias arridens, "per Iovem", inquit, "o So(39)crates mihi quidem haud multum ridere cupienti risum expressisti.
Nam multos arbi(40)tror fore qui si id audierint aptissime in philosophos dictum putent, nostrosque homines (41) consensuros et valde quidem, philosophos revera mori nec tamen ignorare quam digni (42) sint morte."
Simmias said laughingly: Though not in a laughing humour, you have made me laugh, Socrates;
for I cannot help thinking that the many when they hear your words will say how truly you have described philosophers, and our people at home will likewise say that the life which philosophers desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the death which they desire.
καὶ ἀληθῆ γ᾽ ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι.
λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ᾗ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ᾗ ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἵου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι.
(64c) εἴπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι;
SOCRATES. “Et vera dicerent, O Simmia, preter ipsos non latere;
latuit enim eos qualiter morti se parent et qualiter digni sunt morte et quali morte quam vere philosophi.
Dicamus enim” inquit “ad nos ipsos - valere dicentes illis - : existimamus quid mortem esse?”
"Forte id recte, o Simmia", inquit, "dicerent, praeterquam quod non ignorare (43) addunt.
Latuit sane eos, qua ratione veri philosophi et mori studeant et morte sint di(44)gni.
Sed iam relinquamus illos nobisque ipsis loquamur. Putamusne aliquid esse mor(45)tem?"
And they are right, Simmias, in thinking so, with the exception of the words ‘they have found them out’;
for they have not found out either what is the nature of that death which the true philosopher deserves, or how he deserves or desires death.
But enough of them:--let us discuss the matter among ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?
ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν;
καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν [ἀπὸ] τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἶναι;
ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο;
SOCRATES. “Igitur num aliud quoque quam anime a corpore sequestracionem?
Et esse hoc mori, secus quidem ab anima separatum ipsum per se corpus fieri, secus autem animam a corpore separatam ipsam per se ipsam esse?
Ergo numquid aliud quid est mors quam istud?”
"Nunquid aliud", inquit, "quam animae a corpore solutio(46)nem?
Esseque id mortuum esse, scilicet solutum ab anima corpus per se seorsum esse? Seor(47)sum quoque a corpore animam solutam ipsam per se ipsam existere?
Nunquid mors praeter (48) hoc aliud est?"
Is it not the separation of soul and body?
And to be dead is the completion of this; when the soul exists in herself, and is released from the body and the body is released from the soul,
what is this but death?
σκέψαι δή, ὠγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί· (64d) ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν.
φαίνεταί σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων [τε] καὶ ποτῶν;
ἥκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
SOCRATES. “Contemplare autem, O bone, si ergo et tibi simul videantur que et michi; ex hiis enim magis reor nos scire de quibus intendimus.
Videtur tibi philosophi viri esse studere circa voluptates vocatas tales quidem, quemadmodum escarum et potuum?”
“Neutiquam, O Socrate,” ait Simmias,
"Considera", inquit, "bone vir, num tibi idem quoque (49) et mihi videatur. In his enim vos arbitror planius quae perquirimus inventuros.
Vide(50)turne tibi philosophi officium esse sectari eas quae appellantur voluptates, quales sunt epu(51)larum atque poculorum?"
"Minime quidem, o Socrates", inquit.
There is another question, which will probably throw light on our present inquiry if you and I can agree about it:
--Ought the philosopher to care about the pleasures--if they are to be called pleasures--of eating and drinking?
Certainly not, answered Simmias.
τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας;
δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος;
οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, (64e) καθ᾽ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν;
SOCRATES. “Quid alias circa corpus curas?
Videtur tibi preciosas existimare talis?
Velut vestimentorum differencium possessiones et calcia mentorum et alios ornatus circa corpus, utrum honorare tibi videtur sive inhonorare, secundum quantum non multa necessitas participare eis?”
"Quid reliquum corporis cultum,
an multifacere philosophus tibi (53) videtur?
Vt habere vestes egregias calceosque et alia quae circa corpus sunt ornamenta, u(54)trum multifacere tibi videtur an nihilipendere, nisi quatenus magna cogat necessitas illis uti?"
And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body,
for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say?
οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;
SOCRATES. “Nonne igitur omnino videtur tibi” inquit “huius talis intencio minime circa corpus esse, immo secundum quantum potest distare ab ipso, ad animam autem converti?”
(2) "Annon tibi videtur", inquit, "eiusmodi studium haud ad corpus quidem declinare, sed (3) quantum fieri potest ab illo discedere atque ad animum se convertere."
Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to get away from the body and to turn to the soul.
