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Aristoteles: Rhetorica
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9. (8) Ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὃ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν·  (9) τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντι(10)κείμενόν ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους τὸ λυπεῖ(11)σθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις. 
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Part 9. Most directly opposed to pity is the feeling called Indignation.  Pain at unmerited good fortune is, in one sense, opposite to pain at unmerited bad fortune, and is due to the same moral qualities. 
καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἤθους (12) χρηστοῦ·  δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξίως πράττουσι κακῶς (13) συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὖ νεμεσᾶν·  ἄδικον γὰρ τὸ (14) παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γιγνόμενον·  διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ (15) νεμεσᾶν. 
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Both feelings are associated with good moral character;  it is our duty both to feel sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to feel indignation at unmerited prosperity;  for whatever is undeserved is unjust,  and that is why we ascribe indignation even to the gods. 
(16) δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν (17) ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον, ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νεμεσᾶν, (18) ἔστι δ’ ἕτερον·  λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν (19) καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ,  ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ (20) ὁμοίου. 
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It might indeed be thought that envy is similarly opposed to pity, on the ground that envy it closely akin to indignation, or even the same thing. But it is not the same.  It is true that it also is a disturbing pain excited by the prosperity of others.  But it is excited not by the prosperity of the undeserving but by that of people who are like us or equal with us. 
τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ δι’ (21) αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν·  οὐ γὰρ ἔτι (22) ἔσται τὸ μὲν φθόνος, τὸ δὲ νέμεσις, ἀλλὰ φόβος,  ἐὰν διὰ (23) τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαῦλον (24) ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου εὐπραξίας. 
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The two feelings have this in common, that they must be due not to some untoward thing being likely to befall ourselves, but only to what is happening to our neighbour.  The feeling ceases to be envy in the one case and indignation in the other, and becomes fear,  if the pain and disturbance are due to the prospect of something bad for ourselves as the result of the other man’s good fortune. 
φανερὸν δ’ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ (25) τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις·  ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς (26) ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς (27) ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν,  οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαι(28)φόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός·  (29) δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δ’ αὔτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς (30) εὖ πράττουσι κατ’ ἀξίαν·  ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν (31) τὸν ἐπιεικῆ·  ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν ἅπερ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, (32) καὶ αὑτῷ. 
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The feelings of pity and indignation will obviously be attended by the converse feelings of satisfaction.  If you are pained by the unmerited distress of others, you will be pleased, or at least not pained, by their merited distress.  Thus no good man can be pained by the punishment of parricides or murderers.  These are things we are bound to rejoice at, as we must at the prosperity of the deserving;  both these things are just, and both give pleasure to any honest man,  since he cannot help expecting that what has happened to a man like him will happen to him too. 
καὶ ἔστιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δ’ (33) ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου·  ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ (1387a1) φθονερός·  ἐφ’ ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, (2) ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου (3) χαίρειν·  διὸ κωλυτικὰ μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτ’ ἐστί, διαφέρει (4) δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν (5) ἅπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα. 
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All these feelings are associated with the same type of moral character. And their contraries are associated with the contrary type;  the man who is delighted by others’ misfortunes is identical with the man who envies others’ prosperity.  For any one who is pained by the occurrence or existence of a given thing must be pleased by that thing’s non—existence or destruction.  We can now see that all these feelings tend to prevent pity (though they differ among themselves, for the reasons given), so that all are equally useful for neutralizing an appeal to pity. 
(6) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν λέγωμεν, τίσιν τε νεμε(7)σῶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες αὐτοί, εἶτα μετὰ ταῦτα (8) περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
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We will first consider Indignation — reserving the other emotions for subsequent discussion — and ask with whom, on what grounds, and in what states of mind we may be indignant. 
φανερὸν δ’ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·  εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ (9) νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν,  (10) πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (11) νεμεσᾶν·  οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, (12) νεμεσήσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων (13) εἰσίν),  ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅσων (14) ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄξιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ φύσει ἔχοντες (15) ἀγαθά, οἷον εὐγένειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. 
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These questions are really answered by what has been said already.  Indignation is pain caused by the sight of undeserved good fortune.  It is, then, plain to begin with that there are some forms of good the sight of which cannot cause it.  Thus a man may be just or brave, or acquire moral goodness: but we shall not be indignant with him for that reason, any more than we shall pity him for the contrary reason.  Indignation is roused by the sight of wealth, power, and the like—by all those things, roughly speaking, which are deserved by good men and by those who possess the goods of nature — noble birth, beauty, and so on. 
ἐπεὶ δὲ (16) τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐγγύς τι φαίνεται τοῦ φύσει,  ἀνάγκη τοῖς ταὐτὸ (17) ἔχουσιν ἀγαθόν, ἐὰν νεωστὶ ἔχοντες τυγχάνωσι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο (18) εὐπραγῶσι, μᾶλλον νεμεσᾶν·  μᾶλλον γὰρ λυποῦσιν οἱ νεωστὶ (19) πλουτοῦντες τῶν πάλαι καὶ διὰ γένος·  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντες (20) καὶ δυνάμενοι καὶ πολύφιλοι καὶ εὔτεκνοι καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν (21) τοιούτων. 
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Again, what is long established seems akin to what exists by nature;  and therefore we feel more indignation at those possessing a given good if they have as a matter of fact only just got it and the prosperity it brings with it.  The newly rich give more offence than those whose wealth is of long standing and inherited.  The same is true of those who have office or power, plenty of friends, a fine family, &c. 
καὶ ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν γίγνηται αὐτοῖς, (22) ὡσαύτως·  καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μᾶλλον λυποῦσιν οἱ νεόπλουτοι (23) ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἢ οἱ ἀρχαιόπλουτοι.  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (24) ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
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We feel the same when these advantages of theirs secure them others.  For here again, the newly rich give us more offence by obtaining office through their riches than do those whose wealth is of long standing;  and so in all other cases. 
αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δοκοῦσι τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν (25) οἱ δ’ οὔ·  τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ οὕτω φαινόμενον ἔχειν ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὥστε (26) οἱ ἕτεροι οὐ τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν. 
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The reason is that what the latter have is felt to be really their own, but what the others have is not;  what appears to have been always what it is is regarded as real, and so the possessions of the newly rich do not seem to be really their own. 
καὶ ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ (27) τοῦ τυχόντος ἄξιον,  ἀλλά τις ἔστιν ἀναλογία καί τι ἁρμόττον,  (28) οἷον ὅπλων κάλλος οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ ἁρμόττει ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ,  (29) καὶ γάμοι διαφέροντες οὐ τοῖς νεωστὶ πλουσίοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς (30) εὐγενέσιν·  ἂν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὢν μὴ τοῦ ἁρμόττοντος τυγχάνῃ, (31) νεμεσητόν. 
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Further, it is not any and every man that deserves any given kind of good;  there is a certain correspondence and appropriateness in such things;  thus it is appropriate for brave men, not for just men, to have fine weapons,  and for men of family, not for parvenus, to make distinguished marriages.  Indignation may therefore properly be felt when any one gets what is not appropriate for him, though he may be a good man enough. 
καὶ <τὸ> τὸν ἥττω τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν,  (32) μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται,
Αἴαντος δ’ ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο·
(34) Ζεὺς γὰρ οἱ νεμέσασχ’, ὅτ’ ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο·  (1387b1) εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ὁ ἥττων τῷ κρείττονι,  οἷον εἰ ὁ (2) μουσικὸς τῷ δικαίῳ·  βέλτιον γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς μου(3)σικῆς. 
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It may also be felt when any one sets himself up against his superior,  especially against his superior in some particular respect — whence the linesOnly from battle he shrank with Aias Telamon’s son;Zeus had been angered with him, had he fought with a mightier one;  but also, even apart from that, when the inferior in any sense contends with his superior;  a musician, for instance, with a just man,  for justice is a finer thing than music. 
(4) οἷς μὲν οὖν νεμεσῶσι καὶ διὰ τί, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον·  ταῦτα (5) γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν. 
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Enough has been said to make clear the grounds on which, and the persons against whom,  Indignation is felt—they are those mentioned, and others like him. 
αὐτοὶ δὲ νεμεσητικοί εἰσιν, ἐὰν (6) ἄξιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ταῦτα (7) κεκτημένοι·  τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων ἠξιῶσθαι τοὺς μὴ ὁμοίους οὐ (8) δίκαιον. 
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As for the people who feel it; we feel it if we do ourselves deserve the greatest possible goods and moreover have them,  for it is an injustice that those who are not our equals should have been held to deserve as much as we have. 
δεύτερον δέ, ἂν ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι τυγχά(9)νωσιν·  κρίνουσί τε γὰρ εὖ, καὶ τὰ ἄδικα μισοῦσι.  καὶ ἐὰν (10) φιλότιμοι καὶ ὀρεγόμενοί τινων πραγμάτων, καὶ μάλιστ’ <ἂν> (11) περὶ ταῦτα φιλότιμοι ὦσιν ὧν ἕτεροι ἀνάξιοι ὄντες τυγχάνουσιν.  (12) καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοὶ αὑτοὺς ὧν ἑτέρους μὴ ἀξιοῦσι, (13) νεμεσητικοὶ τούτοις καὶ τούτων·  διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνδραποδώδεις (14) καὶ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀφιλότιμοι οὐ νεμεσητικοί·  οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν οὗ (15) ἑαυτοὺς οἴονται ἀξίους εἶναι. 
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Or, secondly, we feel it if we are really good and honest people;  our judgement is then sound, and we loathe any kind of injustice.  Also if we are ambitious and eager to gain particular ends, especially if we are ambitious for what others are getting without deserving to get it.  And, generally, if we think that we ourselves deserve a thing and that others do not, we are disposed to be indignant with those others so far as that thing is concerned.  Hence servile, worthless, unambitious persons are not inclined to Indignation,  since there is nothing they can believe themselves to deserve. 
(16) φανερὸν δ’ ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ ποίοις ἀτυχοῦσι καὶ κακο(17)πραγοῦσιν ἢ μὴ τυγχάνουσι χαίρειν ἢ ἀλύπως ἔχειν δεῖ·  ἐκ γὰρ (18) τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι δῆλα, ὥστ’ ἐὰν τούς τε (19) κριτὰς τοιούτους παρασκευάσῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας (20) ἐλεεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐλεεῖσθαι, δείξῃ ἀναξίους ὄντας τυγ(21)χάνειν ἀξίους δὲ μὴ τυγχάνειν, ἀδύνατον ἐλεεῖν. 
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From all this it is plain what sort of men those are at whose misfortunes, distresses, or failures we ought to feel pleased, or at least not pained: by considering the facts described we see at once what their contraries are.  If therefore our speech puts the judges in such a frame of mind as that indicated and shows that those who claim pity on certain definite grounds do not deserve to secure pity but do deserve not to secure it, it will be impossible for the judges to feel pity. 
 
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