καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα (34) τοῦ αὐτοῦ μείζονι μείζω· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ (35) μείονι.
καὶ τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ μείζω·
τοῦτο (36) γὰρ ἦν τὸ μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι.
καὶ οὗ τὸ ποιητικὸν (37) μεῖζον, ὡσαύτως·
εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ἡδέος (38) καὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ἡδονῆς μείζων.
καὶ (1364a1) αἱρετώτερον τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ’ αὑτό, οἷον ἰσχὺς ὑγιει(2)νοῦ·
τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ, ὅπερ ἦν (3) τὸ ἀγαθόν.
κἂν ᾖ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ δὲ μὴ τέλος·
τὸ μὲν (4) γὰρ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ, οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ εὖ (5) ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα.
καὶ τὸ ἧττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου [ἢ] ἑ(6)τέρων· αὐταρκέστερον γάρ·
ἧττον δὲ προσδεῖται τὸ ἐλαττόνων (7) ἢ ῥᾳόνων προσδεόμενον.
καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τοῦδε μὴ (8) ᾖ, ἢ μὴ δυνατὸν ᾖ γενέσθαι, θάτερον δὲ ἄνευ τούτου,
αὐταρ(9)κέστερον [δὲ] τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ὥστε φαίνεται μεῖζον ἀγαθόν.
(10) κἂν ᾖ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, κἂν ᾖ αἴτιον, τὸ δ’ οὐκ (11) αἴτιον, διὰ τὸ αὐτό·
ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἀδύνατον (12) εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι.
καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος ἀρχῆς (13) μεῖζον, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἰτίου μεῖ(14)ζον.
καὶ ἀνάπαλιν δὲ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν ἡ τοῦ μείζονος ἀρχὴ (15) μείζων, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἴτιον μεῖζον.
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Again, when two things each surpass a third, that which does so by the greater amount is the greater of the two; for it must surpass the greater as well as the less of the other two.
A thing productive of a greater good than another is productive of is itself a greater good than that other.
For this conception of ‘productive of a greater’ has been implied in our argument.
Likewise, that which is produced by a greater good is itself a greater good;
thus, if what is wholesome is more desirable and a greater good than what gives pleasure, health too must be a greater good than pleasure.
Again, a thing which is desirable in itself is a greater good than a thing which is not desirable in itself, as for example bodily strength than what is wholesome,
since the latter is not pursued for its own sake, whereas the former is; and this was our definition of the good.
Again, if one of two things is an end, and the other is not, the former is the greater good,
as being chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of something else; as, for example, exercise is chosen for the sake of physical well—being.
And of two things that which stands less in need of the other, or of other things, is the greater good, since it is more self—sufficing.
(That which stands ‘less’ in need of others is that which needs either fewer or easier things.)
So when one thing does not exist or cannot come into existence without a second, while the second can exist without the first, the second is the better.
That which does not need something else is more self—sufficing than that which does, and presents itself as a greater good for that reason.
Again, that which is a beginning of other things is a greater good than that which is not, and that which is a cause is a greater good than that which is not;
the reason being the same in each case, namely that without a cause and a beginning nothing can exist or come into existence.
Again, where there are two sets of consequences arising from two different beginnings or causes, the consequences of the more important beginning or cause are themselves the more important;
and conversely, that beginning or cause is itself the more important which has the more important consequences.
