[I.2.13] ἐνδέχεται (8) δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμέ(9)νων πρότερον,
τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἀσυλλογίστων μέν, δεομένων δὲ συλ(10)λογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔνδοξα,
ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν (11) μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπό(12)κειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς),
τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ὁμο(13)λογουμένων εἶναι μηδ’ ἐνδόξων,
ὥστ’ ἀναγκαῖον τό τε ἐνθύ(14)μημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περί τε τῶν ἐνδεχομένων (15) ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν ἄλλως,
τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγω(16)γὴν τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν,
καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ (17) πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός·
ἐὰν γὰρ (18) ᾖ τι τούτων γνώριμον, οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν·
αὐτὸς γὰρ τοῦτο προσ(19)τίθησιν ὁ ἀκροατής, οἷον ὅτι Δωριεὺς στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα νενίκη(20)κεν·
ἱκανὸν γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ὀλύμπια νενίκηκεν, τὸ δ’ ὅτι στεφανί(21)της τὰ Ὀλύμπια οὐδὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναι· γιγνώσκουσι γὰρ πάντες.
Contingit autem sillogizare et congregare hec quidem ex sillogizatis prius,
hec vero ex non sillogizatis, indigentibus autem sillogismo ex eo quod non sunt opinabilia,
necesse autem horum hec quidem non esse bene consequentia propter longitudinem (iudex enim supponitur esse universaliter),
hec vera non probabilia ex eo quod non ex confessis sunt neque opinabilibus,
quare necessarium est entimema esse et exemplum de contingentibus autem sicut in plnribus se habere,
sed exemplum quidem tamquam inductionem, entimema quidem sicut sillogismum,
et ex paucis autem et multociens minimis aut ex quibus primus sillogismus;
si enim fuerit aliquid horum cognitum, non oportet dicere;
ipse enim auditor hoc proponit, ut, quod Dorieus coronatur in agone vicit;
sufficiens est dicere quoniam Olimpia vicit, quod coronatur in Olimpiadibus non oportet proponi; cognoscunt enim omnes.
aut sic: contingit consiliari et concludere hec quidem ex sillogizatis prius,
hec autem ex non sillogizatis, oportunis autem sillogismo propterea quod non sunt opinata,
necesse autem horum hec quidem non esse bene assequibilia propter longitudinem (iudex enim supponitur esse simplex),
hec autem non persuasibilia propterea quod neque ex confessis sint neque ex opinabilibus,
quare necessarium enthymema esse et exemplum de contingentibus aliter se habere ut multa,
exemplum quidem inductionem, enthymema autem sillogismum,
et ex paucis et sepe paucioribus quam ex quibus primus sillogismus;
si enim sit aliquid horum notum, nichil oportet dicere;
ipse enim auditor hoc apponit, puta quod Dorieus coronalem agonem devicit; cognoscunt enim omnes.
sufficiens dicere quod Olympia enim devicit, hoc autem quod coronalis Olympia nichil oportet apponere; cognoscunt enim omnes.
It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previous syllogisms;
or, on the other hand, from premisses which have not been thus proved, and at the same time are so little accepted that they call for proof.
Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers;
those of the latter kind will fail to win assent, because they are based on premisses that are not generally admitted or believed.
The enthymeme and the example must, then, deal with what is in the main contingent,
the example being an induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, about such matters.
The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism.
For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it;
the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, a fact which everybody knows.
it is enough to say ‘For he has been victor in the Olympic games’, without adding ‘And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown’, for everybody knows it.