καὶ οὐκ ἔχει πολ(28)λὰς διατριβάς, οἷον πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὑτοῦ, ἢ παθη(29)τικὸν ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἥκιστα πάντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξιστῇ.
δεῖ οὖν (30) ἀποροῦντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες ποιοῦσι (31) καὶ Ἰσοκράτης· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύων κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακε(32)δαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάρητος δ’ ἐν τῷ συμ(33)μαχικῷ.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν (34) ἐπαίνοις, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· ἀεὶ γάρ τινα εἰσάγει.
καὶ (35) ὃ ἔλεγεν Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, ταὐτό (36) ἐστιν·
εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγει Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἶτα Αἰακόν, (37) εἶτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἣ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἢ (38) τοιόνδε ἐστίν.
ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἠθικῶς λε(39)κτέον καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ἐνθυμήματα, ἠθι(40)κῶς·
καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ἁρμόττει χρηστὸν φαίνεσθαι (1418b1) ἢ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ.
τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ (2) μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὅτι ὅσα ἔλεγχον ποιεῖ, μᾶλ(3)λον δῆλον ὅτι συλλελόγισται·
παρ’ ἄλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τἀ(4)ναντία γνωρίζεται.
(5) τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον οὐχ ἕτερόν τι εἶδος,
ἀλλὰ (6) τῶν πίστεών ἐστι <τὸ> τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῷ.
(7) δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν συμβουλῇ καὶ ἐν δίκῃ ἀρχόμενον μὲν λέγειν (8) τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πίστεις πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ πρὸς τἀναντία (9) ἀπαντᾶν λύοντα καὶ προδιασύροντα.
ἂν δὲ πολύχους ᾖ ἡ (10) ἐναντίωσις, πρότερον τὰ ἐναντία,
οἷον ἐποίησε Καλλίστρατος (11) ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνιακῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ· ἃ γὰρ ἐροῦσι προανελὼν οὕτως (12) τότε αὐτὸς εἶπεν.
ὕστερον δὲ λέγοντα πρῶτον πρὸς τὸν (13) ἐναντίον λόγον λεκτέον, λύοντα καὶ ἀντισυλλογιζόμενον, καὶ (14) μάλιστα ἂν εὐδοκιμηκότα ᾖ·
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον προδια(15)βεβλημένον οὐ δέχεται ἡ ψυχή, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ (16) λόγον, ἐὰν ὁ ἐναντίος εὖ δοκῇ εἰρηκέναι.
δεῖ οὖν χώραν (17) ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀκροατῇ τῷ μέλλοντι λόγῳ· ἔσται δὲ ἂν ἀνέλῃς·
διὸ (18) ἢ πρὸς πάντα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα ἢ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἢ τὰ εὐέλεγκτα (19) μαχεσάμενον οὕτω τὰ αὑτοῦ πιστὰ ποιητέον.
ταῖς θεαῖσι πρῶτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι·
(20) ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἥραν·
(21) ἐν τούτοις ἥψατο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐηθεστάτου.
(22) περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα.
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Besides, in forensic oratory you have a basis in the law; and once you have a starting—point, you can prove anything with comparative ease.
Then again, political oratory affords few chances for those leisurely digressions in which you may attack your adversary, talk about yourself, or work on your hearers’ emotions; fewer chances indeed, than any other affords, unless your set purpose is to divert your hearers’ attention.
Accordingly, if you find yourself in difficulties, follow the lead of the Athenian speakers, and that of Isocrates, who makes regular attacks upon people in the course of a political speech, e.g. upon the Lacedaemonians in the Panegyricus, and upon Chares in the speech about the allies.
In ceremonial oratory, intersperse your speech with bits of episodic eulogy, like Isocrates, who is always bringing some one forward for this purpose.
And this is what Gorgias meant by saying that he always found something to talk about.
For if he speaks of Achilles, he praises Peleus, then Aeacus, then Zeus; and in like manner the virtue of valour, describing its good results, and saying what it is like.
Now if you have proofs to bring forward, bring them forward, and your moral discourse as well; if you have no enthymemes, then fall back upon moral discourse:
after all, it is more fitting for a good man to display himself as an honest fellow than as a subtle reasoner.
Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative ones: their logical cogency is more striking:
the facts about two opposites always stand out clearly when the two are nut side by side.
The ‘Reply to the Opponent’ is not a separate division of the speech;
it is part of the Arguments to break down the opponent’s case, whether by objection or by counter—syllogism.
Both in political speaking and when pleading in court, if you are the first speaker you should put your own arguments forward first, and then meet the arguments on the other side by refuting them and pulling them to pieces beforehand.
If, however, the case for the other side contains a great variety of arguments, begin with these,
like Callistratus in the Messenian assembly, when he demolished the arguments likely to be used against him before giving his own.
If you speak later, you must first, by means of refutation and counter—syllogism, attempt some answer to your opponent’s speech, especially if his arguments have been well received.
For just as our minds refuse a favourable reception to a person against whom they are prejudiced, so they refuse it to a speech when they have been favourably impressed by the speech on the other side.
You should, therefore, make room in the minds of the audience for your coming speech; and this will be done by getting your opponent’s speech out of the way.
So attack that first—either the whole of it, or the most important, successful, or vulnerable points in it, and thus inspire confidence in what you have to say yourself—
First, champion will I be of Goddesses...
Never, I ween, would Hera...
where the speaker has attacked the silliest argument first.
