Bibliotheca Polyglotta

6.(15) Ὧν μὲν οὖν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ὡς ἐσομέ(16)νων ἢ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ ὧν ἀποτρέποντα, φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ (17) ἐναντία τούτων ἐστίν.

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Part 6. It is now plain what our aims, future or actual, should be in urging, and what in depreciating, a proposal; the latter being the opposite of the former.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι (18) σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον (βουλεύονται γὰρ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ (19) περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ (20) τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἀγαθόν), ληπτέον ἂν εἴη τὰ στοι(21)χεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἁπλῶς.

. . .

Now the political or deliberative orator’s aim is utility: deliberation seeks to determine not ends but the means to ends, i.e. what it is most useful to do. Further, utility is a good thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts about Goodness and Utility in general.

ἔστω δὴ ἀγα(22)θὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ᾖ αἱρετόν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἄλλο (23) αἱρούμεθα, καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν (24) ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν, καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ (25) ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ· (26) τοῦτό <γάρ> ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ παρόντος εὖ διάκει(27)ται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ (28) φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ (29) τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά.

. . . . . .

We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self—sufficing condition; or as self—sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites.

ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ (30) διχῶς (ἢ γὰρ ἅμα ἢ ὕστερον, οἷον τῷ μὲν μανθάνειν τὸ (31) ἐπίστασθαι ὕστερον, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν ἅμα), καὶ τὰ (32) ποιητικὰ τριχῶς, τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ (33) ὡς σιτία ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, ὅτι ὡς ἐπὶ (34) τὸ πολὺ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν.

. . .

One thing may entail another in either of two ways — (1) simultaneously, (2) subsequently. Thus learning entails knowledge subsequently, health entails life simultaneously. Things are productive of other things in three senses: first as being healthy produces health; secondly, as food produces health; and thirdly, as exercise does — i.e. it does so usually.

τούτων δὲ κειμένων ἀνάγκη τάς τε (35) λήψεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τῶν κακῶν (36) ἀποβολάς· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὸ κακὸν (37) ἅμα, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὕστερον.

. .

All this being settled, we now see that both the acquisition of good things and the removal of bad things must be good; the latter entails freedom from the evil things simultaneously, while the former entails possession of the good things subsequently.

καὶ ἡ ἀντ’ ἐλάτ(38)τονος ἀγαθοῦ μείζονος λῆψις καὶ ἀντὶ μείζονος κακοῦ ἐλάτ (1362b1) τονος· ᾧ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τὸ μεῖζον τοῦ ἐλάττονος, τούτῳ γίνε(2)ται τοῦ μὲν λῆψις τοῦ δ’ ἀποβολή.

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The acquisition of a greater in place of a lesser good, or of a lesser in place of a greater evil, is also good, for in proportion as the greater exceeds the lesser there is acquisition of good or removal of evil.

καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ (3) ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι (κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διάκεινται (4) οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικαὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ πρακτικαί· (5) περὶ ἑκάστης δὲ καὶ τίς καὶ ποία χωρὶς ῥητέον), καὶ τὴν (6) ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· πάντα γὰρ ἐφίεται τὰ ζῷα αὐτῆς τῇ (7) φύσει· ὥστε καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ (8) εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ποιητικά, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν (9) ἡδέα τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ αἱρετά ἐστιν.

. . . . . . . . .

The virtues, too, must be something good; for it is by possessing these that we are in a good condition, and they tend to produce good works and good actions. They must be severally named and described elsewhere. Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since it is the nature of all animals to aim at it. Consequently both pleasant and beautiful things must be good things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the beautiful things some are pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves.

(10) ὡς δὲ καθ’ ἓν εἰπεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τάδε. εὐδαιμονία· (11) καὶ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ αὔταρκες, καὶ ἕνεκα αὐτῆς (12) τἆλλα αἱρούμεθα. δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλο(13)ψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἕξεις· ἀρεταὶ (14) γὰρ ψυχῆς.

. . .

The following is a more detailed list of things that must be good. Happiness, as being desirable in itself and sufficient by itself, and as being that for whose sake we choose many other things. Also justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and all such qualities, as being excellences of the soul.

καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· (15) ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώματος καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, οἷον ὑγίεια (16) καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, διὸ καὶ ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι (17) δύο τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμιωτάτων αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἡδονῆς καὶ (18) τοῦ ζῆν.

. . .

Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many other good things: for instance, health is productive both of pleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these two things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by ordinary people.

πλοῦτος· ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικὸν πολ(19)λῶν.

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Wealth, again: for it is the excellence of possession, and also productive of many other good things.

φίλος καὶ φιλία· καὶ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς ὁ (20) φίλος καὶ ποιητικὸς πολλῶν.

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Friends and friendship: for a friend is desirable in himself and also productive of many other good things.

τιμή, δόξα· καὶ γὰρ ἡδέα (21) καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐταῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (22) πολὺ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐφ’ οἷς τιμῶνται.

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So, too, honour and reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good things, and usually accompanied by the presence of the good things that cause them to be bestowed.

δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν, (23) τοῦ πράττειν· ποιητικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν.

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The faculty of speech and action; since all such qualities are productive of what is good.

ἔτι (24) εὐφυΐα, μνήμη, εὐμάθεια, ἀγχίνοια, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· (25) ποιητικαὶ γὰρ αὗται ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν.

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Further — good parts, strong memory, receptiveness, quickness of intuition, and the like, for all such faculties are productive of what is good.

ὁμοίως δὲ (26) καὶ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι.

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Similarly, all the sciences and arts.

καὶ τὸ ζῆν· εἰ γὰρ (27) μηδὲν ἄλλο ἕποιτο ἀγαθόν, καθ’ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν ἐστιν.

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And life: since, even if no other good were the result of life, it is desirable in itself.

καὶ (28) τὸ δίκαιον· συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῇ ἐστιν.

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And justice, as the cause of good to the community.

(29) ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν τὰ ὁμολογούμενα ἀγαθά ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ (30) τοῖς ἀμφισβητησίμοις ἐκ τῶνδε οἱ συλλογισμοί.

. .

The above are pretty well all the things admittedly good. In dealing with things whose goodness is disputed, we may argue in the following ways:

ᾧ τὸ ἐναντίον (31) κακόν, τοῦτ’ ἀγαθόν.

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— That is good of which the contrary is bad.

καὶ οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμ(32)φέρει· οἷον εἰ τὸ δειλοὺς εἶναι μάλιστα συμφέρει τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, (33) δῆλον ὅτι ἀνδρεία μάλιστα ὠφέλιμον τοῖς πολίταις.

. .

That is good the contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies; for example, if it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that we should be cowards, clearly courage is of particular value to our countrymen.

καὶ (34) ὅλως ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ βούλονται ἢ ἐφ’ ᾧ χαίρουσι, τοὐναντίον (35) τούτου ὠφέλιμον φαίνεται· διὸ εἴρηται (35)
ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος.

. .

And generally, the contrary of that which our enemies desire, or of that at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable. Hence the passage beginning: Surely would Priam exult.

(36) ἔστι δ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει (37) ἐνίοτε ταὐτὸ συμφέρειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· ὅθεν λέγεται ὡς τὰ (1363a1) κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν ᾖ ταὐτὸ βλαβερὸν ἀμφοῖν.

. . .

This principle usually holds good, but not always, since it may well be that our interest is sometimes the same as that of our enemies. Hence it is said that ‘evils draw men together’; that is, when the same thing is hurtful to them both.

(2) καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ὃ δ’ ἂν ᾖ μεῖζον ἢ (3) δεῖ, κακόν. καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται· (4) φαινόμενον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἤδη, καὶ ὡς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμ(5)βάνεται, καὶ τέλος πολλῶν, τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθόν.

. . .

Further: that which is not in excess is good, and that which is greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much labour or money has been spent; the mere fact of this makes it seem good, and such a good is assumed to be an end — an end reached through a long chain of means; and any end is a good.

ὅθεν ταῦτ’ εἴρηται (6) “κὰδ δέ κεν εὐχωλὴν Πριάμῳ” καὶ “αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε (7) μένειν”. καὶ ἡ παροιμία δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὑδρίαν.

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Hence the lines beginning: And for Priam (and Troy—town’s folk) should they leave behind them a boast; and Oh, it were shame to have tarried so long and return empty—handed as erst we came; and there is also the proverb about ‘breaking the pitcher at the door’.

καὶ οὗ <οἱ> (8) πολλοὶ ἐφίενται, καὶ τὸ περιμάχητον φαινόμενον· οὗ γὰρ πάντες (9) ἐφίενται, τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν ἦν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὥσπερ πάντες φαίνον(10)ται. καὶ τὸ ἐπαινετόν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐπαινεῖ.

. . .

That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an object of contention, is also a good; for, as has been shown, that is good which is sought after by everybody, and ‘most people’ is taken to be equivalent to ‘everybody’. That which is praised is good, since no one praises what is not good.

(11) καὶ ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἐπαινοῦσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ (12) πάντες ἤδη ὁμολογοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες· διὰ γὰρ (13) τὸ φανερὸν ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὥσπερ καὶ φαῦλοι οὓς οἱ φί(14)λοι ψέγουσι καὶ [ἀγαθοὶ] οὓς οἱ ἐχθροὶ μὴ ψέγουσιν (διὸ λελοι(15)δορῆσθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου ποιήσαντος
(16) Κορινθίοις δ’ οὐ μέμφεται τὸ Ἴλιον).

. . . .

So, again, that which is praised by our enemies, or by the worthless, for when even those who have a grievance think a thing good, it is at once felt that every one must agree with them; our enemies can admit the fact only because it is evident, just as those must be worthless whom their friends censure and their enemies do not. For this reason the Corinthians conceived themselves to be insulted by Simonides when he wrote: Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.

(17) καὶ ὃ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναι(18)κῶν προέκρινεν, οἷον Ὀδυσσέα Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ Ἑλένην Θησεὺς καὶ (19) Ἀλέξανδρον αἱ θεαὶ καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ὅμηρος.

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Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favour of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses, and Achilles by Homer.

καὶ ὅλως τὰ προ(20)αιρετά· προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν τά τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ τοῖς (21) ἐχθροῖς κακὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατά· ταῦτα (22) δὲ διχῶς ἐστιν, τά τε γενόμενα ἂν καὶ τὰ ῥᾳδίως γιγνό(23)μενα· ῥᾴδια δὲ ὅσα ἢ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· τὸ (24) γὰρ χαλεπὸν ὁρίζεται ἢ λύπῃ ἢ πλήθει χρόνου.

. . . .

And, generally speaking, all things are good which men deliberately choose to do; this will include the things already mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are ‘practicable’ in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them. Things are done ‘easily’ when they are done either without pain or quickly: the ‘difficulty’ of an act lies either in its painfulness or in the long time it takes.

καὶ (25) ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται· βούλονται δὲ ἢ μηδὲν κακὸν ἢ ἔλαττον (26) τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται, ἐὰν ἢ λανθάνῃ ἢ ἡ τιμωρία μι(27)κρὰ ᾖ).

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Again, a thing is good if it is as men wish; and they wish to have either no evil at it or at least a balance of good over evil. This last will happen where the penalty is either imperceptible or slight.

καὶ τὰ ἴδια, καὶ ἃ μηδείς, καὶ τὰ περιττά· τιμὴ (28) γὰρ οὕτω μᾶλλον.

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Good, too, are things that are a man’s very own, possessed by no one else, exceptional; for this increases the credit of having them.

καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτοῖς· τοιαῦτα δὲ (29) τά τε προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν, καὶ ὧν ἐλλείπειν (30) οἴονται καὶ ἂν μικρὰ ᾖ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον προαιροῦνται ταῦτα (31) πράττειν. καὶ τὰ εὐκατέργαστα. δυνατὰ γὰρ καὶ ῥᾴδια· (32) εὐκατέργαστα δὲ ἃ πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι ἢ οἱ (33) ἥττους κατώρθωσαν.

. . . . . .

So are things which befit the possessors, such as whatever is appropriate to their birth or capacity, and whatever they feel they ought to have but lack — such things may indeed be trifling, but none the less men deliberately make them the goal of their action. And things easily effected; for these are practicable (in the sense of being easy); such things are those in which every one, or most people, or one’s equals, or one’s inferiors have succeeded.

καὶ ἃ χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις, ἢ (34) ἃ ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. καὶ ὅσα οὓς θαυμάζουσι (35) προαιροῦνται πράττειν. καὶ πρὸς ἃ εὐφυεῖς εἰσιν καὶ ἔμπει(36)ροι· ῥᾷον γὰρ κατορθώσειν οἴονται. καὶ ἃ μηδεὶς φαῦλος· (37) ἐπαινετὰ γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦντες τυγχάνουσιν, (38) οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον φαίνεται.

. . . . . . . .

Good also are the things by which we shall gratify our friends or annoy our enemies; and the things chosen by those whom we admire: and the things for which we are fitted by nature or experience since we think we shall succeed more easily in these: and those in which no worthless man can succeed, for such things bring greater praise: and those which we do in fact desire, for what we desire is taken to be not only pleasant but also better.

καὶ μάλιστα (1363b1) ἕκαστοι πρὸς ἃ φιλοτοίουτοι, οἷον οἱ φιλόνικοι εἰ νίκη (2) ἔσται, οἱ φιλότιμοι εἰ τιμή, οἱ φιλοχρήματοι εἰ χρήματα, καὶ (3) οἱ ἄλλοι ὡσαύτως.

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Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: lovers of victory make for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money—loving men for money, and so with the rest.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέρον(4)τος ἐκ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς πίστεις.

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These, then, are the sources from which we must derive our means of persuasion about Good and Utility.

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