τί δέ; ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι (101c) τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν;
καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῴης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ,
καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἓν ἔσεσθαι,
τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐῴης ἂν χαίρειν, παρεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτοῦ σοφωτέροις·
σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἄν, τὸ (101d) λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἄν.
εἰ δέ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἐῴης ἂν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ὁρμηθέντα σκέψαιο εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ·
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοιτο, (101e) ἕως ἐπί τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις,
ἅμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν;
ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲ εἷς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς·
ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες ὅμως δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ἀρέσκειν·
σὺ δ᾽, εἴπερ εἶ τῶν φιλοσόφων, (102a) οἶμαι ἂν ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω ποιοῖς.
SOCRATES. “Quid sane? Uni uno apposito apposicionem causam esse ut duo fiant seu discisso discissionem non verearis utique dicere?
Et magna voce clames quoniam nequaquam arbitramur alio quolibet modo singulum factum quam participans propria essencia singuli quocumque participet,
et in hiis minime habes aliquam aliam causam ut duo fiant, sed binarii participacionem, et oportere hoc participare que debent duo fore, atque unitate quodcumque debeat unum fore,
porra scissiones has et apposiciones atque alias huiusmodi compsias sinas nempe valere, permittens respondere se ipso sapiencioribus;
tu veritus quoque, ut solet dici, sui ipsius umbram et impericiam, fultus illa soliditate ypotheseos, ita respondeas equidem.
Si vera quis ipsa ypothesi innitatur, valere sinas quidem et non respondeas, donec que ab illa oriantur consideres utrum tibi ad invicem consonent vel discrepent;
quoniam quidem illius ipsius oporteat te dare racionem, similiter certe metuas aliam iterum ypothesim ponens que superiorum optima videatur quousque in quidpiam ydoneum venias,
simulque numquam misceas quemadmodum antilogici de principio disputans et de hiis que ex illo oriuntur, si velis quid eorum que sunt invenire?
Illis namque forsan nullus super hoc sermo neque sollicitudo;
ydonei enim a sapiencia simul omnia movendo confundentes tamen posse ipsi ipsis placere;
tu autem si es de philosophis, autumo quoque velut ego dico facies.”
“Quid vero si uni (12) addatur unum, additamentum ipsum esse causam ut duo fiant, vel si dividatur, divisionem (13) ipsam duorum esse causam, dicere non formidares?
Altiusque exclamares nescire te quo(14)nam alio pacto quicquam fiat, nisi participatione quadam essentiae unicuique propriae, cu(15)ius sit particeps?
Atque in his nullam aliam habere te causam, cur duo fiant praeter duitatis (16) ipsius participationem, sed oportere huius participia fore, quaecunque futura sunt duo, et (17) similiter unitatis quodcunque futurum sit unum?
Has vero divisiones adiunctionesque et cae(18)teras eiusmodi argutias valere sineres relinqueresque sapientioribus te per eas pro arbitrio (19 responsuris.
[marg: Proverbium Tuam umbram metuis] Tu vero tuam, quemadmodum dici solet, metuens umbram et imperitiam at(20)que innixus tutissimae illi positioni, sic utique responderes?
At vero si quis eandem positio(21)nem complexus instaret velere sineres, neque prius responderes quam quae inde manant (22) considerasses utrum consonent invicem aut dissonent?
Vbi vero illius ipsius rationem o(23)porteret afferre, eodem modo afferres atque aliam rursus positionem adduceres quae supe(24)riorum optima videretur, quoad ad aliquid sufficiens pervenires?
Nunquam vero simul (25) confunderes contentiosorum more, ubi et de principio et de his quae a principio deducun(26)tur disputas, si modo velles eorum aliquid quae vere sunt invenire?
Nam illis fortasse nul(27)lus hac de re sermo est, nulla cura.
Possunt enim prae sapientia et simul omnia commiscere (28) et tamen sibimet placere.
Tu vero si ex philosophorum numero es, quae dico, ut arbitror, (29) facies.”
Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two?
And you would loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except by participation in its own proper essence,
and consequently, as far as you know, the only cause of two is the participation in duality--this is the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one.
You would say: I will let alone puzzles of division and addition--wiser heads than mine may answer them;
inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, as the proverb says, at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a principle.
And if any one assails you there, you would not mind him, or answer him, until you had seen whether the consequences which follow agree with one another or not,
and when you are further required to give an explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume a higher principle, and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best of the higher;
but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences in your reasoning, like the Eristics--at least if you wanted to discover real existence.
Not that this confusion signifies to them, who never care or think about the matter at all,
for they have the wit to be well pleased with themselves however great may be the turmoil of their ideas.
But you, if you are a philosopher, will certainly do as I say.
