To add that, in the same way that the analysis of the chariot relates to the imputation of the self and what it assimilates, it is applicable to all other things as well:

A pot, a blanket, straw mats, armies, woods, a necklace, or a tree,
A house, a cart, a cottage, or else anything that it may be

These are not found to exist in any of the seven ways when subjected to the analysis of the chariot. And here it may be added: and yet, according to general consensus they exist. And other types of things of similar sort:

Should likewise be acknowledged as they’re generally made out to be,

… just as consensus thinks they are without analysing. And why?

Because the Mighty Sage would not with normal people disagree. (6.166)

As stated in the scriptures:

The world may quarrel with me, but I have no quarrel with the world.¹

One should thus not discredit the general consensus of the world.

‘So how does the world designate things as conventions?’ To explain this it is said:

The parts and whole, the traits and qualified, the wish and he who wants,
The features, featured, fuel and fire, and all pairs like these are when
Examined like the cart shown to exist in none of seven ways.
And yet, according to the general consensus they exist. (6.167)

Just as a pot is the whole while clay and so forth are its parts; the pot is the qualified while the dark pattern of flames and so forth are traits; and the pot is the featured, while its features are being pot-bellied, having a spout, a long neck and so forth. This similarly applies to blankets and so forth. To wish is to have a craving. He who wants is the support for the wish. Fire is that which burns; fuel that which is burnt.

It’s based on the parts that a whole is imputed, and based on the whole that parts are imputed, as in the example of the chariot. So too with the rest, including fire in relation to the fuel, and fuel in relation to fire. These are worldly conventions that cannot be subjected to analysis.

To explain that not only are such things, parts and so forth, established only in mutual dependence, even causes and effects are mutually dependent: Because…

A cause will only be a cause when there’s a product it has made.
If it does not produce results, it lacks that which makes it a cause.
Results will likewise only come about when there exists a cause.

This should be understood as saying that, in the case of cause and result too, it is only when there is one that there is the other. Causes and results do not have any inherent existence.

And if you dare to presume that these two are established in and of themselves, then… my word!

So tell me then, which one derives from which? Which is the first to come? (6.168)

Is it the cause or the result which precedes the other, and from which is either the cause or the result then made? Among them, is the cause or the result the first? Understand therefore that cause and result are relative imputations alike unto the chariot, and not inherently real.

Furthermore, if a cause really produces a result, is there contact or not when it is produced? For instance,

If you suggest that there is contact when a cause makes a result,
Then they’re a single force; the maker and result are not distinct.
If they’re apart, non-causes are not different from what is the cause.
Discarding these two options there’s no other notion possible. (6.169)

If the cause and result connect during production, as they connect they are one, just as there is no difference in the water when a river meets the ocean. And as one cannot then differentiate between them by saying, ‘This is the cause; that is the result,’ what is then produced by what? If they do not meet during production, just as other non-results are not produced when there is no meeting, its result should likewise not be produced when there is no meeting. But if there is production without contact, then anything can be produced.

For someone who claims that there are inherent causes and results, it is not possible to come up with a third option other than the product and the producer either being in contact or not, and the only conclusion must therefore be that there is no inherently real causal production.

Therefore,

But if your cause produces no result, results do not exist.

And when causes do not produce results, there are no results, which means that:

And causes that have no results are not as causes justified.

It is the causal function of giving rise to results that makes it a cause. If there were causes even in the absence of results, the causal quality of the cause would then not have anything to do with causality, which can’t be accepted. Causes and results cannot therefore be inherently existent.

‘So how do you suggest it is then?’

But since these two are both just like illusions I am not at faultIn granting that the factual things of worldly life can still appear. (6.170)

In the case of distinctively characterised entities produced and their producers, this analysis will apply. If, however, it is the case that the production of things is a mistaken imputation, their nature being as unarisen as illusions, and even though unreal they can still be conceptual objects like things such as the hairs appearing to one with cataracts, these considerations are not relevant. The faults mentioned above will not then apply to me, and the things of the world, existing as they are if left unanalysed, remain accounted for.

At this some may reply: ‘You will be liable to the same criticism as when saying that cause and result must either be in contact or not during production. How so?’

‘Does your critique make contact with the criticised, or does it not?
This may be asked, and aren’t you then accountable to this same fault?’

‘If, during these critical remarks, the criticism makes contact with the criticised, there will be the same problem. And equally so if it does not make contact. Discarding these two options there is no other notion possible.’‘

Thus, as your criticism does not have the power to discredit the criticised, your criticism itself is discredited, and as a matter of course the reality of causes and results are then established. To express this point:’

‘As what you say will only serve to quash the view you hold yourself,
Your criticism lacks the power to discredit what you aim.’ (6.171)

‘Furthermore,

‘Because your cavilling is subject to the self-same consequence
And your denial of existent things is quite unreasonable,
Insightful persons will not be convinced by what you have to say.
You argue just to quarrel and have no position of your own.’ (6.172)

‘That your cavilling is subject to the self-same consequence has already been mentioned. That your denial of existent things is quite unreasonable shall now be explained. How to respond to the argument that things that are equally not in contact do not produce anything? A magnet will exert a pull on metals close to it without touching them, but not on all. And eyes can see forms within their scope without touching them, but not all. Similarly, even though causes can produce things without contact, that does not mean that everything not in contact with it will be produced. Also, you’re arguing just to quarrel: to argue just to refute others’ position without presenting any position of your own, is to argue just to quarrel. And you don’t have any position of your own, because your own presentation is made purely to refute the position of others.’

To this we reply:

To claim that it’s an issue whether this critique makes contact with
The criticised or not while criticising will only apply
To those thinking in absolutes, but we do not endorse a stance,
And therefore this unwanted consequence does not apply to us. (6.173)

Concerning the statement because your cavilling is subject to the self-same consequence; it is not in fact the case that this consequence applies equally to ourselves, because in our point of view the critique does not make contact with the criticised while criticising, nor does it not make contact, since neither the critique nor the criticised are inherently established.

Do not therefore entertain the idea that there must be either contact or not. As stated:

[…]: … Venerable Subhūti. Does the attainment when not yet attained already exist as something, or does it not?

Subhūti replied: Venerable Śāriputra. I do not think the attainment when not yet attained already exists as something, nor that it does not already exist as something.

Śāriputra said: But, venerable Subhūti, is there then no attainment and no realisation?

Subhūti replied: Venerable Śāriputra, there is both attainment and realisation, but not in a dualistic manner. Attainment and realisation are worldly conventions, venerable Śāriputra. The stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, arhat, solitary buddha and bodhisattva are worldly conventions, but ultimately there is neither attainment nor realisation.²

Here, that the attainment attained can exist or not exist as something is refuted as duality would be a consequence, and duality is unreasonable for a non-entity, so attainment is accepted as a worldly convention when not analysed. Similarly, although the criticised and the critique neither connect nor do not connect, there can still be the convention of the critique discrediting the criticised.

Also,

As when the features of the sun being eclipsed
Are also seen in its reflected silhouette,
That sun and likeness meet or not is ludicrous,
It happens in dependence, just conventionally. (6.174)

Although unreal, it helps us beautify our face.
Just so, these arguments that have the power to
Refine the face of wisdom can’t be verified.
And still, know that the proof they give is realised. (6.175)

What we call a reflection is not real in the slightest, so it is neither here nor there to think that it must occur in contact with the disc of the sun or not. And still, with a certain proximity to the form, one will certainly have the perception of the reflection as expected. It is the same with the critique that is empty of inherent existence but can still discredit the criticised, and the argument which is empty of inherence and can’t be verified, but can still prove what it sets out to prove. One should take from this that our own words are not subject to the self-same consequence, since it does not follow that there is a duality.

Since it is the very visage of wisdom itself, it is referred to as the face of wisdom. To refine it means to make it immaculate by removing ignorance. That they have the power to means that this power or ability is seen in them. Since claiming that there is this duality does not make sense to those for whom it is an imputation, they will not be able to harm the Middle Way in any way whatsoever with critiques and replies based on this duality. As Āryadeva states:

However long one may attempt
One cannot pinpoint any fault
In he who holds to neither stance:
‘It is’, ‘is not’, ‘is both’, or ‘none.’³

Likewise:

When the argument is emptiness
And someone offers a reply,
It’s just like no reply at all
As it assumes what’s being proved.⁴

This also clarifies the case of productive causes. Some⁵ , however, will suggest that the Middle Way Treatise is here dealing specifically with productive causes and not with rhetorics, that the conflicts involved in contact versus non-contact apply to rhetorical causality and not productivity, and that this is why we are not guilty of making spurious arguments.⁶ But this will not suffice as a reply. One will not find the opponent very amiable when saying things that are so encumbered by problematic issues, and since rhetorics are alike to productivity in having such issues, this in an insufficient reply. Also, in their attempt to deflect the accusation of spurious reasoning they use the arguments they themselves accept to prove the assertions of the Treatise, only ending up at the receiving end of critiques made by opponents. This is what makes our own replies all the more elegant.

Furthermore,

Yes, if the reason used as proof were something real,
And real also the thing that we attempt to prove,
The argument of contact would be relevant.
Since it’s not so you’re only troubling yourself. (6.176)

You’re pointlessly wearing yourself out on our behalf by arraying the faults of a flawed position against a flawless position. For example, if someone has cataracts and sees hairs, discrediting that there are just one, or are many, that they are long, circular, black or the like, will have no effect on those with the disease. And it is the same when in the analysis of causes and results that have no inherent existence your criticism is based in dualism – it will have no effect. Understand therefore that the examples presented here, of there being activity without contact – such as the eyes, the magnet and so forth – are disproved, as the same consequence applies to them.

You give up the straight path of non-inherence for the windy road of philosophical speculation. Applying your atrocious conceptual handiwork, you gladly block the authentic route. Why make such immense trouble for yourself?!

Furthermore,

That all things lack reality we show with ease.
But it’s no easy matter for our challenger
To demonstrate how things exist inherently.
Why tax the world with webs of shoddy pedantry? (6.177)

To back up our position we use the examples of dreams, illusions and so forth, and are thus able to bring about an understanding that the things of the world lack inherent existence. But it is not as easy to demonstrate the idea that things have inherent existence, because there are no examples for that which are agreed upon by both of us. This being the case, we can repel any argument while none can provide adequate replies.

Is there anyone who is encouraging you to continue this disservice to the world? The afflicted world is like a silkworm trapped in the cocoon of its own concepts, so why add to that by stringing a tight web around it using the cords of shoddy pedantry? So give up this squabbling! Things are like reflections, and there are no such things as particular or universal characteristics, so what does it matter whether it’s direct perception or inference? There is only one direct perception when it comes down to it, and that is the wisdom of omniscience.

Also,

If having grasped the prior points, now please forget
This extra censure, that of touch, expressly made.
It wasn’t just for frivolous wrangling this was said,
But so that such additional points are recognised. (6.178)

When further types of criticism are already understood from the arguments directed at the opposing side using the principles of interdependence and dependent imputation, one should avoid replying to those who ask, ‘Does the cause make contact with the result during production, or not?’, with this criticism. The purpose of the Treatise is to counteract conceptions, and since our point has already been made, why should the Treatise be used to further frivolous wrangling (vitaṇḍa)?⁷ We are not here eliminating the others’ positions, because there are no real things to be eliminated. So how can this be frivolous wrangling? According to how frivolous wrangling is defined, the proper definition of it involves someone establishing their own position while refuting the position of others, which means that the definition of frivolous wrangling is not met in any way whatsoever. Similar additional criticisms may be understood from this point.