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Plato: Phaedo

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εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη·  ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, (70a) τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μή, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ᾖ,  ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται ᾗ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνῄσκῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ.  ἐπεί, εἴπερ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὺ νυνδὴ διῆλθες, πολλὴ ἂν εἴη ἐλπὶς καὶ καλή, ὦ (70b) Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις·  ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καί τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. 
Inquiente vero Socrate ista, excipiens Cebes ait:  “O Socrate, alia videntur michi bene dici, que vero de anima multam incredulitatem prebet hominibus, ne cum recedat a corpore nusquam amplius sit,  sed illa die corrumpaturque et pereat quacumque homo expiraverir, statim alienata a corpore et exiliens tamquam spiritus sive fumus disseda, feratur avolans et nichil amplius nusquam sit.  Quia si fuerit alicubi ipsa secundum se ipsam coartata et alienata ab hiis malis que tu nunc percurristi, plurima utique spes erit et bona, O Socrate, quoniam vera sunt que tu dicis.  Ceterum hoc fortassis haut modica commonicione indiget et fide, quoniam est anima defundo homine et quam virtutem habet atque prudenciam.” 
Cum haec Socrates dixisset, suspici(31)ens sermonem Cebes sic inquit.  "Caetera quidem, o Socrates, recte dicta videntur. Quantum (32) vero ad ipsam animam spectat, valde ambigunt homines ne anima a corpore separata nus(33)quam sit alterius,  sed ea ipsa die qua homo mortem obierit, intereat statimque seiuncta a cor(34)pore dissolvatur atque exhalans quasi ventus aut fumus dissipetur atque evanescat neque us(35)quam ulterius omnino sit aliquid.  Profecto si esset alicubi collecta in semetipsam et ab his (36) malis quae tu modo narrabas liberata, multa nimirum bonasque spes esset, o Socrates, vera quae (37) dicebas fore.  Caeterum ad id fortasse persuasione fideque non parva opus est, ut credatur su(38)peresse animam post interitum hominis atque aliquam vim intelligentiamque habere." 
Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say.  I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. But in what concerns the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere,  and that on the very day of death she may perish and come to an end--immediately on her release from the body, issuing forth dispersed like smoke or air and in her flight vanishing away into nothingness.  If she could only be collected into herself after she has obtained release from the evils of which you are speaking, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is true.  But surely it requires a great deal of argument and many proofs to show that when the man is dead his soul yet exists, and has any force or intelligence. 
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν;  ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; 
“Vera” inquit “ais” Socrates, “O Cebes; ceterum quid faciemus?  Quam de ipsis hiis velis confabulemur sive convenienter ita se habeat sive minime?” 
"Ve(39)ra, o Cebes, loqueris", inquit Socrates. "Verum quid agendum censes?  an forte de his ipsis (40) confabulandum, utrum ita fore an aliter probabile sit?" 
True, Cebes, said Socrates;  and shall I suggest that we converse a little of the probabilities of these things? 
ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι ἥντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν.  οὔκουν γ᾽ ἂν οἶμαι, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν (70c) ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ᾽ εἰ κωμῳδοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. 
“Ego igitur” inquit Cebes “libenter utique audirem quam opinionem habes de istis.”  “Non igitur reor” ait ille “dicere quempiam nunc audientem, neque si comediarum fictor fuerit, quoniam nugor et non de ad rem pertinentibus mencionem facio. 
"Libenter equidem", inquit Cebes, (41) "audirem de his rebus quid sentias."  "Neminem arbitror", inquit, "haec audientem, ne si co(42)moedus quidem sit, esse dicturum nugari nunc me ac de quibus minime oporteat verba (43) facere. [marg: Proponitur discutiendum an anima hominis sit post obitum]  
I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion about them.  I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were one of my old enemies, the Comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I have no concern: 
εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι. 
Si ergo videtur, oportet attendere. 
Si ergo placet oportetque considerare, 
--If you please, then, we will proceed with the inquiry. 
σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδέ πῃ, εἴτ᾽ ἄρα ἐν Ἅιδου εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ.  παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ,  καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων·  καὶ εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας,  ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν (70d) ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ;  οὐ γὰρ ἄν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὖσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι,  εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γίγνοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων·  εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν του δέοι λόγου. 
Consideremus autem ipsum quocumque modo, sive vero in Averno sunt anime defunctorum hominum sive eciam ubi.  Vetus igitur est quidam sermo iste cuius meminimus, quoniam sunt istinc abeuntes illuc,  et iterum hue advenientes et fiunt ex mortuis;  et si hoc sic se habet, iterum fieri ex defunctis vivos,  aliud quid quam ut sint quidem anime nostre ibi?  Non enim alicubi iterum fierent si non extitissent, et hoc sufficiens argumentum ista esse,  si pro vero clarum fiat quoniam neutiquam aliunde fiunt vivi quam ex mortuis,  si vero non est hoc, alia quacumque aliqua indiget racione.” 
id hoc pacto consideremus, utrum videlicet (44) apud inferos sint mortuorum animae nec ne.  Vetus quidem hic extat sermo cuius memo(45)res sumus, abire quidem illuc animas defunctorum  rursusque huc reverti fierique ex mor(46)tuis.  Atqui si hoc verum est, ut ex mortuis iterum viventes fiant,  essent animae illic nostrae.  (47) Neque enim rursus fierent si alicubi non essent. Atque haec sufficiens coniectura est ita esse,  si (48) revera constet haud aliunde viventes fieri quam ex mortuis.  At vero nisi id sit, alia opus (49) erit ratione." 
Suppose we consider the question whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below.  There comes into my mind an ancient doctrine which affirms that they go from hence into the other world,  and returning hither, are born again from the dead.  Now if it be true that the living come from the dead,  then our souls must exist in the other world,  for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive,  if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead;  but if this is not so, then other arguments will have to be adduced. 
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. 
“Prorsus utique” ait Cebes. 
"Omnino", inquit Cebes. 
Very true, replied Cebes. 
μὴ τοίνυν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾷον μαθεῖν,  ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν περὶ πάντων (70e1)  ἴδωμεν ἆρ᾽ οὑτωσὶ γίγνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία,  ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει.  τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα ἀναγκαῖον ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου.  οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι; 
“Neve itaque de hominibus” ait ille “considera solum istud, si vis facile addiscere,  immo de animalibus universis et plantis, et universaliter quecumque habent generacionem,  de omnibus videamus an sic fiant universa et non aliunde quam ex contrariis contraria,  quibuscumque contingit esse tale quid, quale honestum turpi contrarium aliquo modo et iustum iniusto, et alia decem milia sic se habent.  Hoc igitur consideremus, utrum necesse quibuscumque est contrarium, haut aliunde ipsum fieri quam ex sibi ipsi contrario.  Quemadmodum cum maius quid fiat, necesse aliquo modo ex minore existente prius deinceps maius fieri.” 
"Neque vero id in hominibus solum," inquit, "si pla(50)nius intelligere vis, consideres,  sed in animalibus omnibus et plantis atque, ut summatim(51) dicam, in omnibus quae gignuntur. [marg: Generationem fieri a contrarijs]  in his, inquam, omnibus consideremus nunquid om(52)nia sic fiant neque aliunde quam ex contrarijs contraria,  quibuscunque tale aliquid contin(53)git, quemadmodum pulchrum turpi quodammodo contrarium est et iustum iniusto a(54)liaque eiusmodi quamplurima videmus.  Ergo utrum necessarium sit, cuicunque aliquid est (498, 1) contrarium, nullo modo aliunde id quam ex suo contrario fieri?  Veluti quando quid ma(2)ius efficitur, necesse est ex eo quod ante fuerat minus, postea maius evadere." 
Then let us consider the whole question, not in relation to man only,  but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there is generation, and the proof will be easier.  Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites?  I mean such things as good and evil, just and unjust--and there are innumerable other opposites which are generated out of opposites.  And I want to show that in all opposites there is of necessity a similar alternation; I mean to say,  for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less. 
ναί. 
CEBES. “Ita.” 
"Ita est", inquit (3) Cebes. 
True. 
οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον (71a) ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται; 
SOCRATES. “Nonne et si minus fiat, ex maiore existente prius posterius minus erit?” 
"Nonne et si minus aliquid fiat ex eo quod ante maius erat, postea fiet minus?" 
And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have become less. 
ἔστιν οὕτω, ἔφη. 
CEDES. “Est” infit “ita.” 
(4) "Sic omnino", inquit Cebes. 
Yes. 
καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶττον; 
SOCRATES. “Eciam ex forcioribus imbecillius et ex tardioribus celerius?” 
"Quinetiam ex robustiori debilius, ex tardiori velocius?" 
And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower. 
πάνυ γε. 
CEBES. “Penitus quidem.” 
"Pror(5)sus." 
Very true. 
τί δέ; ἄν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; 
SOCRATES. “Quid vera? Si quid deterius fiat, nonne ex podore? Et si iustius, nonne ex iniustiore?” 
"Quid vero? Si quid evadat deterius, nonne ex meliori? Et si iustius, ex iniustiori?" 
And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more unjust. 
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 
CEBES. “Qui enim minime?” 
"Quid (6) ni?" 
Of course. 
ἱκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; 
SOCRATES. “Satis igitur” inquit “habemus istud, quoniam unrversa sic fiunt, ex contrariis contrarie res?” 
"In omnibus igitur satis id exploratum habemus, omnia ita fieri, contraria videlicet (7) ex contrarijs." 
And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites? 
πάνυ γε. 
CEBES. “Funditus autem.” 
"Prorsus", inquit Cebes. 
Yes. 
τί δ᾽ αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντοιν δύο γενέσεις, (71b) ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ᾽ αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον·  μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; 
SOCRATES. “Quid iterum? Est amplius et tale eciam in ipsis, quemadmodum inter utraque cuncta contraria duum existencium due generaciones, ab altera quidem in alterum, rursus ab altero iterum in alterum.  Maiorem enim rem et minorem inter augmentum et diminucio, atque appellamus ita hoc quidem augeri, illud vero minui?” 
"Quid rursus?" inquit. "Est ne medium aliquid in(8)ter contraria duo? Duae videlicet inter illa generationes sive progressiones ab altero qui(9)dem in alterum, atque in alterum vicissim ab altero?  Sane inter maius atque minus me(10)dium obtinet incrementum et decrementum, dicimusque id quidem crescere, illud ve(11)ro decrescere." 
And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other opposite, and back again;  where there is a greater and a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane? 
ναί, ἔφη. 
CEBES. “Ne” ait. 
"Ita", inquit Cebes. 
Yes, he said. 
οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαί τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἶναι ἑκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα; 
SOCRATES. “Nonne igitur et disgregari et coartari, et algere atque calefieri, atque universa sic, tametsi non utamur nominibus alicubi, verum opere ubique ita se habere necesse est, fieri ipsa ex invicem generacionemque ex utroque in invicem?” 
"Nonne similiter discerni vicissim atque confundi, (12) frigescere et incalescere, omniaque eodem pacto? Et si nomina nobis desunt alicubi, ubi(13)que tamen ita necesse est fieri, videlicet omnia ex contrarijs invicem generationemque es(14)se utriusque vicissim in alterum?" 
And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And this necessarily holds of all opposites, even though not always expressed in words--they are really generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them? 
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. 
“Prorsus” infit ille, 
"Omnino quidem", inquit. 
Very true, he replied. 
(71c) τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; 
SOCRATES. “Quid ergo?” ait. “Ei quod est vivere est quid contrarium, velut ei quod est vigilare id quod est dormire?” 
"Quid vero? Ei quod est vi(15)vere, est ne aliquid contrarium? Quemadmodum ei quod vigilare est dormire contra(16)rium?" 
Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking? 
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 
CEBES. “Omnino vero” ait, 
"Sic est omnino", inquit Cebes. 
True, he said. 
τί; 
SOCRATES. “Quid?” 
"Quidnam?" 
And what is it? 
τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη. 
CEBES. “Mori” inquit. 
"Mori." 
Death, he answered. 
οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστιν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντοιν; 
SOCRATES. “Numquid non ex invicem fiunt ista, si quidem contraria sunt, et generaciones sunt ipsis inter ipsa duo duobus existentibus?” 
"An non ex se invicem haec (17) fiunt, siquidem contrarium sunt? Cumque duo sint, duae quoque inter haec generationes mutuae (18) sive progressiones?" 
And these, if they are opposites, are generated the one from the other, and have there their two intermediate processes also? 
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 
CEBES. “Qui enim minime?” 
"Nihil prohibet." 
Of course. 
τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. 
SOCRATES. “Igitur alteram coniugadonem de quibus nunc disputabam.” “Ego a te” ait “percundabor.”
SOCRATES. “Et ipsam et generaciones.”
CEBES. “Tu vero michi alteram.” 
"Alteram quidem coniugationem eorum quae (19) modo dicebam, ego tibi dicam, tam ipsam quam generationes eorum. "Tu vero mihi ape(20)ries alteram." 
Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. 
λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ (71d) ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ᾽ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. 
SOCRATES. “Dico sane hoc quidem dormire, illud vero vigilare, et ex dormire fieri vigilare et ex vigilare dormire, et generaciones illorum hanc certe dormire esse, illam nempe expergefieri. 
"Dico autem illud quidem dormire, illud autem evigilare, atque ex somno (21) vigiliam fieri, et ex vigilia somnum, horumque generationes hanc quidem connivere, illam (22) vero expergisti. 
One of them I term sleep, the other waking. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. 
ἱκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἢ οὔ; 
Sufficienter tibi” ait, “Necne?” 
Satisfeci tibi necne?" 
Do you agree? 
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
CEBES. “Omnino profecto.” 
"Satisfecisti certe", inquit Cebes. 
I entirely agree. 
λέγε δή μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου.  οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῂς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; 
SOCRATES. “Dic eciam et tu michi” ait “ita de vita et morte.  Nonne contrarium inquis ei quod est vivere mori esse?” 
"Dic tu mihi quo(23)que similiter de vita atque morte.  An non contrarium vivere dicis esse atque mori?" 
Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner.  Is not death opposed to life? 
ἔγωγε. 
CEBES. “Ego certe.” 
"Equi(24)dem." 
Yes. 
γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; 
SOCRATES. “Gignique ex invicem?” 
"Et ex se invicem fieri?" 
And they are generated one from the other? 
ναί. 
CEBES. “Eciam.” 
[] 
Yes. 
ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον; 
SOCRATES. “Ex vivente igitur quid gignitur?” 
Ergo ex vivente quidnam fiet?" 
What is generated from the living? 
τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη. 
CEBES. “Mortuum” ait, 
"Mortuum." 
The dead. 
τί δέ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος; 
SOCRATES. “Quid vero” inquit ille “ex mortuo?” 
"Quid (25) autem ex mortuo?" 
And what from the dead? 
ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. 
CEBES. “Necesse” infit “fateri quoniam vivens.” 
"Necesse est confiteri vivens." 
I can only say in answer--the living. 
ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίγνονται; 
SOCRATES. “Ex mortuis igitur, O Cebes, et vivencia et viventes fiunt?” 
"Igitur ex mortuis, o Cebes, viventia (26) fiunt atque viventes." 
Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead? 
(71e) φαίνεται, ἔφη. 
CEBES. “Lueet” inquit, e 
"Apparet." 
That is clear, he replied. 
εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἅιδου. 
SOCRATES. “Sunt igitur” ait “anime nostre in Averno?” 
"Sunt igitur apud inferos animae nostrae." 
Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below? 
ἔοικεν. 
CEBES. “Videtur.” 
"Videtur." 
That is true. 
οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἥ γ᾽ ἑτέρα σαφὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει;  τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκειν σαφὲς δήπου, ἢ οὔ; 
SOCRATES. “Numquid vero eciam duarum generacionum circa hec altera evidens esse contingit?  Quoniam mori evidens est aliquo modo, necne?” 
(27) "Nonne ergo et generationum quae circa haec sunt, altera quidem manifesta est?  Mori e(28)nim manifestum est, nonne?" 
And one of the two processes or generations is visible  --for surely the act of dying is visible? 
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 
CEBES. “Funditus igitur” ait. 
"Ita prorsus." 
Surely, he said. 
πῶς οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ποιήσομεν;  οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις;  ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; 
SOCRATES. “Quomodo ergo” inquit ille “faciemus?  Nonne reddemus contrariam generacionem, verum hee clauda erit natura?  Seu necesse reddere ei quod est mori contrariam quamdam generacionem?” 
"Quidnam igitur faciemus?  Non redde(29)mus vicissim generationem huic contrariam, sed hac in re duntaxat mancam dicemus (30) naturam esse?  An vero necesse est reddere ei quod mori est contrariam quandam genera(31)tionem?" 
What then is to be the result? Shall we exclude the opposite process?  And shall we suppose nature to walk on one leg only?  Must we not rather assign to death some corresponding process of generation? 
πάντως που, ἔφη. 
CEBES. “Prorsus” ait. 
"Omnino." 
Certainly, he replied. 
τίνα ταύτην; 
SOCRATES. “Quam hanc?” 
"Quam vero istam?" 
And what is that process? 
τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. 
CEBES. “Reviviscere.” 
"Reviviscere." 
Return to life. 
οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν (72a) τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; 
“Nonne igitur” ait ille “si quidem est reviviseere, ex mortuis itaque erit generacio in viventes ista, reviviscere?” 
"Nonne igitur si reviviscen(32)tia est progressio quaedam, haec est ex mortuis ad viventes?" 
And return to life, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the world of the living? 
πάνυ γε. 
CEBES. “Penitus.” 
"Est utique." 
Quite true. 
ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων,  τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. 
SOCRATES. “Conceditur nobis igitur et ista, viventes ex mortuis fieri nichilo minus quam mortuos ex viventibus;  hoc sane cum sit, ydoneum videtur argumentum esse quoniam necesse defunctorum animas esse ubi unde iterum fiant.” 
"Convenit ergo (33) nobis hac insuper ratione, viventes ex mortuis fieri nihilominus quam mortuos ex vi(34)ventibus.  Quod cum ita sit, sufficientem coniecturam hinc haberi animas mortuorum ne(35)cessario alicubi esse, unde iterum revertantur." 
Then here is a new way by which we arrive at the conclusion that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living;  and this, if true, affords a most certain proof that the souls of the dead exist in some place out of which they come again. 
δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν. 
“Videtur” inquit Cebes “michi, O Socrate, ex concessis necessarium ad hunc modum se habere.” 
"Videtur mihi, o Socrates, hoc ex his quae (36) concessa sunt necessario sequi." 
Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of our previous admissions. 
ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀδίκως ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ.  εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ (72b) ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα,  ἀλλ᾽ εὐθεῖά τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο,  οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα; 
“Vide igitur” ait, “O Cebes, quoniam non iniuste fassi sumus, ut michi videtur.  Si enim non semper reddantur altera alteris facta, quemadmodum in giro circumeuncia,  sed directa quedam sit generacio ex altero dumtaxat in oppositum, et non recurvetur iterum in alterum neque reflexum faciat,  nosti quomam universa intereuncia eamdem figuram fingant et eamdem passionem paciantur, atque desinere que fiunt?” 
"Animadverte ergo," inquit, "o Cebes, haud ab re nos haec, (37) ut arbitror, concessisse.  Nisi enim continue altera vicissim alteris redderentur quasi quo(38)dam circulo remeantia,  sed directa quaedam progressio foret duntaxat ex altero in eius op(39)positum, neque rursus reflecterentur in alterum facerentque regressum,  omnia tandem, mihi (40) crede, eandem subirent figuram atque passionem fierique cessarent." 
And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, I think, as follows:  If generation were in a straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in nature,  no turn or return of elements into their opposites,  then you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation of them. 
πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. 
“Qui dicis?” ait. 
"Quonam id pacto dicis?" (41) inquit Cebes. 
What do you mean? he said. 
οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω·  ἀλλ᾽ οἷον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη,  τὸ δ᾽ ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ᾽ (72c) <ἂν> λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν.  κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, “ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα”.  ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθνῄσκοι μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἆρ᾽ οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα (72d) τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν;  εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνῄσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; 
“Non difficile” inquit ille “intelligere quod aio;  verum possibile, si dormire quoque fiat,  expergisci vero non reddatur factum ex dormiente nosti quoniam finem capiencia cunda delirum Endimionem ostendent, et nusquam utiquam comparebunt eo quod cetera cuncta idem illi paciantur, dormire.  Et si coartentur universa, divellantur autem minime, forsan id quod est Anaxagore factum erit ‘simul universas res.’  Similiter, O amice Cebes, et si moriantur omnia quecumque vita participant, ex quo defunda erunt, manebunt in hac figura que mortua sunt et non iterato reviviscent, itaque nonne plurima necessitas finem habencia cunda mori et nichil vivere?  Si enim ex aliis vivencia gignantur, vivenciaque moriuntur, que possibilitas haut omnia consumi in moriendo?” 
"Haudquaquam intellectu difficile est", inquit, "quod loquor.  Perinde e(42)nim ac si in somnum caderetur quidem,  ab eo vere in vigiliam nunquam resurgeretur, mi(43)nime te latet omnia tandem eo deventura, ut Endymion ridicula quaedam fabula videa(44)tur, neque appareat usquam, cum caetera quoque universa somno similiter opprimantur.  Pro(45)inde si confunderentur quidem omnia, nunquam vero discernerentur, Anaxagoras illud (46) repente contingeret, universa videlicet esse simul.  Eadem ratione, o amice Cebes, si quae(47)cunque vitam acceperint moriantur, mortua vero cum fuerint, mortua relinquantur ne(48)que iterum reviviscant, an non necessarium est omnino cuncta demum interijsse nihilque (49) vivere?  Nam si ex alijs quidem viventia fierent, postea vero perirent, quid obstaret quo(50)minus in interitum cuncta consumerentur?" 
A simple thing enough,  which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he replied.  You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and waking, the tale of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other things would be asleep, too, and he would not be distinguishable from the rest.  Or if there were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again.  And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive--what other result could there be?  For if the living spring from any other things, and they too die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death? (But compare Republic.) 
οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. 
“Nulla michi videtur” ait Cebes, “O Socrate; atqui michi videris universaliter vera dicere.” 
"Nihil prorsus, o Socrates," inquit Cebes, "sed (51) mihi omnino vera loqui videris." 
There is no escape, Socrates, said Cebes; and to me your argument seems to be absolutely true. 
ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω,  καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν,  ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς (72e) εἶναι [καὶ ταῖς μέν γε ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον]. 
“Est enim” infit, “O Cebes, ut michi videtur, universo magis ita,  et nos ipsa hec non seducti confitemur.  Sed est in re vera et reviviscere atque ex defundis viventcs gigni necnon defunctorum animas extare et bonis e melius esse, malis autem deterius.” 
"Est certe, o Cebes," inquit, "maxime omnium ita ut mi(52)hi videtur,  neque nos haec ipsa quasi decepti confessi sumus,  sed revera reviviscentia est, (53) atque ex mortuis viventes fiunt, mortuorumque supersunt animae. Atque bonis quidem (54) melius est, malis vero peius." 
Yes, he said, Cebes, it is and must be so, in my opinion;  and we have not been deluded in making these admissions;  but I am confident that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil. 
καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμεθα.  τοῦτο δὲ (73a) ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι·  ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἔοικεν εἶναι. 
“Eciam” inquit Cebes inferens “et iuxta mum sermonem, O Socrate, si verus est, quem tu consuevisti crebro dicere, quia nobis disciplina minime aliud quid quam monimentum contingit esse, atque secundum istum necesse ubi nos in priori aliquo tempore didicisse quorum nunc meminimus.  Hoc autem impossibile, si non esset ubi nostra anima prius quam in hoc humano fieret;  unde et ipsa immortale quid videtur anima esse.” 
Atqui et secundum illud, o Socrates," inquit Cebes, "quod (499, 1) frequenter usurpare soles, si modo verum est disciplinam videlicet nostram nihil esse aliud (2) quam reminiscentiam. Et secundum hoc, inquam, necesse est nos in superiori quodam tem(3)pore ea quorum nunc reminiscimur didicisse.  Id vero fieri non posset, nisi prius anima no(4)stra fuisset alicubi quam in hanc humanam speciem deveniret.  Quamobrem et hac ra(5)tione immortale quiddam anima videtur esse." 
Cebes added: Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect.  But this would be impossible unless our soul had been in some place before existing in the form of man;  here then is another proof of the soul's immortality. 
ἀλλά, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις;  ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. 
“Ceterum, O Cebes,” infit Simmias suscipiens “que horum demonstraciones?  Reduc in memoriam michi; non enim firmiter in presenti memini.” 
"At quales huius rei demonstrationes", in(6)quit Simmias, "habes, o Cebes?  Commemora nobis eas. Non enim satis in praesentia me(7)mini." [marg: Ostenditur nostra scientia esse reminiscentia] 
But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what arguments are urged in favour of this doctrine of recollection.  I am not very sure at the moment that I remember them. 
ἑνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι,  ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ᾗ ἔχει  --καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι  --ἔπειτα (73b) ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. 
“Una autem racione” inquit Cebes “potissima, quoniam interrogari homines  si quis bene sciscitatus fuerit, ipsi dicunt cuncta praut se habent  – et, si non contingeret ipsis sciencia inesse et recta racio, non utique valerent hoc efficere;-  dehinc si quis ad descripciones agat sive aliud quid talium, hic evidentissime predicet quia hoc ita se habet.” 
"Vna quidem ratio est pulcherrima", inquit Cebes, "quod interrogati homines  si quis (8) eos recte interroget, ipsi omnia quemadmodum sunt respondent  atqui nunquam id face(9)re possent nisi inesset ipsis scientia rectaque ratio.  Deinde siquis eos ad geometricas figuras (10) descriptionesque vel simile aliquid converterit, ibi manifeste comperiet ita id se habere." 
One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions.  If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself,  but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him?  And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort. (Compare Meno.) 
εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθῃ, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἂν τῇδέ πῄ σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξῃ.  ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δὴ πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν; 
“Sin autem non hactenus” infit “persuaderis, O Simmia,” Socrates, “considera utique qualiter tibi consideranti complaceat.  Incredulus es enim quomodo que vocatur disciplina monimentum est?” 
(11) Si haec, o Simmia, ratio", inquit Socrates, "tibi non satisfacit, attende, an sic tibi consideranti (12) idem quod nobis videatur.  Diffidis enim eam quam disciplinam vocant, reminiscentiam esse (13) posse." 
But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way;  --I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection. 
ἀπιστῶ μέν [σοι] ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι.  καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι·  οὐδὲν μεντἂν ἧττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν πῇ σὺ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. 
“Incredulus sum ego” ait ille “nequaquam; hoc vera ipsum indigeo discere de quo sermo, reminisci.  Et ferme ex quibus Cebes conatus est dicere, iam memini atque persuadeor.  Nichilo autem minus audirem nunc, tu qualiter conatus es dicere.” 
"Haud quidem diffido", inquit Simmias. "Veruntamen id expedit mihi discere de (14) quo sermo est, scilicet reminisci.  Ac ferme ex his quae Cebes coepit dicere, iam recordor et (15) credo.  Nihilo minus tamen et a te, o Socrates, qua ratione id modo probare ipse aggredie(16)baris, perlibenter audirem." 
Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection,  and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced;  but I should still like to hear what you were going to say. 
(73c) τῇδ᾽ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.  ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. 
“Quid ego quidem?” ait ille.  “Fatemur enim aliquo modo, si quis alicuius rei meminerit, oportere ipsum hoc prius aliquando scisse.” 
"Hac equidem ratione", inquit Socrates.  "Confitemur sane quo(17)dammodo, siquis alicuius reminiscatur, oportere ipsum prius aliquando id scivisse." 
This is what I would say, he replied:  --We should agree, if I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous time. 
πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη. 
“Omnino” infit. 
"Pror(18)sus", inquit Simmias. 
Very true. 
ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι;  λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τόνδε.  ἐάν τίς τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλη, ἆρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὗ τὴν ἔννοιαν (73d) ἔλαβεν; 
SOCRATES. “Ergo igitur, eciam hoc fatebimur, cum sciencia advenerit modo tali, recordacionem esse?  Dico autem aliquem modum hunc:  si quis quid prius aut videns aut audiens aut aliquem alium sensum suscipiens, non solum illud cognoverit, verum eciam aliud intellexerit cuius non eadem sciencia sed alia, igitur nonne ilIius iuste dicimus quoniam recordatus fuerit, cuius intelligenciam suscepit?” 
"Nunquid ergo et hoc confitemur," inquit, "quoties scientia hoc mo(19)do provenit, reminiscentiam eam esse?" [marg: Quid reminiscentia]  Dico autem hoc pacto:  siquis aliud quiddam vide(20)rit vel audiverit vel alio perceperit sensu, neque solum idipsum cognoscat, verum etiam a(21)gnoscat1 aliud quiddam, cuius non una eademque, sed alia scientia sit, nonne merito dicemus (22) hunc eius rei reminisci in cuius pervenerit notionem?" 
And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection?  I mean to ask,  Whether a person who, having seen or heard or in any way perceived anything, knows not only that, but has a conception of something else which is the subject, not of the same but of some other kind of knowledge, may not be fairly said to recollect that of which he has the conception? 
πῶς λέγεις; 
SIMMIAS. “Qui” ait. 
"Quonam pacto id dicis?" inquit (23) Simmias. 
What do you mean? 
οἷον τὰ τοιάδε·  ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. 
SOCRATES. “Velut talia quoque;  alia vero sciencia hominis et lire. 
"Hoc", inquit Socrates.  "Alia quodammodo hominis scientia est, alia lyrae." 
I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:  --The knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man? 
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 
SIMMIAS. “Qui vero non?” 
"Quid (24) ni?" inquit Simmias. 
True. 
οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο·  ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα;  τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις·  ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη. 
SOCRATES. “Nonne igitur nosti quoniam amatores, quociens videant liram seu vestimentum sive aliud quid quibus pueri eorum consueverunt uti, perpeciuntur hoc:  cognoverunt autem liram, et in mente susceperunt speciem pueri cuius erat lira?  Istud autem est commemoracio;  veluti eciam Simmiam quis videns Cebetis reminiscitur, et alia decem milia talia utique sunt.” 
"An ignoras hoc amantibus evenire, cum lyram aut vestem aut quid (25) aliud ex his aspiciant quibus uti eorum amatae consueverunt?  Nam et agnoscunt lyram (26) et simul mente formam recolunt puellae cuius erat lyra.  Hoc vero est reminisci.  Ceu siquis (27) cum viderit Simmiam saepe, Cebetis recordetur, et caetera eiusdem generis infinita." 
And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using?  Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs?  And this is recollection.  In like manner any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless examples of the same thing. 
μυρία μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. 
"Decem milia, per Iovem" inquit Simmias. 
(28) "Infinita per Iovem", inquit Simmias. 
Endless, indeed, replied Simmias. 
(73e) οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι;  μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; 
"Numquid non" ait ilIe "tale recordacio quedam est?  Precipue certe quociens quis hoc paciatur circa ilia quorum sub tempore et eo quod non intenderit iam oblivionem sumpserit?" 
"An non igitur", inquit, tale quiddam recordatio (29) quaedam est?  Maxime vero si id nobis in illis contingat rebus, quas longitudine tempo(30)ris et neglegentia oblivioni iam tradiderimus?" 
  And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has been already forgotten through time and inattention. 
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 
"Penitus igitur" infit, 
"Ita certe", inquit Simmias. 
Very true, he said. 
τί δέ;  ἦ δ᾽ ὅς· ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι,  καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι; 
"Quid igitur?"  ait ille. ‘Est equum scriptum videntem et liram scriptam hominis reminisci,  et Simmiam videntem scriptum Cebetis recordari?” 
"Quid vero?" (31) inquit Socrates.  "Contingitne ut qui equum pictum viderit pictamque lyram, (32) reminiscatur hominis?  Atque cum pictum aspexerit Simmiam, veniat illi mentem et Cebes?" 
Well;  and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre remember a man?  and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes? 
πάνυ γε. 
SIMMIAS.“Prorsus vero.” 
"Sic (33) utique", inquit. 
True. 
οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; 
SOCRATES. “Nonne eciam Simmiam videntem scriptum, ipsius Simmie recordari?” 
“Nonne evenit etiam ut qui Simmiam inspexerit pictum, ipsius quoque Sim(34)miae recordetur?” 
Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself? 
(74a) ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη. 
SIMMIAS. “Est sane” inquit. 
“Evenit certe.” 
Quite so. 
ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων; 
SOCRATES. “Ergo igitur, nonne secundum universa hec contingit monimentum esse quidem a similibus, esse eciam a dissimilibus?” 
“An non secundum haec omnia contingit, tum a simi(35)libus, tum a dissimilibus reminiscentiam proveniret?” 
And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike? 
συμβαίνει. 
“Accidit.” 
“Contingit.” 
It may be. 
ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνῄσκηταί τίς τι, ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη; 
“Ceterum quociens a similibus meminerit quis alicuius, nonne necesse ad hoc eciam simul pati, intelligere sive in quo defecerit hoc secundum similitudinem sive minime illius cuius reminiscitur?” 
“Verum quoties a simi(36)libus quispiam reminiscitur, an non necesse est id insuper intelligere, utrum deficiat hoc (37) secundum similitudinem nec ne ab illo cuius repetita memoria est?” 
And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another consideration is sure to arise, which is--whether the likeness in any degree falls short or not of that which is recollected? 
ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. 
“Necesse” infit. 
“Necesse est.” 
Very true, he said. 
σκόπει δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.  φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον,  οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον·  φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν; 
SOCRATES. “Contemplate utique” ait ille “si hec ita se habent,  Dicimus umquam quid esse equale?  Non lignum Dico ligno, neque lapidem lapidi, neque aliud quid talium quippiam, verum preter cuncta hec diversum quid, ipsum hoc equale;  asseremus quid esse vel nichil?” 
“At(38)tende sane, nunquid haec ita se habeant.  Dicimus aliquid esse aequale?  Non dico lignum li(39)gno neque lapidem lapidi neque aliud eiusmodi quicquam, sed praeter haec omnia aliud (40) quiddam aequale.  Ipsum dicimusne aliquid esse an nihil?” 
And shall we proceed a step further,  and affirm that there is such a thing as equality,  not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over and above this, there is absolute equality?  Shall we say so? 
(74b) φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. 
“Asseremus, per Iovem” ait Simmias, “admirabiliter nempe.” 
“Dicimus per Iovem, et qui(41)dem mirifice.” 
Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence in life. 
ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; 
SOCRATES. “Vel eciam scimus ipsum quod est equale?” 
“An scimus et ipsum quod est aequale?” 
And do we know the nature of this absolute essence? 
πάνυ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. 
SIMMIAS. “Funditus” ait ille. 
“Omnino quidem.” 
To be sure, he said. 
πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;  ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων;  ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται;  σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε.  ἆρ᾽ οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ᾽ οὔ; 
SOCRATES. “Unde sumens illius scienciam?  Numquid non ex quibus nunc diximus, seu ligna seu lapides, seu alia aliqua videntes equalia, ex hiis illud intelleximus, diversum ens hoc?  Seu non diversum tibi videtur?  Attende eciam et hoc modo:  ergo nonne lapides quidem equales et ligna interdum eadem cum sint, nunc autem equalia videntur, nunc vero minime?” 
“Vndenam (42) scientiam eius accepimus?  An non ex his quae modo diximus, videlicet conspicati vel li(43)gna vel saxa vel alia quaedam aequalia, ex his illud excogitamus, quod aliud est quam (44) haec?  An non aliud quiddam apparet?  Considera vero et hoc pacto.  Nonne saxa vel li(45)gna aequalia dum eadem sunt, alias aequalia, alias inaequalia nobis apparent?” 
And whence did we obtain our knowledge?  Did we not see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them?  For you will acknowledge that there is a difference.  Or look at the matter in another way:  --Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal? 
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
SIMMIAS. “Omnifariam sane.” 
“Penitus.” 
That is certain. 
(74c) τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; 
SOCRATES. “Quid? Ipsa equalia est quando inequalia tibi videantur, an equalitas inequalitas?” 
(46) “Quid autem ipsa aequalia? Possunt inaequalia tibi videri? Vel aequalitas, inaequali(47)tas?” 
But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as of inequality? 
οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. 
SIMMIAS. “Numquam, O Socrate.” 
“Nunquam, o Socrates.” 
Impossible, Socrates. 
οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. 
SOCRATES. “Non idem igitur est hec quidem equalia et ipsum hoc equale.” 
“Quamobrem non idem sunt haec aequalia atque ipsum aequa(48)le.” 
Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality? 
οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. 
SIMMIAS. “Nullatenus michi videtur, O Socrate.” 
“Nullo modo idem mihi apparent, o Socrates.” 
I should say, clearly not, Socrates. 
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ᾽, ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας; 
“Quin immo ex hiis” ait “equalibus, diversa cum sint ab illo equali, tamen ipsius scienciam intellexistique et suscepisti?” 
“Veruntamen ab his aequalibus quae (49) alia sunt quam ipsum illud aequale, ipsius simul excogitasti scientiam atque percepisti.” 
And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea? 
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. 
“Verissima’ inquit “ais. 
“Ve(50)rissima loqueris.” 
Very true, he said. 
οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου; 
SOCRATES. “Nonne vel simili existente istis vel dissimili?” 
“An non sive simile ipsum sit sive dissimile?” 
Which might be like, or might be unlike them? 
πάνυ γε. 
SIMMIAS. “Penitus veto.” 
“Omnino.” 
Yes. 
διαφέρει δέ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐδέν·  ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ (74d) ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. 
“Interest” ait ille “nichil;  donec enim aliud videns ab ipso visu aliud perpendisti, sive simile sive dissimile, necesse” inquit “ipsum monimentum fieri.” 
“Nihil sane (51) refert.  Quatenus enim aliud conspicatus ex hac ipsa perspectione aliud intellexeris, sive si(52)mile sive dissimile, necesse est hinc reminiscentiam provenire.” 
But that makes no difference;  whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection? 
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
SIMMIAS. “Prorsus vero.” 
“Et maxime quidem.” 
Very true. 
τί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς· ἦ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις;  ἆρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν,  ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν; 
“Quid?” ait ille. “An patimur quid tale circa ea que in lignis quidem, et in quibus nunc disseruimus, in equis?  Utrum apparet nobis ita equalia esse quemadmodum ipsum hoc quod est equale,  an deest quid illi in hoc quod tale sit quale hoc equale, vel nichil?” 
(53) “Quid vero ad id? An sic nos habemus circa quae sunt in his quae modo dicebamus aequa(54)lia saxisque et alijs?  Videnturne ita aequalia haec esse, ut ipsum quod est aequale?  An (500, 1) deesse potius aliquid quo minus talia sint quale est aequale ipsum an nihil?” 
But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression produced by them?  Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal?  or do they fall short of this perfect equality in a measure? 
καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. 
SIMMIAS. “Eciam plurimum” inquit “deest.” 
“Permultum (2) certe deest.” 
Yes, he said, in a very great measure too. 
οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, (74e) ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἴσον] οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν; 
SOCRATES.· “Nonne ergo fatemur, quociens quis quid videns animadverterit quoniam vult quidem hoc, quod nunc ego conspicio, esse quale aliud quid eorum que sunt, deficit autem et nequit tale esse equale quale illud, immo est deterius, necesse quoque eum qui hoc mente perpenderit prescisse illud cui ait ipsum assimilari, minus vera habere?” 
“Nonne confitemur quando quis aliquid intuens animadvertat appetere qui(3)dem hoc quod in praesentia videt, esse tale quale quiddam aliud ex his quae sunt, verum de(4)ficere neque posse tale esse aequale, quale sit illud illud, sed deterius esse, necesse esse eum qui ani(5)madvertit, ante cognovisse illud cui dicit hoc quodammodo simile fieri, sed ad plenam simi(6)litudinem non accedere?” 
And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior? 
ἀνάγκη. 
SIMMIAS. “Necesse.” 
“Necesse est.” 
Certainly. 
τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἢ οὒ περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; 
SOCRATES. “Quid igitur? Huiusmodi perpessi sumus et nos, necne, circa equalia et ipsum hoc equale?” 
“Quid ergo? Talene aliquid contingit et nobis (7) necne, circa haec aequalia ipsumque aequale?” 
And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality? 
παντάπασί γε. 
SIMMIAS. “Omnino certe.” 
“Quamplurimum.” 
Precisely. 
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