(21) ἄλλος ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου,
(22) μάλιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ ἀεί, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ’ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι, (23) ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, ἢ ἀγαθοί,
ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ (24) κρίνοντες, ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οἷς μὴ οἷόν τε (25) ἐναντίον κρίνειν, οἷον τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ οἷς μὴ καλὸν ἐναντίον (26) κρίνειν, οἷον θεοῖς ἢ πατρὶ ἢ διδασκάλοις,
ὥσπερ ὃ εἰς (27) Μιξιδημίδην εἶπεν Αὐτοκλῆς, [εἰ] ταῖς μὲν σεμναῖς θεαῖς (28) καλῶς εἶχεν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δοῦναι τὰ δίκαια, Μιξιδημίδῃ (29) δ’ οὔ.
ἢ ὥσπερ Σαπφώ, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ (30) γὰρ οὕτω κεκρίκασιν· ἀπέθνησκον γὰρ ἄν.
ἢ ὥσπερ Ἀρί(31)στιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς ᾤετο· (32) “ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γ’ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν”, ἔφη, “οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον”, λέγων (33) τὸν Σωκράτη,
καὶ Ἡγησίπολις ἐν Δελφοῖς ἠρώτα τὸν θεόν, (34) πρότερον κεχρημένος Ὀλυμπίασιν, εἰ αὐτῷ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ (1399a1) ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν,
καὶ περὶ τῆς (2) Ἑλένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἔγραψεν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἴπερ Θησεὺς (3) ἔκρινεν, καὶ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὅτι αἱ θεαὶ προέκριναν,
καὶ (4) περὶ Εὐαγόρου, ὅτι σπουδαῖος, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης φησίν· (5) “Κόνων γοῦν δυστυχήσας, πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους παραλιπών, (6) ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθεν”.
(It may be argued that peoples for whom philosophers legislate are always prosperous) on the ground that the Athenians became prosperous under Solon’s laws and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus, while at Thebes no sooner did the leading men become philosophers than the country began to prosper.
11. Another line of argument is founded upon some decision already pronounced, whether on the same subject or on one like it or contrary to it.
Such a proof is most effective if every one has always decided thus; but if not every one, then at any rate most people; or if all, or most, wise or good men have thus decided,
or the actual judges of the present question, or those whose authority they accept, or any one whose decision they cannot gainsay because he has complete control over them, or those whom it is not seemly to gainsay, as the gods, or one’s father, or one’s teachers.
Thus Autocles said, when attacking Mixidemides, that it was a strange thing that the Dread Goddesses could without loss of dignity submit to the judgement of the Areopagus, and yet Mixidemides could not.
Or as Sappho said, ‘Death is an evil thing; the gods have so judged it, or they would die’.
Or again as Aristippus said in reply to Plato when he spoke somewhat too dogmatically, as Aristippus thought: ‘Well, anyhow, our friend’, meaning Socrates, ‘never spoke like that’.
And Hegesippus, having previously consulted Zeus at Olympia, asked Apollo at Delphi ‘whether his opinion was the same as his father’s’, implying that it would be shameful for him to contradict his father.
Thus too Isocrates argued that Helen must have been a good woman, because Theseus decided that she was; and Paris a good man, because the goddesses chose him before all others;
