πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ νόμων εἴπωμεν, πῶς (26) χρηστέον καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγο(27)ροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον.
φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναν(28)τίος ᾖ ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ χρηστέον (29) καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεστέροις καὶ δικαιοτέροις.
καὶ ὅτι τὸ “γνώμῃ (30) τῇ ἀρίστῃ” τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμ(31)μένοις.
καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἀεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε (32) μεταβάλλει, οὐδ’ ὁ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γάρ ἐστιν), οἱ δὲ (33) γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις,
ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους (34) Ἀντιγόνῃ·
ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος (35) νόμον, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρὰ τὸν ἄγραφον,
(1375b1) οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ’ ἀεί ποτε ...
ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός ....
(2) καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τε καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ’ οὐ (3) τὸ δοκοῦν, ὥστ’ οὐ νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος·
οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ (4) ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου.
καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής (5) ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνῃ τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀληθές.
(6) καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμ(7)μένοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐμμένειν.
καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμῳ (8) εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ,
οἷον ἐνίοτε ὁ μὲν κελεύει (9) κύρια εἶναι ἅττ’ ἂν συνθῶνται, ὁ δ’ ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συν(10)τίθεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον.
καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν (11) καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ποτέραν [τὴν] ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρμό(12)σει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἶτα τούτῳ χρῆσθαι.
καὶ εἰ τὰ μὲν (13) πράγματα ἐφ’ οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, (14) πειρατέον τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν νόμον.
(15) ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ᾖ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, τό τε “γνώμῃ (16) τῇ ἀρίστῃ” λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἕνεκα δικάζειν (17) ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιορκῇ.
(18) καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἱρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὑτῷ.
(19) καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι.
καὶ (20) ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν (21) ἰατρόν·
οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἁμαρτία τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὅσον (22) τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι.
καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων (23) σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νό(24)μοις ἀπαγορεύεται.
καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτως διωρίσθω·
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First, then, let us take laws and see how they are to be used in persuasion and dissuasion, in accusation and defence.
If the written law tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law, and insist on its greater equity and justice.
We must argue that the juror’s oath ‘I will give my verdict according to honest opinion’ means that one will not simply follow the letter of the written law.
We must urge that the principles of equity are permanent and changeless, and that the universal law does not change either, for it is the law of nature, whereas written laws often do change.
This is the bearing the lines in Sophocles’ Antigone, where Antigone pleads that in burying her brother she had broken Creon’s law, but not the unwritten law:
Not of to—day or yesterday they are,But live eternal: (none can date their birth.)Not I would fear the wrath of any man(And brave God’s vengeance) for defying these.
We shall argue that justice indeed is true and profitable, but that sham justice is not, and that consequently the written law is not,
because it does not fulfil the true purpose of law.
Or that justice is like silver, and must be assayed by the judges, if the genuine is to be distinguished from the counterfeit.
Or that the better a man is, the more he will follow and abide by the unwritten law in preference to the written.
Or perhaps that the law in question contradicts some other highly—esteemed law, or even contradicts itself.
Thus it may be that one law will enact that all contracts must be held binding, while another forbids us ever to make illegal contracts.
Or if a law is ambiguous, we shall turn it about and consider which construction best fits the interests of justice or utility, and then follow that way of looking at it.
Or if, though the law still exists, the situation to meet which it was passed exists no longer, we must do our best to prove this and to combat the law thereby.
If however the written law supports our case, we must urge that the oath ‘to give my verdict according to my honest opinion’ not meant to make the judges give a verdict that is contrary to the law, but to save them from the guilt of perjury if they misunderstand what the law really means.
Or that no one chooses what is absolutely good, but every one what is good for himself.
Or that not to use the laws is as ahas to have no laws at all.
Or that, as in the other arts, it does not pay to try to be cleverer than the doctor:
for less harm comes from the doctor’s mistakes than from the growing habit of disobeying authority.
Or that trying to be cleverer than the laws is just what is forbidden by those codes of law that are accounted best.
— So far as the laws are concerned, the above discussion is probably sufficient.
