Bibliotheca Polyglotta

Aristoteles: Rhetorica

Complete text

[1.3.1] (36) Ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἴδη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν· τοσοῦτοι (37) γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες.

قد توجد أنواع الريطورية ثلاثة عددا وكذلك يوجد السامعون للكلام

Sunt autem rethorice species tres numero; tot enim et auditores sermonum sunt.

Sunt itaque rethorice species tres numero; tot enim et auditores orationum existunt entes.

Part 3. Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches.

σύγ(38)κειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ (1358b1) περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστιν, (2) λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν.

والكلام نفسه مركب من ثلاثة من القائل ومن المقول فيه ومن الذي إليه القول والغاية إنما هي نحو هذا أعني السامع

Constat enim ex tribus sermo, ex dicente quidem et de quo dicit et ad quem, et finis apud hunc, dico autem auditorem.

Componitur quidem enim ex tribus oratio, ex dicente et de quo dicit et ad quem, et finis ad hunc est, dico autem auditorem.

For of the three elements in speech-making – speaker, subject, and person addressed –it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech’s end and object.

[1.3.2] ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν (3) εἶναι ἢ κριτήν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελ(4)λόντων.

فالسامع لا محالة إما نظار وإما حاكم والحاكم إما في المستقبلات وإما في اللاتي قد كن

Necesse autem auditorem aut scientem esse aut iudicem, iudicem autem aut factorum aut futurorum.

Necesse autem auditorem aut speculatorem esse aut iudicem, iudicem autem aut factorum aut futurorum.

The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer.

ἔστιν δ’ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων ὁ ἐκ(5)κλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων [οἷον] ὁ δικαστής, ὁ (6) δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός, ὥστ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη (7) τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικα(8)νικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν.

فالذي يحكم في المستقبلات كرئيس الجمع والذي يحكم في اللاتي قد كنّ كالفاحص وأمّا الناظر فللقوّة فمن الاضطرار إذا يكون الكلام الريطوري ثلاثة أجناس مشوريّ ومشاجريّ وتثبيتيّ

. .

Est autem qui de futuris iudicat ut orator, de factis vero iudex, qui vero circa potentiam sciens, quare ex necessitate utique erunt tria genera sermonum rethoricorum, deliberativum, iudiciale, demonstrativum.

Est autem qui quidem de futuris discernit velut capitaneus, qui autem de factis velut iudicator, qui vero de potentia vel ut speculator; quare ex necessitate tria utique erunt genera orationum rethoricarum, deliberativum, disceptativum, exclamativum.

A member of the assembly decides about future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely decide on the orator’s skill are observers. From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory — (1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display.

συμβουλῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπή, τὸ (9) δὲ ἀποτροπή· ἀεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ (10) κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν. δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν (11) κατηγορία, τὸ δ’ ἀπολογία· τούτων γὰρ ὁποτερονοῦν ποιεῖν (12) ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας. ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπ(13)αινος τὸ δὲ ψόγος.

فأمّا المشير فمنه إذن ومنه منع فإنّ الذين يشيرون في الخواص والذين يشيرون العوام معا إنّما يفعلون أبدا واحدة من هاتين وأمّا التشاجر فمنه شكاية ومنه اعتذار فإنّ الذين يتشاجرون لا محالة إنّما يفعلون أبدا واحدة من هاتين وأمّا المُرى أو المُثبت فمنه مدح ومنه ذم

. . . . .

Deliberationis quidem hoc dissuasum, aliud vero persuasum; semper enim deliberantes propria et communia perorantes horum alterum faciunt. Iudicialis quidem hoc quidem accusatio, alterum vero responsio; horum enim utrum igitur facere necesse questionantes. Demonstrativi quidem hoc quidem laus, hoc vero vituperium.

Deliberationis autem hoc quidem exhortatio, hoc autem dehortatio; semper enim qui singulariter consulunt et qui communiter contionantur horum alterum faciunt. Disceptationis autem hoc quidem accusatio, hoc autem defensio; horum enim alterutrum facere necesse litigantes. Exclamativi autem hoc quidem laus, hoc autem vituperium.

Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of display either praises or censures somebody.

χρόνοι δὲ ἑκάστου τούτων εἰσὶ τῷ μὲν (14) συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων (περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβου(15)λεύει ἢ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων), τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γε(16)νόμενος (περὶ γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀεὶ ὁ μὲν κατηγορεῖ, (17) ὁ δὲ ἀπολογεῖται), τῷ δ’ ἐπιδεικτικῷ κυριώτατος μὲν ὁ (18) παρών (κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαινοῦσιν ἢ ψέγουσιν (19) πάντες), προσχρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀνα (20)μιμνήσκοντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προεικάζοντες.

والوقت أو الزمان لكلّ واحد من هذه أمّا الذي يشير فالمستقبل لأنه إنّما يشير المشير فيما هو مستقبل فيأذن أو يمنع فأمّا الذي ينازع فالذي قد كان فأمّا الآن فإنّما يذكر ليفصل النافع وكذلك تلك الأخرى وإنّما يكون أبدا واحد يشكو وواحد يعتذر في اللاتي قد فعلن وأمّا المرى أو المثبت فإنّ الذي هو أولى الزمان به ذلك القريب الحاضر فإنّ الناس جميعا إنما يمدحون ويذمّون على حسب ما هو موجود قائم وقد يستعملون الأرب أحيانا فإذا ذكروا النافعات تقدّموا فأشاروا في المستقبلات

. . . .

Tempora autem uniuscuiusque istorum sunt deliberanti quidem futurum (de futuris enim deliberat qui persuadet aut dissuadet), iudiciali vero factum (de factis enim semper hic quidem accusat, alter vero respondet), demonstrativo valde proprium est presens (secundum enim existentia laudant aut vituperant omnes), utuntur autem multociens et preterita commemorantes et futura preponentes.

Tempora autem uniuscuiusque horum sunt deliberauti quidem futurum (de futuris enim deliberat qui exhortatur aut dehortatur), disceptanti autem preteritum (de actis enim semper hic quidem accusat, hic autem defendit), exclamativo autem principalissimum quidem presens (secundum existentia enim laudant aut vituperant omnes), coutuntur autem sepe et facta rememorantes et futura preconicientes.

These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future.

(20) τέλος δὲ (21) ἑκάστοις τούτων ἕτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὖσι τρία, τῷ μὲν (22) συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ (23) προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς (24) χείρονος ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμ(25)βάνει, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν· τοῖς δὲ (26) δικαζομένοις τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι (27) συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα· τοῖς δ’ ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ (28) ψέγουσιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα καὶ οὗτοι (29) πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν.

وأما الغاية من كل واحد من هذه فمختلفة وهي ثلاث لثلاثة أما للمشير فالنافع والضارّ فإنّ الذي يشير يأذن في التي هي أفضل ويمنع من تلك الأخسّ وقد تستعمل تلك الأخر أيضا في هذا المعنى أعني العادلة والجائرة أو الصالحة أو السعيدة وأما المشاجري فالعادلة أو الجائرة

. . . . . .

Horum autem unicuique finis alius est, et cum sint tria tres, deliberanti quidem utile et inutile; qui enim persuadet sicut melius consulit, qui vero dissuadet sicut deterius dissuadet, alia vero cum hoc assumit, aut iustum aut iniustum, aut bonum aut malum; iudicantibus vero iustum et iniustum, et alia et hii assumunt ad hec; laudantibus et vituperantibus bonum et malum, alia vero ad hec et hii referunt.

Singulis autem horum finis alius est, et tribus existentibus tres, deliberanti quidem conferens et nocivum; qui enim exhortatur tamquam melius consulit, qui autem dehortatur tamquam deterius dissuadet, alia autem ad hoc coassumit, aut iustum vel iniustum aut pulcrum vel turpe; disceptantibus autem iustum et iniustum, alia autem et hii coassumunt ad hec; laudantibus vera et vituperantibus pulcrum et turpe, alia autem ad hec et hii referunt.

Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three kinds. The political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. Parties in a law—case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all other considerations with reference to this one.

σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι τὸ εἰρημένον (30) ἑκάστοις τέλος· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἂν (31) ἀμφισβητήσαιεν, οἷον ὁ δικαζόμενος ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ (32) οὐκ ἔβλαψεν· ὅτι δ’ ἀδικεῖ οὐδέποτ’ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν· (33) οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει δίκης.

والرسم لكل واحد منهما هو الغاية التي ذكرت وأما تلك الأخرى فربما لم يكن فيها مكاس ومعاسرة /و/كما ينازع المنازع في أنه قد كان أو أنه لم يكن فاما أنه ظلم فلا يقرّ بذلك البتّة فربما لم تكن به حاجة إلى المشاجرة

. . . .

Signum quidem quoniam dictum unicuique finis est; de aliis enim aliquotiens non dubitabunt, ut iudex quomodo non factum est aut quomodo non lesit; quoniam autem iniustificat non utique confitebitur; non enim verebatur iustitiam.

Signum autem quod id quod dictum est singulis sit finis; de aliis quidem enim numquam utique litigabunt, puta qui diiudicatur quomodo non fuerit factum aut quomodo non nocuerit; quod autem iniuriam fecerit non utique confitebitur; nichil enim utique opus esset disceptatione.

That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at the three ends we have mentioned is shown by the fact that speakers will sometimes not try to establish anything else. Thus, the litigant will sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit; otherwise there would be no need of a trial.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ συμβουλεύοντες (34) τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προΐενται, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμ(35)βουλεύουσιν ἢ ἀπ’ ὠφελίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογή(36)σαιεν· ὡς δ’ [οὐκ] ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι (37) καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

وكذلك الذين يشيرون قد يقدّمون هذه الأخر كثيرا ويشيرون بما لا ينفع ويمنعون من النافعات غير أنهم لا يقرّون بذلك كمثل ما قالوا إنه ليس جور منهم أن يقهروا مدينة في جوارهم وما لم يجوروا عليه وليس ينبغي أن يعنيهم شيء من أمره

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Similiter autem et deliberantes alia quidem multociens pretermittunt, sicut inhonesta deliberant aut ab utilibus dissuadent non utique confitebuntur; sicut non iniustum cives vicinos servos facere et nichil iniustificantes, multociens non curant.

Similiter autem et deliberantes alia quidem sepe fatentur, quod autem inutilia consuluerint aut a proficuis dissuaserint non utique confitebuntur; quasi autem non iniustum vicinos in servitutem redigere et eos qui nichil iniuriabantur, sepe nichil curant.

So too, political orators often make any concession short of admitting that they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course or not to take an expedient one. The question whether it is not unjust for a city to enslave its innocent neighbours often does not trouble them at all.

(38) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ ψέγοντες οὐ σκοποῦσιν (1359a1) εἰ συμφέροντα ἔπραξεν ἢ βλαβερά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπαίνῳ (2) πολλάκις τιθέασιν ὅτι ὀλιγωρήσας τοῦ αὑτῷ λυσιτελοῦντος (3) ἔπραξεν ὅ τι καλόν, οἷον Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε (4) τῷ ἑταίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν ἐξὸν ζῆν.

وكذلك الذين يمدحون ويذمون لا ينـظرون كثيرا في أنه فعل فيما ينفع أو يضرّ لكنهم يضعون الاتي يكون بها المدح أكثر ذلك فإن المرء قد يتهاون بالذي ينفعه ويفعل مع ذلك كل حسن كما يمدح أخيلوس حين نصر فطروقلوس صاحبه وهو يعلم أنه يموت بسببه ولا يحيا

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Similiter autem et laudantes et vituperantes non considerant aut honesta egerint aut inhonesta, sed in laude posuerunt quoniam despicientes quod proficit eis multociens operati sunt bonum aliquod, ut Achillem laudant quoniam auxiliatus est alteri Patroclo sciens quoniam oportet ipsum mori quam vivere.

Similiter autem et laudantes et vituperantes nichil considerant si conferentia egerunt aut nociva, sed et in laude sepe ponunt quod parvi pendens quod ipsi erat pretiosum egit quod pulcrum, Achillem laudant quod adiuvit amicum Patroclum sciens quod oportebat ipsum mori cum posset vivcre.

In like manner those who praise or censure a man do not consider whether his acts have been expedient or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise that he has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable. Thus, they praise Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though he knew that this meant death, and that otherwise he need not die:

(5) τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν συμφέρον.

فالموت لهذا هاهنا أحسن والحياة هي النافعة له

Huic autem huiusmodi mors melior est, vivere vero honestum.

Huic autem talis mors pulcrior erat, vivere autem conferens.

yet while to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient thing was to live on.

(6) φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ τού(7)των ἔχειν πρῶτον τὰς προτάσεις· τὰ γὰρ τεκμήρια καὶ (8) τὰ εἰκότα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα προτάσεις εἰσὶν ῥητορικαί· ὅλως (9) μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεών ἐστιν, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα (10) συλλογισμός ἐστι συνεστηκὼς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων προτάσεων. (11) ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε πραχθῆναι οἷόν τε οὔτε πεπρᾶχθαι τὰ ἀδύ(12)νατα ἀλλὰ τὰ δυνατά, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἢ μὴ ἐσό(13)μενα [οὐχ] οἷόν τε τὰ μὲν πεπρᾶχθαι, τὰ δὲ πραχθήσεσθαι, (14) ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῷ συμβουλεύοντι καὶ τῷ δικαζομένῳ καὶ (15) τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ ἔχειν προτάσεις περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, (16) καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ ἔσται ἢ μή.

فهو معلوم من قبل ما قد قيل أنه من الاضطرار أن يكون في هذا النحو من الكلام قضية مقدّمة فالدلائل والصدق والرواسم هن مقدمات الريطورية لأن السلوجسموس بأسره من المقدمات فأما التفكير فسلوجسموس يكون من هذه المقدمات التي ذُكرت ومن أجل أن الاتي هن لا ممكنات لا يستطاع أن يفعلن في الحاضر ولا في المستقبل فانه لا الاتي لم يكنّ ولا الاتي لا يكنّ فيما يستقبل يستطاع أن يكنّ مفعولات أو يكنّ سيفعلن فلا بد للذي يشير والذي ينازع والذي يرى أو يثبت من أن تكون له قضايا في الأمر يمكن ولا يمكن وهل كان أو لم يكن ويكون أو لا يكون

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Manifestum autem ex dictis quod necesse est de hiis habere prius propositiones; tecmiria enim et ycota et signa propositiones sunt rethorice; universaliter quidem enim sillogismus ex propositionibus est, entimema quidem sillogismus quidam sensibilis ex predictis. Quoniam autem neque fieri arbitrantur neque facta sunt impossibilia sed possibilia, neque non fienda aut futura non arbitrantur hec quidem facta sunt, hec vero fient, necessarium est et deliberanti et iudicanti et demonstranti habere propositiones de possibili et impossibili, et si factum est aut non, aut erit aut non.

Manifestum autem ex dictis quod necesse de hiis habere primum propositiones; tecmeria enim et ykota et signa propositiones sunt rethorice; totaliter quidem enim sillogismus ex propositionibus est, enthymema autem sillogismus est constans ex dictis propositionibus. Quoniam autem neque acta esse neque agenda possibile est impossibilia, sed possibilia, neque que non fiebant aut futura erant non possibile est hcc quidem acta esse in preterito, hec autem agi in futuro, necessarium et deliberanti et clisceptanti et exclamativo habere propositiones de possibili et impossibili, et si factum fuit aut non, et si erit aut non.

It is evident from what has been said that it is these three subjects, more than any others, about which the orator must be able to have propositions at his command. Now the propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs. Every kind of syllogism is composed of propositions, and the enthymeme is a particular kind of syllogism composed of the aforesaid propositions. Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the forensic, and the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at their command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur.

ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ ἅπαν(17)τες, καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ ψέγοντες, καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ (18) ἀποτρέποντες, καὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ ἀπολογούμενοι, οὐ μόνον (19) τὰ εἰρημένα δεικνύναι πειρῶνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μέγα ἢ (20) μικρὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακόν, ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρόν, (21) ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τὸ ἄδικον, ἢ καθ’ αὑτὰ λέγοντες ἢ πρὸς (22) ἄλληλα ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες, δῆλον ὅτι δέοι ἂν καὶ περὶ (23) μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος καὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος (24) προτάσεις ἔχειν, καὶ καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου, οἷον τί μεῖ(25)ζον ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ ἀδίκημα ἢ δικαίωμα· ὁμοίως δὲ (26) καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ (27) λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἴρηται·

ثم أن جميع المتكلمين يمدحون ويذمّون ويأذنون ويمنعون ويشكون ويعتذرون وليس هذا فقط يتكلفون بل ان الأمر حسن أو قبيح أو عدل أو جور اما حين يضعون الأمور مفردة بأنفسها واما حين يقيسون بعضها ببعض فهو معلوم أنه ينبغي أن تكون عندهم قضايا في أن الأمر عظيم أو يسير وفي الأفضل والأخسّ وفي الكليات والمفردات كما يقال في شيء من الخير إنه فاضل أو خسيس وإنه جور أو واجب وكذلك تلك الأخرى أما الاتي ينبغي اضطرارا أن تستعمل في القضايا فقد وصفناها

. .

Amplius autem quoniam omnes, et laudantes et vituperantes, et persuadentes et dissuadentes, et accusantes et respondentes, non solum predicta demonstrare temptant, sed et quoniam magnum aut parvum bonum aut malum, aut iustum aut iniustum, ad invicem aut secundum se aut ad alia intromittuntur, palam quoniam oportebit et de magnitudine et de parvitate et maiori et minori propositiones habere, et de universali et particulari, ut puta quid maius bonum aut quid minus aut iustificatio aut iniustificatio; similiter autem et de aliis. De quibus quidem igitur ex necessitate oportet dicere propositiones, dictum est;

Adhuc autem quoniam omnes, et laudantes et vituperantes, et exhortantes et dehortantes, et accusantes et defendentes, non solum ea que dicta sunt ostendere temptant, sed et quod magnum aut parvum bonum aut malum, vel pulcrum aut turpe, vel iustum aut iniustum, vel secundum se dicentes aut ad invicem comparantes, palam quia oportebit utique et de magnitudine et parvitatc et de maiori et minori propositiones habere, et universaliter et de unoquoque, puta quid maius bonum aut quid minus vel iniustitia aut iustitia; similiter autem et de aliis. De quibus quidem igitur ex necessitate oportet dicere propositiones, dictum est.

Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing others or defending themselves, attempt not only to prove the points mentioned but also to show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either absolutely or relatively; and therefore it is plain that we must also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness and the greater or the lesser—propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be able to say which is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser act of justice or injustice; and so on. Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we are inevitably bound to master the propositions relevant to them.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαιρετέον (28) ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου τούτων, οἷον περὶ ὧν συμβουλὴ καὶ περὶ (29) ὧν οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ ὧν αἱ δίκαι.

وأما بعد هذا فإنه ينبغي أن نقسم على حدة كل واحدة من هذه الاتي فيها تكون المشورة والكلام /و/المثبت والثالثة الاتي فيها يكون التشاجر

post hec autem dividendum est propria de unoquoque istorum, ut puta de quibus deliberatio et de quibus demonstrativi sermones, tertio autem et de quibus iudicia.

Post hec autem dividendum singulariter de unoquoque horum, puta de quibus deliberatio et de quibus exclamative orationes, tertio autem de qui bus disceptationes.

We must now discuss each particular class of these subjects in turn, namely those dealt with in political, in ceremonial, and lastly in legal, oratory.

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