ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς (4) παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος (5) συλλογισμός,
οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν (6) [ὄν], ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄν,
καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον, (7) ἔστιν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον ὅτι ἄγνωστον,
οὕτως καὶ (8) ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἐστιν φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ (9) ἁπλῶς εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός.
ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ (10) καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει
τάχ’ ἄν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ εἶναι λέγοι,
(11) βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα.
(12) γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ (13) εἰκός,
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκός.
ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, (14) ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ (15) πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν,
καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ (16) τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός.
ἔστι δ’ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ (17) τόπου ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη·
“ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ᾖ τῇ (18) αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενὴς ὢν αἰκίας φεύγει (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός),
κἂν ἔνοχος (19) ᾖ, οἷον ἰσχυρὸς ὤν (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι εἰκὸς ἔμελλε δόξειν)”.
(20) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ γὰρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ (21) ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ·
φαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀμφότερα εἰκότα, (22) ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἴρηται·
(23) καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν.
καὶ (24) ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέραινον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου (25) ἐπάγγελμα·
ψεῦδός τε γάρ ἐστιν, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινό(26)μενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλ’ <ἢ> ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ (27) ἐριστικῇ.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
but it is not so in every case—only when it is unprovoked.
9. Again, a spurious syllogism may, as in ‘eristical’ discussions, be based on the confusion of the absolute with that which is not absolute but particular.
As, in dialectic, for instance, it may be argued that what—is—not is, on the ground that what—is—not is what—is—not:
or that the unknown can be known, on the ground that it can be known to he unknown:
so also in rhetoric a spurious enthymeme may be based on the confusion of some particular probability with absolute probability.
Now no particular probability is universally probable: as Agathon says,
One might perchance say that was probable—
That things improbable oft will hap to men.
For what is improbable does happen, and therefore it is probable that improbable things will happen.
Granted this, one might argue that ‘what is improbable is probable’.
But this is not true absolutely. As, in eristic, the imposture comes from not adding any clause specifying relationship or reference or manner;
so here it arises because the probability in question is not general but specific.
It is of this line of argument that Corax’s Art of Rhetoric is composed.
If the accused is not open to the charge—for instance if a weakling be tried for violent assault—the defence is that he was not likely to do such a thing.
But if he is open to the charge—i.e. if he is a strong man—the defence is still that he was not likely to do such a thing, since he could be sure that people would think he was likely to do it.
And so with any other charge: the accused must be either open or not open to it:
there is in either case an appearance of probable innocence, but whereas in the latter case the probability is genuine, in the former it can only be asserted in the special sense mentioned.
This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse argument seem the better.
Hence people were right in objecting to the training Protagoras undertook to give them.
