καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας·
καὶ ἐγώ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὃ (85c) ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὖ ὅδε, ᾗ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι,
τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός·
δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι,
ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν ἤ,
εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, (85d) ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον,
εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, [ἢ] λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι.
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἅ μοι δοκεῖ.
ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι.
“Bene” ait “dicis” Simmias;
“et ego a te quero unde dubius sum et item iste quoque, quo pacto non recipit dicta.
Michi siquidem videtur, O Socrate, de talibus forsitan quemadmodum et tibi, evidenter quidem scire in presenti vita vel impossibile esse vel perdifficile quid,
ceterum vero ipsa que dicta sunt de hiis non omnimode argumento discutere et non discedere prius quam utique undequaque examinans dicendo deficiat quis, prorsus mollis esse viri.
Oportere namque circa hec unum quid istorum peragere,
seu discere quo pacto se habeat, vel irrvenire, aut,
si hec impossibile, igitur optimam humanarum racionem sumentem et maxime irreprehensibilem, in hac vectum ut in scindula conantem transnare hanc vitam,
nisi quis valeat firmius et tucius in firmiori vectura seu racione divina aliqua transmeare.
Quin eciam et nunc ego quidem non erubescam sciscitari, cum et tu hec dicas, neque me ipsum causabor in postero tempore quod nunc non dicerem que michi videntur.
Michi quippe, O Socrate, quociens et ad me ipsum et ad hunc respicio que dicta sunt, non omnino videntur ad plenum dici.”
“Praeclare loqueris”, inquit Simmias.
“Itaque et ego tibi aperiam qua in re dubitem, et (22) rursus hic Cebes quidnam ex superiori disputationi minus admittat.”
“Mihi quidem, o So(23)crates quemadmodum fortasse tibi quoque, videtur de his quidem rebus manifesta veritas (24) in vita praesenti aut nullo modo aut summa cum difficultate intelligi posse.
Quae porro (25) de his dicuntur, ea non omni modo et explorare et non prius desistere quam examinan(26)do omnia, animum despondeas, mollis nimium iudico esse viri.
Oportet enim circa haec al(27)terutrum efficere,
aut discere invenireque quemadmodum se habebant,
aut si haec fieri neque(28)ant, optimam atque tutissimam humanarum rationum eligere, qua quis tanquam rate ve(29)hatur atque ita procellas huius vitae pertranseat,
si nequeat firmiori quodam vehiculo vel di(30)vino aliquo verbo tutius ac minori cum periculo tranare.
Atque ego nunc non verebor in(31)terrogare, praesertim cum ad hoc ipse nos adhorteris, ne forte meipsum quandoque sim cul(32)paturus, quod nunc quae mihi videantur minime dixerim.
Profecto mihi, o Socrates, una (33) cum hoc Cebete tua dicta reputanti haud satis confirmata videntur.”
Very good, Socrates, said Simmias;
then I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes will tell you his.
I feel myself, (and I daresay that you have the same feeling), how hard or rather impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these in the present life.
And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side.
For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things:
either he should discover, or be taught the truth about them;
or, if this be impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life
--not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him.
And now, as you bid me, I will venture to question you, and then I shall not have to reproach myself hereafter with not having said at the time what I think.
For when I consider the matter, either alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to me, Socrates, to be not sufficient.
ταύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ᾗ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ (86a) θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ.
ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἢ κατάξῃ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδάς, εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι
--οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρωγυιῶν τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν (86b) ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῆ τε καὶ συγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην
--ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη ἔτι που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι πρίν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν--
καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι
ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν (86c) αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν,
ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα--εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὖσαν θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἵ τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἑκάστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν, (86d) ἕως ἂν ἢ κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατασαπῇ--
ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι.
“Sic michi quidem” ait ille, “prout et de armonia si quis et lira quoque atque fidibus eundem sermonem hunc dicat, quoniam autem armonia invisibile et incorporeum et optimum quid atque divinum est in aptata lira, ipsa vero lira et corde corpora et corporea necnon composita atque terrestria sunt et mortalitati cognata.
Ubi ergo vel confringat quis liram aut secet seu rumpat fides, si quis instat eidem racioni quemadmodum tu, quoniam necesse superesse armoniam illam et minime disperiisse
- nulla quippe possibilitas erit liram adhuc disruptis fidibus atque fides mortali forme similes esse, armoniam vero perire numini et immortali similem in nativitate et coortivam, priorem mortali disperdi
- immo dicat necesse adhuc alicubi esse ipsam armoniam, et prius ligna atque cordas putrefieri quam quid ipsam pati -
et enim igitur, O Socrate, opinor ego quidem et ipsum te hoc concepisse, quoniam tale quid precipue suspieamur animam esse,
quemadmodum intensi corporis nostri et concreti a fervido et algido et arido atque liquentc et talium quorumdam, mixtionem esse necnon armoniam ipsorum horum animam nostram,
ex quo hec metrice et bene misceantur ad invicem – si ergo contingat animam esse armoniam quamdam, liquet quando remittatur corpus nostrum preter modum vel subiciarur ab egritudinibus atque aliis malis, arumam quoque necesse statim est deperire, et cum sit divinissima, quemadmodum cetere armonie que in sonis et in artificum operibus omnibus, reliquias autem corporis cuiusque multo tempore permanere, donec comburantur vel putrefiant;
contuere igitur ad hunc sermonem quid dicemus, si quis probet crasim animam eorum que in corpore in eo quod vocatur letum primam interim.”
(35) “In hac utique”, inquit Simmias. “Nempe de harmonia et lyra, et fidibus idem posset quispiam (36) dicere, harmoniam videlicet esse invisibile quiddam et incorporeum et perpulchrum (37) atque divinum in lyra rite temperata, ipsam vero lyram fidesque corporea esse, atque corporea (38) et composita terrestriaque et mortali cognata.
Cum igitur aliquis vel lyram fregerit vel fi(39)des inciderit sive disruperit, poterit quis eadem qua tu ratione probare, necessarium esse (40) illam superesse harmoniam neque disperdi.
Nulla enim machinatio foret lyram quidem es(41)se adhuc fidibus iam disruptis atque ipsas fides mortalis generis, harmoniam vero, quae di(42)vini et immortalis cognata erat, priusquam mortale illud interisse.
Ille vero diceret adhuc esse (43) alicubi harmoniam, atque prius ligna et fides putrefieri quam illa aliquid patiatur.
Arbitror (44) equidem, o Socrates, te animadvertisset, nos tale aliquid potissimum esse animam cogitare.
(45) Esse videlicet in corpore nostro intentionem, et complexionem quandam ex calido, frigi(46)do, sicco, humido caeterisque talibus, horumque temperantiam consonantiamque animam esse,
(47) resultantem videlicet in corpore postquam haec ipsa bene moderateque invicem tempera(48)ta fuerint. Si ergo anima harmonia quaedam est, quoties horum natura in corpore propter (49) morbos aliaque mala immoderate vel remittitur vel intenditur, necesse est animam quidem (50) quamvis divinissimam subito interire, sicut solent caeterae consonantiae, sive quae in voci(51)bus, sive quae in alijs artificum operibus fiunt. Reliquias autem corporis cuiusque diutius (52) permanere, quousque vel ardeant, vel putrefiant.
Considera igitur quid huic rationi sit re(53)sponendum, si quis censeat animam temperamentum quoddam esse eorum quae sunt in (54) corpore, prioremque in morte perire.”
In this respect, replied Simmias:--Suppose a person to use the same argument about harmony and the lyre--might he not say that harmony is a thing invisible, incorporeal, perfect, divine, existing in the lyre which is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality?
And when some one breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony survives and has not perished
--you cannot imagine, he would say, that the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has perished--perished before the mortal.
The harmony must still be somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before anything can happen to that.
The thought, Socrates, must have occurred to your own mind that such is our conception of the soul;
and that when the body is in a manner strung and held together by the elements of hot and cold, wet and dry, then the soul is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of them.
But if so, whenever the strings of the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disease or other injury, then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of music or of works of art, of course perishes at once, although the material remains of the body may last for a considerable time, until they are either decayed or burnt.
And if any one maintains that the soul, being the harmony of the elements of the body, is first to perish in that which is called death, how shall we answer him?
διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας,
δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας.
εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο;
καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἁπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου.
δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι (86e) τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν,
ἔπειτα [δὲ] ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐάν τι δοκῶσι προσᾴδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου.
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὖ θρᾶττον [ἀπιστίαν παρέχει].
Dispiciens itaque Socrates, ut plurimum consuevit, et arridens:
“Iusta” infit “Simmias dicit.
Si ergo quis vestrum copiosior me, ut quid non respondeat?
Non enim inepte tangenti racionem.
Videtur sane michi portare ante responsionem eciam prius Cebetem audire quid rursum ipse petit sermonem, quatenus tempore facto deliberemus quid dicamus,
deinceps audientes vel assentire eis, si quid videantur concinere; sin autem minime, ita demum agere pro iusticia sermonis.
Immo age” infit ille, “O Cebes, dic quid erat quod te iterum turbans incredulitatem prestar.”
Tunc Socrates quemadmodum saepe solebat, intuens (506, 1) acrius atque ridens
“Iuste”, inquit, “tu quidem loqueris Simmia.
Si quis ergo vestrum me fa(2)cundio est, cur his non respondebat?
Nonne enim ignave rationem attigisse videtur.
Iu(3)dico tamen antequam Simmiae respondeatur, quid Cebes quoque damnet, esse audiendum ut (4) tempore interiecto deliberandi habeamus facultatem.
Deinde his auditis vel his conceden(5)dum, si consentanea vero videantur afferre, sin vero minus, rationem superiorem defen(6)dendam esse atque retinendam.
Quamobrem dic age, o Cebes, quidnam potissimum te tur(7)bet, quo minus assentiaris.”
Socrates looked fixedly at us as his manner was, and said with a smile:
Simmias has reason on his side;
and why does not some one of you who is better able than myself answer him?
for there is force in his attack upon me.
But perhaps, before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes has to say that we may gain time for reflection, and when they have both spoken,
we may either assent to them, if there is truth in what they say, or if not, we will maintain our position.
Please to tell me then, Cebes, he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you?
λέγω δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Κέβης.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καί, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, (87a) ταὐτὸν ἔγκλημα ἔχειν.
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τόδε τὸ εἶδος ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνυ χαριέντως καί, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι·
ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἔστιν, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τῇδε.
ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει·
δοκεῖ γάρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν.
τί οὖν, ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς,
ἐπειδὴ ὁρᾷς ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν;
τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερον (87b) οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σῴζεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ;
πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἴ τι λέγω·
εἰκόνος γάρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, κἀγὼ ὥσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἄν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον,
ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι που σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοἰμάτιον ὃ ἠμπείχετο αὐτὸς ὑφηνάμενος ὅτι ἐστὶ σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν,
καὶ εἴ τις (87c) ἀπιστοίη αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτῴη πότερον πολυχρονιώτερόν ἐστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἱματίου ἐν χρείᾳ τε ὄντος καὶ φορουμένου, ἀποκριναμένου δή [τινος] ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἴοιτο ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὅ γε ἄνθρωπος σῶς ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τό γε ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν.
τὸ δ᾽ οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἃ λέγω.
πᾶς [γὰρ] ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὔηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων·
ὁ γὰρ ὑφάντης οὗτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαῦτα ἱμάτια καὶ ὑφηνάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ὕστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν (87d) ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἶμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἕνεκα ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἱματίου φαυλότερον οὐδ᾽ ἀσθενέστερον.
τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην οἶμαι εἰκόνα δέξαιτ᾽ ἂν ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα,
καί τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι᾽ ἄν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχρονιώτερον·
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ἑκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε κἂν πολλὰ ἔτη βιῷ
--εἰ γὰρ ῥέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, (87e) ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι
--ἀναγκαῖον μεντἂν εἴη, ὁπότε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὕφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι,
ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ᾽ ἤδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπὲν διοίχοιτο.
ὥστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὔπω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν ὡς (88a) ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν.
εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἢ ἃ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὖθις -- οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν --
δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι,
τοῦτον δὲ τὸν (88b) θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἣ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι--ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁτῳοῦν αἰσθέσθαι ἡμῶν--
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν, ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον·
εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαζεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπόληται.
“Dico nempe” ait ille.
“Michi siquidem videtur adhuc in eodem sermo esse, et quod in prioribus diximus eamdem calumpniam habere.
Quoniam autem erat nostra anima et ante quam in hanc speciem veniret, non contrapono neque non omnino gratulabunde et, si non molestum est dicere, penitus satis demonstratum esse.
Quoniam autem et defunctis nobis adhuc alicubi erit, non michi videtur hactenus.
Quod autem non validius et diutumius anima corpore, non assencior Simmie argumentacioni;
videtur namque michi omnibus hiis valde differre.”
SOCRATES. “'Quid ergo?’ dicat sermo. ‘Adhuc hesitas,
quoniam quidem vides mortuo homine quod est infirmius adhuc superesse,
quod vero diuturnius non videtur tibi necessarium esse adhuc salvari hoc tempore?’“
CEBES. “Ad hoc istud quidem intuere, si quid dico:
ymagine quippe aliqua, ut videtur, et ego velut Simmias indigeo.
Michi namque videtur ita dici hec quemadmodum si quis de homine textore sene moriente dicat hunc sermonem,
quia non interiit is homo, sed est ubi forsan, argumentumque prebeat hanc vestem quam vestiebat ipse texens quoniam est integra et non deperiit,
atque si quis hesitans hoc requirat utrum diuturnius est genus hominis seu vestis in usu existentis et vestite, respondente vero aliquo quia longe hominis, opinetur demonstrari quoniam universo igitur magis homo superstes est, quoniam quod minus diuturnum non deperiit.
Hoc reor, Simmia, non ita se habet; contemplare quippe et tu que dico.
Unusquisque utique suspicetur quoniam fatue dixerit qui hoc dixerit;
nam textor iste multas deterens tales vestes, illis posterius interiit multe cum essent, extrema vero prior, et nichilo quid magis ea propter homo est veste deterius neque imbecillius.
Eamdem quoque hanc, opinor, ymaginem recipiet anima erga corpus,
atque aliquis dicens ipsa hec de illis modeste michi videbitur dicere, quoniam anima quidem diuturnum est, corpus vero imbecillius et minus diuturnum.
Quin immo utique dicat singulam animarum multa corpora deterere, aliter quidem et si multos annos vixerit
– si enim fluat corpus et pereat adhuc vivente homine, atqui anima semper detritum retexit
- necesse profecto erit, cum perierit anima, ultimam texturam contingere ipsam habere et hac sola priorem interire,
cum autem perierit anima, tunc iam naturam imbecillitatis ostendet corpus et mox putrefaccum avolabit.
Quas ob res hanc racionem haut dignum credentem confidere quoniam, simul obierimus, adhuc aliquatenus anima nostrum est.
Si quis enim et plus adhuc dicenti quam que tu dicis assensum prestiterit, dans sibi non solum in eo quod fuit prius quam fuissemus nos tempore esse nostri animam, immo nichil prohibere, eciam simul expiraverimus, quorumdam adhuc esse atque fore et frequenter nasci atque mori iterum - ita quippe ipsum e natura validum esse, ut crebro genitam animam sustinere,-
concedens autem hec, illi nondum assenciatur, neu non dolere ipsam in multis genituris, atque finem recipientem in aliquo letorum omnifariam perire,
hoc vero letum et hanc dissolucionem corporis, que anime ferat interitum, neminem dicat scire – impossibile enim esse cuilibet sentire nostrum -
si vero hoc ita se habet, nulli competit mortem confidenti neve non insensate confidere, quisquis non habet demonstrare quia est anima omnimode immortale quidem et ininteribile;
sin autem, necesse esse semper eum qui futurus est mori formidare pro sui ipsius anima, ne in presenti corporis disiugacione penitus pereat.”
“Dicam”, inquit Cebes.
“Mihi quidem videtur eodem revolvi, (8) eidemque quod in superioribus diximus, crimini obnoxia esse.
Quod enim fuerit anima no(9)stra prius quam in humanam descenderet speciem, haud equidem retracto quin bellissime (10) dictum fuerit ac nisi dictum esset grave, sufficienter demonstratum asseverarem.
Attamen (11) nobis mortuis superfore, non sic assentior.
Neque tamen Simmiae concedo obijcienti non (12) esse animam validiorem corpore atque diuturniorem.
Videtur profecto mihi his omnibus (13) anima praestare quamplurimum.”
“Hic ergo ratio superior ad me conversa sic inquiet. (14) 'Quidnam ulterius ambigis?
Cum videas homine defuncto quod in eo imbecillius fue(15)rat superesse,
cur non concedis oportere etiam quod validius diuturniusque erat, hoc ipso (16) in tempore superesse?'"
"Sed adverte iam quanti momenti sit, quod ad id respondeo.
Simili(17)tudine mihi quoque opus est, quemadmodum Simmiae.
Profecto mihi perinde haec dici vi(18)dentur si quis de homine textore sene defuncto diceret
nondum interisse illum, sed for(19)te alicubi superesse, coniecturamque afferret vestis, qua ipse cum texuisset usus fuerit, affe(20)retque eum adhuc esse incolumem neque interijsse,
ac si quis id non credat, interrogaretur (21) ab eo utrum diuturnius sit hominis genus an vestis qua quotidie quis utatur. Quod si re(22)spondeat genus humanum diuturnius esse, tunc demonstratum id esse putaret, videlicet (23) multo propterea magis sospitem esse hominem, quandoquidem quod in eo erat fragili(24)us, nondum perierit.
Hoc autem, o Simmia, ita se habere non arbitror. Sed considera tu (25) quoque quid dicam.
Profecto quivis intelligere inepte illud adduci.
Nam hic textor qui mul(26)tas contriverit vestes multasque texuerit, multis quidem posterior obijt, ultima vero prior, (27) neque propterea magis sequitur hominem esse veste viliorem atque debiliorem.
Eandem fie(28)ri similitudinem animae ad corpus posse aritror,
ac si quis de his duobus eadem illa ad(29)ducat, congrue dicere videretur – videlicet animam quidem esse diuturniorem, corpus ve(30)ro debilius minusque diuturnum –
verum diceret quemlibet animorum plura consumere (31) corpora, praesertim si multos vivant annos.
Si enim fluat corpus, homineque etiam viven(32)te dissolvatur, anima vero quod consumitur retexat continue,
necessarium tamen erit (33) quando perierit anima, tunc ultimam habere vestem, eaque sola priorem perire.
Cum ve(34)ro perierit anima, tunc demum imbecillitatem naturae suae corpus ostendere, cito putre(35)scens atque evanescens,
ut hac ratione nondum considere valeamus tunc etiam cum decesse(36)rimus animam nostram superfore.
Nam si quis dicenti etiam plura quam quae tu dicis con(37)cesserit, nec solum ante ortum nostrum animam extitisse, verum etiam nihil prohibere e(38)tiam post obitum quorundam nostrum remanere, saepiusque accedere ac decedere fateatur: (39) adeo enim naturam animae validam esse, ut saepius corpori indita se corpusque servet.
His ta(40)men concessis nondum illud tibi daret, non defatigari in multis generationibus animam,(41) sed tandem aliqua ex pluribus morte diceret omnino deleri.
Quinetiam adderet nemi(42)nem mortem illam dissolutionemque corporis, quae animae quoque interitum infert, posse (43) discernere, esse enim impossibile ut quisquam nostrum id sentiat.
Quod quidem si ita se (44) habeat, nemo non stulte in morte confidit nisi demonstrare possit animam omnino immor(45)talemque atque indissolubilem esse.
Alioquin consentaneum est necessarium esse ut qui mori(46)turus est animae metuat suae semperque sit sollicitus ne in ea quae proxime imminet corpo(47)ris disiunctione prorsus intereat.”
Cebes said: I will tell you.
My feeling is that the argument is where it was, and open to the same objections which were urged before;
for I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, if I may say so, quite sufficiently proven;
but the existence of the soul after death is still, in my judgment, unproven.
Now my objection is not the same as that of Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more lasting than the body,
being of opinion that in all such respects the soul very far excels the body.
Well, then, says the argument to me, why do you remain unconvinced?
--When you see that the weaker continues in existence after the man is dead,
will you not admit that the more lasting must also survive during the same period of time?
Now I will ask you to consider whether the objection,
which, like Simmias, I will express in a figure, is of any weight.
The analogy which I will adduce is that of an old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody says:
--He is not dead, he must be alive;--see, there is the coat which he himself wove and wore, and which remains whole and undecayed.
And then he proceeds to ask of some one who is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more lasting, because the less lasting remains.
But that, Simmias, as I would beg you to remark, is a mistake;
any one can see that he who talks thus is talking nonsense.
For the truth is, that the weaver aforesaid, having woven and worn many such coats, outlived several of them, and was outlived by the last; but a man is not therefore proved to be slighter and weaker than a coat.
Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a similar figure;
and any one may very fairly say in like manner that the soul is lasting, and the body weak and shortlived in comparison.
He may argue in like manner that every soul wears out many bodies, especially if a man live many years.
While he is alive the body deliquesces and decays, and the soul always weaves another garment and repairs the waste.
But of course, whenever the soul perishes, she must have on her last garment, and this will survive her;
and then at length, when the soul is dead, the body will show its native weakness, and quickly decompose and pass away.
I would therefore rather not rely on the argument from superior strength to prove the continued existence of the soul after death.
For granting even more than you affirm to be possible, and acknowledging not only that the soul existed before birth, but also that the souls of some exist, and will continue to exist after death, and will be born and die again and again, and that there is a natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born many times
--nevertheless, we may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labours of successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and utterly perish;
and this death and dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can have had any experience of it:
and if so, then I maintain that he who is confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable.
But if he cannot prove the soul's immortality, he who is about to die will always have reason to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also may utterly perish.
(88c) πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἀηδῶς διετέθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὕστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι,
μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταὶ ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἄπιστα ᾖ.
FEDON. Omnes igitur audientes dicentes illos amare dispositi sumus, sicut posterius diximus ad invicem,
quoniam a priori disputacione plurimum persuasos nos olim videbantur returbare et in incredulitatem detrudere non tantum pretaxatis sermonibus, immo eciam in posterius debencia dici,
ne nullius digni essemus iudices quia et res ipse incredibiles essent.
Omnes igitur cum haec audivissemus conturbati sumus, ut (48) postea invicem aperuimus,
quod cum superiori disputatione nobis fuisset magnopere per(49)suasum, viderentur nos ab eo statu in praesentia deturbasse atque eo iam deiecisse ut nedum (50) rationibus iam adductis, sed et dicendis insuper,
fidem ullam adhiberemus verentes ne (51) vel nos nequaquam boni essemus iudices vel res ipsae fide essent indignae.
All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant feeling at hearing what they said.
When we had been so firmly convinced before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future one;
either we were incapable of forming a judgment, or there were no grounds of belief.
Ἐχεκράτης
νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν.
καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτόν τι λέγειν (88d) πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται·
“τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ;
ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὤν, ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν”.
θαυμαστῶς γάρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεί, τὸ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπέμνησέν με ῥηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προυδέδοκτο.
καὶ πάνυ δέομαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου ὅς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποθνῄσκει ἡ ψυχή.
λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διὸς πῇ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον;
καὶ πότερον (88e) κἀκεῖνος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φῄς, ἔνδηλός τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὔ,
ἀλλὰ πρᾴως ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ;
[ἢ] καὶ ἱκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἢ ἐνδεῶς;
πάντα ἡμῖν δίελθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.
ECHECRATES. Per deos, O Fedon, veniam habeo vobis;
et enim ipsi michi nunc audienti te tale quid dicere ad me ipsum subit:
‘Cui ergo amplius credemus racioni?
Nam quam plurimum probabilis existens quem Socrates dixit sermonem, nunc in ambiguitatem delapsus est.’
Firmiter siquidem michi sermo iste tenetur et nunc et semper, armoniam quamdam nostrum esse animam, et quemadmodum in memoriam reduxit me dictus; nam et ipsi michi hec prius videbantur.
Et funditus egeo iterate quasi ex principio alia quadam racione, que michi persuadeat quod moriente non commoritur anima.
Dic itaque, per Iovem, quo pacto Socrates pertransiit sermonem
et utrum eciam ille, quemadmodum vos dicis, apparuit molestatus necne,
immo e tranquille succurrit sermoni?
Sive eciam sufficienter succurrit sive minus?
Hec nobis edissere prout potes accuratissime.
ECHE. Veniam e(52)quidem per Iovem do vobis, o Phaedo.
Nam mihi quidem modo te audienti tale quiddam (53) veniebat in mentem.
"Cuinam deinde rationi credemus?
Quippe cum ratio illa Socratis usque (54) adeo paulo ante probabilis, iam fidem amiserit."
Mirum est enim quantum apud me contra (507, 1) possit ratio illa semperque potuerit, quae animam nostram harmoniam quandam esse pro(2)bat et nunc quidem audita me subito in memoriam revocavit, quantum mihi quoque alias (3) persuaserit.
Quo efficitur ut alia quadam ratione iterum tanquam ab initio prorsus indigeam, (4) quae mihi persuadeat animam cum corpore non interire.
Dic ergo per Iovem, precor, quo (5) pacto disputationem peregerit Socrates
et utrum ipse quoque quemadmodum de vobis (6) ipse fateris, graviter id ferre visus fuerit an contra
benigne suam defenderit rationem,
prae(7)terea utrum satis nec ne eam tutatus fuerit.
Haec nobis quam potes diligentissime refer o(8)mnia.
ECHECRATES: There I feel with you--by heaven I do, Phaedo,
and when you were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question:
What argument can I ever trust again?
For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit?
That the soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attraction for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once, as my own original conviction.
And now I must begin again and find another argument which will assure me that when the man is dead the soul survives.
Tell me, I implore you, how did Socrates proceed?
Did he appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention?
or did he calmly meet the attack?
And did he answer forcibly or feebly?
Narrate what passed as exactly as you can.
Φαίδων
καὶ μήν, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἠγάσθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος.
(89a) τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅτι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον·
ἀλλὰ ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο, ὡς ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο,
ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὀξέως ᾔσθετο ὃ ᾽πεπόνθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων,
ἔπειτα ὡς εὖ ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὥσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ ἡττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.
FEDON. Revera, O Echecrate, valde miratus Socratem, numquam magis admiracione perculsus sum quam tunc presens.
Id igitur habere quod dicit ille, fors nichil incongruum;
sed ego maxime miratus sum de ipso primum quidem hoc, quam dulciter quam pie quam gaudenter adolescencium verbum recipiebat,
deinceps quam acute novit quod passi sumus a sermonibus,
deinde quam bene nos sanabat, et velut profugos atque victos revocabat, et convertit ad exequendum et coexaminandum sermonem.
PHAE. Equidem, o Echecrates, saepe admiratus Socratem, nunquam maiori cum vo(9)luptate quam tunc praesens sum admiratus meque affuisse ibi mirifice gaudeo.
Habuisse qui(10)dem illum quod obiectionibus responderet, forte non est mirandum,
sed haec in eo potissi(11)mum sum admiratus, primo quidem quam iucunde, benigne, amice adolescentium ver(12)ba recepit,
deinde quam sagaciter sensit nos illorum rationibus fuisse commotos,
demum (13) quam opportune nobis adhibuit medicinam et quasi fugientes atque victos revocavit nos (14) convertitque ad prosequendum atque considerandum.
PHAEDO: Often, Echecrates, I have wondered at Socrates, but never more than on that occasion.
That he should be able to answer was nothing,
but what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving manner in which he received the words of the young men,
and then his quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and the readiness with which he healed it.
He might be compared to a general rallying his defeated and broken army, urging them to accompany him and return to the field of argument.
Φαίδων
ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος (89b) παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ.
καταψήσας οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας--εἰώθει γάρ, ὁπότε τύχοι, παίζειν μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας--
Αὔριον δή, ἔφη, ἴσως, ὦ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερῇ.
FEDON. Contingit enim me sedere in dextera eius, iuxta lectum in humili quodam, ipse vero in multo sublimiori quam ego.
Contrectans ergo michi caput et apprehendens in cervice crines - consuevit enim, quociens contingebat, ludere michi in crines -
“Cras utique” ait “forsitan, O Fedon, pulcras has comas tondebis.”
PHAE. Di(15)cam equidem. Sedebam forte ad dexteram eius in subsellio quodam humili iuxta lectu(16)lum. Ipse vero Socrates sedebat longe superior.
Attrectans igitur caput meum compri(17)mensque crines super cervicem, consueverat enim nonnunquam ubi contigisset in meos cri(18)nes ludere.
“Cras forsitan,” inquit, “o Phaedo, istas pulchras incides comas.”
PHAEDO: You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher.
He stroked my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck--he had a way of playing with my hair; and then he said:
To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that these fair locks of yours will be severed.
τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.
(89c) καὶ ἔγωγ᾽ ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἴην καί με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι,
μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ κέβητος λόγον.
“Hodie” infit “et ego meas et tu istas, si quidem nobis sermo finem ceperit et non valuerimus eum in robur vitale reducere.
Et ego quidem, si tibi sit et me fugiat racio, iusiurandum utique faciam ve1ut Argivi,
non prius comas nutrire quam utique vicero decertans Simmie atque Cebetis sermonem.”
(20) “Imo hodie et ego meas et tu tuas, si nobis ratio intereat, neque eam ipsi suscitare possimus.
(21) Atqui si ego tu essem, ac me fugeret ratio, more Argivorum iurarem
non prius comam nu(22)triturum quam vicissem Simmiam Cebetemque expugnavissem.”
To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again, you and I will both shave our locks;
and if I were you, and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold my ground against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like the Argives,
not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and defeated them.
(89d) μὴ γενώμεθα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, μισόλογοι, ὥσπερ οἱ μισάνθρωποι γιγνόμενοι·
ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, ὅτι ἄν τις μεῖζον τούτου κακὸν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισήσας.
γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία.
ἥ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἄνευ τέχνης,
καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασί γε ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ὑγιῆ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔπειτα ὀλίγον ὕστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον, καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον·
καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθῃ τις καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὓς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο (89e) οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἑταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν.
ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι σύ πω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;
“Ne simus” ait ille “misologi, velut qui misantropi fiunt;
quia non est quod utique quis maius hoc malum tolleret quam si raciocinaciones abhorreat.
Fit autem ex eodem modo misologia et misantropia.
Namque misantropia ingreditur ex hoc quod nimium alicui credatur absque arte;
et autumetur omnino in omnibus verum esse atque sanum et fidelem virum, deinde paulo posterius inveniatur hic nequam et infidelis et statim alter;
et cum hoc frequencius paciatur quis et ab hiis maxime quoscumque iudicabit familiarissimos et amicissimos, ad ultimum autem crebro propulsans exosos habet cunctos et arbitratur nullius nichil esse sanum penitus.
Vel non nosti nondum hoc factum?”
“Ne rationum”, inquit, “osores evadamus, quemadmodum nonnulli ho(27)minum osores fiunt.
Nullum enim maius quam hoc malum nobis posset accidere, videlicet si ra(28)tiones odio habuerimus.
Fit autem eodem pacto odium et adversus rationes et adversus (29) homines.
Odium quidem contra homines tunc maxime subit, quando alicui nimium cre(30)dimus absque arte,
putamusque ipsum omnino verum et syncerum fidumque virum esse, deinde (31) vero mox pravum infidumque deprehendimus, rursusque alium eodem pacto.
Itaque quando (32) quis saepius offensus ita decipitur, praesertim ab ijs quos praecipue familiarissimos amicis(33)simosque existimabat, odit tandem plurimum universos putatque nihil omnino apud quen(34)quam esse syncerum.
An te latuit id ita accidere consuevisse?"
Lest we become misologists, he replied,
no worse thing can happen to a man than this.
For as there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, which is ignorance of the world.
Misanthropy arises out of the too great confidence of inexperience;
--you trust a man and think him altogether true and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be false and knavish;
and then another and another, and when this has happened several times to a man, especially when it happens among those whom he deems to be his own most trusted and familiar friends, and he has often quarreled with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one has any good in him at all.
You must have observed this trait of character?
