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Aristoteles: Rhetorica
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[2.2.1] (30) Ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας [φαινομένης] (31) διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ <τι> τῶν αὐτοῦ, (32) τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος. 
فليكن الغضب حزنا أو أذى مع تشوق من المرء إلى عقوبة ترى من أجل صغر نفسه أو استهانة به أو بمن يتصل به 
. 
[2] Sit autem ira appetitus cum tristitia afflictione apparente propter apparentem despectum eorum que sunt ad ipsum aut ad ipsius aliquem non convenienter. 
[2] Sit aut em ira appetitus cum tristitia punitionis apparentis propter apparentem parvipensionem eorum que in ipsum aut in ipsius aliqua non convenienter. 
Part 2. Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends. 
[2.2.2] εἰ δὴ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, (33) ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι ἀεὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστόν τινι, (34) οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ,  καὶ ὅτι αὑτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τί (1378b1) πεποίηκεν ἢ ἤμελλεν,  καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονήν, (2) τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι·  ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι (3) τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων (4) ἐφίεται αὑτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὑτῷ. 
فإن كان هذا هو الغضب فلا بد أن يكون الذي يغضب أبدا يغضب على واحد من الناس فردا أي على فلان وليس على الإنسان  وذلك لشيء فعله به أو أحد ممن هو منه بسبب  وأن يلزم كل غضب شيء من اللذة من قبل أنه يؤمل أن ينتقم  لأنه قد يلتذ إذا ظن أنه سيظفر بما قد يرى ممتنعا حتى تتوق نفسه إلى ذلك والذي يغضب أو يستشيط قد يتشوق في نفسه 
.  .  .  . 
Quoniam autem hoc est ira, necesse iracundum irasci semper alicui singularium, ut Cleoni, sed non homini,  et quod ipsum aut aliquid eorum que sunt in ipso fecit aut debebat,  et omni ire consequi quandam voluptatem, que est a spe tormentandi;  delectabile quidem enim posse invenire que desiderant, nullus autem apparentia impossibilia appetit, qui vera irascitur appetit sibi. 
Quoniam autern hoc est ira, necesse eum qui irascitur irasci semper singularium alicui, puta Cleoni, sed non homini,  et quia in ipsum aut in aliquid eorum que ipsius fecit aut facturus erat,  et ad omnem iram sequi aliquam delectationem a spe puniendi;  delectabile quidem enim existimare adipisci ea que appetuntur, nullus autem ea que apparent sibi impossibilia appetit, iratus autem appetit sibi possibilia. 
If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt towards some particular individual, e.g. Cleon, and not ‘man’ in general.  It must be felt because the other has done or intended to do something to him or one of his friends.  It must always be attended by a certain pleasure — that which arises from the expectation of revenge.  For since nobody aims at what he thinks he cannot attain, the angry man is aiming at what he can attain, and the belief that you will attain your aim is pleasant. 
διὸ (5) καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ·
(6) ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο
(7) ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται·  (8) ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἡδονή τις διά τε τοῦτο καὶ διότι δια(9)τρίβουσιν ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ·  ἡ οὖν τότε γινομένη (10) φαντασία ἡδονὴν ἐμποιεῖ, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἐνυπνίων. 
فما أحسن ما قيل في الغضب إن الذي يعتلج في صدر الرجل منه أحلى من العسل والشهد وإن له مثل الدخان 1   فقد يلزمه شيء من اللذة لهذا السبب ثم لأن الأوهام تدرس وتحيل ذكر الانتقام في الفكر  والمتبع الذي يكون في وهم المرء من ذلك يُحدث له لذة كالذي يحدث من الأحلام 
.  .  . 
Ideo bene dictum est de ira: ‘quare multo dulcius melle stillante in pectoribus hominum augetur’;  consequitur enim et voluptas quedam per hoc et propter quod conteruntur in tormentando in intellectu;  aut igitur huius facta fantasia voluptatem facit, quemadmodum ea que est sompniorum. 
Propter quod bene dictum est de ira: ‘que multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum crescit; ’  assequitur enim et delectatio quedam et propter hoc et propterea quia demorantur in puniendo mente;  que igitur tunc infit fantasia delectationem facit sicut que sompniorum. 
Hence it has been well said about wrath, Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb, dripping with sweetness, And spreads through the hearts of men.  It is also attended by a certain pleasure because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance,  and the images then called up cause pleasure, like the images called up in dreams. 
[2.2.3] ἐπεὶ δὲ (11) ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαι(12)νόμενον  (καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τἀγαθὰ ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς (13) εἶναι, καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα πρὸς αὐτά·  ὅσα δὲ μηδέν τι ἢ μικρόν, (14) οὐδενὸς ἄξια ὑπολαμβάνομεν),  τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη ὀλιγωρίας, (15) καταφρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπηρεασμὸς καὶ ὕβρις·  [2.2.4] ὅ τε γὰρ κατα(16)φρονῶν ὀλιγωρεῖ  (ὅσα γὰρ οἴονται μηδενὸς ἄξια, τούτων (17) καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ μηδενὸς ἀξίων ὀλιγωροῦσιν),  καὶ ὁ (18) ἐπηρεάζων φαίνεται ὀλιγωρεῖν.  ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμὸς (19) ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς βουλήσεσιν μὴ ἵνα τι αὑτῷ ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὴ (20) ἐκείνῳ·  ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἵνα αὑτῷ τι, ὀλιγωρεῖ·  δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε (21) βλάψειν ὑπολαμβάνει, ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ οὐκ ὠλιγώρει,  οὔτ’ (22) ὠφελῆσαι ἂν οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου, ἐφρόντιζε γὰρ ἂν ὥστε (23) φίλος εἶναι·  καὶ ὁ ὑβρίζων δὲ ὀλιγωρεῖ·  ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ (24) πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ (25) ἵνα τι γίγνηται αὑτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅ τι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἡσθῇ·  οἱ (26) γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται. 
وصغر النفس إنما يكون من قبل الظن بالشيء أنه لا قدر له ولا يستحق أن يعنى به  فإن الشرور والخيرات قد تظن مستوجبة للعناية واللوازم لهذه أيضا  وإنما نظن أنه لا يستحق شيئا بكل ما ظننا أنه ليس بشيء أو أنه يسير جدا  وانواع صغر النفس ثلاثة وهي التهاون والعيث والشتيمة  لان الذي يتهاون قد يصغر نفسه  وانما يتهاون المرء بالذين يظنّ انّهم ليسوا بأهل لشيء والذين ليسوا اهلا لشيء قد تصغر النفس فيهم    فانّ العيث عائق للارادات وقد يفعله الفاعل ليس لان يكون له شيء ولكن لكيلا يكون كذاك  ومن اجل انّه ليس في نفسه يصغر نفسه  فهو واضح انّه لا يظنّ في ذلك ضررا عليه ولو ظنّ ذلك لخوف فلم يكن يصغر نفسه  فامّا نفعه ان انتفع به فلا يستحق ان يقال فيه هاهنا شيء لانّه حينئذ يحتال لان يستعطف  كذلك الذي يشتم أيضا قد تصغر نفسه  فإن الشتيمة إضرار والإضرار أذى فيما يخزى منه المشتوم وليس في شيء يكون له ولكن فيما قد كان وإنه قد أحس به كيف هو  لأن الذين يفعلون خلاف ذلك لا يشتمون لكنهم يعاقبون 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Amplius autem despectio est actio opinionis circa dignum apparens nulli  (et enim mala et bona digna extimamus studioso esse, et distensa ad hec;  quecumque vera non aut valde parva nullo digna arbitramur),  tres autem sunt species despectus, negligentia et temptatio et iniuria;  qui enim negligit despicit  (que enim considerant nullo digna esse, hec negligunt),  et temptans videtur negligere.  Est autem temptatio impedimentum consultationibus non ipsi,  sed quod non illi despicit;  palam enim non ledere arbitratur, timebat enim et non despiciebat,  neque proderit utique nichil dignum sermone, curabat enim sicut amicus esse;  et iniurians despicit;  est enim iniuria ledendi et tristandi in quibus verecundia est patienti, non quod aliquid fiat alii aut quoniam factum est, sed quomodo sentiat;  contrafacientes enim non iniuriantur, sed affiiguntur. 
Quoniam autem parvipensio est actus opinionis circa id quod nullo dignum videtur  (et enim mala et bona digna putamus studio esse, et tendentia ad hec;  quecumque autem nichil aut valde modica, nullo digna existimamus),  tres sunt species parvipensionis, despectus et epireasmus et contumeliatio;  qui enim despicit parvi pendit  (que enim putant nullo digna esse, hec despiciunt, que autem nullo digna parvi pendunt),  et que epireazat videtur despicere.  Est enim epireasmus impedimentum voluntatibus non ut aliquid sibi, sed ut non illi;  quoniam igitur non ut aliquid sibi, parvi pendit;  palam enim quod neque nociturum existimat (timeret enim et non parvi penderet)  neque prodesse utique nichil dignum verbo (curaret enim utique ut amicus esset);  et contumelians autem parvi pendit;  est enim contumeliatio nocendi et contristandi in quibus confusio est patienti, non ut aliquid fiat sibi aliud, sed ut delectetur;  qui enim contrafaciunt non contumelizant, sed puniunt. 
Now slighting is the actively entertained opinion of something as obviously of no importance.  We think bad things, as well as good ones, have serious importance; and we think the same of anything that tends to produce such things,  while those which have little or no such tendency we consider unimportant.  There are three kinds of slighting — contempt, spite, and insolence.  (1) Contempt is one kind of slighting:  you feel contempt for what you consider unimportant, and it is just such things that you slight.  (2) Spite is another kind;  it is a thwarting another man’s wishes, not to get something yourself but to prevent his getting it.  The slight arises just from the fact that you do not aim at something for yourself:  clearly you do not think that he can do you harm, for then you would be afraid of him instead of slighting him,  nor yet that he can do you any good worth mentioning, for then you would be anxious to make friends with him.  (3) Insolence is also a form of slighting,  since it consists in doing and saying things that cause shame to the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or because anything has happened to yourself, but simply for the pleasure involved.  (Retaliation is not ‘insolence’, but vengeance.) 
αἴτιον (27) δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῖς ὑβρίζουσιν, ὅτι οἴονται κακῶς δρῶντες (28) αὐτοὶ ὑπερέχειν μᾶλλον  (διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι ὑβρισταί· (29) ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὑβρίζοντες)·  ὕβρεως δὲ ἀτιμία, ὁ δ’ (30) ἀτιμάζων ὀλιγωρεῖ·  τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμήν, (31) οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ·  διὸ λέγει ὀργιζόμενος ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς “ἠτίμησεν· ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς” (32) καὶ (33) “ὡς εἴ τιν’ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην,” (34) ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ὀργιζόμενος. 
والعلة فيما يجد الذين يشتمون اللذة أنهم يظنون إذا فعلوا ذلك أنهم أفضل من المشتومين  ولذلك ما يوجد الأحداث والأغنياء شتامين أو فحاشين فقد يظنون إذا شتموا أنهم أفضل من المشتوم  والشتيمة استهانة واحتقار وإنما يحتقر من ليس بأهل لشيء  وليس له شيء من الكرامة لا في خير ولا في شر  ولذلك ما قال اوميروس إن اغاممنن استهان باخليوس حيث غضب وسلبه كرامته يعني سرّيته وتركه كالطارئ المحتقر فغضب لذلك اخليوس 
.  .  .  .  . 
Causa autem voluptatis iniuriantibus quoniam extimant male agentes ipsos superhabundare magis  (ideo iuvenes et divites iniuriatores; superhabundare arbitrantur iniuriantes) ;  iniurie autem dedecus, qui enim dedecorat despicit;  quod nulli dignum nullum habet honorem, neque boni neque mali;  ideo dicit iratus Achilles: ‘dedecoravit; auferens enim habet decus auferens’, et ‘sicut aliquem advenam dedecoratum’, sicut per hec iratus. 
Causa autem delectationis contumelizantibus, quia putant quod ipsi male agentes excedant magis  (propter quod et iuvenes et divites contumeliosi; excellere enim putant contumelias inferentes);  contumeliationis autem dehonoratio, qui enim dehonorat parvi pendit;  quod enim nullo dignum nullum habet honorem, neque mali neque boni;  propter quod dicit iratus Achilles: ‘dehonoravit; accipiens enim habet venerationem ipse auferens,’ et, ‘ac si aliquem inhonoratum post exurgentem,’ tamquam propter hec iratus. 
The cause of the pleasure thus enjoyed by the insolent man is that he thinks himself greatly superior to others when ill—treating them.  That is why youths and rich men are insolent; they think themselves superior when they show insolence.  One sort of insolence is to rob people of the honour due to them; you certainly slight them thus;  for it is the unimportant, for good or evil, that has no honour paid to it.  So Achilles says in anger: He hath taken my prize for himself and hath done me dishonour, and Like an alien honoured by none, meaning that this is why he is angry. 
[II.2.7] προσήκειν δὲ οἴονται πολυωρεῖ(35)σθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡττόνων κατὰ γένος, κατὰ δύναμιν, κατ’ ἀρετήν, (1379a1) καὶ ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς ὑπερέχῃ πολύ,  οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ (2) πλούσιος πένητος  καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ῥητορικὸς ἀδυνάτου εἰπεῖν  (3) καὶ ἄρχων ἀρχομένου καὶ ἄρχειν ἄξιος οἰόμενος τοῦ ἄρχε(4)σθαι ἀξίου·  διὸ εἴρηται “θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλήων” (5) καὶ “ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον·” (6) ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. 
وقد يظن كثير من الناس أن لها حقا واجبا على الذين هم دونهم في الجنس والقوة والفضيلة وفي كل ما يوجد لهم عليهم فيه الفضل جملة  كفضل الأغنياء على الفقراء بالمال  وفضل البليغ على الضعيف عن المنطق بالمنطق  وفضل المتسلط <على المتسلط> عليه بالسلطان والذي يظن أنه يستحق أن يتسلط على الذي يستحق أن يتسلط (86) عليه  ولذلك ما قيل إن شدة الاستشاطة للملوك الذين نشئوا في الثروة وأشياء أخر تتصل بذلك فقد يمتعضون لعظم شأنهم 
.  .  .  .  . 
Con venire autem opinantur multipliciter diffiniri a minoribus secundum genus, secundum patentiam, secundum virtutem, et simpliciter in quo utique eadem multum superhabundat,  ut in pecuniis dives a mendico  et in dicendo rethoricus a potente dicere  et dominus domino et dominari dignus existimans dominari digno;  ideo dictum est: ‘ira autem magna est nobilium regum’, ‘sed tamen et denique portat iram ut perficiat’; vexantur (conturbantur)1 autem propter superhabundantiam. 
Convenire autem putant magni pendi a minoribus secundum genus, secundum potentiam, secundum virtutem, et totaliter in ipso in quo excedunt multum,  ut in pecuniis dives pauperem  et in loquendo rethoricus impotentem loqui  et principans subiectum et arbitratus dignus ad principandum eum qui dignus subici;  propter quod dictum est: ‘ira autem magna est a Iove educatorum regum,’ et, ‘alias autem et posterius habet iram; ' indignantur enim propter excellentiam. 
A man expects to be specially respected by his inferiors in birth, in capacity, in goodness, and generally in anything in which he is much their superior:  as where money is concerned a wealthy man looks for respect from a poor man;  where speaking is concerned, the man with a turn for oratory looks for respect from one who cannot speak;  the ruler demands the respect of the ruled, and the man who thinks he ought to be a ruler demands the respect of the man whom he thinks he ought to be ruling.  Hence it has been said: “Great is the wrath of kings, whose father is Zeus almighty,” and “Yea, but his rancour abideth long afterward also,” their great resentment being due to their great superiority. 
[II.2.8] ἔτι ὑφ’ ὧν τις οἴεται (7) εὖ πάσχειν δεῖν·  οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οὓς εὖ πεποίηκεν ἢ ποιεῖ, (8) αὐτὸς ἢ δι’ αὐτόν τις ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τις, ἢ βούλεται ἢ ἐβουλήθη. 
ثم الذين يتوقع منهم الإحسان  وذلك فيما لم يفعل أو لا يفعل إما به نفسه وإما بأحد ممن يتصل به إن كان هوى ذلك أو يهواه 
.  . 
Amplius ex quibus quis extimat bene pati oportere;  hii autem sunt quos bene fecit aut facit, aut ipse autem eum qui sunt in ipso aliquis aut per se, aut vult aut voluit. 
Adhuc a quibus aliquis putat debere bene pati;  isti autem sunt quibus bene fecit aut facit, aut ipse aut aliquis suorum aut per ipsum, aut volitum est aut volitum fuit. 
Then again a man looks for respect from those who he thinks owe him good treatment,  and these are the people whom he has treated or is treating well, or means or has meant to treat well, either himself, or through his friends, or through others at his request. 
[II.2.9] (9) φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἤδη πῶς τε ἔχοντες ὀργίζονται (10) αὐτοὶ καὶ τίσιν καὶ διὰ ποῖα. 
فقد يستبين من هذا القول كيف وبأية \ حال إذا كان المرء فهو غضوب وعلى من يغضب ومن أجل أي شيء يغضب 
. 
Manifestum igitur ex hiis utique qualiter se habentes irascuntur ipsi et quibusdam et per qualia. 
Manifestum igitur ex hiis iam qualiter habentes irascuntur ipsi et quibus et propter que. 
It will be plain by now, from what has been said, (1) in what frame of mind, (2) with what persons, and (3) on what grounds people grow angry. 
αὐτοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὅταν λυπῶνται·  (11) ἐφίεται γάρ τινος ὁ λυπούμενος·  ἐάν τε οὖν κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν (12) ὁτιοῦν ἀντικρούσῃ τις, οἷον τῷ διψῶντι πρὸς τὸ πιεῖν, ἐάν τε (13) μή, ὁμοίως ταὐτὸ φαίνεται ποιεῖν·  καὶ ἐάν τε ἀντιπράττῃ (14) τις ἐάν τε μὴ συμπράττῃ ἐάν τε ἄλλο τι ἐνοχλῇ οὕτως (15) ἔχοντα, πᾶσιν ὀργίζεται·  [II.2.10] διὸ κάμνοντες, πενόμενοι, <πολε(16)μοῦντες,> ἐρῶντες, διψῶντες, ὅλως ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ μὴ(17) (18) κατορθοῦντες ὀργίλοι εἰσὶ καὶ εὐπαρόρμητοι,  μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς (19) τοὺς τοῦ παρόντος ὀλιγωροῦντας,  οἷον κάμνων μὲν τοῖς πρὸς (20) τὴν νόσον,  πενόμενος δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πενίαν,  πολεμῶν δὲ (21) τοῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον,  ἐρῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα,  ὁμοίως (22) δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ‹εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο ὀλιγωρῇ τις›·  (23) προοδοποιεῖται γὰρ ἕκαστος πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου ὀργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ (24) ὑπάρχοντος πάθους·  [II.2.11] ἔτι δ’ ἐὰν τἀναντία τύχῃ προσδεχόμενος·  (25) λυπεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν,  ὥσπερ καὶ τέρπει τὸ (26) πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ἐὰν γένηται ὃ βούλεται·  διὸ καὶ ὧραι καὶ (27) χρόνοι καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ ἡλικίαι ἐκ τούτων φανεραί, ποῖαι (28) εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε,  καὶ ὅτε μᾶλλον ἐν (29) τούτοις εἰσί, μᾶλλον καὶ εὐκίνητοι. 
فإذا كان بهذه \ الحال أعني أن يكون مع الحزن أو الأذى  يتشوق إلى شيء  دخلته الموجدة من ساعته \ أو لم تدخله غير أنه يُرى فاعلا ذلك بعينه إن فعل به أحد شيئا وإن لم يفعل به  وكذلك \ إن كان شيء آخر يؤذيه فإنه إذا كان كذلك فقد يغضب على كل أو في كل  فالذين إذا مستهم \ فاقة أو مرض يشتهون البتة ولا يقومون شيئا فهم غضوبون وليسوا شهويين  وقد يغضبون بزيادة على الذين تصغر نفوسهم أو يتهاونون بالأمر الواقع  أما عند الوجع \ منهم فعلى الذين يتهاونون بالوجع  وأما في حال الفاقة منهم فعلى المتهاونين بالفاقة  وأما في الحرب فعلى المتهاونين بالحرب  وأما في الصداقة فعلى المتهاونين بالذين هم أصدقاء  وإن لم يكن شيء من هذا فغير ذلك مما يتهاون فيه المتهاون  فكل امرئ فقد يخرج إلى الغضب من قبل الألم الذي هو به  ثم إن صار إلى خلاف ما أمل  فقد يعرض للمرء الأذى والحزن الشديد بالأكثر إذا ظن ظنا ولم يكن ما أمل    وقد يستبين من هذا الذي ذكرنا في أي الأوقات والأزمنة والأسنان والأخلاق يكونون أيسر تحريكا نحو الغضب 2    
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Ipsi quidem enim, quando tristantur;  appetit enim aliquid qui tristatur;  si secundum visum igitur repercutit aliquis, ut sitienti ad bibendum, si vero non, similiter idem videtur facere;  et si ad invicem agit aliquis sive non simul operatur sive aliud quis impedit sic se habentem, omnibus irasci;  ideo laborantes mendici desiderantes sitientes, omnino concupiscentes et non rectificantes irascibiles sunt et bene mobiles,  maxime quidem despicientes presens,  ut puta laborans quidem existentibus ad egritudinem,  mendicans autem entibus ad mendicitatem,  bellans vero eis qui sunt in bello,  petens vero eis qui sunt ad petitionem,  similiter autem et alii, si vero non, et quoniam utique aliud parvipendit aliquid;  preparatur enim unusquisque ad uniuscuiusque iram ab existente passione;  amplius autem si contraria attigerit expectans;  tristatur enim magis multum transopinabile,  tamquam et exultat multum inopinabile, si fiat quod vult;  ideoque hore et anni et dispositiones et etates ex hiis manifeste, et que bene mobiles ad iram et quando,  et quoniam quando magis in hiis sunt, magis et bene mobiles. 
Ipsi quidem enim, cum tristantur;  appetit enim aliquid qui tristatur;  sive directe contra molestet quis, ut sitienti quantum ad bibere, sive non, idem videtur facere;  et sive contra agat aliquis sive non cooperetur sive in alio quis molestet sic habens omnibus irascitur;  propter quod infirmi, egentes, amantes, sitientes, totaliter concupiscentes et non assequentes iracundi sunt et facile commobiles,  maxime quidem ad presentes parvi pendentes,  puta laborans quidem eis qui ad egritudinem,  egentes autem eis qui ad egestatem,  bellans autem eis qui ad bellum,  amans autem eis qui ad amorem,  similiter autem et alii, si autem non et quodcumque aliud parvi pendat quis;  preparatur enim unusquisque ad uniuscuiusque iram ab inexistente passione;  adhuc autem si contraria extiterit suscipiens;  contristat enim magis quod multum inopinatum,  sicut et delectat quod multum inopinatum, si fiat quod volitum est;  propter quod et tempora et hore et dispositiones et etates ex hiis manifeste, et que facile mobiles ad iram et quando et ubi,  et quod quando magis in hiis sunt, magis etiam facile mobiles. 
(1) The frame of mind is that of one in which any pain is being felt.  In that condition, a man is always aiming at something.  Whether, then, another man opposes him either directly in any way, as by preventing him from drinking when he is thirsty, or indirectly, the act appears to him just the same;  whether some one works against him, or fails to work with him, or otherwise vexes him while he is in this mood, he is equally angry in all these cases.  Hence people who are afflicted by sickness or poverty or love or thirst or any other unsatisfied desires are prone to anger and easily roused:  especially against those who slight their present distress.  Thus a sick man is angered by disregard of his illness,  a poor man by disregard of his poverty,  a man waging war by disregard of the war he is waging,  a lover by disregard of his love,  and so throughout, any other sort of slight being enough if special slights are wanting.  Each man is predisposed, by the emotion now controlling him, to his own particular anger.  Further, we are angered if we happen to be expecting a contrary result:  for a quite unexpected evil is specially painful,  just as the quite unexpected fulfilment of our wishes is specially pleasant.  Hence it is plain what seasons, times, conditions, and periods of life tend to stir men easily to anger, and where and when this will happen;  and it is plain that the more we are under these conditions the more easily we are stirred. 
[II.2.12] (30) αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργήν,  ὀργί(31)ζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ χλευάζουσιν καὶ σκώ(32)πτουσιν (ὑβρίζουσι γάρ),  καὶ τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα βλάπτουσιν ὅσα (33) ὕβρεως σημεῖα·  ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἃ μήτε ἀντί τινος (34) μήτ’ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ποιοῦσιν·  ἤδη γὰρ δοκεῖ δι’ ὕβριν. 
  وعلى من يغضبون وبمن يهزؤون يعينون وبمن يعيرون [L 87] وإنما يشتمون أو يستهينون  بالذين هم بهذه الحال أعني الذين يضرون بهم فعلامات الشتم أو الاستهانة بالغة ما بلغت  تعدو أن تكون من هذا النحو أعني التي لا ينتفع بها الفاعلون في شيء  فقد يظن واجبا أن يكون من الشتم والاستهانة 
.  .  .  .  . 
Hii quidem igitur sic se habentes bene mobiles ad iram,  irascuntur autem deridentibus et deliciosis; vituperant (iniuriantur enim);  et ledentibus talia quecumque iniurie signa;  necesse talia esse que nee contra aliquem nee auxilium facientibus;  utique enim videtur per iniuriam. 
Ipsi quidem igitur sic habentes facile mobiles ad iram.  Irascuntur autem et deridentibus et subsannantibus et conviciantibus (contumeliam enim inferunt),  et in talibus nocentibus quecumque sunt contumelie signa;  necesse autem talia esse que neque pro aliquo neque proficua facientibus;  iam enim videntur in contumeliam. 
These, then, are the frames of mind in which men are easily stirred to anger.  The persons with whom we get angry are those who laugh, mock, or jeer at us, for such conduct is insolent.  Also those who inflict injuries upon us that are marks of insolence.  These injuries must be such as are neither retaliatory nor profitable to the doers:  for only then will they be felt to be due to insolence. 
[II.2.13] καὶ (35) τοῖς κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ καταφρονοῦσι περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ μάλιστα (36) σπουδάζουσιν,  οἷον οἱ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐάν τις (37) εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν,  οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐάν τις εἰς τὴν ἰδέαν, (38) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων·  [II.2.14] ταῦτα δὲ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν (39) ὑποπτεύσωσι μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὑτοῖς, ἢ ὅλως ἢ μὴ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ (1379b1) μὴ δοκεῖν·  ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴωνται ὑπερέχειν ἐν τού(2)τοις ἐν οἷς σκώπτονται, οὐ φροντίζουσιν. 
فعل الذين يسيئون القول ويستخفون بالمجتهدين فضل اجتهاد في الفضيلة  كالذين يشرفون بالفلسفة إن امرؤ شرف بها  أو بما أشبهها إن كان شيء يشبهها وكذلك سائر الأخر  فأما هؤلاء فكم بالحري يظنون أنه ليست لهم في ذلك منفعة البتة أو يظنون بلا قوة أو لا يظنون  لكنهم إن ظنوا أن لهم في اللاتي يعيرون بها منفعة عظيمة 3  
.  .  .  .  . 
Et male dicentibus et spernentibus ea circa que maxime student,  tamquam qui in phllosophia diliguntur honorabiles si quis ad philosophiam,  hii vero in ydea si quis ad ydeam, similiter autem et in aliis;  hec autem multo magis, si insidiantur non esse ipsis, aut omnino aut non fortiter aut non videri;  quoniam autem si vehementer arbitrantur esse in hiis in quibus iniuriam patiantur, non curant. 
Et obloquentibus et despicientibus ea circa que ipsi maxime student,  puta qui in philosophia amant honorari si quis in philosophiam,  qui autem in specie si quis in speciem, similiter aute1n et in aliis;  hec autem multo magis, si suspicati fuerint non existere ipsis, aut totaliter aut non fortiter, aut non videri;  sed cum valde putent existere in hiis in quibus subsannantur, non curant. 
Also those who speak ill of us, and show contempt for us, in connexion with the things we ourselves most care about:  thus those who are eager to win fame as philosophers get angry with those who show contempt for their philosophy;  those who pride themselves upon their appearance get angry with those who show contempt for their appearance and so on in other cases.  We feel particularly angry on this account if we suspect that we are in fact, or that people think we are, lacking completely or to any effective extent in the qualities in question.  For when we are convinced that we excel in the qualities for which we are jeered at, we can ignore the jeering. 
[II.2.15] καὶ τοῖς φίλοις (3) μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις·  οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον (4) πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἢ μή. 
فهم بالأكثر يخالون للرحمة أو العطف  لأنهم يظنون أنهم قريب من أن ينالون منهم فعل حسن إلا أن 
.  . 
Et amicis magis quam non amicis;  extimant convenire magis ab ipsis bene pati aut non. 
Et amicis magis quam non amicis;  arbitrantur enirn con venire magis ab ipsis bene pati quam non. 
Again, we are angrier with our friends than with other people,  since we feel that our friends ought to treat us well and not badly. 
[II.2.16] καὶ τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τιμᾶν ἢ (5) φροντίζειν, ἐὰν πάλιν μὴ οὕτως ὁμιλῶσιν·  καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ (6) τούτων οἴονται καταφρονεῖσθαι· ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιεῖν. 
يكونوا إنما يعيرون أو يخالون باللاتي قد اعتيدت وإن لم يعودوا فيلقوهم بمثل ذلك ثانية  فإنهم قد يظنون بهؤلاء أيضا التهاون بهم 
.  . 
Et consuetis honorare aut curare, si iterum non sic mitigentur;  et enim ab hiis putant despici; hec enim utique facere. 
Et hiis qui consueverunt honorare aut curare, si iterum non ita se habeant;  et enim ab hiis putant despici; eadem enim utique facerent. 
We are angry with those who have usually treated us with honour or regard, if a change comes and they behave to us otherwise:  for we think that they feel contempt for us, or they would still be behaving as they did before. 
καὶ (7) τοῖς μὴ ἀντιποιοῦσιν εὖ μηδὲ τὴν ἴσην ἀνταποδιδοῦσιν. 
وكذلك يظنون بالذين لا يعودون فيحسنون والذين لا يكافئون بالاستيجاب 
. 
Et non contrafacientibus bene neque equalitatem retribuentes. 
Et hiis qui non contra bene faciunt neque equalem retribuunt. 
And with those who do not return our kindnesses or fail to return them adequately, 
[II.2.17] καὶ (8) τοῖς τἀναντία ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν ἥττους ὦσιν.  καταφρονεῖν (9) γὰρ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι φαίνονται,  καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἡττόνων οἱ (10) δ’ ὡς παρὰ ἡττόνων. 
والذين يفعلون بهم المخالفات والذين هم عندهم بحال خسيسة  فكل هؤلاء ونحوهم قد يظنون متهاونين  أما بعضهم ففي الأمور الخسيسة وأما بعضهم ففي التي هي أخس 
.  .  . 
Et facientibus contraria ipsis, quamvis minores sint.  Despicere enim omnes hii videntur,  et hii quidem tamquam minora, hii vera tamquam iuxta minora. 
Et hiis qui contraria faciunt ipsis, si minores fuerint.  Despicere enim omnes tales videntur,  et hii quidem ut minores, hii autem ut comparatione minores. 
and with those who oppose us though they are our inferiors:  for all such persons seem to feel contempt for us;  those who oppose us seem to think us inferior to themselves, and those who do not return our kindnesses seem to think that those kindnesses were conferred by inferiors. 
[II.2.18] καὶ τοῖς ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ οὖσιν, ἄν τι (11) ὀλιγωρῶσι, μᾶλλον·  ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ τῆς ὀλιγωρίας (12) πρὸς τοὺς μὴ προσήκοντας, προσήκει δὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι μὴ ὀλι(13)γωρεῖν·  [II.2.19] τοῖς δὲ φίλοις, ἐάν τε μὴ εὖ λέγωσιν ἢ ποιῶσιν,  καὶ (14) ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐὰν τἀναντία,  καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθάνωνται δεομένων, (15) ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀντιφῶντος Πλήξιππος τῷ Μελεάγρῳ·  ὀλιγωρίας (16) γὰρ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι σημεῖον·  ὧν γὰρ φροντίζομεν οὐ (17) λανθάνει. 
والتي ليست فيها كلمة البتة  وأيضا الغضب موضوع تحت صغر النفس في الواجبات فليس ينبغي أن تصغر النفس في الأمور اليسيرة  فأما الأصدقاء فقد يجب الغضب عليهم إن لم يقولوا جميلا  وأكثر من ذلك  وإن كانوا لا يحسون أو يألمون للمتضادات المخالفات إذا أصابت أصدقاءهم وإذا مستهم حاجة كمثل [L 88] ما يقال في فيليخيفوس صاحب أنطيفون بمالاغروس  ولا حس أو لا ألم دليل على صغر النفس والتهاون  ثم إن هم أحزنوا أو أذوا من يعنون به 4  
.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Et existentibus nulli rationi, si quid despiciunt magis;  subiacct enim ira despectioni ad non convenientes, con venit autem minoribus non despicere;  amicis vera, sive non bene dicant aut faciant,  et amplius magis si contraria,  et si non tangunt indigentia, quemadmodum Antphontis Plexippus Meleagro;  despectionis enim non tangere signum;  que curamus non latere. 
Et hiis qui in nulla proportione sunt, si quid parvi pendant, magis;  supponitur enim ira parvipensionis ad non convenientes, convenit autem minoribus non parvi pendere;  amicis autem, si non bene dicant vel faciant,  et adhuc magis si contraria,  et si non intendant indirogentibus, sicut Plexippus Antifontis Meleagro;  parvipensionis enim non intendere signum;  ea enim que curamus non latent. 
And we feel particularly angry with men of no account at all, if they slight us.  For, by our hypothesis, the anger caused by the slight is felt towards people who are not justified in slighting us, and our inferiors are not thus justified.  Again, we feel angry with friends if they do not speak well of us or treat us well;  and still more, if they do the contrary;  or if they do not perceive our needs, which is why Plexippus is angry with Meleager in Antiphon’s play;  for this want of perception shows that they are slighting us  — we do not fail to perceive the needs of those for whom we care. 
[II.2.20] καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχαίρουσι ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καὶ ὅλως (18) εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀτυχίαις·  ἢ γὰρ ἐχθροῦ ἢ ὀλι(19)γωροῦντος σημεῖον. 
   
.  . 
Et gaudentibus infelicitatibus et universaliter bene putantibus in infelicitatibus ipsorum;  aut enim inimici aut despicientis signum. 
Et exultantibus in infortuniis et totaliter hiis qui boni animi in ipsorum infortuniis;  aut enim inimici aut parvi pendentis signum. 
Again we are angry with those who rejoice at our misfortunes or simply keep cheerful in the midst of our misfortunes,  since this shows that they either hate us or are slighting us. 
καὶ τοῖς μὴ φροντίζουσιν ἐὰν λυπήσωσιν·  (20) διὸ καὶ τοῖς κακὰ ἀγγέλλουσιν ὀργίζονται. 
  فقد يغضبون على من أساءوا به الظن 
.  . 
Et non sollicitis entibus si tristabuntur;  ideo mala nuntiantibus irascuntur. 
Et hiis qui non curant si contristaverint;  propter quod mala annuntiantibus irascuntur. 
Also with those who are indifferent to the pain they give us:  this is why we get angry with bringers of bad news. 
[II.2.21] καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἀκούουσι (21) περὶ αὐτῶν ἢ θεωμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν φαῦλα·  ὅμοιοι γάρ εἰσιν ἢ (22) ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἢ ἐχθροῖς·  οἱ γὰρ φίλοι συναλγοῦσιν, θεώμενοι δὲ (23) τὰ οἰκεῖα φαῦλα πάντες ἀλγοῦσιν. 
وعلى الذين يتهاونون بما يبلغون عنهم أو يرون بهم من سوء  فإنهم يشبهون عندهم الأعداء إذا صغرت أنفسهم أو تهاونوا  لأن كل الذين يمضهم أمر أصدقائهم قد يألمون أو يجزعون إذا رأوا بهم سوءا 
.  .  . 
Et audientibus de ipsis aut videntibus ipsorum mala;  silniles enim sunt aut despicientibus aut inimicis;  amici enim condolent, inspicientes autem propria mala omnes dolent. 
Et hiis qui aut audiunt de ipsis aut inspiciunt ea que ipsorum mala;  silniles enim sunt aut parvi pendentibus aut inimicis;  amici enirn condolcnt, inspicientes autem propria mala omnes dolent. 
And with those who listen to stories about us or keep on looking at our weaknesses;  this seems like either slighting us or hating us;  for those who love us share in all our distresses and it must distress any one to keep on looking at his own weaknesses. 
[II.2.22] ἔτι τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσι πρὸς (24) πέντε, πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, [πρὸς] οὓς θαυμάζουσιν, ὑφ’ (25) ὧν βούλονται θαυμάζεσθαι, ἢ οὓς αἰσχύνονται, ἢ ἐν τοῖς (26) αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς·  ἄν τις ἐν τούτοις ὀλιγωρῇ, ὀργίζονται (27) μᾶλλον. 
ثم قد يغضبون على الذين يتهاونون أو بصغر أنفسهم في خمسة أصناف وذلك في الذين يكرمونهم وفي الذين يتعجبون منهم وفي الذين يحبون أن يكونوا عندهم عجيبين أو متعجبا منهم وفي الذين هم يستخزون منهم وفي اللاتي يكون فيها الخزى والفضيحة  إن امرء صغرت نفسه أو تهاون بذلك فقد يشتد الغضب منهم على الذين يتهاونون أو تصغر نفوسهم 
.  . 
Amplius despicientibus ad quinque, apud quos philotimunte, ad quos mirantur, a quibus, volunt admirari, ad quos verentur, in verentibus ipsos;  in hiis si quis despicit, irascuntur magis. 
Adhuc parvi pendentibus ad quinque, ad quos sunt in am ore honoris, ad quos sunt in admiratione, a quibus volunt in admiratione haberi, ad quos verecundantur aut in confundentibus ipsos;  in hiis si quis parvi pendat, irascuntur magis. 
Further, with those who slight us before five classes of people: namely, (1) our rivals, (2) those whom we admire, (3) those whom we wish to admire us, (4) those for whom we feel reverence, (5) those who feel reverence for us:  if any one slights us before such persons, we feel particularly angry. 
[II.2.23] καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀλιγωροῦσιν ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτοῖς (28) αἰσχρὸν μὴ βοηθεῖν, οἷον γονεῖς, τέκνα, γυναῖκας, ἀρχομένους.  (29) καὶ τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδοῦσιν·  παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον γὰρ ἡ (30) ὀλιγωρία. 
وفي هذه الأصناف كالذين لا يؤازرونهم على الجميل وذلك كغضب الآباء على البنين والنساء على الذين يتسلطن عليهم  ثم على الذين لا يكافون بالمنة  فإن النقصان في الواجب من صغر النفس أو التهاون 
.  .  . 
Et despicientibus ad hec super qui bus ipsis malum non auxiliantur, ut puta parentes, filios, uxores, dominantes.  Et non retribuentibus gratias;  iuxta decens enim despectio. 
Et hiis qui in talibus parvi pendunt in quibus turpe est ipsis non auxiliari, puta parentes, pueros, uxores, subiectos.  Et gratiam non reddentibus;  preter conveniens enim parvipensio. 
Again, we feel angry with those who slight us in connexion with what we are as honourable men bound to champion — our parents, children, wives, or subjects.  And with those who do not return a favour,  since such a slight is unjustifiable. 
[II.2.24] καὶ τοῖς εἰρωνευομένοις πρὸς σπουδάζοντας·  (31) καταφρονητικὸν γὰρ ἡ εἰρωνεία. 
وعلى الذين يهزلون عند الذين يجدون  لأن الهزل تهاون 
.  . 
Et yronizantibus ad studentes;  despectibile enim yronia. 
Et yronizantibus ad studentes;  despectivum enim yronia. 
Also with those who reply with humorous levity when we are speaking seriously,  for such behaviour indicates contempt. 
[II.2.25] καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων εὐποιη(32)τικοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν·  καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο καταφρονητικόν, (33) τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν, ὧν πάντας, καὶ αὐτόν. 
وعلى الذين يحسنون إلى آخرين إن لم يكونوا يحسنون إليهم  لأن هذا أيضا من التهاون أعني الأمر لا يستوي فيه المرء بالكل 
.  . 
Et aliis bene facientibus, si non et ipsis;  et enim hoc despectibile, non dignari omnes et ipsum. 
Et hiis qui sunt aliis benefactivi, si non et ipsis;  et enim hoc despectivum, non dignificare ipsum, quibus omnes. 
And with those who treat us less well than they treat everybody else;  it is another mark of contempt that they should think we do not deserve what every one else deserves. 
[II.2.26] ποιητικὸν δ’ ὀργῆς καὶ (34) ἡ λήθη,  οἷον καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων, οὕτως οὖσα περὶ μικρόν·  (35) ὀλιγωρίας γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ λήθη σημεῖον εἶναι·  δι’ ἀμέλειαν (36) μὲν γὰρ ἡ λήθη γίγνεται, ἡ δ’ ἀμέλεια ὀλιγωρία τίς (37) ἐστιν. 
ثم مما يفعل فعل الغضب أيضا النسيان  كالذي قد يعرض في الأسماء وكذلك مهما كان في الأمور اليسيرة  لأن النسيان أيضا قد يظن دليلا على صغر النفس  وذلك [L89] أن النسيان إنما يكون عن التواني والتواني شيء من صغر النفس 
.  .  .  . 
Effectivum autem ire et oblivio,  ut puta et ea que est nominum, circa parvum;  despcctionis enim videtur et oblivio signum esse;  ob negligentiam quidem enim oblivio fit, negligentia enim despectio est. 
Factivurn autern ire et oblivio,  velut et que nominum, existens circa modicum;  parvipensionis enim videtur et oblivio signum esse;  propter incuriam quidem enim oblivio fit, incuria autem parvipensio est. 
Forgetfulness, too, causes anger,  as when our own names are forgotten, trifling as this may be;  since forgetfulness is felt to be another sign that we are being slighted;  it is due to negligence, and to neglect us is to slight us. 
[II.2.27] (1380a1) οἷς μὲν οὖν ὀργίζονται καὶ ὡς ἔχοντες καὶ διὰ ποῖα, (2) ἅμα εἴρηται·  δῆλον δ’ ὅτι δέοι ἂν κατασκευάζειν τῷ λόγῳ (3) τοιούτους οἷοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν,  καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους (4) τούτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ’ οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἵοις (5) ὀργίζονται. 
أما على من يغضبون وبأية حال يكونون غضابا ومن أجل أي شيء يغضبون فقد قيل  ثم هو معلوم أنه يمكن أن يثبت بهذا القول أن كيف يوجد الذين يكون لهم صغر النفس  فأما أضداد هؤلاء أعني الغضاب فقد يستدل عليهم من قبل الغضاب والأشياء التي في مثلها يغضبون 
.  .  . 
Quibus quidem igitur irascuntur et quomodo se habentes et per qualia, dictum est;  manifestum autem tamquam oporteat ipsum construere sermone hos putantes irascibiliter habent,  et contrarios hiis reos existentes in quibus irascuntur, et tales qui quibus irascuntur. 
Quibus quidem igitur irascuntur et quomodo habentes et propter que, dictum est;  palam autem quomodo oportebit utique ipsum efficere oratione tales quales existentes iracunde habent,  et contrarios hiis reos existentes in quibus irascuntur, et tales qualibus irascuntur. 
The persons with whom we feel anger, the frame of mind in which we feel it, and the reasons why we feel it, have now all been set forth.  Clearly the orator will have to speak so as to bring his hearers into a frame of mind that will dispose them to anger,  and to represent his adversaries as open to such charges and possessed of such qualities as do make people angry. 
 
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Enhet: Det humanistiske fakultet   Utviklet av: IT-seksjonen ved HF
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