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Aristoteles: Rhetorica

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20. (23) Λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πίστεων ἅπασιν εἰπεῖν, ἐπείπερ (24) εἴρηται περὶ τῶν ἰδίων.  εἰσὶ δ’ αἱ κοιναὶ πίστεις δύο τῷ γένει, (25) παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα·  ἡ γὰρ γνώμη μέρος ἐνθυμήματός (26) ἐστιν. 
Part 20. The special forms of oratorical argument having now been discussed, we have next to treat of those which are common to all kinds of oratory.  These are of two main kinds, ‘Example’ and ‘Enthymeme’;  for the ‘Maxim’ is part of an enthymeme. 
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν· ὅμοιον (27) γὰρ ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἡ δ’ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή.  (28) παραδειγμάτων δὲ εἴδη δύο·  ἓν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν παραδείγμα(29)τος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγενομένα, ἓν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν (30) ποιεῖν.  τούτου δὲ ἓν μὲν παραβολὴ ἓν δὲ λόγοι, οἷον οἱ Αἰσώ(31)πειοι καὶ Λιβυκοί. 
We will first treat of argument by Example, for it has the nature of induction, which is the foundation of reasoning.  This form of argument has two varieties;  one consisting in the mention of actual past facts, the other in the invention of facts by the speaker.  Of the latter, again, there are two varieties, the illustrative parallel and the fable (e.g. the fables of Aesop, those from Libya). 
ἔστιν δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν τοιόνδε (32) τι,  ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς βασιλέα παρασκευάζεσθαι (33) καὶ μὴ ἐᾶν Αἴγυπτον χειρώσασθαι·  καὶ γὰρ πρότερον Δαρεῖος (1393b1) οὐ πρότερον διέβη πρὶν Αἴγυπτον ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη,  καὶ (2) πάλιν Ξέρξης οὐ πρότερον ἐπεχείρησεν πρὶν ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν (3) δὲ διέβη, ὥστε καὶ οὗτος ἐὰν λάβῃ, διαβήσεται, διὸ οὐκ ἐπι(4)τρεπτέον. 
As an instance of the mention of actual facts, take the following.  The speaker may argue thus: ‘We must prepare for war against the king of Persia and not let him subdue Egypt.  For Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross.  And Xerxes, again, did not attack us until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. If therefore the present king seizes Egypt, he also will cross, and therefore we must not let him.’ 
παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι οὐ (5) δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν·  ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοὺς (6) ἀθλητὰς κληροίη μὴ οἳ δύνανται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλ’ οἳ ἂν (7) λάχωσιν, ἢ τῶν πλωτήρων ὅντινα δεῖ κυβερνᾶν κληρώσειεν, (8) ὡς δέον τὸν λαχόντα ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον.  λόγος δέ, οἷος (9) ὁ Στησιχόρου περὶ Φαλάριδος καὶ <ὁ> Αἰσώπου ὑπὲρ τοῦ δημα(10)γωγοῦ.  Στησίχορος μὲν γὰρ ἑλομένων στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα (11) τῶν Ἱμεραίων Φάλαριν καὶ μελλόντων φυλακὴν διδόναι τοῦ (12) σώματος, τἆλλα διαλεχθεὶς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς λόγον ὡς ἵππος (13) κατεῖχε λειμῶνα μόνος,  ἐλθόντος δ’ ἐλάφου καὶ διαφθείροντος (14) τὴν νομὴν βουλόμενος τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον ἠρώτα τινὰ (15) ἄνθρωπον εἰ δύναιτ’ ἂν μετ’ αὐτοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον,  (16) ὁ δ’ ἔφησεν, ἐὰν λάβῃ χαλινὸν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβῇ ἐπ’ αὐτὸν (17) ἔχων ἀκόντια·  συνομολογήσας δὲ καὶ ἀναβάντος ἀντὶ τοῦ (18) τιμωρήσασθαι αὐτὸς ἐδούλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.  “οὕτω δὲ καὶ (19) ὑμεῖς”, ἔφη, “ὁρᾶτε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρή(20)σασθαι τὸ αὐτὸ πάθητε τῷ ἵππῳ·  τὸν μὲν γὰρ χαλινὸν ἔχετε (21) ἤδη, ἑλόμενοι στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα·  ἑὰν δὲ φυλακὴν δῶτε (22) καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐάσητε, δουλεύσετε ἤδη Φαλάριδι”.  Αἴσωπος δὲ (23) ἐν Σάμῳ δημηγορῶν κρινομένου δημαγωγοῦ περὶ θανάτου ἔφη  (24) ἀλώπεκα διαβαίνουσαν ποταμὸν ἀπωσθῆναι εἰς φάραγγα,  οὐ (25) δυναμένην δὲ ἐκβῆναι πολὺν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν καὶ κυνοραι(26)στὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς,  ἐχῖνον δὲ πλανώμενον, ὡς εἶδεν (27) αὐτήν, κατοικτείραντα ἐρωτᾶν εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτῆς τοὺς κυνοραι(28)στάς, τὴν δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν·  ἐρομένου δὲ διὰ τί, “ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν” φάναι (29) “ἤδη μου πλήρεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὀλίγον ἕλκουσιν αἷμα, ἐὰν δὲ τούτους (30) ἀφέλητε, ἕτεροι ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες ἐκπιοῦνταί μου τὸ λοιπὸν (31) αἷμα”.  “ἀτὰρ καὶ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Σάμιοι, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτι (32) βλάψει (πλούσιος γάρ ἐστιν),  ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτον ἀποκτείνητε, ἕτεροι (1394a1) ἥξουσι πένητες, οἳ ὑμᾶς ἀναλώσουσι τὰ λοιπὰ κλέπτοντες.” (2)  εἰσὶ δ’ οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, (3) ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπόν, λόγους (4) δὲ ῥᾷον·  ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἄν τις (5) δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὁρᾶν, ὅπερ ῥᾷόν ἐστιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας. 
The illustrative parallel is the sort of argument Socrates used: e.g. ’Public officials ought not to be selected by lot.  That is like using the lot to select athletes, instead of choosing those who are fit for the contest; or using the lot to select a steersman from among a ship’s crew, as if we ought to take the man on whom the lot falls, and not the man who knows most about it.’  Instances of the fable are that of Stesichorus about Phalaris, and that of Aesop in defence of the popular leader.  When the people of Himera had made Phalaris military dictator, and were going to give him a bodyguard, Stesichorus wound up a long talk by telling them the fable of the horse who had a field all to himself.  Presently there came a stag and began to spoil his pasturage. The horse, wishing to revenge himself on the stag, asked a man if he could help him to do so.  The man said, ‘Yes, if you will let me bridle you and get on to your back with javelins in my hand’.  The horse agreed, and the man mounted; but instead of getting his revenge on the stag, the horse found himself the slave of the man.  ’You too’, said Stesichorus, ‘take care lest your desire for revenge on your enemies, you meet the same fate as the horse.  By making Phalaris military dictator, you have already let yourselves be bridled.  If you let him get on to your backs by giving him a bodyguard, from that moment you will be his slaves.’  Aesop, defending before the assembly at Samos a poular leader who was being tried for his life, told this story:  A fox, in crossing a river, was swept into a hole in the rocks;  and, not being able to get out, suffered miseries for a long time through the swarms of fleas that fastened on her.  A hedgehog, while roaming around, noticed the fox; and feeling sorry for her asked if he might remove the fleas. But the fox declined the offer;  and when the hedgehog asked why, she replied, ‘These fleas are by this time full of me and not sucking much blood; if you take them away, others will come with fresh appetites and drink up all the blood I have left.’  ‘So, men of Samos’, said Aesop, ‘my client will do you no further harm; he is wealthy already.  But if you put him to death, others will come along who are not rich, and their peculations will empty your treasury completely.’  Fables are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies; and they have one advantage—they are comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past events.  You will in fact frame them just as you frame illustrative parallels: all you require is the power of thinking out your analogy, a power developed by intellectual training. 
ῥᾴω (6) μὲν οὖν πορίσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν λόγων, χρησιμώτερα δὲ πρὸς (7) τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων· ὅμοια γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (8) πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγονόσιν.  (9) δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παραδείγμασι οὐκ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐν(10)θυμήματα ὡς ἀποδείξεσιν (ἡ γὰρ πίστις διὰ τούτων),  ἔχοντα (11) δὲ ὡς μαρτυρίοις, ἐπιλόγῳ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν·  προ(12)τιθέμενα μὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἐπαγωγῇ, τοῖς δὲ ῥητορικοῖς οὐκ (13) οἰκεῖον ἐπαγωγὴ πλὴν ἐν ὀλίγοις,  ἐπιλεγόμενα δὲ μαρτυρίοις, (14) ὁ δὲ μάρτυς πανταχοῦ πιθανός·  διὸ καὶ προτιθέντι μὲν ἀνάγκη (15) πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐπιλέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἓν ἱκανόν·  μάρτυς γὰρ χρηστὸς (16) καὶ εἷς χρήσιμος. 
But while it is easier to supply parallels by inventing fables, it is more valuable for the political speaker to supply them by quoting what has actually happened, since in most respects the future will be like what the past has been.  Where we are unable to argue by Enthymeme, we must try to demonstrate our point by this method of Example, and to convince our hearers thereby.  If we can argue by Enthymeme, we should use our Examples as subsequent supplementary evidence.  They should not precede the Enthymemes: that will give the argument an inductive air, which only rarely suits the conditions of speech—making.  If they follow the enthymemes, they have the effect of witnesses giving evidence, and this alway tells.  For the same reason, if you put your examples first you must give a large number of them; if you put them last, a single one is sufficient;  even a single witness will serve if he is a good one. 
(17) πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη παραδειγμάτων, καὶ πῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ πότε (18) χρηστέον, εἴρηται. 
It has now been stated how many varieties of argument by Example there are, and how and when they are to be employed. 
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