Bibliotheca Polyglotta

9. (23) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ (24) καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ· οὗτοι γὰρ σκοποὶ τῷ ἐπαινοῦντι καὶ ψέ(25)γοντι· συμβήσεται γὰρ ἅμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κἀκεῖνα (26) δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοί τινες ὑποληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, (27) ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον (28) ἀξιόπιστον δυνησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν.

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Part 9. We have now to consider Virtue and Vice, the Noble and the Base, since these are the objects of praise and blame. In doing so, we shall at the same time be finding out how to make our hearers take the required view of our own characters — our second method of persuasion. The ways in which to make them trust the goodness of other people are also the ways in which to make them trust our own.

ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβαίνει (29) καὶ χωρὶς σπουδῆς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐπαινεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μόνον (30) ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τὸ τυχόν, (31) τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ τούτων ληπτέον τὰς προτάσεις, (32) ὥστε ὅσον παραδείγματος χάριν εἴπωμεν καὶ περὶ τούτων.

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Praise, again, may be serious or frivolous; nor is it always of a human or divine being but often of inanimate things, or of the humblest of the lower animals. Here too we must know on what grounds to argue, and must, therefore, now discuss the subject, though by way of illustration only.

(33) καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὃ ἂν δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ὂν ἐπ(34)αινετὸν ᾖ, ἢ ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἡδὺ ᾖ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ (35) τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλόν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν εἶναι· (36) ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν.

. . .

The Noble is that which is both desirable for its own sake and also worthy of praise; or that which is both good and also pleasant because good. If this is a true definition of the Noble, it follows that virtue must be noble, since it is both a good thing and also praiseworthy.

ἀρετὴ δ’ ἐστὶ μὲν δύ(37)ναμις ὡς δοκεῖ ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ (38) δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, καὶ πάντων (1366b1) περὶ πάντα· μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφρο(2)σύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, φρόνησις, (3) σοφία.

. . .

Virtue is, according to the usual view, a faculty of providing and preserving good things; or a faculty of conferring many great benefits, and benefits of all kinds on all occasions. The forms of Virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom.

ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις (4) χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική, (5) <καὶ> διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶ(6)σιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰ(7)ρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλλοις.

. . .

If virtue is a faculty of beneficence, the highest kinds of it must be those which are most useful to others, and for this reason men honour most the just and the courageous, since courage is useful to others in war, justice both in war and in peace.

εἶτα ἐλευθεριότης· προΐενται γὰρ (8) καὶ οὐκ ἀνταγωνίζονται περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὧν μάλιστα (9) ἐφίενται ἄλλοι.

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Next comes liberality; liberal people let their money go instead of fighting for it, whereas other people care more for money than for anything else.

ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν (10) ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος· ἀδικία δὲ δι’ ἣν τὰ ἀλλό(11)τρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος.

. .

Justice is the virtue through which everybody enjoys his own possessions in accordance with the law; its opposite is injustice, through which men enjoy the possessions of others in defiance of the law.

ἀνδρεία δὲ δι’ ἣν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν (12) καλῶν ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ (13) ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ· δειλία δὲ τοὐναντίον.

. .

Courage is the virtue that disposes men to do noble deeds in situations of danger, in accordance with the law and in obedience to its commands; cowardice is the opposite.

σωφροσύνη δὲ (14) ἀρετὴ δι’ ἣν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν (15) ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει· ἀκολασία δὲ τοὐναντίον.

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Temperance is the virtue that disposes us to obey the law where physical pleasures are concerned; incontinence is the opposite.

ἐλευθεριότης (16) δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὐποιητική, ἀνελευθερία δὲ τοὐναντίον.

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Liberality disposes us to spend money for others’ good; illiberality is the opposite.

(17) μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων (18) [μικροψυχία δὲ τοὐναντίον], μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπα(19)νήμασι μεγέθους ποιητική, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικρο(20)πρέπεια τἀναντία.

. . .

Magnanimity is the virtue that disposes us to do good to others on a large scale; [its opposite is meanness of spirit]. Magnificence is a virtue productive of greatness in matters involving the spending of money. The opposites of these two are smallness of spirit and meanness respectively.

φρόνησις δ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ’ (21) ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν (22) εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

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Prudence is that virtue of the understanding which enables men to come to wise decisions about the relation to happiness of the goods and evils that have been previously mentioned.

(23) περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ περὶ τῶν μο(24)ρίων εἴρηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἱκανῶς, περὶ δὲ τῶν (25) ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τά τε ποιη (26)τικὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι καλά (πρὸς ἀρετὴν γάρ) καὶ τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρε(27)τῆς γινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε σημεῖα τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὰ (28) ἔργα· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅ ἐστιν ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα (29) ἢ πάθη καλά, ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε ἀνδρείας ἔργα ἢ σημεῖα ἀν(30)δρείας ἢ ἀνδρείως πέπρακται καλὰ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δίκαια (31) καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα (πάθη δὲ οὔ· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ταύτῃ τῶν (32) ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ δικαίως καλόν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦ(33)σθαι αἰσχρὸν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως), καὶ κατὰ (34) τὰς ἄλλας δὲ ἀρετὰς ὡσαύτως.

. . . . . .

The above is a sufficient account, for our present purpose, of virtue and vice in general, and of their various forms. As to further aspects of the subject, it is not difficult to discern the facts; it is evident that things productive of virtue are noble, as tending towards virtue; and also the effects of virtue, that is, the signs of its presence and the acts to which it leads. And since the signs of virtue, and such acts as it is the mark of a virtuous man to do or have done to him, are noble, it follows that all deeds or signs of courage, and everything done courageously, must be noble things; and so with what is just and actions done justly. (Not, however, actions justly done to us; here justice is unlike the other virtues; ‘justly’ does not always mean ‘nobly’; when a man is punished, it is more shameful that this should be justly than unjustly done to him). The same is true of the other virtues.

καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσοις τὰ ἆθλα (35) τιμή, καλά. καὶ ἐφ’ ὅσοις τιμὴ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα. (36) καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα πράττει τις τῶν αἱρετῶν, καὶ τὰ (37) ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά, ὅσα τε ὑπὲρ πατρίδος τις ἐποίησεν παρ(38)ιδὼν τὸ αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὰ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθά, καὶ ἃ μὴ αὐτῷ (1367a1) ἀγαθά· αὑτοῦ γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

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Again, those actions are noble for which the reward is simply honour, or honour more than money. So are those in which a man aims at something desirable for some one else’s sake; actions good absolutely, such as those a man does for his country without thinking of himself; actions good in their own nature; actions that are not good simply for the individual, since individual interests are selfish.

καὶ ὅσα τεθνεῶτι (2) ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι· τὸ γὰρ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα (3) μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζῶντι.

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Noble also are those actions whose advantage may be enjoyed after death, as opposed to those whose advantage is enjoyed during one’s lifetime: for the latter are more likely to be for one’s own sake only.

καὶ ὅσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων ἕνεκα· (4) ἧττον γὰρ αὑτοῦ. καὶ ὅσαι εὐπραγίαι περὶ ἄλλους ἀλλὰ (5) μὴ περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ <αἱ> περὶ τοὺς εὖ ποιήσαντας· δίκαιον γάρ. (6) καὶ τὰ εὐεργετήματα· οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὑτόν.

. . .

Also, all actions done for the sake of others, since less than other actions are done for one’s own sake; and all successes which benefit others and not oneself; and services done to one’s benefactors, for this is just; and good deeds generally, since they are not directed to one’s own profit.

καὶ τὰ ἐναντία (7) ἢ ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχύνονται καὶ (8) λέγοντες καὶ ποιοῦντες καὶ μέλλοντες, ὥσπερ καὶ Σαπφὼ (9) πεποίηκεν, εἰπόντος τοῦ Ἀλκαίου (10) θέλω τι εἰπῆν, ἀλλά με κωλύει
(11) αἰδώς,
(12) αἱ δ’ ἦχες ἐσθλῶν ἵμερον ἢ καλῶν
(13) καὶ μή τι εἰπῆν γλῶσσ’ ἐκύκα κακόν
(14) αἰδώς κέν σε οὐκ εἶχεν ὄμματ’,
(15) ἀλλ’ ἔλεγες περὶ τῶ δικαίω.

. . .

And the opposites of those things of which men feel ashamed, for men are ashamed of saying, doing, or intending to do shameful things. Sappho wrote, when Alcaius said: Something I fain would say to thee,Only shame restraineth me,If for things good and noble thou wert yearning,If to speak baseness were thy tongue not burning,No load of shame would on thine eyelids weigh;What thou with honour wishest thou wouldst say.

(16) καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι· περὶ γὰρ τῶν πρὸς (17) δόξαν φερόντων ἀγαθῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν. καὶ αἱ τῶν φύσει (18) σπουδαιοτέρων ἀρεταὶ καλλίους καὶ τὰ ἔργα, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἢ (19) γυναικός.

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Those things, also, are noble for which men strive anxiously, without feeling fear; for they feel thus about the good things which lead to fair fame. Again, one quality or action is nobler than another if it is that of a naturally finer being: thus a man’s will be nobler than a woman’s.

καὶ αἱ ἀπολαυστικαὶ ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοῖς· (20) διὸ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καλόν.

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And those qualities are noble which give more pleasure to other people than to their possessors; hence the nobleness of justice and just actions.

καὶ τὸ τοὺς (21) ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι· τό τε γὰρ (22) ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καλόν, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ (23) ἡττᾶσθαι.

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It is noble to avenge oneself on one’s enemies and not to come to terms with them; for requital is just, and the just is noble; and not to surrender is a sign of courage.

καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν· αἱρετά (24) τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα, καὶ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς δηλοῖ. καὶ τὰ (25) μνημονευτά, καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον.

. . .

Victory, too, and honour belong to the class of noble things, since they are desirable even when they yield no fruits, and they prove our superiority in good qualities. Things that deserve to be remembered are noble, and the more they deserve this, the nobler they are.

καὶ ἃ μὴ ζῶντι (26) ἕπεται, καὶ οἷς τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ τὰ περιττά, καὶ τὰ (27) μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα, καλλίω· εὐμνημονευτότερα γάρ. καὶ (28) κτήματα ἄκαρπα· ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ. καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἑκά(29)στοις δὲ ἴδια καλά, καὶ ὅσα σημεῖά ἐστιν τῶν παρ’ ἑκάστοις (30) ἐπαινουμένων, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κομᾶν καλόν· ἐλευθέρου (31) γὰρ σημεῖον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κομῶντα ῥᾴδιον οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἔργον (32) θητικόν.

. . . .

So are the things that continue even after death; those which are always attended by honour; those which are exceptional; and those which are possessed by one person alone—these last are more readily remembered than others. So again are possessions that bring no profit, since they are more fitting than others for a gentleman. So are the distinctive qualities of a particular people, and the symbols of what it specially admires, like long hair in Sparta, where this is a mark of a free man, as it is not easy to perform any menial task when one’s hair is long.

καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην· (33) ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν.

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Again, it is noble not to practise any sordid craft, since it is the mark of a free man not to live at another’s beck and call.

ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ (34) σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ὡς ταὐτὰ ὄντα καὶ πρὸς ἔπ(35)αινον καὶ πρὸς ψόγον, οἷον τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβου(36)λον καὶ τὸν ἠλίθιον χρηστὸν ἢ τὸν ἀνάλγητον πρᾶον, καὶ (37) ἕκαστον δ’ ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, (38) οἷον τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸν αὐθάδη (1367b1) μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν, καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς (2) ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἷον τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸν (3) ἄσωτον ἐλευθέριον· δόξει τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἅμα (4) παραλογιστικὸν [ἐκ] τῆς αἰτίας. εἰ γὰρ οὗ μὴ ἀνάγκη κιν(5)δυνευτικός, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειεν ὅπου καλόν, καὶ εἰ (6) προετικὸς τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ (7) ἀρετῆς τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιεῖν.

. . . . . . . . . .

We are also to assume when we wish either to praise a man or blame him that qualities closely allied to those which he actually has are identical with them; for instance, that the cautious man is cold—blooded and treacherous, and that the stupid man is an honest fellow or the thick—skinned man a good—tempered one. We can always idealize any given man by drawing on the virtues akin to his actual qualities; thus we may say that the passionate and excitable man is ‘outspoken’; or that the arrogant man is ‘superb’ or ‘impressive’. Those who run to extremes will be said to possess the corresponding good qualities; rashness will be called courage, and extravagance generosity. That will be what most people think; and at the same time this method enables an advocate to draw a misleading inference from the motive, arguing that if a man runs into danger needlessly, much more will he do so in a noble cause; and if a man is open—handed to any one and every one, he will be so to his friends also, since it is the extreme form of goodness to be good to everybody.

σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ’ οἷς ὁ (8) ἔπαινος· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθη(9)ναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν. δεῖ δὲ τὸ παρ’ ἑκάστοις τίμιον (10) ὂν λέγειν ὡς ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις ἢ Λάκωσιν ἢ φιλοσό(11)φοις.

. . .

We must also take into account the nature of our particular audience when making a speech of praise; for, as Socrates used to say, ‘it is not difficult to praise the Athenians to an Athenian audience.’ If the audience esteems a given quality, we must say that our hero has that quality, no matter whether we are addressing Scythians or Spartans or philosophers.

καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ τίμιον ἄγειν εἰς τὸ καλόν, ἐπείπερ (12) γε δοκεῖ γειτνιᾶν. καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον, οἷον εἰ ἄξια (13) τῶν προγόνων καὶ τῶν προϋπηργμένων· εὐδαιμονικὸν γὰρ (14) καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ προσεπικτᾶσθαι τιμήν.

. . .

Everything, in fact, that is esteemed we are to represent as noble. After all, people regard the two things as much the same. All actions are noble that are appropriate to the man who does them: if, for instance, they are worthy of his ancestors or of his own past career. For it makes for happiness, and is a noble thing, that he should add to the honour he already has.

καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσ(15)ῆκον ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κάλλιον, οἷον εἰ εὐτυχῶν (16) μὲν μέτριος, ἀτυχῶν δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, ἢ μείζων γιγνό(17)μενος βελτίων καὶ καταλλακτικώτερος.

. . .

Even inappropriate actions are noble if they are better and nobler than the appropriate ones would be; for instance, if one who was just an average person when all went well becomes a hero in adversity, or if he becomes better and easier to get on with the higher he rises.

τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ τοῦ (18) Ἰφικράτους, “ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα”, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ὀλυμπιονίκου
(19) πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφ’ ὤμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν, (20) καὶ τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου
(21) ἣ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ’ οὖσα τυράννων.

. . .

Compare the saying of Iphicrates, ‘Think what I was and what I am’; and the epigram on the victor at the Olympic games, In time past, bearing a yoke on my shoulders, of wood unshaven, and the encomium of Simonides, A woman whose father, whose husband, whose brethren were princes all.

(22) ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου (23) τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι πράττοντα κατὰ (24) προαίρεσιν, χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπρα(25)χότα· διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς (26) ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον· ἂν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὅμοια προ(27)φέρηται, σημεῖον ἀρετῆς εἶναι δόξει καὶ προαιρέσεως.

. . .

Since we praise a man for what he has actually done, and fine actions are distinguished from others by being intentionally good, we must try to prove that our hero’s noble acts are intentional. This is all the easier if we can make out that he has often acted so before, and therefore we must assert coincidences and accidents to have been intended. Produce a number of good actions, all of the same kind, and people will think that they must have been intended, and that they prove the good qualities of the man who did them.

(28) ἔστιν δ’ ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. δεῖ οὖν (29) τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται.

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Praise is the expression in words of the eminence of a man’s good qualities, and therefore we must display his actions as the product of such qualities.

τὸ δ’ ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔρ(30)γων ἐστίν (τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ παι(31)δεία· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω τραφέντα (32) τοιοῦτον εἶναι), διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας.

. . . .

Encomium refers to what he has actually done; the mention of accessories, such as good birth and education, merely helps to make our story credible — good fathers are likely to have good sons, and good training is likely to produce good character. Hence it is only when a man has already done something that we bestow encomiums upon him.

τὰ δ’ (33) ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῖμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πε(34)πραγότα, εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. μακαρισμὸς δὲ καὶ (35) εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὑτοῖς μὲν ταὐτά, τούτοις δ’ οὐ ταὐτά, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ (36) ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ὁ εὐδαιμονισμὸς περιέχει ταῦτα. (37) ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί. (38) ἃ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἄν, ταῦτα μετατεθέντα (1368a1) τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίγνεται.

. . . . . .

Yet the actual deeds are evidence of the doer’s character: even if a man has not actually done a given good thing, we shall bestow praise on him, if we are sure that he is the sort of man who would do it. To call any one blest is, it may be added, the same thing as to call him happy; but these are not the same thing as to bestow praise and encomium upon him; the two latter are a part of ‘calling happy’, just as goodness is a part of happiness. To praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action. The suggestions which would be made in the latter case become encomiums when differently expressed.

ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν ἃ δεῖ πράτ(2)τειν καὶ ποῖόν τινα εἶναι δεῖ, ταῦτα ὡς ὑποθήκας λέγοντας (3) τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι δεῖ καὶ στρέφειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ (4) μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι’ αὑτόν. (5) οὕτω μὲν οὖν λεχθὲν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ὡδὶ δ’ ἔπαινον “μέγα (6) φρονῶν οὐκ <ἐπὶ> τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι’ (7) αὑτόν”. ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ὑπόθοιο· καὶ ὅταν (8) ὑποθέσθαι, ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας. ἡ δὲ λέξις ἔσται ἀντικειμένη (9) ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅταν τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὸ δὲ μὴ κωλῦον μετατεθῇ.

. . . . . . .

When we know what action or character is required, then, in order to express these facts as suggestions for action, we have to change and reverse our form of words. Thus the statement ‘A man should be proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself’, if put like this, amounts to a suggestion; to make it into praise we must put it thus, ‘Since he is proud not of what he owes to fortune but of what he owes to himself.’ Consequently, whenever you want to praise any one, think what you would urge people to do; and when you want to urge the doing of anything, think what you would praise a man for having done. Since suggestion may or may not forbid an action, the praise into which we convert it must have one or other of two opposite forms of expression accordingly.

(10) χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ μό(11)νος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετ’ ὀλίγων ἢ καὶ [ὃ] μάλιστα πεποίηκεν· (12) ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα καλά.

. .

There are, also, many useful ways of heightening the effect of praise. We must, for instance, point out that a man is the only one, or the first, or almost the only one who has done something, or that he has done it better than any one else; all these distinctions are honourable.

καὶ τῷ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ (13) τῶν καιρῶν· τούτῳ δ’ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον. καὶ εἰ πολ(14)λάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν· μέγα γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ (15) τύχης ἀλλὰ δι’ αὑτοῦ ἂν δόξειεν. καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα (16) καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ τοῦτον εὕρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη, καὶ εἰς (17) τοῦτον πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη, οἷον εἰς Ἱππόλοχον, καὶ <εἰς> (18) Ἁρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σταθῆναι· ὁμοίως δὲ (19) καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. κἂν μὴ καθ’ αὑτὸν εὐπορῇς, πρὸς (20) ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ τὴν (21) ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν· (22) αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων βελτίων. πίπτει δ’ (23) εὐλόγως ἡ αὔξησις εἰς τοὺς ἐπαίνους· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ ἐστιν, (24) ἡ δ’ ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν· διὸ κἂν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδόξους, (25) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖ παραβάλλειν, ἐπείπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ (26) δοκεῖ μηνύειν ἀρετήν.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

And we must, further, make much of the particular season and occasion of an action, arguing that we could hardly have looked for it just then. If a man has often achieved the same success, we must mention this; that is a strong point; he himself, and not luck, will then be given the credit. So, too, if it is on his account that observances have been devised and instituted to encourage or honour such achievements as his own: thus we may praise Hippolochus because the first encomium ever made was for him, or Harmodius and Aristogeiton because their statues were the first to be put up in the market—place. And we may censure bad men for the opposite reason. Again, if you cannot find enough to say of a man himself, you may pit him against others, which is what Isocrates used to do owing to his want of familiarity with forensic pleading. The comparison should be with famous men; that will strengthen your case; it is a noble thing to surpass men who are themselves great. It is only natural that methods of ‘heightening the effect’ should be attached particularly to speeches of praise; they aim at proving superiority over others, and any such superiority is a form of nobleness. Hence if you cannot compare your hero with famous men, you should at least compare him with other people generally, since any superiority is held to reveal excellence.

ὅλως δὲ τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν ἅπασι τοῖς (27) λόγοις ἡ μὲν αὔξησις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς (τὰς (28) γὰρ πράξεις ὁμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ὥστε λοιπὸν μέ(29)γεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος)· τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα τοῖς (30) συμβουλευτικοῖς (ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα (31) καταμαντευόμενοι κρίνομεν)· τὰ δ’ ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικα(32)νικοῖς (αἰτίαν γὰρ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν μάλιστα δέχεται τὸ γε(33)γονὸς διὰ τὸ ἀσαφές).

. . . .

And, in general, of the lines of argument which are common to all speeches, this ‘heightening of effect’ is most suitable for declamations, where we take our hero’s actions as admitted facts, and our business is simply to invest these with dignity and nobility. ‘Examples’ are most suitable to deliberative speeches; for we judge of future events by divination from past events. Enthymemes are most suitable to forensic speeches; it is our doubts about past events that most admit of arguments showing why a thing must have happened or proving that it did happen.

ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν οἱ ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ (34) ψόγοι λέγονται σχεδὸν πάντες, καὶ πρὸς ποῖα δεῖ βλέ(35)ποντας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ ἐγκώμια γί(36)γνεται καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη, ταῦτ’ ἐστίν· ἐχομένων γὰρ τούτων τὰ (37) ἐναντία τούτοις φανερά· ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν.

. . . .

The above are the general lines on which all, or nearly all, speeches of praise or blame are constructed. We have seen the sort of thing we must bear in mind in making such speeches, and the materials out of which encomiums and censures are made. No special treatment of censure and vituperation is needed. Knowing the above facts, we know their contraries; and it is out of these that speeches of censure are made.

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