The proponents of consciousness cannot accept the teachings of the Middle Way, and therefore express the tradition they themselves have conceptually fashioned regarding how to regard objects in order to dispel what has been explained here, saying:

When bodhisattvas dwell within intelligence
They know reality to be just consciousness;
No subject can be seen without the object, thus
They find the triple realm to be the mind alone. (6.45)

The word established means to dwell. To be established in intelligence is to dwell in intelligence (prajñā); and the one who is there is established in intelligence, is practicing intelligence. The bodhisattvas refers to those who have reached Present. Those who unmistakenly and without any superimposition whatsoever know, see and fully comprehend the actual reality, know reality. This then forms part of the phrase … know reality to be simply consciousness. Since they realise that in the absence of material form the mind and mental states are merely dependently arisen entities, they know reality to be simply consciousness.

One may ask how they know the actual reality to be simply consciousness. That is why it is said, ‘Seeing no subject in the absence of objects, and realising the three realms as mere consciousness….’ Through the presented reasoning the bodhisattvas come to see that, as there are no apprehended objects, there is also no apprehending subject, and then cultivate the thought, ‘…the three realms are mere consciousness…,’ over an extended period of time. Through this cultivation they come to see mere inexpressible entities through self-cognition, and gradually realise the actual reality as mere consciousness.

‘If they are simply consciousness; in the absence of external objects how can a consciousness bearing their aspects arise?’ To this they say:

It is just like the waves that will appear
Upon the ocean as by wind it’s stirred,
When from the substrate, seed of all, appears
Just consciousness by self-potential spurred. (6.46)

When a stretch of water in the ocean, the supporter of waves, is agitated by the wind, through the conditioning wind’s stirrings one can discern the movements of rising waves previously dormant, as if they are competing to assume a physical identity.

Similarly, the continuum of consciousness has been ongoing since beginningless time, and as tendencies for grasping at subject and object ripen things assume particular identities. When these cease they leave particular imprints in the substrate consciousness that serve as causes for later occurrences of consciousnesses with similar features. Eventually the conditions for them to ripen stir, and they reach ripening. It is in relation to these impure merely dependent occurrences that immature beings then impute concepts of subject and object where there are in fact no objects whatsoever apart from consciousness.

As the proponents of an almighty god (īśvara) and so forth will say:

Just as the spider is the cause of the spiderweb,
The water-crystal is for water,
And the fig-tree for its branches,
He is the cause for all things embodied.¹

Just as those who profess such things as an almighty god as the creator of the world, the proponents of a substrate consciousness claim that the substrate consciousness is the omnific source (sarvabījaka), since it is the fundamental seed of all things perceived. The only difference between them is that the almighty god is said to be permanent while the substrate consciousness is impermanent.

‘Since this is the way it is clearly presented in the scriptures:

And this dependent nature is the source
From whence ideas of real things then appear –
Appears without external things, exists,
In nature free from all abstracting thought. (6.47)

‘The dependent nature must unquestionably be accepted, since it is held to be the basis for the entire interlacing matrix of thought. One cannot mistake a rope for a snake without the rope as a contingent cause, and one cannot mistake earth and so forth for a vase without the contingent causes of earth and so forth; the latter would not happen in relation to the element of space. Likewise, in the absence of external objects, what would be the rationale for such thoughts as blue and so forth to occur? Hence, one must inevitably accept that the dependent nature is the cause of thoughts; it is the cause for the conditions of thorough affliction and complete purification. In this way, emptiness may be properly understood through statements such as:

“What lacks a certain thing is found to be empty of that, while that which remains is what actually exists.” This is the authentic and precise understanding granting unmistaken access to emptiness.²

‘It is by nature beyond the scope of all elaboration, and since verbal expression relies on designations there is no way to communicate it through the medium of words. Thus, to summarise, the dependent nature is here presented as threefold: (1) it arises solely from its own imprints without knowable objects; (2) it has existence; and (3) it is not within the scope of any mental elaboration. That it is the cause for things having imputed existence is established by the fact of its existence, and this is therefore not a point apart from the aforementioned three.’

To this we say:

But how can mind be there without external things?

This should be investigated. They might reply:

‘It’s like a dream,’ you say. …

‘Someone asleep inside a tiny room might dream that the room is filled with a herd of mad elephants, which is not at all the case. That there can be consciousness in the absence of external objects must therefore necessarily be acknowledged.’

To show that this is completely unfounded, it is said:

… Well, let’s consider that:

How? Well,

For me, in dreams as well my mind does not exist,
Which means that your example is not relevant. (6.48)

The cognition appearing as a herd of mad elephants³ is for us as non-existent as the object itself, because it is unproduced. And when consciousness is non-existent, this example will not be applicable for both of us, and therefore there is no existent consciousness in the absence of external things.

They might think, ’But if the mistaken cognition of the dream does not exist, one shouldn’t then be able to remember one’s dream-experiences when waking up.’ This too is unsound, in that

If mind exists since dreams can be recalled
When waking, then external things should too,

Why?

Since just as you recall the thought ‘I saw,’
You do remember these external things. (6.49)

If the memory of the dream-experience meant that mind exists, the object too would then exist since the experience of the object is also remembered. The unavoidable alternative is to say that consciousness does not exist.

To this they reply: ‘If appearances of such things as elephants in dreams did exist, the eye-consciousness should also be operative then since they are being apprehended; but it is not, since the fivefold collection of consciousness is interrupted by sleep and hence not present.’ Thus,

You claim, ‘It’s not there when one is asleep, because
There is no visual consciousness, just conscious mind,
Its images believed to be external things.
And as in dreams, the same is taking place right now.’ (6.50)

‘When dreaming the eye-consciousness is in every way absent, and with that absent there cannot be an eye sense field (āyatana) apprehending the appearances of such things as elephants; but the mental consciousness is operative. Therefore, it cannot be denied that external forms are absent, and that it is the features of one’s own consciousness that are taken to be external. And just as it is only consciousness appearing in dreams without external things, the same is the case now.’