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12. (4) Ὧν μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσιν, ταῦτ’ ἐστίν·  πῶς δὲ ἔχον(5)τες καὶ τίνας, λέγωμεν νῦν. 
Part 12. The above are the motives that make men do wrong to others;  we are next to consider the states of mind in which they do it, and the persons to whom they do it. 
αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ὅταν οἴωνται (6) δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα πραχθῆναι καὶ αὑτοῖς δυνατόν,  (7) εἶτ’ ἂν λαθεῖν πράξαντες,  ἢ μὴ λαθόντες μὴ δοῦναι δίκην,  (8) ἢ δοῦναι μὲν ἀλλ’ ἐλάττω τὴν ζημίαν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους (9) αὑτοῖς ἢ ὧν κήδονται. 
They must themselves suppose that the thing can be done, and done by them:  either that they can do it without being found out,  or that if they are found out they can escape being punished,  or that if they are punished the disadvantage will be less than the gain for themselves or those they care for. 
ποῖα μὲν οὖν δυνατὰ φαίνεται καὶ ποῖα (10) ἀδύνατα, ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται  (κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα (11) πάντων τῶν λόγων)·  αὐτοὶ δ’ οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἶναι μάλιστα (12) ἀζήμιοι ἀδικεῖν οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοὶ καὶ (13) οἱ ἔμπειροι πολλῶν ἀγώνων, κἂν πολύφιλοι ὦσιν, κἂν (14) πλούσιοι. 
The general subject of apparent possibility and impossibility will be handled later on,  since it is relevant not only to forensic but to all kinds of speaking.  But it may here be said that people think that they can themselves most easily do wrong to others without being punished for it if they possess eloquence, or practical ability, or much legal experience, or a large body of friends, or a great deal of money. 
καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἂν αὐτοὶ ὦσιν ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις (15) οἴονται δύνασθαι,  εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὑπάρχωσιν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι (16) φίλοι ἢ ὑπηρέται ἢ κοινωνοί·  διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα δύνανται καὶ (17) πράττειν καὶ λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ δοῦναι δίκην. 
Their confidence is greatest if they personally possess the advantages mentioned:  but even without them they are satisfied if they have friends or supporters or partners who do possess them:  they can thus both commit their crimes and escape being found out and punished for committing them. 
καὶ ἐὰν φί(18)λοι ὦσιν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἢ τοῖς κριταῖς·  οἱ μὲν γὰρ φίλοι (19) ἀφύλακτοί τε πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ προσκαταλλάττονται (20) πρὶν ἐπεξελθεῖν,  οἱ δὲ κριταὶ χαρίζονται οἷς ἂν φίλοι ὦσι,  (21) καὶ ἢ ὅλως ἀφιᾶσιν ἢ μικροῖς ζημιοῦσιν. 
They are also safe, they think, if they are on good terms with their victims or with the judges who try them.  Their victims will in that case not be on their guard against being wronged, and will make some arrangement with them instead of prosecuting;  while their judges will favour them because they like them,  either letting them off altogether or imposing light sentences. 
λαθητικὰ δ’ εἰσὶν (22) οἵ τ’ ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν,  οἷον ἀσθενεῖς περὶ αἰκίας [καὶ] (23) ὁ πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρὸς περὶ μοιχείας,  καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ (24) καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς·  ἀφύλακτα γὰρ διὰ τὸ ὅλως μηδένα ἂν (25) οἴεσθαι. 
They are not likely to be found out if their appearance contradicts the charges that might be brought against them:  for instance, a weakling is unlikely to be charged with violent assault, or a poor and ugly man with adultery.  Public and open injuries are the easiest to do,  because nobody could at all suppose them possible, and therefore no precautions are taken. 
καὶ τὰ τηλικαῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷα μηδ’ ἂν (26) εἷς·  ἀφύλακτα γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα·  πάντες γὰρ τὰ εἰωθότα, (27) ὥσπερ ἀρρωστήματα, φυλάττονται καὶ τἀδικήματα,  ὃ δὲ (28) μηδείς πω ἠρρώστηκεν, οὐδεὶς εὐλαβεῖται. 
The same is true of crimes so great and terrible that no man living could be suspected of them:  here too no precautions are taken.  For all men guard against ordinary offences, just as they guard against ordinary diseases;  but no one takes precautions against a disease that nobody has ever had. 
καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς (29) ἐχθρὸς ἢ πολλοί·  οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἴονται λήσειν διὰ τὸ μὴ φυ(30)λάττεσθαι,  οἱ δὲ λανθάνουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἂν ἐπιχειρῆ(31)σαι φυλαττομένοις,  καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπολογίαν ἔχειν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν (32) ἐνεχείρησαν. 
You feel safe, too, if you have either no enemies or a great many;  if you have none, you expect not to be watched and therefore not to be detected;  if you have a great many, you will be watched, and therefore people will think you can never risk an attempt on them,  and you can defend your innocence by pointing out that you could never have taken such a risk. 
καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει κρύψις ἢ τρόποις ἢ τόποις, ἢ (33) διαθέσεις εὔποροι.  καὶ ὅσοις μὴ λανθάνουσιν ἔστιν δίωσις δίκης (34) ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου ἢ διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν.  καὶ οἷς, ἐὰν γένηται (35) ζημία, ἔστιν δίωσις τῆς ἐκτίσεως ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνιος.  ἢ <εἰ> (36) δι’ ἀπορίαν μηδὲν ἔχει ὅ τι ἀπολέσει. 
You may also trust to hide your crime by the way you do it or the place you do it in, or by some convenient means of disposal.  You may feel that even if you are found out you can stave off a trial, or have it postponed, or corrupt your judges:  or that even if you are sentenced you can avoid paying damages, or can at least postpone doing so for a long time:  or that you are so badly off that you will have nothing to lose. 
καὶ οἷς τὰ μὲν κέρδη (37) φανερὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ ἐγγύς, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι μικραὶ ἢ ἀφα (1372b1) νεῖς ἢ πόρρω.  καὶ ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν τιμωρία ἴση τῇ ὠφελείᾳ, οἷον (2) δοκεῖ ἡ τυρρανίς.  καὶ ὅσοις τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα λήμματα, (3) αἱ δὲ ζημίαι ὀνείδη μόνον.  καὶ οἷς τοὐναντίον τὰ μὲν ἀδική(4)ματα εἰς ἔπαινόν τινα,  οἷον εἰ συνέβη ἅμα τιμωρήσασθαι (5) ὑπὲρ πατρὸς ἢ μητρός, ὥσπερ Ζήνωνι,  αἱ δὲ ζημίαι εἰς (6) χρήματα ἢ φυγὴν ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι·  δι’ ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀδι(7)κοῦσι καὶ ἀμφοτέρως ἔχοντες, πλὴν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀλλ’ οἱ (8) ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἤθεσιν. 
You may feel that the gain to be got by wrong—doing is great or certain or immediate, and that the penalty is small or uncertain or distant.  It may be that the advantage to be gained is greater than any possible retribution: as in the case of despotic power, according to the popular view.  You may consider your crimes as bringing you solid profit, while their punishment is nothing more than being called bad names.  Or the opposite argument may appeal to you: your crimes may bring you some credit  thus you may, incidentally, be avenging your father or mother, like Zeno,  whereas the punishment may amount to a fine, or banishment, or something of that sort.  People may be led on to wrong others by either of these motives or feelings; but no man by both — they will affect people of quite opposite characters. 
καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἢ λεληθότες ἢ μὴ ἐζη(9)μιωμένοι, καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἀποτετυχηκότες  (εἰσὶ γάρ τινες (10) καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οἷοι ἀνα(11)μάχεσθαι).  καὶ οἷς ἂν παραχρῆμα ᾖ τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν (12) ὕστερον, ἢ τὸ κέρδος, ἡ δὲ ζημία ὕστερον·  οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς (13) τοιοῦτοι, ἔστιν δὲ ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὀρέγονται.  καὶ οἷς (14) ἂν τοὐναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἤδη ᾖ ἢ ἡ ζημία, τὸ δὲ ἡδὺ (15) καὶ <τὸ> ὠφέλιμον ὕστερα καὶ χρονιώτερα· οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ (16) φρονιμώτεροι τὰ τοιαῦτα διώκουσιν.  καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐνδέχηται διὰ (17) τύχην δόξαι πρᾶξαι ἢ δι’ ἀνάγκην ἢ διὰ φύσιν ἢ δι’ ἔθος, (18) καὶ ὅλως ἁμαρτεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀδικεῖν.  καὶ οἷς ἂν ᾖ τοῦ ἐπι(19)εικοῦς τυχεῖν.  καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐνδεεῖς ὦσιν· διχῶς δέ εἰσιν ἐνδεεῖς· ἢ (20) γὰρ ὡς ἀναγκαίου, ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες, ἢ ὡς ὑπερβολῆς, ὥσπερ οἱ (21) πλούσιοι.  καὶ οἱ σφόδρα εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ οἱ σφόδρα ἀδοξοῦν(22)τες, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐ δόξοντες, οἱ δ’ ὡς οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀδοξοῦντες. 
You may be encouraged by having often escaped detection or punishment already; or by having often tried and failed;  for in crime, as in war, there are men who will always refuse to give up the struggle.  You may get your pleasure on the spot and the pain later, or the gain on the spot and the loss later.  That is what appeals to weak—willed persons — and weakness of will may be shown with regard to all the objects of desire.  It may on the contrary appeal to you as it does appeal to self—controlled and sensible people — that the pain and loss are immediate, while the pleasure and profit come later and last longer.  You may feel able to make it appear that your crime was due to chance, or to necessity, or to natural causes, or to habit: in fact, to put it generally, as if you had failed to do right rather than actually done wrong.  You may be able to trust other people to judge you equitably.  You may be stimulated by being in want: which may mean that you want necessaries, as poor people do, or that you want luxuries, as rich people do.  You may be encouraged by having a particularly good reputation, because that will save you from being suspected: or by having a particularly bad one, because nothing you are likely to do will make it worse. 
(23) αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπιχειροῦσιν <ἀδικεῖν>,  ἀδι(24)κοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα,  τοὺς ἔχοντας ὧν (25) αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἢ εἰς τἀναγκαῖα ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς ἀπό(26)λαυσιν, καὶ τοὺς πόρρω καὶ τοὺς ἐγγύς·  τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ (27) λῆψις ταχεῖα, τῶν δ’ ἡ τιμωρία βραδεῖα, οἷον οἱ συλῶντες (28) τοὺς Καρχηδονίους.  καὶ τοὺς μὴ εὐλαβεῖς μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς (29) ἀλλὰ πιστευτικούς·  ῥᾴδιον γὰρ πάντας λαθεῖν. 
The above, then, are the various states of mind in which a man sets about doing wrong to others.  The kind of people to whom he does wrong, and the ways in which he does it, must be considered next.  The people to whom he does it are those who have what he wants himself, whether this means necessities or luxuries and materials for enjoyment. His victims may be far off or near at hand.  If they are near, he gets his profit quickly; if they are far off, vengeance is slow, as those think who plunder the Carthaginians.  They may be those who are trustful instead of being cautious and watchful,  since all such people are easy to elude. 
καὶ τοὺς ῥα(30)θύμους· ἐπιμελοῦς γὰρ τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν.  καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυντηλούς· (31) οὐ γὰρ μαχητικοὶ περὶ κέρδους.  καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀδικη(32)θέντας καὶ μὴ ἐπεξελθόντας,  ὡς ὄντας κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν (33) τούτους Μυσῶν λείαν.  καὶ τοὺς μηδεπώποτε καὶ τοὺς πολλάκις·  (34) ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἀφύλακτοι, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἂν (35) ἔτι.  καὶ τοὺς διαβεβλημένους ἢ εὐδιαβόλους·  οἱ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ (36) οὔτε προαιροῦνται, φοβούμενοι τοὺς κριτάς, οὔτε δύνανται (37) πείθειν,  ὡς μισούμενοι καὶ φθονούμενοι. 
Or those who are too easy—going to have enough energy to prosecute an offender.  Or sensitive people, who are not apt to show fight over questions of money.  Or those who have been wronged already by many people, and yet have not prosecuted;  such men must surely be the proverbial ‘Mysian prey’.  Or those who have either never or often been wronged before;  in neither case will they take precautions; if they have never been wronged they think they never will, and if they have often been wronged they feel that surely it cannot happen again.  Or those whose character has been attacked in the past, or is exposed to attack in the future:  they will be too much frightened of the judges to make up their minds to prosecute, nor can they win their case if they do:  this is true of those who are hated or unpopular. 
καὶ πρὸς οὓς (1373a1) ἔχουσι πρόφασιν ἢ προγόνων ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ φίλων ἢ ποιη(2)σάντων κακῶς ἢ μελλησάντων, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ προγόνους ἢ ὧν κή(3)δονται·  ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ παροιμία, προφάσεως δεῖται μόνον ἡ (4) πονηρία. 
Another likely class of victim is those who their injurer can pretend have, themselves or through their ancestors or friends, treated badly, or intended to treat badly, the man himself, or his ancestors, or those he cares for;  as the proverb says, ‘wickedness needs but a pretext’. 
καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ τοὺς φίλους· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ῥᾴ(5)διον, τοὺς δὲ ἡδύ.  καὶ τοὺς ἀφίλους, καὶ τοὺς μὴ δεινοὺς εἰ(6)πεῖν ἢ πρᾶξαι·  ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἐγχειροῦσιν ἐπεξιέναι, ἢ καταλλάττον(7)ται, ἢ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν. 
A man may wrong his enemies, because that is pleasant: he may equally wrong his friends, because that is easy.  Then there are those who have no friends, and those who lack eloquence and practical capacity;  these will either not attempt to prosecute, or they will come to terms, or failing that they will lose their case. 
καὶ οἷς μὴ λυσιτελεῖ διατρί(8)βειν ἐπιτηροῦσιν ἢ δίκην ἢ ἔκτισιν,  οἷον οἱ ξένοι καὶ αὐτουργοί·  (9) ἐπὶ μικρῷ τε γὰρ διαλύονται καὶ ῥᾳδίως καταπαύονται. 
There are those whom it does not pay to waste time in waiting for trial or damages,  such as foreigners and small farmers;  they will settle for a trifle, and always be ready to leave off. 
(10) καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἠδικηκότας, ἢ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἀδικοῦνται·  ἐγ(11)γὺς γάρ τι δοκεῖ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον (12) ἀδικηθῇ τις οἷον εἰώθει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν·  λέγω δ’ οἷον εἴ (13) τις τὸν εἰωθότα ὑβρίζειν αἰκίσαιτο. 
Also those who have themselves wronged others, either often, or in the same way as they are now being wronged themselves  — for it is felt that next to no wrong is done to people when it is the same wrong as they have often themselves done to others:  if, for instance, you assault a man who has been accustomed to behave with violence to others. 
καὶ τοὺς ἢ πεποιηκότας (14) κακῶς ἢ βουληθέντας ἢ βουλομένους ἢ ποιήσοντας·  ἔχει γὰρ (15) καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαί(16)νεται. 
So too with those who have done wrong to others, or have meant to, or mean to, or are likely to do so;  there is something fine and pleasant in wronging such persons, it seems as though almost no wrong were done. 
καὶ οἷς χαριοῦνται ἢ φίλοις ἢ θαυμαζομένοις ἢ (17) ἐρωμένοις ἢ κυρίοις ἢ ὅλως πρὸς οὓς ζῶσιν αὐτοί.  καὶ πρὸς (18) οὓς ἔστιν ἐπιεικείας τυχεῖν.  καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐγκεκληκότες ὦσιν (19) καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες,  οἷον Κάλλιππος ἐποίησεν τὰ περὶ (20) Δίωνα·  καὶ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν φαίνε(21)ται.  καὶ τοὺς ὑπ’ ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἂν μὴ αὐτοί, ὡς οὐκέτι (22) ἐνδεχόμενον βουλεύσασθαι,  ὥσπερ λέγεται Αἰνεσίδημος Γέ(23)λωνι πέμψαι κοττάβια ἀνδραποδισαμένῳ < >, ὅτι ἔφθασεν, (24) ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μέλλων.  καὶ οὓς ἀδικήσαντες δυνήσονται (25) πολλὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ὡς ῥᾳδίως ἰασόμενοι,  ὥσπερ ἔφη (26) Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ (27) δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν. 
Also those by doing wrong to whom we shall be gratifying our friends, or those we admire or love, or our masters, or in general the people by reference to whom we mould our lives.  Also those whom we may wrong and yet be sure of equitable treatment.  Also those against whom we have had any grievance, or any previous differences with them,  as Callippus had when he behaved as he did to Dion:  here too it seems as if almost no wrong were being done.  Also those who are on the point of being wronged by others if we fail to wrong them ourselves, since here we feel we have no time left for thinking the matter over.  So Aenesidemus is said to have sent the ‘cottabus’ prize to Gelon, who had just reduced a town to slavery, because Gelon had got there first and forestalled his own attempt.  Also those by wronging whom we shall be able to do many righteous acts; for we feel that we can then easily cure the harm done.  Thus Jason the Thessalian said that it is a duty to do some unjust acts in order to be able to do many just ones. 
καὶ ἃ πάντες ἢ πολλοὶ ἀδικεῖν (28) εἰώθασιν·  συγγνώμης γὰρ οἴονται τεύξεσθαι. 
Among the kinds of wrong done to others are those that are done universally, or at least commonly:  one expects to be forgiven for doing these. 
καὶ τὰ ῥᾴ(29)δια κρύψαι·  τοιαῦτα δὲ ὅσα ταχὺ ἀναλίσκεται, οἷον τὰ (30) ἐδώδιμα,  ἢ τὰ εὐμετάβλητα σχήμασιν ἢ χρώμασιν ἢ (31) κράσεσιν,  ἢ ἃ πολλαχοῦ ἀφανίσαι εὔπορον·  τοιαῦτα δὲ (32) τὰ εὐβάστακτα καὶ ἐν μικροῖς τόποις ἀφανιζόμενα.  καὶ (33) οἷς ἀδιάφορα καὶ ὅμοια πολλὰ προϋπῆρχεν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι.  (34) καὶ ὅσα αἰσχύνονται οἱ ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν,  οἷον γυναικῶν (35) οἰκείων ὕβρεις ἢ εἰς αὑτοὺς ἢ εἰς υἱεῖς.  καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῖν (36) δόξειεν ἂν ὁ ἐπεξιών·  τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐφ’ (37) οἷς συγγνώμη. 
Also those that can easily be kept dark,  as where things that can rapidly be consumed like eatables are concerned,  or things that can easily be changed in shape, colour, or combination,  or things that can easily be stowed away almost anywhere  — portable objects that you can stow away in small corners,  or things so like others of which you have plenty already that nobody can tell the difference.  There are also wrongs of a kind that shame prevents the victim speaking about,  such as outrages done to the women in his household or to himself or to his sons.  Also those for which you would be thought very litigious to prosecute any one  — trifling wrongs, or wrongs for which people are usually excused. 
ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ ποῖα καὶ (38) ποίους καὶ διὰ τί, σχεδὸν ταῦτ’ ἐστίν. 
The above is a fairly complete account of the circumstances under which men do wrong to others, of the sort of wrongs they do, of the sort of persons to whom they do them, and of their reasons for doing them. 
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