iha ca sato ’rthasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ | tadyathā nāstighaṭo geha iti sato ghaṭasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ |
evam eva nāsti svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ iti sataḥ svabhāvasya pratiṣedhaḥ prāpnoti nāsataḥ |
tatra yad uktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad na | pratisedhasaṃbhāvād eva sarvabhāvasvabhāvo ’pratiṣiddhaḥ |
此偈明何義 有物得遮無物不遮 如無瓶?則不須遮 有瓶得遮無瓶不遮
如是如是法無自體則不須遮 法有自體可得有遮 無云何處
若一切法皆無自體而便遮言 一切諸法無自體者 義不相應 汝何所遮 若有遮體 能遮一切諸法自體
’di la don yod pa la ’gog par byed kyi | med pa la ni ma yin te | dper na khyim na bum pa med ces bya ba lta bu ste | bum pa yod pa la ’gog pa yin gyi | med pa la ni ma yin no ||
de bźin du chos rnams kyi raṅ bźin med do źes bya ba yaṅ raṅ bźin yod pa la ’gog par || ’gyur ba yin gyi | med pa la ni ma yin pas
de la chos thams cad kyi raṅ bźin med do źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de mi ruṅ ṅo || ’di ltar gźan yaṅ ’gog pa yod pa ñid kyi phyir dṅos po thams cad kyi raṅ bźin rab tu grub pa yin no ||
It is only an existent object that is negated, not a non-existent one, For instance, when it is said: ‘There is no pot in the house’, it is an existent pot that is negated, not a non-existent one.
In like manner it follows that the negation ‘The things have no intrinsic nature’ is the negation of an existent intrinsic nature, not of a non-existent one.
In these circumstances, the statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is not valid. By the very fact that a negation is possible, the intrinsic nature of all things is non-negated.