εἶεν δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἁρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἵλεά πως, ὡς ἔοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν·
τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ;
“Esto quidem” ait ille Socrates, “sane ea que de Armonia nobis Thebaica propicia aliquatenus, ut videtur, modeste facta sunt;
quid autem ea que Cadmi” ait, “O Cebes, qui propiciabimus et qua racione?”
“Age harmoniam Theba(8)nam satis, ut videtur, iam placavimus.
Rationem vero Cadmeam, o Cebes, quonam pacto (9) et qua ratione placabimus?”
Thus much, said Socrates, of Harmonia, your Theban goddess, who has graciously yielded to us;
but what shall I say, Cebes, to her husband Cadmus, and how shall I make peace with him?
σύ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν·
τουτονὶ γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἶπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν.
Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἠπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαύμαζον (95b) εἴ τι ἕξει τις χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ·
πάνυ οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου.
ταὐτὰ δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.
“Tu michi videris” infit Cebes “adinvenire;
hunc ergo sermonem qui ad armoniam mirabiliter michi dixisti tamquam preter opinionem.
Simmia quippe dicente quod dubitaverit penitus mirabar si quid habuerit quis uti racione ipsius;
funditus ita que michi incompetenter visum est confestim primum ingressum non recipere tue oracionis.
Hec utique non mirer et Cadmi sermonem si paciatur.”
“Tu mihi, o Socrates, viam”, inquit Cebes, “inventurus videris.
(10) Nempe rationem hanc adversus harmoniam mirifice praeter opinionem nostram exco(11)gitasti.
Cum enim audirem Simmiam dubitantem, valde admirabar si quis rationibus eius (12) resistere posset.
Itaque summae mihi fuit admirationi, ipsum nec primum quidem potuisse (13) rationis tuae imperium sustinere.
Quapropter non admirarer si Cadmeus quoque sermo (14) idem pateretur."
I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said Cebes;
I am sure that you have put the argument with Harmonia in a manner that I could never have expected.
For when Simmias was mentioning his difficulty, I quite imagined that no answer could be given to him,
and therefore I was surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset of yours,
and not impossibly the other, whom you call Cadmus, may share a similar fate.
ὠγαθέ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μή τις ἡμῖν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι.
ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὁμηρικῶς ἐγγὺς ἰόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις.
ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ζητεῖς·
ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν (95c) ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὖσαν,
εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανὼν ἐκεῖ εὖ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἠλίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει.
τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ὅτι ἰσχυρόν τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδὲς καὶ ἦν ἔτι πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν κωλύειν φῂς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή,
ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιόν τέ ἐστιν ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν που πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ᾔδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα·
ἀλλὰ γὰρ (95d) οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχὴ ἦν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὥσπερ νόσος·
καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ζῴη καὶ τελευτῶσά γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοιτο.
διαφέρειν δὲ δὴ φῂς οὐδὲν εἴτε ἅπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἴτε πολλάκις, πρός γε τὸ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι·
προσήκει γὰρ φοβεῖσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἴη, τῷ μὴ εἰδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι (95e) ὡς ἀθάνατόν ἐστι.
τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα ἐστίν, οἶμαι, ὦ Κέβης, ἃ λέγεις·
καὶ ἐξεπίτηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μή τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἴ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῇς ἢ ἀφέλῃς.
“O bone” inquit Socrates, “ne magna dicas, ne forte quis nostrum fascino invertat sermonem futurum dici;
verum hec quoque deo cure erunt, nos autem Omerice prope euntes temptabimus si certe quid dicas.
Estque capitulum horum que queris.
Postulas demonstrari nostrum animam indestructibilemque et immortalem esse,
si philosophus vir futurus mori, confidens et cogitans cum expiraverit illic bene actum ire differenter quam si in alia vita degens obierit haut inutili quoque et fatua confidencia fidet.
Pronunciare profecto quoniam potens quid est anima et deiforme et quoniam erat eciam prius, ante quam nos homines fieremus, nichil prohibere dicis universa hec monere immortalitatem quoque minime,
quoniam diuturnius est anima et aliquo modo erat prius immensum tempus, et novitque et egit multa quedam.
Immo nichilo magis erat immortale, atqui in hominis corpus venire primordium erat ipsi interitus quemadmodum morbus;
et captivata utique hanc vitam degat et desinens in eo quod vocatur mors intereat.
Differre quidem ais, nichil sive semel in corpus veniat sive multociens ad hoc quemque nostrum formidare.
Convenit siquidem metuere nisi insensatus fuerit, non scienti neque habenti racionem reddere quoniam immortale est.
Talia quedam sunt, opinor, O Cebes, que dicis;
et ex studio frequencius repeto, neu quid subterfugiat nos, si vero quid velis apponas vel demas.'
“Parcius ista, bone vir, nequa invidia nobis sequentia interturbet.
Sed haec (15) quidem deo curae erunt, nos autem ut ait Homerus comminus congressi periculum fa(16)ciamus an forte quid dicas.
Summa vero eorum quae perquiris est eiusmodi:
demonstran(17)dum esse iudicas animam nostram indissolubilem immortalemque esse,
ne vir philosophus (18) in morte securus magnaque cum fiducia sperans in alia vita longe beatiorem ob philoso(19)phiae studium se futurum, insipiens sit stulteque confidat.
Ostendere autem validum quid(20)dam esse animam atque divinis persimile priusque etiam quam nos extitisse, nihil impedi(21)mento esse ais quo minus haec omnia non immortalitatem quidem significent,
sed dun(22)taxat animam corpore diuturniorem esse multaque ante nos secula fuisse novisseque et (23) egisse permulta,
nihilo tamen magis ob hoc immortalem esse existimandam. Immo hunc (24) ipsum in humanum corpus ingressum quasi morbum quendam interitus eius initium (25) esse,
adeo ut et in hac vita sit misera et in corporis morte depereat.
Nihil autem differre (26) censes, sive semel tantum, sive saepius labatur in corpus ut quivis nostrum pertimescat.
(27) Merito nanque timendum esse nisi stultus sit, ei qui neque sciat neque assignare queat im(28)mortalitatis animae rationem.
Talia quaedam sunt quae dicis, o Cebes, egoque ea consulto
(29) saepius repeto ne quid nos fugiat, sive addere his quicquam velis, sive demere.”
Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye should put to flight the word which I am about to speak.
That, however, may be left in the hands of those above, while I draw near in Homeric fashion, and try the mettle of your words.
Here lies the point:
--You want to have it proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal,
and the philosopher who is confident in death appears to you to have but a vain and foolish confidence,
if he believes that he will fare better in the world below than one who has led another sort of life, unless he can prove this;
and you say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul, and of her existence prior to our becoming men, does not necessarily imply her immortality.
Admitting the soul to be longlived, and to have known and done much in a former state, still she is not on that account immortal;
and her entrance into the human form may be a sort of disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after the toils of life are over, end in that which is called death.
And whether the soul enters into the body once only or many times, does not, as you say, make any difference in the fears of individuals.
For any man, who is not devoid of sense, must fear, if he has no knowledge and can give no account of the soul's immortality.
This, or something like this, I suspect to be your notion, Cebes;
and I designedly recur to it in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract anything.
ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχὼν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος,
οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς·
ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι.
(96a) ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη·
ἔπειτα ἄν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὧν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ περὶ ὧν δὴ λέγεις χρήσῃ.
FEDON. Itaque Socrates crebrum tempus detinens et penes se ipsum quid contuitus:
“Haut contemptibilem rem” infit, “O Cebes, percunctaris;
ex toto enim de generacione et corrupcione causam disquirere.
Ego igitur expono tibi de illis, si vis, meas passiones;
deinceps si quid tibi utile videatur eorum quecumque assero, ad persuasionem de quibuscumque dixeris uteris.”
Tunc Socrates cum aliquantum se recepisset ad se conversus
“Haud leve quiddam re(32)quiris,” inquit,“o Cebes,
sed cuius gratia oporteat generationis corruptionisque causam per(33)tractare.
Ego igitur si vis ea tibi quae mihi evenerunt enarrabo.
Deinde si quid eorum quae (34) dixero ad quaestionis tuae veritatem aperiendam conducere putabis, utere.”
Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection.
At length he said: You are raising a tremendous question, Cebes,
involving the whole nature of generation and corruption,
about which, if you like, I will give you my own experience;
and if anything which I say is likely to avail towards the solution of your difficulty you may make use of it.
ἄκουε τοίνυν ὡς ἐροῦντος.
ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὢν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν·
ὑπερήφανος γάρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι.
καὶ πολλάκις (96b) ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε·
“ἆρ᾽ ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῷα συντρέφεται;
καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἀὴρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ;
ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδέν, ὁ δ᾽ ἐγκέφαλός ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἠρεμεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην;
καὶ αὖ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν (96c) τε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυὴς εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα.
τεκμήριον δέ σοι ἐρῶ ἱκανόν·
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην,
ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ᾤμην εἰδέναι,
περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται.
τοῦτο γὰρ ᾤμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν·
(96d) ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἑκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν.
οὕτως τότε ᾤμην· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως;
SOCRATES. “Audi ergo velut dicentem.
Ego siquidem” ait, “O Cebes, iunior cum essem pervalde affectavi hanc sapienciam quam appellant de natura historiam;
splendidissima namque michi visa est esse, nosse causas uniuscuiusque, quare generetur singulum et quare dispereat et quare sit;
et sepe me ipsum sursum deorsum mutabam dispiciens primo talia quoque:
anne ubi fervidum et algidum putrefaccionem aliquam sumant, velut quidam inquiebant, tunc animalia connutriri;
et utrum sanguis sit quo sentimus, vel aer aut ignis,
sive horum nichil, cerebrum vera sit quod sensus exhibeat audiendi et videndi atque olfaciendi, ex hiis autem fiat memoria et opinio, ex memoria nempe et opinione sumente quietem, et secundum hec fieri scienciam;
et item horum corrupciones inspiciens et eas que circa celumque et terram passiones, novissime tamen michi ipsi videbar ad hanc consideracionem obtusus esse quantum nullam rem;
argumentum quoque tibi dicam ydoneum;
ego namque que prius manifeste sciebam, velut michi et aliis videbatur, demum ab ilia consideracione itatenus excecatus sum,
ut dediscerem eciam ea que ante hoc estimabam nosse,
de aliis vera multis et propter quid homo crescit.
Hoc namque rebar prius cuilibet liquidum esse, quia propter comedere et potum sumere;
quando quidem ex cibariis carnibus carnes accrescunt, ossibusque ossa et ita iuxta eamdem racionem eciam aliis sui ipsorum propria singulis adiciuntur, demum utique modica sarcina cum sit, posterius multam fieri, atque sic fieri parvum hominem magnum.
Ita tunc opinabar; nonne videor tibi modeste?”
“Audi igitur iam narrantem.
Equidem, o Cebes, cum essem iuvenis mira qua(36)dam eius sapientiae cupiditate flagrabam quam naturae vocant historiam.
Praeclarissimum (37) enim esse censebam causas intelligere per quas singula fiant atque intereant et qua sint ra(38)tione,
saepiusque me sursum deorsumque iactavi talia quaedam primo considerans
nunquid (39) postquam calidum et frigidum putrefactionem aliquam acceperunt, quemadmodum nonnulli di(40)xerunt, tunc animalia convalescant.
Praeterea utrum sit quo sapimus vel aer vel (41) ignis,
aut nihil horum sit, sed cerebrum quod praebeat sensus audiendi, vivendi, olfaciendi, ex (42) his autem memoria et opinio fiat, ex memoria vero et opinione quietem accipiente per haec (43) scientia oriatur.
Proinde horum corruptiones considerans atque eas quae circa coelum ter(44)ramque passiones contingunt, tandem adeo mihi ad haec consideranda visus sum hebes ut ni(45)hil magis.
Coniecturam vero ad id afferam tibi sufficientem.
Nempe ob eiusmodi conside(46)rationem usqueadeo sum occaecatus ut ea etiam quae prius manifeste sciebam, ut mihi alijsque (47) videbatur,
dediscerem et alia videlicet multa quae antea me scire putabam
et qua ratio(48)ne homo crescat.
Id nanque opinabar ante esse cuilibet manifestum, hominem videlicet per ci(49)bum potumque augeri.
Quando enim per haec carnes carnibus ossaque ossibus adduntur eo(50)demque modo in alijs quando sua cuique adhibentur, tunc sane molem primo parvam deinde (51) magnam evadere, atque ita parvum hominem effici magnum.
Sic ego tunc opinabar, nonne sa(52)tis belle tibi videor?”
Then I will tell you, said Socrates.
When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature;
to know the causes of things, and why a thing is and is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty profession;
and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of questions such as these:
--Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said?
Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire?
or perhaps nothing of the kind--but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when they have attained fixity.
And then I went on to examine the corruption of them, and then to the things of heaven and earth, and at last I concluded myself to be utterly and absolutely incapable of these enquiries,
as I will satisfactorily prove to you.
For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things which I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well;
I forgot what I had before thought self-evident truths;
e.g. such a fact as that the growth of man
is the result of eating and drinking;
for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man great.
Was not that a reasonable notion?
σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι.
ᾤμην γὰρ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖν, ὁπότε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρωπος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων (96e) εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἵππου·
καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.
SOCRATES. “Dispice vero et ista adhuc.
Autumabam quippe sufficienter videri michi, quociens quis appareat astans homo magnus parvo, maior esse ipso capite, et equus equo;
et adhuc hiis evidencius decem michi videbantur octo plura esse eo quod duo eis addantur, et bicubitum cubitali maius esse eo quod medietate ipsum superet.”
“Animadverte haec insuper.
Arbitrabar (53) enim satis recte mihi videri quoties hominem vel equum magnum parvo propinquum, al(54)terum altero iudicaram capite ipso esse maiorem.
Atque multo etiam evidentius decem plura (511, 1) apparebant mihi quam octo, propterea quod denarius duo praeter octonarium contine(2)ret. Praeterea bicubitum cubitali maius, quoniam dimidio superaret.”
Well; but let me tell you something more.
There was a time when I thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller than the other by a head; or one horse would appear to be greater than another horse:
and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is the double of one.
πόρρω που, ἔφη, νὴ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἑνί τις προσθῇ ἕν, ἢ τὸ ἓν ᾧ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, <ἢ τὸ προστεθέν>, ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη (97a) διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο·
θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἓν ἄρα ἑκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἤστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι.
οὐδέ γε ὡς ἐάν τις ἓν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι·
ἐναντία γὰρ (97b) γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι.
τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ᾽ ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ᾽ ἑτέρου.
οὐδέ γε δι᾽ ὅτι ἓν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἔτι πείθω ἐμαυτόν, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἑνὶ λόγῳ δι᾽ ὅτι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου,
ἀλλά τιν᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τοῦτον δὲ οὐδαμῇ προσίεμαι.
“Procul in quibusdam” inquiebat, “per Iovem, me esse ab estimacione de hiis hanc causam cognoscere, qui non approbo me ipsum, neque quociens uni quis adiciat unum, sive unum cui appositum est duo factum est, sive quod appositum est, et cui appositum est propter apposicionem alterius ad alterum duo facta sunt;
admiror enim si quociens utrumque ipsorum sequestratum ab invicem erat, unum fors utrumque erat et non erant tunc duo, cum vero appropiassent sibi invicem, hec igitur ipsis causa facta est ut duo essent, conventus propinque invicem posicionis.
Neque quociens si quis unum scindat, possum adhuc persuaded quatinus ipsa item causa facta est scissura, ut duo fierent;
contraria quippe fit que tunc fuit causa uti duo fierent;
tunc siquidem quando coacta sunt prope ad invicem et apponebatur alterum alteri, nunc profecto quoniam abactum est et separatur alterum ab altero.
Neque propter quid unum fit ut scio, persuadeo michi ipsi neque aliud quippiam uno verbo propter quid vel generatur vel corrumpitur vel est, iuxta hunc modum methodi,
verum aliquem alium modum incassum permisceo, huic autem nullatenus accedo.
“Procul equidem per Iovem abesse mihi videor ut alicuius (4) horum causam intelligere putem qui nondum mihijpsi persuadere possum ut quando quis (5) uni addat unum, tunc vel illud unum cui unum adiunctum est fiat duo, vel et adiunctum (6) et illud cui adiunctum est propter alterius ad alterum adiunctionem evadat duo.
Admiror (7) equidem si cum utrunque horum separatum erat, utrunque unum erat neque erant tunc duo, (8) postquam invicem cohaeserunt, haec ipsa causa fuerit ut duo fierent, congressio videlicet per (9) quam propius iam posita sunt.
Neque etiam si quis unum dividat, adhuc possum persuaderi (10) hanc ipsam divisionem causam esse ut duo evadant.
Contraria enim tunc atque superius cau(11)sa fit qua duo fiant.
Tunc enim quia coniungebantur propius invicem, alterumque admo(12)vebatur alteri, nunc vero quoniam removetur alterum ab altero atque separatur.
Neque propter (13) quid unum fiat adhuc scire me arbitror neque ut summatim dicam, aliud quicquam quare fiat (14) aut pereat aut sit, per hanc ipsam viam me nosse profiteor,
sed alium quendam ipse modum (15) frustra misceo, hunc vero nullo modo admitto.
I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause of any of them, by heaven I should; for I cannot satisfy myself that, when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or that the two units added together make two by reason of the addition.
I cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition or meeting of them should be the cause of their becoming two:
neither can I understand how the division of one is the way to make two;
for then a different cause would produce the same effect,
--as in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the cause.
Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or anything else is either generated or destroyed or is at all,
but I have in my mind some confused notion of a new method, and can never admit the other.
ἀλλ᾽ ἀκούσας μέν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξαγόρου (97c) ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἥσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον,
καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ·
εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ (97d) ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν·
ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον.
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἰδέναι·
τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν.
ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἅσμενος ηὑρηκέναι ᾤμην διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καί μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ (97e) στρογγύλη,
ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι·
καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι·
καὶ εἴ μοι (98a) ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος.
καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμην ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε ταῦτ᾽ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει.
οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν ᾤμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμῆσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν (98b) ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει·
ἑκάστῳ οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἑκάστῳ βέλτιστον ᾤμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν·
καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἷός τ᾽ ἦ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἵν᾽ ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.
Immo cum audissem aliquando ex libro quodam, ut ait, Anaxagora legente et dicente quoniam animus est perornansque et omnium causa, huic vero cause applaudebam quidem et visum est michi modo quodam bene se habere animum esse universorum causam,
et cogitabam utrum hoc ita se habet, mentem quoque ornantem cuncta ornare et singulum ponere ut utcumque potissime se habeat;
si ergo quis voluerit causam invenire singuli qualiter fit vel interit vel est, hoc oportere de ipso reperire qualiter optime ipsi sit vel esse vel aliud quodcumque pati vel agere;
ex racione ista nichil aliud considerare competit homini et de ipso et de aliis nisi optimum et potissimum;
necesseque esse eumdem hunc et deterius scire;
eamdem enim esse scienciam illorum.
Hec vero meditatus alacer invenisse putabam doctorem cause eorum que sunt iuxta animum michi ipsi Anaxagoram, et michi exponere primum equidem utrum sit terra latitudine distracta vel rotunda;
cumque exposuisset, superaddere ut recitaret causam et necessitatem, dicentem quod pocius et quoniam ipsam pocius erat talem esse;
et si in medio dicat esse ipsam superaddere ut recitet quoniam pocius erat ipsi in medio esse;
et si michi hec diffinirentur, astruebam quoniam non amplius ponerem cause aliam speciem.
Eciam et de sole ita astruebam similiter interrogaturus de luna et aliis astris, de celeritate quidem ad invicem et conversionibus et aliis passionibus, qualiter quando ista pocius est singulum et facere et pati que paciuntur.
Non enim umquam ipsum rebar asserentem quoque ab animo hec ornari, aliam aliquam causam ipsis superinducere quam quoniam melius ipsa sic se habere sit prout habent.
Unicuique igitur eorum reddentem causam et communiter universis, singulo optimum rebar et commune omnibus superexponere bonum;
et non utique redderem pro multo has spes; immo summo opere sumens hos libros quantocius poteram legebam, uti quantocius cognoscerem potissimum et deterius.
Verum cum audissem aliquando ex libro, ut ille (16) aiebat, Anaxagorae legentem quendam hanc Anaxagoriae ipsius sententiam, videlicet men(17)tem omnia exornare omniumque causam esse, hoc utique causae genere magnopere sum de(18)lectatus – existimans quodammodo consentaneum mentem esse omnium causam –
putabamque si (19) id ita esset ut mens omnia exornaret, singula per haec ita esse disposita ut optime disponi po(20)tuerant.
Propterea si quis vellet causam invenire qua singula fiant aut pereant aut sint, hoc (21) ipsum esse inveniendum, qua videlicet ratione optimum sit unicuique aut esse aut quodvis (22) aliud pati vel agere.
Atque hoc pacto nihil aliud considerandum homini vel de seipso vel de (23) alijs, nisi quod potissimum sit et optimum.
Necesse vero est eum qui id norit, illud quoque quod (24) est deterius cognovisse,
quippe cum eadem horum scientia sit.
Haec utique mecum ipse re(25)putans gaudebam, invenisse ratus Anaxagoram magistrum qui me id quod tantopere cu(26)piebam causas rerum doceret primumque mihi diceret utrum plana sit terra vel rotunda.
Et (27) cum haec dixisset, subiungeret mihi causam atque necessitatem, afferens videlicet id ipsum quod (28) melius est, meliusque fuisse eam esse talem.
Proinde si terram diceret in mundo mediam esse, mox (29) exponeret melius extitisse ut media esset.
Quod si ille haec ostenderet, ita me comparabam (30) quasi nullam amplius causarum speciem positurus.
Praeterea de sole et luna caeterisque stel(31)lis earumque inter se velocitate conversionibusque et de huiusmodi omnibus me similiter (32) quaesiturum auditurumque comparaveram, quod videlicet et qua ratione haec melius sit sin(33)gula vel facere vel pati, quodcunque agant vel patiantur.
Neque enim putabam cum ab initio (34) dixisset mente omnia exornari, ipsum aliam postea causam rebus assignaturum praeterquam (35) quod optimum sit eas ita se ut habent habere.
Itaque arbitrabar eum in reddendis tum singu(36)lorum, tum cunctorum communiter causis, singulis quidem assignare quod unicuique optimum, (37) cunctis vero commune bonum.
Neque vero spes ipse meas parvifaciebam, sed summo quo(38)dam studio acceptos libros quam velocissime poterant lectitavi ut ocyssime quid optimum (39) quidve eius contrarium esset cognoscerem.
Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion, which appeared quite admirable, and I said to myself:
If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place;
and I argued that if any one desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or doing or suffering was best for that thing,
and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others,
and then he would also know the worse,
since the same science comprehended both.
And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round;
and whichever was true, he would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity of this being so, and then he would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best;
and if he said that the earth was in the centre, he would further explain that this position was the best,
and I should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not want any other sort of cause.
And I thought that I would then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, active and passive, and how all of them were for the best.
For I could not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other account of their being as they are, except that this was best;
and I thought that when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was good for all.
These hopes I would not have sold for a large sum of money, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse.
ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ᾠχόμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊὼν καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ (98c) διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα.
καί μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει, κἄπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστων ὧν πράττω, λέγοι πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειταί μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὀστῶν καὶ νεύρων,
καὶ τὰ μὲν ὀστᾶ ἐστιν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυὰς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ νεῦρα οἷα ἐπιτείνεσθαι (98d) καὶ ἀνίεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὀστᾶ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὃ συνέχει αὐτά·
αἰωρουμένων οὖν τῶν ὀστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν συμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεῦρα κάμπτεσθαί που ποιεῖ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεὶς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι·
καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία (98e) τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος,
ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὖ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἣν ἂν κελεύσωσιν·
ἐπεὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, πάλαι ἂν (99a) ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἦν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαιότερον ᾤμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἥντιν᾽ ἂν τάττῃ.
ἀλλ᾽ αἴτια μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον·
εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω οὐκ ἂν οἷός τ᾽ ἦ ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι·
ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἃ ποιῶ, καὶ ταῦτα νῷ πράττων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ (99b) τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἱρέσει, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥᾳθυμία εἴη τοῦ λόγου.
τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ᾽ εἴη αἴτιον·
ὃ δή μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὀνόματι προσχρώμενοι, ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν.
διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μέν τις δίνην περιτιθεὶς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ καρδόπῳ πλατείᾳ βάθρον τὸν ἀέρα ὑπερείδει·
(99c) τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὡς οἷόν τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθῆναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὔτε ζητοῦσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν,
ἀλλὰ ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἄτλαντα ἄν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν,
καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει μαθητὴς ὁτουοῦν ἥδιστ᾽ ἂν γενοίμην·
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν οὔτε παρ᾽ ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δεύτερον (99d) πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ᾗ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει σοι, ἔφη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὦ Κέβης;
“Admirabili vero spe, O dilecte, ferebar deportatus, cum vero processissem et legissem conspicio virum animo minime fruentem neque aliguas causas pro causis inducentem ad perornandum res, aeras quoque atque etheras et aguas pro causis ferentem et alia multa et innumera.
Et michi videbatur simillimum guid pati ac si utigue quis dicens guoniam Socrates quecumque agit animo agit, et deinceps, perscrutans dicere causas singulorum que facio, dicat primum quidem quoniam propter hoc nunc istic sedeo quoniam componitur michi corpus ex ossibus et nervis,
et ossa quidem sunt solida atque diafias habent seorsum ab invicem, verum nervi ydonei extendi et remitti, amplectencia ossa cum carnibus et pelle que continet ea:
suspensis quippe ossibus in suis enbolis remissos et intensos nervos curvari facit possibile quoque me nunc artus, et ob istam causam incurvatus hic sedeo;
et item super hoc quod discepto vobis alias huiusmodi causas dicat, voces sane et aeras et aures et alia decem milia huiusmodi pro causis ferens,
negligens quam vere causas dicere, scilicet quoniam Atheneis visum est melius me condempnare, propter hec utigue et michi melius iterum visum est, hic sedere et iustius manentem suscipere iudicium quodcumque preceperint,
quoniam per canem, ut ego reor, dudum hii nervi et hec ossa vel circa Megara vel Viotos essent, ab estimacione lata melioris nisi iustius cogitarem et honestius esse quam clam discedere et aufugere, sustinere urbi iudicium guodcumque disposuerit.
Verum causas quidem talia vocare valde inconveniens;
quod si guis dicat guoniam sine talium habitacione et ossium et nervorum et aliorum quecumque habeo non utique possem facere que videntur, michi, vera profecto dicet;
quoniam utique propter hec ago que ago, et ista mente ago, atqui non optimi eleccione multa guidem et longa desidia esset racionis;
quia non distingui possibile esset quoniam aliud quidem est causa vere, aliud quoque sine quo causa numquam erit causa;
quod utique michi videntur disquirentes multi tamquam in tenebris, alieno oculo freti, ut causam ipsum appellent.
Quocirca nempe hic profecto dinen circumponens terre sub celo manere facit terram, hic autem velut cardopo lata profundum aera deorsum despicit;
eam vera que est quam possibile ipsa potissimum poni potenciam ita nunc poni, hanc neque vestigant neque aliquam existimant demonicam vim habere,
immo arbitrantur isto utique aliquando Athlanta robustiorem et immortaliorem et magis universa continentem adinvenire,
id autem quod est et quam vere bonum et oportunum colligare et continere minus opinantur.
Ego sane huiuscemodi cause quomodocumque se habeat discipulus cuiuscumque libentissime quoque fierem;
cumque hac privatus essem et neque ipse invenire neque ab alio discere quivi, secundam navem in cause examinacionem qualiter disquiratur vis tibi” ait “demonstracionem faciam, O Cebes?”
Hac igitur miserabili spe ductus cum legeret per(40)go, video hominem mente quidem nullo utentem nec causam ullam ad ipsum rerum (41) ornatum referentem, sed aereas naturas et aethereas aqueasque et talia multa incredibilia pro (42) rerum causis assignantem.
Qua quidem in re ille mihi perinde visus est agere, ac si quis dice(43)ret Socratem quaecunque facit mente facere, deinde volens singulorum quae facio causas ex(44)plicare, dicat primum quidem nunc me hic propterea sedere, quoniam corpus meum ex ossi(45)bus nervisque componitur,
et ossa quidem solida sunt et iuncturarum intervalla invicem ha(46)bent, nervi autem sic instituti ut extendi et contrahi valeant, complectantur ossa cum car(47)nibus atque cute, quae res illa continet.
Elatis igitur ossibus in suis coniunctionibus, nervi (48) qui et intendunt et remittunt commode, faciunt ut flectendi cuiusque membri habeam fa(49)cultatem atque hanc ob causam hic inflexus sedeam.
Ac rursus disputationis meae alias quas(50)dam eiusmodi causas assignaret, voces et aerem et auditum aliaque generis eiusdem quam(51)plurima,
causas verissimas negligens, videlicet quoniam Atheniensibus melius visum fue(52)rit me condemnare, ideoque mihi etiam melius sit visum hic sedere, iustiusque iudicarim expe(53)ctantem dare poenas quas illi iubeant.
Profecto per Canem iamdiu, ut arbitror, hi nervi atque (54) haec ossa apud Megarenses aut Boeotius essent ipsius quod optimum est opinione delata, (512, 1) nisi iustius honestiusque censuissem poenas civitati pendere quascunque a me exigat, quam (2) subterfugere atque exulem vivere.
Verum talia quaedam causas appellare a ratione est re(3)motissimum.
Siquis autem dixerit absque ossibus et nervis atque similibus non posse me quae (4) mihi facienda videantur implere, vere utique dicet.
Attamen asserere propter haec me fa(5)cere quacunque facio, dum ipsa mente ago, non autem eius quod optimum sit optione, (6) multa magnaque sermonis negligentia esset.
Nam qui sic est affectus nequit discernere a(7)liam quidem esse veram rei alicuius causam, aliud vero illud sine quo ipsa causa esse non (8) potest causa.
Quod quidem multi mihi videntur quasi in tenebris attrectantes alieno ap(9)pellare nomine dum causam nuncupant.
Quapropter nonnulli vertiginem circumponen(10)tes terrae sub coelo eam stabilem faciunt, alij vero tanquam latum pistoris alveum aere ve(11)lut base suffulciunt.
Potentiam vero ipsam, qua nunc ita disposita sit ut optime disponi po(12)terat, neque perquirunt neque daemonicam quandam habere vim putant,
sed Atlantem quen(13)dam robustiorem et immortaliorem magisque omnia continentem invenisse se opinantur.
(14) Ipsum autem bonum atque decens connectere atque continere revera nihil existimant.
Ego (15) igitur libentissime cuiusvis essem discipulus ut quemadmodum se habeat haec ipsa causa (16) discerem.
Postquam vero hac privatus sum, neque ipse invenire neque ab alio discere po(17)tui, secundam navigationem ad causam investigandam molitus sum. Visne, o Cebes, hanc (18) tibi a me demonstrari?”
What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities.
I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles;
and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them;
and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture
--that is what he would say, and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort,
forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence;
for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Boeotia--by the dog they would, if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, of enduring any punishment which the state inflicts.
There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this.
It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes.
But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking.
I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming.
And thus one man makes a vortex all round and steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad trough.
Any power which in arranging them as they are arranges them for the best never enters into their minds;
and instead of finding any superior strength in it, they rather expect to discover another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good;
--of the obligatory and containing power of the good they think nothing;
and yet this is the principle which I would fain learn if any one would teach me.
But as I have failed either to discover myself, or to learn of any one else, the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best mode of enquiring into the cause.
