You are here: BP HOME > BPG > Plato: Phaedo > fulltext
Plato: Phaedo

Choose languages

Choose images, etc.

Choose languages
Choose display
  • Enable images
  • Enable footnotes
    • Show all footnotes
    • Minimize footnotes
Search-help
Choose specific texts..
Plato: Phaedo
    Click to Expand/Collapse Option Complete text
Click to Expand/Collapse Option57a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option60a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option65a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option70a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option75a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option80a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option85a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option90a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option95a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option100a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option105a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option110a
Click to Expand/Collapse Option115a
Back to library
ὃ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον  --οἷον νῦν ἡ τριὰς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὖσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ (105a) τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα--  ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὁρίζῃ, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ᾽ ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἴῃ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι.  πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμνῄσκου· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν.  τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον.  τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν (105b) τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται·  οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,  εἴπερ ἕπῃ τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. 
SOCRATES. “Quod igitur dicebam diffinire oportere que, non contraria alicui cum sint, tamen non recipiunt ipsum, contrarium  - ut modo trias, pari cum non sint contraria, minime magis ipsum recipit; namque contrarium ipsi semper infert, et dias impari et ignis gelido et alia quam plurima;-  ast intuere utrum itatenus diffinias, non solum contrarium contrarium recipere, immo et illud, quodcumque inferat quid contrarium illi, in quocumque ipsum fuerit, ipsum inferens illati contrarietatem numquam recipere.  Iterum reminiscere - non enim malum frequenter audire;  quinque eam que est paris non recipit, neque decem imparis, videlicet duplum;  hoc quidem igitur et alii et ipsi contrarium, tamen eam que est paris minime recipit;  neque vera emiolium neque alia huiuscemodi, medietas, tocius, atque tritimorion rursum et cuncta talia,  utrum consequarisque et complaceat tibi sic.” 
(515, 1) “Quod ergo definiendum assumpseram, qualia videlicet sint, quae etsi alicui sunt con(2)traria, ipsum tamen contrarium non admittunt,  perinde se habet ut trinitas quae cum pa(3)ri non sit contraria, nihilo tamen magis ipsum accidit, propterea quod semper eius con(4)trarium affert. Similiterque binarius ad impar, et ignis se habet ad frigidum, aliaque quamplu(5)rima.  At vide iam num ita definiendum putes ut non modo contrarium non admittat con(6)trarium, verumetiam illud quod aliquid afferat contrarium illi ad quod ipsum accedat, (7) ipsum videlicet quod affert, nunquam contrarium eius quae affertur recipiat formam.  Rur(8)sus autem recordare - neque enim inutile saepius admonere.  Neque quinque paris speciem ad(9)mittent, neque decem imparis, quod est duplum.  Hoc quidem ipsum alij contrarium, spe(10)ciem tamen imparis accipiet nunquam.  Neque etiam numerus sesquialter, neque alia huius(11)modi quae dimidium habent, formam totius suscipiunt, similiterque numerus qui partem ha(12)bet tertiam, atque eiusdem generis alia,  si modo assequeris ista atque consentis.” 
To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposed, and yet do not admit opposites  --as, in the instance given, three, although not opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but always brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not receive the odd, or fire the cold--  from these examples (and there are many more of them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general conclusion, that not only opposites will not receive opposites, but also that nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings, in that to which it is brought.  And here let me recapitulate--for there is no harm in repetition.  The number five will not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the double of five, will admit the nature of the odd.  The double has another opposite, and is not strictly opposed to the odd, but nevertheless rejects the odd altogether.  Nor again will parts in the ratio 3:2, nor any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a third, admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole:  You will agree? 
πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἕπομαι. 
CEBES. “Penitus valde et complacet michi et consequor.' 
“Omnino equi(13)dem consentio atque assequor.” 
Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that. 
πάλιν δή μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε.  καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ.  λέγω δὴ παρ᾽ ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν.  εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν (105c) ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ·  οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρῃ ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ᾽ ᾧ ἂν πυρετός·  οὐδ᾽ ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ᾽ ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως.  ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι βούλομαι. 
SOCRATES. “Iterum profecto michi e principio dic,  et neque michi quicquid percunctatus fuero respondeas, verum imitando me.  Aio quidem preter quam primo dicebam responsionem, scilicet firmam illam, ceterum quam ex eis que dida sunt aliam perspicio firmitudinem.  Si enim scisciteris me quod, cum in corpore insit, calidum sit, minime firmam tibi dicam responsionem illam indisciplinatam, quoniam cuicumque calor, atqui comiorem ex hiis que nunc quoniam cuicumque ignis;  neque si dixerit quod cum corpori insit languescet, non inquiam cuicumque languor, verum cuicumque febris;  neque quod cum in numera sit impar est, non inquiam cuicumque imparitas, immo cuicumque monas, atque alia hoc pacto.  Sed vide utrum iam satis nosti quid velim.” 
“Rursus tanquam a principio mihi dicis.  Nec tamen per id (14) quod nunc interrogo, sed per aliud quiddam mihi respondeas me imitatus.  Dico autem (15) praeter tutam responsionem illam a principio positam, iuxta tutam quoque responsionem aliam (16) per ea quae modo dicta sunt adinventam.  Nempe si me interroges, o Socrates, quidnam (17) in corpore si sit calescet corpus, non tutam responsionem illam rudemque tibi dabo, videli(18)cet si caliditas, sed exquisitionem ex praesentibus verbis, ut si insit ignis.  Similiter si me in(19)terroges, quid si in corpore sit aegrotabit, non respondebo si aegrotatio, sed se febris.  Rur(20)sus si perconteris, quid si insit numero fuerit impar, non dicam si imparitas, imo si unitas, (21) atque in caeteris eodem pacto.  Sed vide an dum quid velim plane cognoveris.” 
And now, he said, let us begin again;  and do not you answer my question in the words in which I ask it:  let me have not the old safe answer of which I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be inferred by you from what has been just said.  I mean that if any one asks you ‘what that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot,’ you will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, a far superior answer, which we are now in a condition to give.  Or if any one asks you ‘why a body is diseased,’ you will not say from disease, but from fever;  and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is the cause of them:  and so of things in general, as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing any further examples. 
ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη. 
“Immo penitus sufficienter” ait. 
“Planissime.” 
Yes, he said, I quite understand you. 
ἀποκρίνου δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν ἔσται; 
“Responde autem” infit ille “quid cum insit corpori vivens est?” 
(22) “Responde igitur: quidnam si in corpore sit erit vivum?” 
Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive? 
ὧι ἂν ψυχή, ἔφη. 
“Cuicumque anima” inquit, 
“Si anima.” 
The soul, he replied. 
(105d) οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; 
SOCRATES. “Semper igitur hoc ita se habet?” 
“Nonne id semper (23) ita se habet?” 
And is this always the case? 
πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. 
“Si vero minime?” ait ille. 
“Semper.” 
Yes, he said, of course. 
ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν; 
“Anima igitur, quodcumque ipsa occupet, semper venit in ipsum ferens vitam?” 
“Anima igitur quicquid occupat, semper ad illud vitam affert?” 
Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life? 
ἥκει μέντοι, ἔφη. 
CEBES. “Venit utique” dixit. 
(24) “Affert proculdubio." 
Yes, certainly. 
πότερον δ᾽ ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; 
SOCRATES. “Utrum est quid vite contrarium, seu nichil?” 
“An est aliquid vitae contrarium nec ne?” 
And is there any opposite to life? 
ἔστιν, ἔφη. 
CEDES. “Est” infit. 
“Est utique”. 
There is, he said. 
τί; 
SOCRATES. “Quid?” 
“Quid istud?” 
And what is that? 
θάνατος. 
CEBES. “Mors.” 
(25) “Mors.” 
Death. 
οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή ποτε δέξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται; 
SOCRATES. “Igitur anima contrarium ei quod ipsa infert semper numquam recipiet, quemadmodum ex prioribus concessum est?” 
“Anima vero contrarium eius quod ipsa semper adducit, subibit nunquam, quem(26)admodum ex superioribus est concessum.” 
Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings. 
καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. 
“Et precipue” ait Cebes. 
“Sic est omnino.” 
Impossible, replied Cebes. 
τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί νυνδὴ ὠνομάζομεν; 
SOCRATES. “Quid ergo? Non recipiens paris ydeam quid equidem nominavimus?” 
“Quid vero? Quod paris ideam (27) non accipit, quonam modo paulo ante nominabamus?” 
And now, he said, what did we just now call that principle which repels the even? 
ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη. 
CEDES. “Impar” infit. 
“Impar omnino.” 
The odd. 
τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται; 
SOCRATES. “Quodque iustum non recipit et quodcumque musicum non recipiat?” 
“Quod vero non (28) accipit iustitiam, quodve non capit musicam?" 
And that principle which repels the musical, or the just? 
(105e) ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. 
CEDES. “Amuson” ait, “illudque iniustum.” 
“Iniustum dicimus et immusicum.” 
The unmusical, he said, and the unjust. 
εἶεν· ὃ δ᾽ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται τί καλοῦμεν; 
SOCRATES. “Esto; quod autem mortem non recipit, quid vocamus?” 
“Age (29) iam, quod non subit mortem, quomodo appellabamus?” 
And what do we call the principle which does not admit of death? 
ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. 
CEDES. “Immortale” infit . 
“Immortale.” 
The immortal, he said. 
οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; 
SOCRATES. “Igitur anima non recipit mortem?” 
“Et anima quidem (30) mortem non suscipit.” 
And does the soul admit of death? 
οὔ. 
CEDES. “Minime.” 
“Nequaquam.” 
No. 
ἀθάνατον ἄρα ψυχή. 
SOCRATES. “Immortale itaque anima?” 
“Est igitur anima immortalis.” 
Then the soul is immortal? 
ἀθάνατον. 
CEBES. “Immortale.” 
“Immortalis quidem.” 
Yes, he said. 
εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν; ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; 
SOCRATES. “Esto” inquit; “hoc quidem demonstrari dicemus? Seu qui videtur?” 
(31)” Age utique hocne iam demonstratum dicemus? An aliter tibi videtur?” 
And may we say that this has been proven? 
καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. 
CEBES. “Et valde sufficienter, O Socrate.” 
“Et sufficientissi(32)me quidem, o Socrates.” 
Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied. 
τί οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν (106a) ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν; 
SOCRATES. “Quid igitur” ait ilIe “si impar necesse esset indestructibile esse, aliud quid tria quam indestructibilia utique essent?” 
“Quid ergo, Cebes? Si necesse foret quod omnino est impar, et in(33)teritus nescium fore, nonne tria interitus nescia forent?” 
Supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable? 
πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 
CEBES. “Qui enim minime?” 
“Quid ni?” 
Of course. 
οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπάγοι, ὑπεξῄει ἂν ἡ χιὼν οὖσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος;  οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. 
SOCRATES. “Nonne igitur, si et calidum necesse esset indestructibile esse, cum quis fervidum super nivem inducit, abscederet profecto nix extans integra et illiquata?   Non enim periret utique, neque iterum manens reciperet certe caliditatem.” 
“Praeterea si quod in(34)calescere nescit, necesse foret interitus nescium esse, quando quis ad nivem calidum admove(35)ret, nix quidem incolumis illiquefactaque subterfugeret,  neque enim vel periret vel permanens (36) calorem admitteret.” 
And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle came attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted  --for it could never have perished, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat? 
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. 
CEBES. “Vera” inquit “dicis.” 
“Vera narras.” 
True, he said. 
ὣς δ᾽ αὔτως οἶμαι κἂν εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπῄει, οὔποτ᾽ ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ᾽ ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὸν ᾤχετο. 
SOCRATES. “Similiter, reor, et si irrefrigerabile indestructibile esset, cum in ignem frigidum superveniret, numquam utique extingueretur neque periret, immo salvum quoque abiens deportaretur.” 
“Simili ut arbitror ratione, si quod frigescere nescium (37) etiam interitus nescium esset, quando in ignem adventat frigus, non extingueretur et eva(38)nesceret ignis, sed abiret incolumis.” 
Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire when assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished, but would have gone away unaffected? 
ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. 
CEBES. “Necesse” inquit. 
“Ita necesse foret.” 
Certainly, he said. 
(106b) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὧδε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου εἰπεῖν;  εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν ἴῃ, ἀπόλλυσθαι·  θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ᾽ ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα, ὥσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδέ γ᾽ αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδὲ δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδέ γε ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης.  “ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει”, φαίη ἄν τις, “ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου, ὥσπερ ὡμολόγηται, (106c) ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι;”  τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμαχέσασθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται·  τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν·  ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὡμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἀρτίου τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία οἴχεται ἀπιόντα·  καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὔ; 
SOCRATES. “Igitur et hoc” ait “necesse de immortali dicere?  Si enim immortale eciam indestructibile est, impossibile anime, quociens letum in illam veniat, perire;  mortem enim ex ante dictis haut recipiet neque erit mortua, quemadmodum non erunt tria, ut diximus, par, neque iterum impar, neque ignis gelidum, neque in igne calor.  ‘Ceterum quid prohibet’ dicat utique quis ‘par quidem impar non fieri superveniente pari, ceu concessum est, intereunteque ipso, pro illo par fieri?’  Ista inquientem non habebimus expugnare quoniam non disperit.  Nam impar non indestructibile est,  quia si hoc concederetur nobis, facile nempe expugnaremus quoniam superveniente pari impar et tria avolant abeuncia;  et de igne et calido atque de ceteris ita utique expugnaremus; necne?” 
“Eodem pacto de immortali quoque (39) necesse est dicamus.  Si enim quod est immortale, interire nequit, impossibile est animam (40) imminente morte perire.  Nam mortem quidem quemadmodum ex superioribus constat, non (41) recipiet neque interierit, quemadmodum ternarius nunquam ut diximus par erit neque rursus (42) impar erit par, neque ignis frigidus, neque caliditas quae inest igni, frigiditas unquam erit.  'Cae(43)terum' dicet quispiam, 'quidnam prohibet, quo minus ipsum impar, par quidem non fiat (44) adveniente pari, quemadmodum inter nos convenit, attamen eo dissoluto par pro ipso suc(45)cedat?'  Ita dicenti repugnare non valeremus, quin sit destructum.  Quippe cum non idem sit (46) impar atque indissolubile.  Alioquin si nobis id constitisset, facile obtineremus invadente pa(47)ri impar ternariumque salvum discedere.  Similiterque de igne et calido caeterisque asseremus. (48) Nonne ita?” 
And the same may be said of the immortal:  if the immortal is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish;  for the preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire or the heat in the fire, of the cold.  Yet a person may say: ‘But although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?’  Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable;  for this has not been acknowledged,  but if this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure;  and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing. 
πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
CEBES. “Penitus quippe.” 
“Prorsus.” 
Very true. 
οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου,  εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι (106d) καὶ ἀνώλεθρος·  εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου. 
SOCRATES. “Adhuc impresenciarum super immortali,  si vero conceditur et indestructibile esse, anima nempe erit ad hoc immortalis esse eciam indestructibilis;  sin autem minime, alia eget disputacione.” 
“Iam vero de immortali,  si nobis id constat quod est immortale, esse (49) etiam interitus nescium, consequens est animam praeter id quod est immortalis interitus (50) quoque nesciam esse.  Sin vero minus id concedatur, ratione alia opus erit." 
And the same may be said of the immortal:  if the immortal is also imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal;  but if not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given. 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἔφη, τούτου γε ἕνεκα·  σχολῇ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ τό γε ἀθάνατον ἀίδιον ὂν φθορὰν δέξεται. 
“Verum nequaquam” ait “huius quidem causa;  incassum quippe quid aliud corrupcionem non recipiat, si immortale et sempiternum corrupcionem receperit.” 
"Sed nihil opus (51) est, quantum ad id spectat, alia ratione.  Siquidem quidnam aliud indissolubile posset esse, (52) si immortale ipsum et sempiternum dissolveretur?" 
No other proof is needed, he said;  for if the immortal, being eternal, is liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable. 
ὁ δέ γε θεὸς οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθείη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. 
“Ipse vero deus, arbitror” infit Socrates, “et ipsa vite species et si quid aliud immortale fuerit, ab omnibus quoque concessum est numquam deperire.” 
"Deum vero et ipsam vitae speciem, (53) et siquid aliud est immortale, indissolubile quoque esse omnes confiterentur." 
Yes, replied Socrates, and yet all men will agree that God, and the essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish. 
παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. 
CEBES. “A cunctis quoque, per Iovem” inquit, “hominibus.” 
"Vniversi per (54) Iovem homines et multo magis ipsi, ut arbitror, dij." 
Yes, all men, he said--that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not mistaken, as well as men. 
(106e) ὁπότε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχὴ ἤ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη; 
SOCRATES. “Et adhuc magis, ut ego reor, a diis. Quodcumque immortale eciam incorruptibile est, aliud quid anima quam si immortalis sit et indestructibilis quidem erit?” 
"Cum igitur quod immortale est, etiam (516, 1) incorruptibile sit, quidnam prohibet animam, si fuerit immortalis, incorruptibilem quoque (2) fore?” 
Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable? 
πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. 
CEBES. “Multa necessitas.” 
“Necessario sequitur.” 
Most certainly. 
ἐπιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνῄσκει, τὸ δ᾽ ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἴχεται ἀπιόν, ὑπεκχωρῆσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. 
SOCRATES. “Superveniente itaque nece in hominem, quod autem mortale, ut videtur, ipsius defungitur, quod incorruptibile avolat abiens cedens leto.” 
“Imminente igitur homini morte quod mortale quidem in (3) eo est interit, quod vero immortale, incorruptum sospesque morti se subtrahit.” 
Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound? 
φαίνεται. 
CEBES. “Apparet.” 
“Manifestum (4) est.” 
True. 
παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ (107a) ἀνώλεθρον,  καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἔσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν Ἅιδου. 
SOCRATES. “Omni magis igitur” ait, “O Cebes, anima immortale et inconsumptibile,  atque revera erunt nostrum anime in Averno.” 
“Itaque maxime omnium, o Cebes, anima immortalis incorruptibilisque est,  eruntque apud (5) manes animae nostrae.” 
Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable,  and our souls will truly exist in another world! 
οὔκουν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πῃ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις.  ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δή τι Σιμμίας ὅδε ἤ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγῆσαι·  ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὅντινά τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἤ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι. 
“Nullatenus habeo ego quidem” ait, “O Socrate, preter hec aliud quid dicere neque diffiteri sermonibus.  Sed si quis Simmias hic sive quis alius habet dicere, bene se habet quatinus non pretereat silencio,  quia non novi in quo quis utique alio tempore resumat quam nunc presenti, de huiuscemodi volens sive dicere sive audire.” 
“Nihil equidem, o Socrates, adversus haec habeo quo minus ratio(6)nibus tuis assentiar.  Verum siquid aut hic Simmias aut alius quisquam habet quod dicat, (7) operaeprecium fuerit non siluisse.  Nescio enim in quod aliud quis differat tempus, siquid (8) de rebus eiusmodi vel dicere vel audire desideret.” 
I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object;  but if my friend Simmias, or any one else, has any further objection to make, he had better speak out, and not keep silence,  since I do not know to what other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he wants to say or to have said. 
ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἔχω ἔτι ὅπῃ ἀπιστῶ ἔκ γε τῶν λεγομένων·  ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ (107b) ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστίαν ἔτι ἔχειν παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. 
“Immo” ait ipse Simmias “neque ipse habeo adhuc quid diffitear ex dictis;  a quantitate sane eorum de quibus sermones sunt et humanam imbecillitatem inhonorans, compellor incredulitatem adhuc habere penes me ipsum de hiis que dicta sunt.” 
“Atqui nec ego”, inquit Simmias, “habeo (9) quicquam quo minus superioribus assentiar rationibus.  Veruntamen rei ipsius qua de a(10)gitur magnitudinem et humanam imbecillitatem considerans cogor intra me dictis non(11)dum acquiescere.” 
But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor can I see any reason for doubt after what has been said.  But I still feel and cannot help feeling uncertain in my own mind, when I think of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man. 
οὐ μόνον γ᾽, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις καὶ τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον·  καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν μάλιστ᾽ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθῆσαι·  κἂν τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω. 
“Non solum" infit, "O Simmia" Socrates, “verum hec bene dicis atque ypotheses primas, et si credibiles vobis sint, tamen attendende clarius;  et si ipsas sufficienter distinguat, ve1ut ego reor, consequetur racioni quantum possibile maxime homini consequi;  et si ipsum hoc evidens fiat, nichil queretur ulterius.” 
“Quinimmo et haec bene dicis, Simmia, et positiones primae quamvis (12) fide vobis dignae videantur, diligentius tamen considerandae,  atque si illas sufficienter , ut ar(13)bitror, susceperitis, hanc sequemini rationem quantum fieri ab homine potest.  Quod si hoc (14) ipsum fuerit manifestum, nihil ulterius perquiretis.” 
Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and I may add that first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered;  and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument;  and if that be plain and clear, there will be no need for any further enquiry. 
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. 
CEBES. “Vera” inquit “dicis.” 
“Vera loqueris”, inquit. 
Very true. 
(107c) ἀλλὰ τόδε γ᾽, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός,  καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει.  εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγή, ἕρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμ᾽ ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὑτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς·  νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν (107d) εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι.  οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς,  ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας. 
“Immo hoc eciam” ait, “O viri, iustum intelligi, quoniam, si quidem anima immortalis est, sollicitudine indiget non pro tempore isto solum, in quo utique vocamus vivere, verum pro universo,  et periculum nunc quoque eciam videbitur grave esse, si quis eam neglexerit.  Si enim esset nex universi liberacio, lucrum inventum certe esset malis morientibus a corpore pariter liberari et ipsorum malicia cum anima;  nunc sane quoniam immortalis apparet esse, nulla profecto erit ipsi alia fuga malorum neque salvacio quam ut optima atque prudentissima fiat.  Nichil enim aliud habens in Avernum anima venit, preter doctrinam et educacionem,  que utique dicuntur maxime iuvare sive obesse obeuntem statim in principio quod illuc ducit itineris. 
(15) “Hoc aiunt, o viri, iustum est cogitare, si anima sit immortalis, eam non solum (16) temporis huius in quo vivere dicimur, verum etiam universi gratia curatio(17)ne plurimum indigere.  Nam grave periculum fore putandum est, si quis ne(18)glexerit animam.  Si enim mors totius dissolutio esset, nimirum improbi lu(19)crarentur, cum et a corpore et ab eorum pravitate cum anima liberarentur.  (20) Nunc autem cum anima immortalis appareat, nulla superest malorum declinatio, nulla (21) salus, nisi ut optima et prudentissima fiat.  Nihil enim aliud cum migrat ad manes anima (22) secum transfert praeter eruditionem atque educationem.  Quae quidem statim in princi(23)pio transmigrationis illius plurimum vel prodesse vel obesse dicuntur. 
But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity!  And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful.  If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls.  But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom.  For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education;  and these are said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very beginning of his journey thither. 
λέγεται δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἕκαστον ὁ ἑκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει, οὗτος ἄγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ εἰς δή τινα τόπον, οἷ δεῖ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἅιδου (107e) πορεύεσθαι μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ᾧ δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε πορεῦσαι·  τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὧν δὴ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ὃν χρὴ χρόνον ἄλλος δεῦρο πάλιν ἡγεμὼν κομίζει ἐν πολλαῖς χρόνου καὶ μακραῖς περιόδοις.  ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τήλεφος λέγει·  ἐκεῖνος (108a) μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῆν οἶμόν φησιν εἰς Ἅιδου φέρειν, ἡ δ᾽ οὔτε ἁπλῆ οὔτε μία φαίνεταί μοι εἶναι.  οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει·  οὐ γάρ πού τις ἂν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμόσε μιᾶς ὁδοῦ οὔσης.  νῦν δὲ ἔοικε σχίσεις τε καὶ τριόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν·  ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω.  ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἕπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα·  ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο πολὺν (108b) χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βίᾳ καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη.  ἀφικομένην δὲ ὅθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καί τι πεποιηκυῖαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδίκων ἡμμένην ἢ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, ἃ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἔργα τυγχάνει ὄντα,  ταύτην μὲν ἅπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε συνέμπορος οὔτε ἡγεμὼν ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι,  αὐτὴ (108c) δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορίᾳ ἕως ἂν δή τινες χρόνοι γένωνται,  ὧν ἐλθόντων ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῇ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν·  ἡ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ συνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ᾤκησεν τὸν αὐτῇ ἑκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. 
Fertur autem ita, quoniam igitur obeuntem quemque cuiusque demon, quemadmodum viventem sortitus est, iste agere satagit in quemdam locum, ubi decet congregatos post quam iudicati fuerint in Avernum ire, et cum duce illo cui preordinatum est eos qui hinc sunt illuc iter agere;  et sortitos illa que decet sortiri et manentes quo necesse est tempore alius hue rursum dux advehit in multis temporis et productis periodis.  Estque igitur via non velut Eschili Telefus ait;  ille namque simplicem stratam dicit in Avernum ferre, que neque simplex neque una michi videtur esse.  Neque enim ductorum opus esset;  neque enim quilibet erraret aliquatenus una via cum esset.  Nunc autem videtur scissionesque et periodos non paucas habere;  ab immolacionibus et legitimis que hic fiunt coniectans dico.  Itaque honesta et prudens anima sequiturque et non ignorat presencia;  concupiscibiliter profecto a corpore habita, quod in priori dicebam, circa illud multo tempore attonita et circa visibilem locum, multa quidem renitens atque multa passa, violencia et vix a preordinato demone asportatur acta.  Advenientemque ubi alie, porro immundam et que quid patraverit huiuscemodi, seu cedibus iniustis contactam sive alia quedam talia operatam que hiis sororiaque et sororiarum animarum opera contingunt esse,  hanc equidem omnis fugitque et avertitur et neque comitator neque ductor vult fieri,  ipsaque errat vagabunda in omni tenta ambiguitate, donec quedam tempora compleantur,  quibus advenientibus ex necessitate fertur in sibi convenientem habitacionem,  que vero sincere et modeste vitam transegit, et comites atque duces deos sortita, habitavit sibi unicuique locum congruentem. 
Ferunt enim (24) quemlibet hinc illuc emigrantem ab eo daemone quem vivens sortitus fuerat in locum (25) quendam duci, ubi oporteat omnes una collectos iudicari, ac deinde ad inferos profici(26)sci eo duce, cui mandatum erat ut hinc decedentes ad illa loca traducat.  Sortitos vero il(27)lic quae oportebat sortiri, tempusque debitum commoratos, ab alio quodam duce rursus (28) huc reduci post multos temporis longosque circuitus.  Est autem iter non tale quale ait Te(29)lephus apud Aeschylum.  Ille siquidem simplicem inquit viam ad inferos ferre. Ego ve(30)ro neque simplicem neque unam esse puto.  Alioquin nullis ducibus opus esset,  quippe (31) cum unica via aberrare possit nemo.  Quinimmo multos tramites multosque anfractus ha(32)bere.  Quod quidem ex sacrificijs et ritibus coniectare licet.  Animus ergo moderatus et (33) prudens ducem sponte sequitur neque ignorat praesentia.  Sed qui cupiditate corporis (34) est infectus, quemadmodum supra dixi, per multum tempus ad ipsam ardenter affici(35)tur et circa locum visibilem multis reluctatus modis multaque perpessus, vix tandem ab (36) eo adducitur daemone, cui eius cura erat iniuncta.  Cum vero ad ea loca ubi alij quoque (37) animi sunt pervenerit, quisquis admodum immundus est et huiusmodi obnoxius crimi(38)ni qui vel iniustis se contaminaverit caedibus vel alia his similia similiumque animorum (39) opera perpetraverit,  hunc quidem animum omnes fugiunt atque declinant, nec reperi(40)tur ullus qui vel socius vel dux eius fieri velit.  Itaque omni auxilio destitutus eo usque per(41)errat, quoad certa temporum curricula impleantur.  Quibus tandem impletis in habita(42)tionem sibi convenientem ab ipsa necessitate transfertur.  Qui vero puram moderatamque (43) transegerit vitam, deos socios ducesque nactus ibi habitat, ubi unicuique convenit. 
For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together, whence after judgment has been given they pass into the world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other:  and when they have there received their due and remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages.  Now this way to the other world is not, as Aeschylus says in the Telephus, a single and straight path  --if that were so no guide would be needed,  for no one could miss it;  but there are many partings of the road, and windings,  as I infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth.    The wise and orderly soul follows in the straight path and is conscious of her surroundings;  but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius,  and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, whether foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime  --from that soul every one flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide,  but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled,  and when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation;  as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home. 
εἰσὶν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἵα οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπό τινος πέπεισμαι. 
Sunt autem et multi telluris loci atque mirabiles, et ipsa neque qualis neque quanta existimatur ab eis qui de terra solent dicere, quemadmodum ego a quodam persuadeor.” 
Multa (44) vero sunt mirabiliaque terrarum loca, ipsaque terra neque talis neque tanta est qualem aut quan(45)tam hi quid de terra loquuntur existimant, quemadmodum mihi a quodam traditum est.” 
Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the authority of one who shall be nameless. 
(108d) καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;  περὶ γάρ τοι γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκήκοα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἃ σὲ πείθει· ἡδέως οὖν ἂν ἀκούσαιμι. 
Et Simmias: “Quomodo hec” inquit “dicis, O Socrate?  Quia de terra eciam ipse plurima quidem audii, verumptamen hec que tibi persuades libenter utique audirem.” 
(46) “Quanam ratione”, inquit Simmias, “haec ais, o Socrates?  Equidem de terrarum orbe mul(47)ta audivi, non tamen haec quae tanquam vera accepisse te ais. Libenter igitur ex te audirem.” 
What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias.  I have myself heard many descriptions of the earth, but I do not know, and I should very much like to know, in which of these you put faith. 
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἅ γ᾽ ἐστίν·  ὡς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην,  καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἴσως οὐδ᾽ ἂν οἷός τε εἴην, ἅμα δέ, εἰ καὶ ἠπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὦ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν.  τὴν μέντοι ἰδέαν τῆς γῆς οἵαν (108e) πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν. 
SOCRATES. “Immo vero, O Simmia, haut Glauci quoque michi ars videtur esse enarrare que sunt;  velut quidem vera, difficilius michi videtur quam secundum Glauci artem,  et simul nempe ego forsan minime potens ero, simulque et diffiderem, vita michi videtur mea, O Simmia, longitudini e sermonis non sufficere.  Verum ydeam terre qualem persuadeor esse, et locos ipsius nichil me prohibet dicere.” 
(48) “Atqui, o Simmia, nequaquam mihi videtur ars Glauci quae ea sint narrare,  sed quod ve(49)ra sint probare, artis Glauci facultatem mihi videtur excedere.  Praeterea ego forsan non (50) sufficerem. Quinetiam si id scirem, haec tamen vita mea, o Simmia, longiori huic narratio(51)ni nequaquam sufficeret.  Formam tamen orbis terrae eiusque loca cuiusmodi esse rear, ni(52)hil prohibet dicere.” 
And I, Simmias, replied Socrates, if I had the art of Glaucus would tell you;  although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of my tale,  which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I could, I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument was completed.  I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of the earth according to my conception of them. 
ἀλλ᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ. 
“Immo” dixit Simmias “et ista sufficiunt.” 
“Satis id erit”, inquit Simmias. 
That, said Simmias, will be enough. 
πέπεισμαι τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερὴς οὖσα, μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε (109a) ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμιᾶς τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἴσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν·  ἰσόρροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθὲν οὐχ ἕξει μᾶλλον οὐδ᾽ ἧττον οὐδαμόσε κλιθῆναι, ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχον ἀκλινὲς μενεῖ.  πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τοῦτο πέπεισμαι. 
“Persuadeor igitur” ait is “ego quoniam prima nempe, si est in medio celo periferes existens, nichil ipsi egere neque aere ad non cadendum, neque alia necessitate aliqua tali, atque sufficientem ipsam quidem tenere similitudinem celi ipsius sibi ipsi undique atque terre ipsius isorropiam.  Isorropa quippe res similis alicuius in medio posita non habebit magis neque minus ex nulla parte declinari, similiter vero se habens non inclinatum manet.  Prime sane hoc persuadeor.” 
“Persuasum mihi quidem est, primo si (53) est terra in coeli medio rotunda, nihil ei opus esse vel aere vel alia necessitate eiusmodi ad (54) hoc ut nunquam decidat. Sed ad eam sustinendam satis id esse, quod et coelum undique (517, 1) sibijpsi simillimum est omnino, et terra undique aequilibris.  Res enim aequilibris in similis (2) alicuius medio posita nec magis nec minus potest in partem aliquam inclinari. Cumque si(3)militer se habeat, ab inclinatione permanet aliena.  Primo igitur mihi esse ita est persuasum.” 
Well, then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or any similar force to be a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise.  For that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of that which is equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in the same state and not deviate.  And this is my first notion. 
καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. 
“Et recte profecto” ait Simmias. 
(4) “Et recte quidem”, inquit Simmias. 
Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias. 
Permanent link
Go to Wiki Documentation
Enhet: Det humanistiske fakultet   Utviklet av: IT-seksjonen ved HF
Login