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13. (1373b1) Τὰ δ’ ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν (2) ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἐντεῦθεν. 
Part 13. It will now be well to make a complete classification of just and unjust actions. 
ὥρισται δὴ τὰ δίκαια καὶ (3) τὰ ἄδικα πρός τε νόμους δύο καὶ πρὸς οὕς ἐστι διχῶς. 
We may begin by observing that they have been defined relatively to two kinds of law, and also relatively to two classes of persons. 
(4) λέγω δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν ἴδιον, τὸν δὲ κοινόν,  ἴδιον μὲν τὸν (5) ἑκάστοις ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὑτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μὲν ἄγρα(6)φον, τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν.  ἔστι (7) γάρ τι ὃ μαντεύονται πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ (8) ἄδικον,  κἂν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ᾖ μηδὲ συν(9)θήκη,  οἷον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, (10) ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρημένου θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ὡς φύσει (11) ὂν τοῦτο δίκαιον·  (12) οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ’ ἀεί ποτε
(13) ζῇ τοῦτο, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη· 
(14) καὶ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμ(15)ψυχον·  τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δ’ οὐ δίκαιον,  (16) ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ’ εὐρυμέδοντος
(17) αἰθέρος ἠνεκέως τέταται διά τ’ ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς· 
(18) καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ λέγει Ἀλκιδάμας,  “ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε (19) πάντας θεός, οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν”. 
By the two kinds of law I mean particular law and universal law.  Particular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature.  For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men,  even on those who have no association or covenant with each other.  It is this that Sophocles’ Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was just by nature.  Not of to—day or yesterday it is, But lives eternal: none can date its birth.  And so Empedocles, when he bids us kill no living creature,  says that doing this is not just for some people while unjust for others,  Nay, but, an all—embracing law, through the realms of the sky Unbroken it stretcheth, and over the earth’s immensity.  And as Alcidamas says in his Messeniac Oration ...  () 
πρὸς οὓς (18a) [(20) δέ, διώρισται δίχα·  ὥρισται γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς (21) ἕνα τῶν κοινωνούντων ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν·  διὸ (22) καὶ τἀδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν (23) καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν·  ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ὡρισμένον ἢ πρὸς (24) τὸ κοινόν·  ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινα τῶν ὡρι(25)σμένων,  ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν. 
The actions that we ought to do or not to do have also been divided into two classes  as affecting either the whole community or some one of its members.  From this point of view we can perform just or unjust acts in either of two ways  — towards one definite person, or towards the community.  The man who is guilty of adultery or assault is doing wrong to some definite person;  the man who avoids service in the army is doing wrong to the community. 
(26) ἁπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διῃρημένων,  καὶ τῶν μὲν (27) ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους,  (28) ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.  ἔστι δὴ τὸ (29) ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἑκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀδι(30)κεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον ἑκούσιον εἶναι. 
Thus the whole class of unjust actions may be divided into two classes,  those affecting the community, and those affecting one or more other persons.  We will next, before going further, remind ourselves of what ‘being wronged’ means.  Since it has already been settled that ‘doing a wrong’ must be intentional, ‘being wronged’ must consist in having an injury done to you by some one who intends to do it. 
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀνάγκη τὸν (31) ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἑκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι,  αἱ μὲν (32) βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραί εἰσιν·  τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ (33) τὰ κακὰ εἴρηται καθ’ αὑτὰ πρότερον καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια, ὅτι (34) ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες,  ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα (35) ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον εἶναι,  καὶ ἢ ἀγνοοῦντος (36) καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἑκόντος καὶ εἰδότος,  καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν (37) προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ πάθος. 
In order to be wronged, a man must (1) suffer actual harm, (2) suffer it against his will.  The various possible forms of harm are clearly explained  by our previous, separate discussion of goods and evils. We have also seen that a voluntary action is one where the doer knows what he is doing.  We now see that every accusation must be of an action affecting either the community or some individual.  The doer of the action must either understand and intend the action, or not understand and intend it.  In the former case, he must be acting either from deliberate choice or from passion. 
περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται (38) ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς (39) ἔχοντες εἴρηται πρότερον. 
(Anger will be discussed when we speak of the passions the motives for crime and the state of mind of the criminal have already been discussed.) 
ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁμολογοῦντες πολ (1374a1) λάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ (2) περὶ ὃ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα,  οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐ κλέψαι,  καὶ (3) πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑβρίσαι,  καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ’ οὐ (4) μοιχεῦσαι,  ἢ κλέψαι μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ (5) τι),  ἢ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐ δημοσίαν,  ἢ διειλέχθαι (6) μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλ’ οὐ προδοῦναι,  διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ἂν (7) καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία,  (8) ὅπως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα (9) δεικνύναι ἔχωμεν ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον. 
Now it often happens that a man will admit an act, but will not admit the prosecutor’s label for the act nor the facts which that label implies.  He will admit that he took a thing but not that he ‘stole’ it;  that he struck some one first, but not that he committed ‘outrage’;  that he had intercourse with a woman, but not that he committed ‘adultery’;  that he is guilty of theft, but not that he is guilty of ‘sacrilege’, the object stolen not being consecrated;  that he has encroached, but not that he has ‘encroached on State lands’;  that he has been in communication with the enemy, but not that he has been guilty of ‘treason’.  Here therefore we must be able to distinguish what is theft, outrage, or adultery, from what is not,  if we are to be able to make the justice of our case clear, no matter whether our aim is to establish a man’s guilt or to establish his innocence. 
ἔστι δὲ πάντα (10) τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἢ μὴ ἄδικον (11) [ἡ] ἀμφισβήτησις·  ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ (12) ἀδικεῖν,  τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν (13) προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή·  οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξεν πάν(14)τως ὕβρισεν,  ἀλλ’ εἰ ἕνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκεῖνον ἢ (15) αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. 
Wherever such charges are brought against a man, the question is whether he is or is not guilty of a criminal offence.  It is deliberate purpose that constitutes wickedness and criminal guilt,  and such names as ‘outrage’ or ‘theft’ imply deliberate purpose as well as the mere action.  A blow does not always amount to ‘outrage’,  but only if it is struck with some such purpose as to insult the man struck or gratify the striker himself. 
οὐδὲ πάντως, εἰ λάθρᾳ ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν,  ἀλλ’ (16) εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ <τούτου ἀφ’ οὗ ἔλαβε> καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἑαυτοῦ. 
Nor does taking a thing without the owner’s knowledge always amount to ‘theft’,  but only if it is taken with the intention of keeping it and injuring the owner. 
(17) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων. 
And as with these charges, so with all the others. 
(18) ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἴδη (19) (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ’ ἄγραφα),  περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ (20) νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἴρηται, τῶν δ’ ἀγράφων δύο ἔστιν εἴδη·  (21) ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κα(22)κίας,  ἐφ’ οἷς ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίαι, καὶ τιμαὶ (23) καὶ δωρεαί  (οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ (24) ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα, καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς (25) φίλοις, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα),  τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ (26) γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα. 
We saw that there are two kinds of right and wrong conduct towards others, one provided for by written ordinances, the other by unwritten.  We have now discussed the kind about which the laws have something to say. The other kind has itself two varieties.  First, there is the conduct that springs from exceptional goodness or badness,  and is visited accordingly with censure and loss of honour, or with praise and increase of honour and decorations:  for instance, gratitude to, or requital of, our benefactors, readiness to help our friends, and the like.  The second kind makes up for the defects of a community’s written code of law. 
τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον (27) εἶναι, ἔστιν δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δί(28)καιον. 
This is what we call equity; people regard it as just; it is, in fact, the sort of justice which goes beyond the written law. 
συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἑκόντων τὰ δὲ ἀκόν(29)των τῶν νομοθετῶν,  ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθῃ,  ἑκόντων δ’ (30) ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι,  ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ᾖ καθ(31)όλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ᾖ δέ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ,  καὶ ὅσα μὴ (32) ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι δι’ ἀπειρίαν,  οἷον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ (33) καὶ ποίῳ τινί·  ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰὼν διαριθμοῦντα. 
Its existence partly is and partly is not intended by legislators;  not intended, where they have noticed no defect in the law;  intended, where find themselves unable to define things exactly,  and are obliged to legislate as if that held good always which in fact only holds good usually;  or where it is not easy to be complete owing to the endless possible cases presented,  such as the kinds and sizes of weapons that may be used to inflict wounds  — a lifetime would be too short to make out a complete list of these. 
ἂν (34) οὖν ᾖ ἀόριστον, δέῃ δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν,  (35) ὥστε κἂν δακτύλιον ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἢ πατάξῃ,  (36) κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχός ἐστι καὶ ἀδικεῖ,  (1374b1) κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτό ἐστιν. 
If, then, a precise statement is impossible and yet legislation is necessary, the law must be expressed in wide terms;  and so, if a man has no more than a finger—ring on his hand when he lifts it to strike or actually strikes another man,  he is guilty of a criminal act according to the unwritten words of the law;  but he is innocent really, and it is equity that declares him to be so. 
(2) εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικές, φανερὸν ποῖά ἐστι τὰ (3) ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποῖοι οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνθρωποι·  (4) ἐφ’ οἷς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα,  καὶ τὸ τὰ (5) ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ τὰ (6) ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα·  [ἔστιν] ἀτυχήματα μὲν <γὰρ> (7) ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας,  ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα (8) μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας,  ἀδικήματα δὲ (9) ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τέ ἐστιν·  τὰ γὰρ δι’ (10) ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας. 
From this definition of equity it is plain what sort of actions, and what sort of persons, are equitable or the reverse.  Equity must be applied to forgivable actions;  and it must make us distinguish between criminal acts on the one hand, and errors of judgement, or misfortunes, on the other.  A ‘misfortune’ is an act, not due to moral badness, that has unexpected results:  an ‘error of judgement’ is an act, also not due to moral badness, that has results that might have been expected:  a ‘criminal act’ has results that might have been expected, but is due to moral badness,  for that is the source of all actions inspired by our appetites. 
καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις (11) συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές.  καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον (12) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην,  καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον (13) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου σκοπεῖν,  καὶ μὴ (14) πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν,  καὶ μὴ πρὸς (15) τὸ μέρος ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον,  μηδὲ ποῖός τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ (16) ποῖός τις ἦν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. 
Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature;  to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them,  and less about what he said than about what he meant;  not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions,  nor this or that detail so much as the whole story;  to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually been. 
καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν (17) μᾶλλον ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν ὧν (18) ἔπαθε μᾶλλον ἢ <ὧν> ἐποίησεν.  καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον.  (19) καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγῳ ἐθέλειν κρίνεσθαι ἢ ἔργῳ.  καὶ τὸ εἰς (20) δίαιταν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς δίκην βούλεσθαι ἰέναι·  ὁ γὰρ (21) διαιτητὴς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὁρᾷ, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς τὸν νόμον·  καὶ (22) τούτου ἕνεκα διαιτητὴς εὑρέθη, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἰσχύῃ. 
It bids us remember benefits rather than injuries, and benefits received rather than benefits conferred;  to be patient when we are wronged;  to settle a dispute by negotiation and not by force;  to prefer arbitration to motion  — for an arbitrator goes by the equity of a case, a judge by the strict law,  and arbitration was invented with the express purpose of securing full power for equity. 
(23) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. 
The above may be taken as a sufficient account of the nature of equity. 
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