ὥσπερ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων·
οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ κύνα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν;
ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδὺν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα;
ἢ οὐχὶ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλίγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά;
“Quemadmodum” ait ille “de valde exiguis et ingentibus;
putes quid rarius esse seu valde modicum reperire virum sive canem vel aliud quidlibet?
Aut item velocem vel tardum seu bonum aut turpe vel candidum sive atrum?
Vel ignorasti quoniam omnium huiusmodi extremitates quidem ultimorum rare et pauce, que vero in medio innumera et multa?”
“Quemadmodum videlicet in rebus contingit valde aut parvis aut (39) magnis”, inquit.
“An tu arbitraris quicquam esse rarius quam valde magnum aut valde par(40)vum reperire hominem vel canem vel quodvis aliud?
Atque rursus celerrimum et tardissimum, (41) pulcherrimum, turpissimum, albissimum, nigerrimum?
An ignoras in his omnibus extre(42)morum summa, rara quidem et pauca esse, media vero frequentia atque multa?”
I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small,
that nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man; and this applies generally to all extremes,
whether of great and small, or swift and slow, or fair and foul, or black and white:
and whether the instances you select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the extremes, but many are in the mean between them. Did you never observe this?
(90b) οὐκοῦν οἴει, ἔφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἀγὼν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλίγους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρώτους φανῆναι;
“Ergo existimas” infit “si nequicie agon proponatur, omruno quoque paucos et hic primes apparere?”
“Nonne igitur arbitraris,” inquit, “si improbitatis proponeretur certamen, admo(44)dum paucos in hoc genere summos inveniri?”
And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition in evil, the worst would be found to be very few?
εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη.
ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιοι οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
ἀλλὰ σοῦ νυνδὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνῃ, ᾗ, ἐπειδάν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεῖ εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κἄπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδὴς εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὤν, ἐνίοτε δ᾽ οὐκ ὤν, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος·
--καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ (90c) περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανενοηκέναι μόνοι
ὅτι οὔτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων,
ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει.
“Convenit enim” ait,
“Atqui hoc modo quoque non similes causaciones hominibus sunt,
atqui te modo preeunte ego consequar,
atqui illo modo, quo ubi quis crediderit sermoni alieni quod verus sit absque illa que circa raciones est arte, atque dehinc posterius paulo ipsi videatur falsus esse, plerumque vero sit, interdum quoque non sit, et statim alter atque alter;
et maxime quidem, qui circa antilogicas oraciones frequenciam habentes, nosti quoniam in novissimo existentes autumant se sapientissimos esse et perintelligere soli
quoniam neque rerum nullius nichil integrum neque certum neque oracionum,
immo cuncta que sunt mirabiliter tamquam in Euripo sursum deorsum vergunt et momento nullo in nullo manent.”
“Consen(45)taneum quidem,” inquit,
“verum non hoc pacto similes rationes sunt atque homines,
sed te nunc (46) ducentem prosecutus,
imo vero in hoc similitudo consistit, quando videlicet quis abs(47)que rationum arte crediderit rationem aliquam esse veram, sed paulo post appareat falsa (48) quae quidem aliquando talis est, aliquando minime et rursus altera similiter atque altera.
(49) Praecipue vero illis id evenit qui plurimum rationes contradictorias agitant. Hos enim scis (50) putare tandem se sapientissimos evasisse solosque animadvertisse
neque in rebus neque in ra(51)tionibus esse sanum aliquid aut firmum,
sed omnia revera tanquam in Euripo sursum deor(52)sumque iactari, nullumque tempus in aliquo permanere.”
Yes, that is very likely, he replied;
although in this respect arguments are unlike men
--there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended;
but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards imagines to be false, whether really false or not, and then another and another,
he has no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind;
for they alone perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments,
or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow.
οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἔφη, οἰκτρὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἰ ὄντος δή τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ (90d) κατανοῆσαι,
ἔπειτα διὰ τὸ παραγίγνεσθαι τοιούτοις τισὶ λόγοις, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθέσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μὴ ἑαυτόν τις αἰτιῷτο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἅσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελοῖ,
τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη.
SOCRATES. “Nonne igitur, O Fedon, miserabilis utique erit passio, si cum sit sane quidam verus et firmus et facilis ad intelligendum,
deinde eo quod annectatur talibus sermonibus, iisdem tum vero videntur veri esse, tum certe minime non se ipsum incuset neque ipsius sui insciciam, sed in novissimo eo quod doleat libens in sermones a se ipso causam pellat, atque demum reliquum tempus vite infestans et contumeliis afficiens sermonum sciencias vitam exigat,
eorum profecto que sunt veritate atque sciencia privetur.”
(53) “Nonne”, inquit, “aegritudo haec Phaedo miserabilis esset, si cum ratio aliqua vera firmaque sit (54) comprehendique valeat,
postea tamen auditis huiuscemodi rationibus quae modo afferre (507, 1) vera, modo falsa videntur, aliquis hinc in ambiguitatem deductus, non seipsum neque eius (2) inertiam ob id accuset, sed tandem velut aeger libenter culpam omnem a seipso in ipsas (3) transferat rationes, et in reliqua vita eas odio habeat atque vituperet,
rerum iam ipsarum (4) veritate scientiaque privatus.”
Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and how melancholy, if there be such a thing as truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge
--that a man should have lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame from himself to arguments in general:
and for ever afterwards should hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge of realities.
πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη, τοῦτο εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ (90e) παρίωμεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύει οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὔπω ὑγιῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγιῶς ἔχειν,
σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἐμοὶ δὲ (91a) αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ θανάτου,
ὡς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονίκως.
καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περί του ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἃ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται.
καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίσειν·
οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὅτι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως (91b) ἔχειν.
λογίζομαι γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε--θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς--εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι·
εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν τοῦτόν γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἧττον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος, ἡ δὲ ἄνοιά μοι αὕτη οὐ συνδιατελεῖ--κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν--ἀλλ᾽ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀπολεῖται.
παρεσκευασμένος δή, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὑτωσὶ ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον·
ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, (91c) σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν μέν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε,
εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἅμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι.
“Primum itaque” infit “hoc vereamur, et non transeamus ad animam tamquam in discrimine sit racionum nichil sanum esse,
sed multo magis quoniam nos nondum sane habemus, immo viriliter agendum et affectandum sane habere,
tibi profecto et ceteris et future vite tocius gracia, michi quoque causa ipsius necis,
ut nitar ego quidem in presenti de ipso hoc non philosophice me habere, sed velut ex omni parte imperiti avare.
Et enim quociens illi de quo hesitaverint, qui se habeant de quibuscumque mencio fuerit, non curant, qui vero que ipsi posuerint ea videantur presentibus, hoc attendunt.
Et ego michi videor in presenti eatenus dumtaxat ab illis distare;
non enim qualiter assistentibus que ego dico videantur vera esse attendam, nisi esset preter rem, immo quomodo ipsi michi quam maxime videantur sic se habere.
Cogito quippe, O amice dilecte, contemplari tamquam avare; si enim accidat vera esse que dico, bene quidem se habebit ad persuadendum;
si vera nichil est obeunti, ceterum hoc utique tempore ipso quod ante migracionem minus presentibus amarus ero lamentans; atque impericia michi ipsa celeriter complebitur - malum namque esset - atqui paulo posterius disperibit.
Preparatus quoque” infit, “O Simmiaque et Cebes, sic venio in oracionem.
Vos autem, si michi credideritis, parum curantes Socratem, veritatem certe multo magis, si nempe vobis videar verum dicere, una confitemini;
sin autem, omni racione renitimini, veriti uti non ego ab affectu simul me ipsumque et vos fallens, tamquam apis centrum intus relinquens avehar.
“In primis igitur”, in(5)quit, “diligenter id caveamus ne persuadeamus nobis nihil in rationibus esse sanum,
sed mul(6)to magis nondum esse nos sanos. Itaque totis viribus ut sani afficiamur est annitendum,
ti(7)bi quidem et alijs totius reliquae vitae gratia, mihi vero gratia mortis qui in periculo sum,
(8) ne in hoc ipso tempore, non ut philosophum me geram, sed ut contentiosum atque per(9)tinacem, quod quidam homines a disciplina alienissimi facere solent.
Illi enim ubi aliqua (10) de re ambigitur, non ut res ipsa de qua agitur se habeat curant, sed ut quae posuerunt ipsi (11) praesentibus videantur vera obnixe contendunt.
Atque ego mihi videor in hoc dun(12)taxat in praesentia ab illis differre,
quod non ut praesentibus probem ea quae dico annitar, ni(13)si quatenus forte contigerit, sed ut mihi ipsi vera quammaxime videantur.
Sic enim cogi(14)to, dulcis amice, et vide quanto cum lucro sit ratio mea. Si forte vera sunt quae dico, operae (15) precium est ita credere:
sin autem nihil superest post mortem, attamen hoc ipsum tempus (16) ante obitum praesentibus minus ero molestus, minusque deplorabo. Haec autem ignorantiae (17) minime perseverabit mecum, malum id quidem esset, sed paulo post delebitur.
Sic equidem, o (18) Simmia et Cebes, paratus revertor ad disputandum.
Vos tamen si mihi assentiamini, non (19) Socrati cedite, sed veritati. Si enim vera vobis loqui videbor, concedite. Sin minus, omni(20)no contradicite,
diligenter caventes ne ego dum annitor meipsum simul vosque decipiam (21) et velut apes aculeo in vobis relicto abeam. [marg. Provebium Velut apes relicto aculeo a bis]
Let us then, in the first place, he said, be careful of allowing or of admitting into our souls the notion that there is no health or soundness in any arguments at all.
Rather say that we have not yet attained to soundness in ourselves, and that we must struggle manfully and do our best to gain health of mind
--you and all other men having regard to the whole of your future life, and I myself in the prospect of death.
For at this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher; like the vulgar, I am only a partisan.
Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions.
And the difference between him and me at the present moment is merely this
--that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself;
to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. And do but see how much I gain by the argument.
For if what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of the truth, but if there be nothing after death, still, during the short time that remains, I shall not distress my friends with lamentations, and my ignorance will not last, but will die with me, and therefore no harm will be done.
This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument.
And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates: agree with me, if I seem to you to be speaking the truth;
or if not, withstand me might and main, that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die.
ἀλλ᾽ ἰτέον, ἔφη.
πρῶτόν με ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος.
Σιμμίας μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ (91d) κάλλιον ὂν τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύηται ἐν ἁρμονίας εἴδει οὖσα·
Κέβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τοῦτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρονιώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντί, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύηται,
καὶ ᾖ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὄλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται.
ἆρα ἄλλ᾽ ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι;
Verum eundum” inquit.
“Primo michi in memoriam ferte que dixistis, si non videor reminisci.
Simmias enim dubitatque et metuit ne anima tamen, quamvis et magis divinum et pulcherrimum cum sit corpore, prius pereat in specie armonie existens;
Cebesque michi visus est hoc michi concedere, diuturniorem esse animam corpore, sed hoc incertum cuique, ne multa quidem corpora et multociens deterens anima novissime corpus deserens nunc ipsa pereat,
et sit ipsum hoc mors, anime interitus, quando quidem corpus semper disperiens minime quiescit.
Itaque nisi hec sint, O Simmia et Cebes, que convenit nos attendere?”
Sed iam accedendum est.
Primum quidem re(22)digite in memoriam mihi quae dicebatis, si minus meminisse vobis videbor.
Simmias qui(23)dem, ut arbitror diffidit ac metuit ne anima quamvis divinior pulchriorque corpore, prius (24) tamen pro harmoniae natura intereat.
Cebes autem mihi visus est concedere diuturnio(25)rem esse animam corpore, sed is addidit scire posse neminem, ne cum multa saepius con(26)sumpserit corpora, tandem quandoque postremum relinquens corpus,
ipsa quoque pereat, (27) atque mors eiusmodi tantum sit interitus animae, corpus vero dissolvi continue consueve(28)rit.
An non haec sunt, o Simmia et Cebes, quae nos oportet considerare?”
And now let us proceed, he said.
And first of all let me be sure that I have in my mind what you were saying.
Simmias, if I remember rightly, has fears and misgivings whether the soul, although a fairer and diviner thing than the body, being as she is in the form of harmony, may not perish first.
On the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more lasting than the body, but he said that no one could know whether the soul, after having worn out many bodies, might not perish herself and leave her last body behind her;
and that this is death, which is the destruction not of the body but of the soul, for in the body the work of destruction is ever going on.
Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have to consider?
πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μέν, τοὺς δ᾽ οὔ;
“Utrum igitur” ait “omnes priores sermones non admittitis, vel hos quoque, illos vero minime?”
“Sed nunquid omnia quae dicta in superioribus fuerant negatis? An quaedam nega(30)tis quidem, sed conceditis alia?”
He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, or of a part only?
τί οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν (92a) ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῆναι;
“Quid sane” infit ille “de illo sermone dicitis, in quo diximus disciplinam recordacionem esse, et hoc se ita habente necessario habere alicubi prius nostrum fuisse animam ante quam in hoc corpus ingressa sit?”
“Quid igitur”, inquit, (31) “de eo quod disciplinam diximus reminiscentiam esse, atque si ita se res habeat, necessario (32) consequi alicubi fuisse animam prius quam corpore clauderetur?”
And what did you think, he said, of that part of the argument in which we said that knowledge was recollection, and hence inferred that the soul must have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed in the body?
ἐγὼ μέν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδενὶ λόγῳ.
καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἴ μοι περί γε τούτου ἄλλο ποτέ τι δόξειεν.
“Ego profecto” ait Cebes, “et tunc quam mirifice persuasus sum ab eo et nunc insisto quantum nulli racioni.”
“Eciam” inquit Simmias “et ipse sic me habeo, et penitus utique mirarer si de hoc alia quando videantur.”
“Mihi quidem”, inquit (33) Cebes, “istud dum diceres mirifice placuit, atque nunc si qua unquam in alia, in hac maxime (34) sententia permaneo.”
“Similiter ego quoque”, inquit Simmias, “affectus sum, vehementerque ad(35)mirarer si mihi unquam hac de re aliter videretur.”
Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the argument, and that his conviction remained absolutely unshaken.
Simmias agreed, and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility of his ever thinking differently.
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὦ ξένε Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δόξαι, ἐάνπερ μείνῃ ἥδε ἡ οἴησις, τὸ ἁρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖσθαι·
οὐ γάρ που ἀποδέξῃ γε (92b) σαυτοῦ λέγοντος ὡς πρότερον ἦν ἁρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἢ ἀποδέξῃ;
Et Socrates: “Ceterum necesse tibi” ait, “O peregrine Thebane, alia opinari, si quidem maneat hec quoque opinacio, armoniam nempe esse compositam rem, animamque armoniam quam ex eis que secundum corpus intensa sunt componi;
haut enim alicubi demonstrabitur temet inquiente quatinus prius armoniam compositam, ante quam ista sint ex quibus oportuit illam constare; vel recipis?”
“At vero necesse est,” inquit, “hospes The(36)bane, aliter tibi videri si in hac opinione permanseris, harmoniam videlicet esse composi(37)tum quoddam, animam vero harmoniam quandam ex his quae per corpus intensa sunt (38) constitutam.
Nunquam enim admittes consonantiam compositam prius esse quam illa (39) ex quibus componi consonantiam oportebat. Nunquid admittes?”
But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body;
for you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the elements which compose it.
αἰσθάνῃ οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὅτι ταῦτά σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν φῇς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἶδός τε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων;
οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἁρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ᾧ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ (92c) οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ πάντων συνίσταται ἡ ἁρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται.
οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνᾴσεται;
“Scias igitur” ait is “quia non hec tibi contingit dicere, quociens inquis esse animam prius eciam quam in hominis formamque et corpus introeat, esse sane illam constantem ex eis que nondum sunt?
Non enim armonia quoque tibi tale est cui assimilas, atqui prius et lira et fides et soni adhuc anarmosti existentes fiunt, novissime certe cunctorum componitur armonia, et prima interit.
Hec itaque racio illi quo pacto concinet?”
“Animadverteris igitur”, inquit, “cogi te id confiteri, quando dicis animum (41) quidem esse prius quam in humanam speciem corpusque deveniret atque esse corporis (42) consonantiam, videlicet ex his quae nondum sunt eam constitui.
Neque enim talis tibi (43) est consonantia, cui tu simile esse dicis. Immo vero prius est ipsa lyra, et fides, et soni ad (44) huc inconcinni, tandem vero ex omnibus componitur consonantia omnium postrema, (45) primasque disperditur.
Hic itaque sermo quonam pacto tuo illi concinet?”
But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the soul existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of elements which as yet had no existence?
For harmony is not like the soul, as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist in a state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes first.
And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?
καὶ μήν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ συνῳδῷ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας.
“Et eciam” inquit ille “decet quoque si quidem alii racioni consonam esse et illi que de armonia.”
"At vero sicubi”, inquit, “verba concinnitatem servare debent, praecipue de(47)cet esse concinna ubi de concentu tractatur.”
And yet, he said, there surely ought to be harmony in a discourse of which harmony is the theme.
οὗτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοὶ οὐ συνῳδός· ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα πότερον αἱρῇ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἢ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν;
“Hec igitur” ait “tibi consona; verum intuere utrum elegeris sermonum, disciplinam commemoracionem seu animam armoniam?”
“Hic igi(48)tur sermo tibi dissonat”, inquit. “Sed vide utrum ex his duobus eligas, disciplinam ne remi(49)niscentiam esse an potius animum esse concentum?”
But there is no harmony, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge is recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them will you retain?
πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ὅδε μὲν γάρ (92d) μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς καὶ εὐπρεπείας, ὅθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις·
ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένοις λόγοις σύνοιδα οὖσιν ἀλαζόσιν, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὖ μάλα ἐξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.
ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι᾽ ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι εἴρηται.
ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ “ὃ ἔστιν” (92e) ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἱκανῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδέδεγμαι.
ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ ταῦτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχή ἐστιν ἁρμονία.
“Longe magis illum” infit, “O Socrate. Hie enim michi factus est absque demonstracione cum conveniente quodam et decore, unde et multis videtur hominibus;
ego autem per convenienciam demonstraciones facientibus sermonibus concino, cum sint elati, et si quis eos non observaverit facillime fallant et in geometria et in aliis universis.
Verum de recordacione et disciplina sermo per ypothesim dignam suscipi dicitur.
Dictum est enim alicubi nostrum sic esse anima eciam ante quam in corpus veniret, prout eius est essencia habens agnomen hoc ab hoc ‘quod est'. Ego vero hoc, ut michi ipsi persuadeo, sufficienterque et recte demonstravi.
Necesse itaque michi, ceu videtur, propter hec neque me ipso neque alio recipere dicente quoniam anima est armonia.”
“Primum quidem potius eligo”, inquit. (50) “Id nanque alterum absque demonstratione admisi ex verisimili quadam convenientia, quem(51)admodum videtur et multis.
Ego autem ea verba quae per id quod convenit demonstra(52)tiones faciunt, semper inania iudicavi. Ac nisi quis caveat valde decipiunt et in geometria (53) et in caeteris omnibus.
Ratio vero de reminiscentia atque disciplina fundamento innitur fi(54)de digno.
Dictum est enim animam nostram ita esse alicubi, prius etiam quam laberetur in (509, 1) corpus, ut illa ipsius essentia habeat eius 'quod vere est' cognomentum. Ego vero hanc ut (2) mihimet persuadeo, sufficienter recteque admisi
proptereaque neque mihi neque alijs animam (3) appellantibus harmoniam assentiri possum."
I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable and plausible grounds; and is therefore believed by the many.
I know too well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and unless great caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive--in geometry, and in other things too.
But the doctrine of knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds;
and the proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence.
Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony.
τί δέ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Σιμμία, τῇδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἁρμονίᾳ ἢ ἄλλῃ (93a) τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἔχῃ ἐξ ὧν ἂν συγκέηται;
“Quid sane” infit is, “O Simmia? Qui tibi videtur armonie vel alii alicui composicioni congruere aliter ut libet se habere quam utique illa se habeant ex quibus componuntur?”
"Quid vero, Simmia? Videturne tibi vel con(4)sonantiae vel alteri cuiquam compositioni congruere ut aliter se habeat quam illa ex qui(5)bus conflatur?”
Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do you imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded?
οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οὐδέ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ᾽ ἃ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ;
SOCRATES. “Nec profecto facere quid, ut ego opinor, neque quid pati aliud preter ea quecumque illa vel agant vel paciantur?”
“Neque etiam ut aliud quicquam, ut arbitror, patiatur aut (6) agat, quam illa vel agant vel patiantur.”
Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?
ἢ οὐχί, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἁρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, (93b) εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλόν τε ἂν ἁρμονία εἴη καὶ πλείων, εἰ δ᾽ ἧττόν τε καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον, ἥττων τε καὶ ἐλάττων;
“Vel non” ait ille, “si mage moduletur, et adhuc si oportet hoc fieri, magis utique armonia erit et maior, si vero minus et ad minus, minus quidem et minor?”
“Nonne si ma(11)gis plusque contemperetur, si modo id admittit, magis plusque consonantia est? Sin vero mi(12)nus atque perpaucum, minus perpaucumque similiter?”
I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully harmonized, to any extent which is possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized.
ἦ οὖν ἔστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχήν, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον καὶ ἧττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχήν;
SOCRATES. “Si ergo hoc est circa animam, ut et secundum minimum magis alteram altera anima ad plus et magis vel paucius et minus ipsum hoc esse, animam?”
“Nunquid de anima id di(13)ci potest? Vt vel in minima quadam re alia anima hoc ipsum quod est anima vel magis vel (14) plus aut contra sit quam alia?”
But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?
φέρε δή, ἔφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχὴ ἡ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή,
ἡ δὲ ἄνοιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίαν (93c) καὶ εἶναι κακή;
καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται;
SOCRATES. “Eya per Iovem; dicitur anima hec quidem mentem habere atque virtutem et esse bona,
illa vera amenciamque et nequiciam et esse prava?
Et hec vere dicuntur?”
“Dic, age per Iovem, precor, num animam dici(15)mus aliam quidem habere mentem virtutemque, atque esse bonam,
aliam vero dementiam (16) et pravitatem, malamque esse?
Haecne, inquam, vere dicuntur?”
Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to be good,
and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul:
and this is said truly?
τῶν οὖν θεμένων ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα ὄντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τήν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν;
πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν;
καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθήν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὔσῃ ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτήν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὑτῇ ἄλλην;
SOCRATES. “Eorum itaque qui ponunt animam armoniam esse quis quid dicet hec cum sint esse in animabus, virtutem et maliciam?
Utrum armoniam item aliquam aliam et anarmostiam?
Et hanc quoque modulari, scilicet bonam, et habere in se ipsa, armonia cum sit, aliam armoniam, illam nempe immodulatam esse et non habere in se ipsa aliam?”
“Eorum er(17)go qui animam esse asserunt harmoniam, quis quidnam dicet esse in animabus, haec scili(18)cet vitium et virtutem?
An aliam quandam consonantiam atque dissonantiam?
et bonam (19) quidem esse consonantem, et cum ipsa consonantia sit, alteram in se consonantiam possi(20)dere, malam vero dissonantem et ipsam esse nec aliam in se habere?”
But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this presence of virtue and vice in the soul?
--will they say that here is another harmony, and another discord,
and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her?
(93d) ἀλλὰ προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ᾽ ἧττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ψυχὴν ψυχῆς εἶναι·
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ ὁμολόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ᾽ ἐπὶ πλέον μηδ᾽ ἧττον μηδ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἁρμονίαν ἁρμονίας εἶναι. ἦ γάρ;
“Atque prius fassum est” inquit “non magis neque minus alteram altera animam anima esse;
hoc autem est confessio, neque magis vel amplius, neque minus neque ad paucius alteram altera armoniam armonia esse. Qui enim?”
“At vero iam concessum est nihilo magis aut minus aliam alia animam esse.
(23) Eiusmodi vero concessio est, neque magis, neque plus, neque minus, neque sub paucioribus gra(24)dibus aliam alia consonantiam esse. Nonne?”
And we have already admitted that no soul is more a soul than another;
which is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony, or more or less completely a harmony?
οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ᾽ ἧττον ἄλλη (93e) ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχή, ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἧττον ἥρμοσται;
SOCRATES. “Igitur anima quando quidem neque magis neque minus alia quam alia ipsum hoc, anima, est; neque certe magis neque minus modulata est?”
“Quapropter (28) anima, si quidem neque magis neque minus alia quam alia secundum animae naturam anima (29) est, consequenter neque magis neque minus est temperata.”
Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not more or less harmonized?
τοῦτο δ᾽ αὖ πεπονθυῖα ἆρ᾽ ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς μετέχοι ἑτέρα ἑτέρας, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ἁρμονία εἴη;
SOCRATES. “Istud item passa putasne plus vicii seu virtutis participabit altera quam altera, si quidem vicium anarmostia et virtus armonia fuerit?”
“Praeter(31)ea cum ita comparata sit, num plus aliquid pravitatis vel virtutis alia quam alia possidet? (32) Siquidem pravitas quidem dissonantia est, virtus vero consonantia.”
And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony?
(94a) μᾶλλον δέ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἁρμονία ἐστίν·
ἁρμονία γὰρ δήπου παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα, ἁρμονία, ἀναρμοστίας οὔποτ᾽ ἂν μετάσχοι.
SOCRATES. “Magis quoque alicubi, O Simmia, iuxta rectam racionem vicio nulla anima participabit, si armonia sit;
armonia quippe prorsus ipsum hoc cum sit, armonia, anarmostia numquam utique participabit.”
(33) “Quinimmo secundum rectam, Simmia, rationem nulla usquam anima pravitate erit affe(34)cta, si fuerit consonantia.
Quandoquidem consonantia vera secundum id quod consonan(35)tia est, nunquam fit dissonantia particeps.”
Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will never have any vice;
because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no part in the inharmonical.
ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῴων ὁμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαί, εἶναι.
SOCRATES. “Ex hac ergo racione nobis omnes anime omnium animalium similiter bone erunt; si similiter anime nate sunt ipsum hoc quod anime sunt.”
“Hac igitur ratione omnes animalium omnium animae bonae similiter erunt si se(38)cundum animae ipius naturam similiter animae sint.”
Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good?
ἦ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν (94b) ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι;
“Vere et bene videtur” ait ille “hic dici et pati hec sermo, si recta ypothesis erat animam armoniam esse?”
(39) “Nunquid recte sic tibi dici videtur atque haec sequi, si vera esset illa positio, animam con(40)sonantiam esse?”
And can all this be true, think you? he said; for these are the consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a harmony?
πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιουμένην;
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἷον καύματος ἐνόντος καὶ δίψους ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἕλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν,
καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν,
καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὁρῶμεν (94c) ἐναντιουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὔ;
“Utrum assencientem eis que secundum corpus passionibus vel eciam adversantem?
Dico autem tale, veluti estu insistente atque siti in contrarium trahentem, scilicet non bibendum,
necnon fame insistente ad non comedendum,
et alia decem milia perspicimus adversantem animam eis que secundum corpus, seu non?”
“Vtrum corporis (42) perturbationibus indulgentem an potius repugnantem?
Dico autem tale quiddam, ve(43)luti si sub aestu sitis angat, interea tamen adversatur animus retrahitque in contrarium ne bi(44)bat,
similiterque si premat fames, ne edat,
in alijsque quamplurimis videmus corporis affe(45)ctibus repugnantem. Nonne?”
And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at variance with them?
For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul incline us against drinking?
and when the body is hungry, against eating?
And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the opposition of the soul to the things of the body.
οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ᾽ ἂν αὐτήν, ἁρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναντία ᾄδειν οἷς ἐπιτείνοιτο καὶ χαλῷτο καὶ ψάλλοιτο καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνοι οὖσα, ἀλλ᾽ ἕπεσθαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὔποτ᾽ ἂν ἡγεμονεύειν;
SOCRATES. “Nonne igitur item fassi sumus in prioribus numquam ipsam, armonia cum sit, contraria canere hiis quibus intendatur et demittatur et palpitet et aliam quamcumque passionem paciantur illa ex quibus contingit esse, sed sequi illa et numquam precedere?”
“Nonne in superioribus confessi (46) sumus animam si consonantia fuerit nunquam dissonaturam his quibus intenditur vel (47) remittitur vel evibratur vel quodcunque aliud patiantur illa, ex quibus ipsa conflatur, sed (48) secuturam illa, nunquam vero ducturam?”
But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can never utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed; she can only follow, she cannot lead them?
τί οὖν; νῦν οὐ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἡγεμονεύουσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησί τις αὐτὴν (94d) εἶναι,
καὶ ἐναντιουμένη ὀλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ᾽ ἀλγηδόνων, τά τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν, τὰ δὲ πρᾳότερον,
καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη;
SOCRATES. “Quid igitur? Nonne omne quod est contrarium nobis videtur operari, principari illis omnibus ex quibus dicit quis illam esse
et adversari ferme in universis per omne vivendi tempus, atque dominari omnibus modis, hec vero gravius animadvertens et cum doloribus, hec sane secundum exercitatoriam et medicinalem, hec prafecto micius
atque hec certe minans, hec nempe monens ad concupiscencias et iras et timores, quasi alia esset alii rei collocuta?
"Quid vero nunc? Nonne (49) contra omnino videtur agere, quatenus ea ducit omnia ex quibus dixerit aliquis ipsam (50) constitui?
atque ferme omnibus per omnem vitam repugnat multisque dominatur modis, (51) interdum rigidius quodam cum supplicio puniens per gymnasticam atque medicinam, (52) interdum vero mitius
castigans comminando aut monendo adversus cupiditates et iras, (53) atque timores, tanquam altera quaedam res contra alteram loquens,
And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact opposite--leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed;
almost always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life, sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then again more gently;
now threatening, now admonishing the desires, passions, fears, as if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the Odyssee represents Odysseus doing in the words--
οἷόν που καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ πεποίηκεν, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὀδυσσέα·
στῆθος δὲ πλήξας
κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·
(94e) τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη·
καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ᾽ ἔτλης.
[Ὁμ. Ὀδύσσεια υ 17]
Quemadmodum in quibusdam et Omerus in Odissia fecit, ubi dicit Ulixem ‘pectus vera percuciens cordi indixit sermone: «sustine cor, et verecundius aliud dudum sustinuistis“.’
quemadmodum Ho(54)merus tradit in Odyssea:
(510, 1) Tum pectus pulsans, cor sic affatur Vlysses:
(2) 'Hoc quoque cor perfer, nanque et graviora tulisti.'
‘He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart: Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!’
ἆρ᾽ οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἁρμονίας αὐτῆς οὔσης καὶ οἵας ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἵας ἄγειν τε ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὔσης αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρου τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ᾽ ἁρμονίαν;
Igitur opinaris ipsum hec facere intelligentem tamquam armoniam esse ipsam, et que possit agi a corporis passionibus, sed non que possit agereque hec et dominari, et cum sit ipsa multo magis divina res quam secundum armoniam?”
(3) An putas Homerum haec dixisse tanquam harmonia quaedam sit ac talis ut corporis passio(4)nibus subijciatur, non autem atque dominetur, an potius quasi quiddam longe divini(5)us quam harmonia sit animus?”
Do you think that Homer wrote this under the idea that the soul is a harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body, and not rather of a nature which should lead and master them--herself a far diviner thing than any harmony?
νὴ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
SIMMIAS. “Per Iovem, O Socrate, michi quoque videtur.”
“Divinius per Iovem mihi videtur significavisse.”
Yes, Socrates, I quite think so.
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