Bibliotheca Polyglotta

21. (19) Περὶ δὲ γνωμολογίας, ῥηθέντος τί ἐστιν γνώμη μάλιστ’ ἂν (20) γένοιτο φανερὸν περὶ ποίων τε καὶ πότε καὶ τίσιν ἁρμόττει (21) χρῆσθαι τῷ γνωμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

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Part 21. We now turn to the use of Maxims, in order to see upon what subjects and occasions, and for what kind of speaker, they will appropriately form part of a speech. This will appear most clearly when we have defined a maxim.

ἔστι δὴ γνώμη (22) ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖός (23) τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου, οὔτε περὶ πάντων, οἷον ὅτι τὸ (24) εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, (25) καὶ <ἃ> αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν, ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ (26) ἐνθύμημα ὁ περὶ τοιούτων συλλογισμός ἐστιν, σχεδὸν τὰ (27) συμπεράσματα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντος (28) τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷον (29)
χρὴ δ’ οὔ ποθ’ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ’ ἀνήρ (30)
παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.
(30) τοῦτο μὲν οὖν γνώμη· προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ (31) τί ἐνθύμημά ἐστιν τὸ ἅπαν, οἷον (32)
χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἧς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας,
(33)φθόνον παρ’ ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ,
(1394b1) καὶ τὸ
οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πάντ’ ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ,
(2) καὶ τὸ (3)
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὅστις ἔστ’ ἐλεύθερος
(4) γνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἐχομένῳ ἐνθύμημα,
(5) ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστιν ἢ τύχης.
(6) εἰ δή ἐστιν γνώμη τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀνάγκη τέτταρα εἴδη εἶναι (7) γνώμης· ἢ γὰρ μετ’ ἐπιλόγου ἔσται ἢ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

It is a statement; not a particular fact, such as the character of Iphicrates, but of a general kind; nor is it about any and every subject —e.g. ’straight is the contrary of curved’ is not a maxim——but only about questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided. Now an Enthymeme is a syllogism dealing with such practical subjects. It is therefore roughly true that the premisses or conclusions of Enthymemes, considered apart from the rest of the argument, are Maxims: e.g.
Never should any man whose wits are sound
Have his sons taught more wisdom than their fellows.
Here we have a Maxim; add the reason or explanation, and the whole thing is an Enthymeme; thus— It makes them idle; and therewith they earn
Ill—will and jealousy throughout the city. Again,
There is no man in all things prosperous,
and
There is no man among us all is free,
are maxims; but the latter, taken with what follows it, is an Enthymeme—
For all are slaves of money or of chance.
From this definition of a maxim it follows that there are four kinds of maxims. In the first Place, the maxim may or may not have a supplement.

ἀπο(8)δείξεως μὲν οὖν δεόμεναί εἰσιν ὅσαι παράδοξόν τι λέγουσιν (9) ἢ ἀμφισβητούμενον· ὅσαι δὲ μηδὲν παράδοξον, ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου. (10) τούτων δ’ ἀνάγκη τὰς μὲν διὰ τὸ προεγνῶσθαι μηδὲν δεῖσθαι (11) ἐπιλόγου, οἷον
(12) ἀνδρὶ δ’ ὑγιαίνειν ἄριστόν ἐστιν,
ὥς γ’ ἐμὶν δοκεῖ (13) (φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτω), τὰς δ’ ἅμα λεγομένας (14) δήλας εἶναι ἐπιβλέψασιν, οἷον
(15) οὐδεὶς ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ.

. . . . . .

Proof is needed where the statement is paradoxical or disputable; no supplement is wanted where the statement contains nothing paradoxical, either because the view expressed is already a known truth, e.g. Chiefest of blessings is health for a man, as it seemeth to me,
this being the general opinion: or because, as soon as the view is stated, it is clear at a glance, e.g. No love is true save that which loves for ever.

(16) τῶν δὲ μετ’ ἐπιλόγου αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος εἰσίν, (17) ὥσπερ
(18) χρὴ δ’ οὔ ποθ’ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων,
(19) αἱ δ’ ἐνθυμηματικαὶ μέν, οὐκ ἐνθυμήματος δὲ μέρος· αἵπερ (20) καὶ μάλιστ’ εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. εἰσὶν δ’ αὗται ἐν ὅσαις ἐμφαίνεται (21) τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ αἴτιον, οἷον ἐν τῷ
(22) ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φύλασσε θνητὸς ὤν·
(23) τὸ μὲν γὰρ φάναι “μὴ δεῖν φυλάττειν” γνώμη, τὸ δὲ προσ(24)κείμενον “θνητὸν ὄντα” τὸ διὰ τί.

. . . . . .

Of the Maxims that do have a supplement attached, some are part of an Enthymeme, e.g. Never should any man whose wits are sound, &c. Others have the essential character of Enthymemes, but are not stated as parts of Enthymemes; these latter are reckoned the best; they are those in which the reason for the view expressed is simply implied, e.g. O mortal man, nurse not immortal wrath. To say ‘it is not right to nurse immortal wrath’ is a maxim; the added words ‘mortal man’ give the reason.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (25) θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν.

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Similarly, with the words Mortal creatures ought to cherish mortal, not immortal thoughts.

(26) φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πόσα τε εἴδη γνώμης, (27) καὶ περὶ ποῖον ἕκαστον ἁρμόττει· περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισ(28)βητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων μὴ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου, ἀλλ’ ἢ προθέντα τὸν (29) ἐπίλογον γνώμῃ χρῆσθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι (οἷον εἴ τις εἴποι
(30) “ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε φθονεῖσθαι δεῖ οὔτ’ ἀργὸν εἶναι, (31) οὔ φημι χρῆναι παιδεύεσθαι”),
ἢ τοῦτο προειπόντα ἐπειπεῖν (32) τὰ ἔμπροσθεν· περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δὲ προστι(33)θέντα τὸ διότι στρογγυλώτατα.

. . . . .

What has been said has shown us how many kinds of Maxims there are, and to what subjects the various kinds are appropriate. They must not be given without supplement if they express disputed or paradoxical views: we must, in that case, either put the supplement first and make a maxim of the conclusion, e.g. you might say, ‘For my part, since both unpopularity and idleness are undesirable, I hold that it is better not to be educated’; or you may say this first, and then add the previous clause. Where a statement, without being paradoxical, is not obviously true, the reason should be added as concisely as possible.

ἁρμόττει δ’ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις (34) καὶ τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα καὶ τὰ αἰνιγματώδη, οἷον εἴ (1395a1) τις λέγει ὅπερ Στησίχορος ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶπεν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὑβρι(2)στὰς εἶναι, ὅπως μὴ οἱ τέττιγες χαμόθεν ᾄδωσιν.

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In such cases both laconic and enigmatic sayings are suitable: thus one might say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, ‘Insolence is better avoided, lest the cicalas chirp on the ground’.

ἁρμόττει δὲ (3) γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικίᾳ μὲν πρεσβυτέρων, περὶ δὲ τούτων ὧν (4) ἔμπειρός τίς ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα γνωμο(5)λογεῖν ἀπρεπὲς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ δὲ ὧν ἄπειρος, (6) ἠλίθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. σημεῖον δὲ ἱκανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῖκοι (7) μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀποφαίνονται.

. . .

The use of Maxims is appropriate only to elderly men, and in handling subjects in which the speaker is experienced. For a young man to use them is—like telling stories—unbecoming; to use them in handling things in which one has no experience is silly and ill—bred: a fact sufficiently proved by the special fondness of country fellows for striking out maxims, and their readiness to air them.

(8) καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἁρμόττει (9) ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ (10) ἀποδείξαντα.

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To declare a thing to be universally true when it is not is most appropriate when working up feelings of horror and indignation in our hearers; especially by way of preface, or after the facts have been proved.

χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ (11) κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ὦσι χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς (12) ὁμολογούντων πάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἷον παρακαλοῦντι (13) ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους
εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης, (14) καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττους ὄντας
(14) ξυνὸς Ἐνυάλιος, (15) καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα καὶ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα
(16) νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

. . . . .

Even hackneyed and commonplace maxims are to be used, if they suit one’s purpose: just because they are commonplace, every one seems to agree with them, and therefore they are taken for truth. Thus, any one who is calling on his men to risk an engagement without obtaining favourable omens may quote One omen of all is hest, that we fight for our fatherland. Or, if he is calling on them to attack a stronger force—The War—God showeth no favour. Or, if he is urging people to destroy the innocent children of their enemies—Fool, who slayeth the father and leaveth his sons to avenge him.

(17) ἔτι ἔνιαι τῶν παροιμιῶν καὶ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷον παροιμία (18) “Ἀττικὸς πάροικος”. δεῖ δὲ τὰς γνώμας λέγειν καὶ παρὰ τὰ (19) δεδημοσιευμένα (λέγω δὲ δεδημοσιευμένα οἷον τὸ “γνῶθι σαυ(20)τὸν” καὶ τὸ “μηδὲν ἄγαν”), ὅταν ἢ τὸ ἦθος φαίνεσθαι μέλλῃ (21) βέλτιον ἢ παθητικῶς εἰρημένη. ἔστι δὲ παθητικὴ μὲν οἷον (22) εἴ τις ὀργιζόμενος φαίη ψεῦδος εἶναι ὡς δεῖ γιγνώσκειν αὑτόν· (23) οὗτος γοῦν εἰ ἐγίγνωσκεν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε στρατηγεῖν (24) ἠξίωσε· τὸ δὲ ἦθος βέλτιον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ὥσπερ φασίν, φιλεῖν (25) ὡς μισήσοντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μισεῖν ὡς φιλήσοντας.

. . . . .

Some proverbs are also maxims, e.g. the proverb ‘An Attic neighbour’. You are not to avoid uttering maxims that contradict such sayings as have become public property (I mean such sayings as ‘know thyself’ and ‘nothing in excess’) if doing so will raise your hearers’ opinion of your character, or convey an effect of strong emotion —e.g. an angry speaker might well say, ‘It is not true that we ought to know ourselves: anyhow, if this man had known himself, he would never have thought himself fit for an army command.’ It will raise people’s opinion of our character to say, for instance, ‘We ought not to follow the saying that bids us treat our friends as future enemies: much better to treat our enemies as future friends.’

δεῖ δὲ τῇ (26) λέξει τὴν προαίρεσιν συνδηλοῦν, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπι(27)λέγειν, οἷον οὕτως εἰπόντα, ὅτι “δεῖ δὲ φιλεῖν οὐχ ὥσπερ φασίν, (28) ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀεὶ φιλήσοντα· ἐπιβούλου γὰρ θάτερον”, ἢ ὧδε, “οὐκ (29) ἀρέσκει δέ μοι τὸ λεγόμενον· δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἀληθινὸν φίλον ὡς (30) φιλήσοντα ἀεὶ φιλεῖν”, καὶ “οὐδὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν· δεῖ γὰρ (31) τούς γε κακοὺς ἄγαν μισεῖν”.

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The moral purpose should be implied partly by the very wording of our maxim. Failing this, we should add our reason: e.g. having said ‘We should treat our friends, not as the saying advises, but as if they were going to be our friends always’, we should add ‘for the other behaviour is that of a traitor’: or we might put it, I disapprove of that saying. A true friend will treat his friend as if he were going to be his friend for ever’; and again, ‘Nor do I approve of the saying nothing in excess: we are bound to hate bad men excessively.’

(1395b1) ἔχουσι δ’ εἰς τοὺς λόγους βοήθειαν μεγάλην μίαν μὲν διὰ (2) τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκροατῶν· χαίρουσι γὰρ ἐάν τις καθόλου (3) λέγων ἐπιτύχῃ τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν. ὃ (4) δὲ λέγω δῆλον ἔσται ὧδε, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πῶς δεῖ αὐτὰς θηρεύειν. (5) ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνώμη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀπόφανσις καθόλου ἐστίν, (6) χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένου ὃ κατὰ μέρος προϋπολαμβά(7)νοντες τυγχάνουσι· οἷον εἴ τις γείτοσι τύχοι κεχρημένος ἢ (8) τέκνοις φαύλοις, ἀποδέξαιτ’ ἂν τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐδὲν γειτο(9)νίας χαλεπώτερον ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἠλιθιώτερον τεκνοποιίας, (10) ὥστε δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι ποῖα τυγχάνουσι προϋπολαμβάνον(11)τες, εἶθ’ οὕτως περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν. ταύτην τε δὴ (12) ἔχει μίαν χρῆσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν, καὶ ἑτέραν κρείττω· ἠθικοὺς (13) γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους. ἦθος δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις (14) δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις· αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν διὰ τὸ (15) ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προ(16)αιρέσεων, ὥστε, ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοήθη (17) φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα.

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One great advantage of Maxims to a speaker is due to the want of intelligence in his hearers, who love to hear him succeed in expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they hold themselves about particular cases. I will explain what I mean by this, indicating at the same time how we are to hunt down the maxims required. The maxim, as has been already said, a general statement and people love to hear stated in general terms what they already believe in some particular connexion: e.g. if a man happens to have bad neighbours or bad children, he will agree with any one who tells him, ‘Nothing is more annoying than having neighbours’, or, ‘Nothing is more foolish than to be the parent of children.’ The orator has therefore to guess the subjects on which his hearers really hold views already, and what those views are, and then must express, as general truths, these same views on these same subjects. This is one advantage of using maxims. There is another which is more important—it invests a speech with moral character. There is moral character in every speech in which the moral purpose is conspicuous: and maxims always produce this effect, because the utterance of them amounts to a general declaration of moral principles: so that, if the maxims are sound, they display the speaker as a man of sound moral character.

(18) περὶ μὲν οὖν γνώμης, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ πόσα εἴδη ταύτης (19) καὶ πῶς χρηστέον αὐτῇ καὶ τίνα ὠφέλειαν ἔχει, εἰρήσθω (20) ταῦτα.

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So much for the Maxim—its nature, varieties, proper use, and advantages.

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