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Aristoteles: Rhetorica

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11. (31) Πῶς δὲ ἔχοντες ζηλοῦσι καὶ τὰ ποῖα καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν, ἐνθένδ’ (32) ἐστὶ δῆλον·  εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ (33) παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων καὶ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ (34) τοὺς ὁμοίους τῇ φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ (35) ἔστιν  διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ (36) φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων·  ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὑτὸν παρασκευάζει (37) διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ (38) ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον),  ἀνάγκη δὴ ζηλωτικοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς (1388b1) ἀξιοῦντας αὑτοὺς ἀγαθῶν ὧν μὴ ἔχουσιν, <ἐνδεχομένων αὐ(2)τοῖς λαβεῖν>·  οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀξιοῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀδύνατα διὸ οἱ (3) νέοι καὶ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι. 
Part 11. We will next consider Emulation, showing in what follows its causes and objects, and the state of mind in which it is felt.  Emulation is pain caused by seeing the presence, in persons whose nature is like our own, of good things that are highly valued and are possible for ourselves to acquire; but it is felt not because others have these goods, but because we have not got them ourselves.  It is therefore a good feeling felt by good persons, whereas envy is a bad feeling felt by bad persons.  Emulation makes us take steps to secure the good things in question, envy makes us take steps to stop our neighbour having them.  Emulation must therefore tend to be felt by persons who believe themselves to deserve certain good things that they have not got,  it being understood that no one aspires to things which appear impossible. It is accordingly felt by the young and by persons of lofty disposition. 
καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει τοιαῦτα (4) ἀγαθὰ ἃ τῶν ἐντίμων ἄξιά ἐστιν ἀνδρῶν·  ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα (5) πλοῦτος καὶ πολυφιλία καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα·  ὡς γὰρ (6) προσῆκον αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι, οἷα προσήκει τοῖς ἀγαθῶς (7) ἔχουσι, ζηλοῦσι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν.  καὶ οὓς οἱ ἄλλοι (8) ἀξιοῦσιν.  καὶ ὧν πρόγονοι ἢ συγγενεῖς ἢ οἰκεῖοι ἢ τὸ ἔθνος ἢ (9) ἡ πόλις ἔντιμοι, ζηλωτικοὶ περὶ ταῦτα·  οἰκεῖα γὰρ οἴονται (10) αὑτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄξιοι <εἶναι> τούτων. 
Also by those who possess such good things as are deserved by men held in honour  —these are wealth, abundance of friends, public office, and the like;  on the assumption that they ought to be good men, they are emulous to gain such goods because they ought, in their belief, to belong to men whose state of mind is good.  Also by those whom all others think deserving.  We also feel it about anything for which our ancestors, relatives, personal friends, race, or country are specially honoured,  looking upon that thing as really our own, and therefore feeling that we deserve to have it. 
εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ζηλωτὰ τὰ (11) ἔντιμα ἀγαθά, ἀνάγκη τάς τε ἀρετὰς εἶναι τοιαύτας, καὶ ὅσα τοῖς (12) ἄλλοις ὠφέλιμα καὶ εὐεργετικά  (τιμῶσι γὰρ τοὺς εὐεργετοῦν(13)τας καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθούς),  καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πλη(14)σίον ἔστιν, οἷον πλοῦτος καὶ κάλλος μᾶλλον ὑγιείας. 
Further, since all good things that are highly honoured are objects of emulation, moral goodness in its various forms must be such an object, and also all those good things that are useful and serviceable to others:  for men honour those who are morally good, and also those who do them service.  So with those good things our possession of which can give enjoyment to our neighbours—wealth and beauty rather than health. 
φανερὸν (15) δὲ καὶ οἱ ζηλωτοὶ τίνες·  οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κεκτη(16)μένοι ζηλωτοί· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὰ εἰρημένα, οἷον ἀνδρεία (17) σοφία ἀρχή  (οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες πολλοὺς δύνανται εὖ ποιεῖν), (18) στρατηγοί, ῥήτορες, πάντες οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμενοι.  καὶ οἷς (19) πολλοὶ ὅμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι, ἢ πολλοὶ γνώριμοι, ἢ φίλοι (20) πολλοί, ἢ οὓς πολλοὶ θαυμάζουσιν, ἢ οὓς αὐτοὶ θαυμάζουσιν.  (21) καὶ ὧν ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια λέγονται ἢ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν ἢ ὑπὸ λογο(22)γράφων. 
We can see, too, what persons are the objects of the feeling.  They are those who have these and similar things—those already mentioned, as courage, wisdom, public office.  Holders of public office—generals, orators, and all who possess such powers—can do many people a good turn.  Also those whom many people wish to be like; those who have many acquaintances or friends; those whom admire, or whom we ourselves admire;  and those who have been praised and eulogized by poets or prose—writers. 
καταφρονοῦσιν δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐναντίον γὰρ ζήλῳ (23) καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν.  ἀνάγκη (24) δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὥστε ζηλῶσαί τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσθαι (25) καταφρονητικοὺς εἶναι τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅσοι τὰ (26) ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν·  διὸ πολλάκις (27) καταφρονοῦσιν τῶν εὐτυχούντων, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγα(28)θῶν ὑπάρχῃ αὐτοῖς ἡ τύχη. 
Persons of the contrary sort are objects of contempt: for the feeling and notion of contempt are opposite to those of emulation.  Those who are such as to emulate or be emulated by others are inevitably disposed to be contemptuous of all such persons as are subject to those bad things which are contrary to the good things that are the objects of emulation: despising them for just that reason.  Hence we often despise the fortunate, when luck comes to them without their having those good things which are held in honour. 
(29) δι’ ὧν μὲν οὖν τὰ πάθη ἐγγίγνεται καὶ διαλύεται, ἐξ ὧν αἱ (30) πίστεις γίγνονται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴρηται. 
This completes our discussion of the means by which the several emotions may be produced or dissipated, and upon which depend the persuasive arguments connected with the emotions. 
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