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Aristoteles: Rhetorica

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[2.1.1] (14) Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ (15) ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι,  καὶ (16) ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, (17) ταῦτ’ ἐστίν·  περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, (18) ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων. 
أما من أي الأشياء يكون الحث والنهي والمدح والذم والشكاية والاحتجاج  وأي الظنون وأي القضايا تصلح للتصديقات المستعملة في هذه الوجوه فالقول فيها على ما قد قدمنا فبيّنّا  فإنه من أجل تلك ومن هذه تقال التفكيرات وهذا الجنس من الكلام خاص بالأمور الوحدانية أي الجزئية 
[1] Ex quibus quidem igitur oportet et persuadere et dissuadere, et vituperare et laudare, et accusare et respondere,  et que opiniones et propositiones utiles ad fidem horum hec sunt ·  de hiis enim et ex hiis entimemata dicuntur, sicut circa unumquodque dicere propria ad genus sermonum. 
[1] Ex quibus quidem igitur oportet et exhortari et dehortari, et vituperare et laudare, et accusare et defendere,  et quales sententie et propositiones utiles ad horum persuasiones, hec sunt;  de hiis enim et ex hiis enthymemata dicuntur, ut circa unumquodque est dicere propter genus sermonum. 
Part 1. We have now considered the materials to be used in supporting or opposing a political measure, in pronouncing eulogies or censures, and for prosecution and defence in the law courts.  We have considered the received opinions on which we may best base our arguments so as to convince our hearers  — those opinions with which our enthymemes deal, and out of which they are built, in each of the three kinds of oratory, according to what may be called the special needs of each. 
[2.1.2] (20) ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕνεκα (19) κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική  (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλὰς κρίνουσι (20) καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἐστίν),  ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον (21) ὁρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός,  ἀλλὰ καὶ αὑτὸν (22) ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν·  [2.1.3] πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει (23) πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἶτα καὶ ἐν (24) ταῖς δίκαις,  τό τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ (25) πρὸς αὑτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν πως διακεῖσθαι αὐτόν,  πρὸς δὲ (26) τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως τυγχάνωσιν. 
ومن أجل أن الريطورية إنما تكون في أمور الحكومة  لأنهم قد يحكمون في المَشورات ثم الأحكام أيضا من الحكومة  فقد يجب اضطرارا أن ينظر ليس في المثبت المصدق من الكلام فقط  وأن كيف يكون بل الذي يصير الحاكم إلى الضعف والميل أيضا  فإنه قد يختلف التصديق جدا ولا سيما في المَشورات ثم في الحكومات من بعد  بأن يعرف الحاكم أي امرئ هو وأن يكون مظنونا عندهم بالاستيجاب  ثم من هذا أيضا أن يعرفوا هم أنفسهم كيف هم وبأية حال هم 
Quoniam autem causa iudicii est rethorica  (et enim consultationes indicant et iustitia iudicium est),  necesse non solum adro sermonem intendere, qualiter dernonstrativus sit et credibilis,  sed et ipsum qualem quendam et iudicem construere;  multum enim dlffert ad fidem, maxime quidem in consultationibus, si que et in iudiciis,  tunc qualem quendam videri dicentem et arbitrari ad ipsos habere qualiter ipsum,  adhuc autem si et ipsi adiacentes qualiter adipiscuntur 
Quoniam autem gratia iudicii est rethorica  (et enim consilia iudicant et dika iudicium est),  necesse non sol urn ad orationem videre, qualiter demonstrativa erit et credibilis,  sed et ipsum qualem quendam et iudicem facere;  multum enim differt ad fidem, maxime quidem in consiliis, deinde autem et in litigiis,  qualem quendam apparere dicentem et [existimare] ad ipsos estimare habere qualiter ipsum,  ad hec autem si et ipsi dispositi aliqualiter existant 
But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions  — the hearers decide between one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is a decision —  the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief;  he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind.  Particularly in political oratory, but also in lawsuits, it adds much to an orator’s influence  that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings towards his hearers;  and also that his hearers themselves should be in just the right frame of mind. 
[2.1.4] τὸ μὲν (27) οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς (28) συμβουλάς ἐστιν,  τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαί πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς (29) δίκας·  οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὐδ’ (30) ὀργιζομένοις καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ (1378a1) κατὰ μέγεθος ἕτερα·  τῷ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦντι περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται (2) τὴν κρίσιν ἢ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι (3) τοὐναντίον·  καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, ἐὰν ᾖ (4) τὸ ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται,  τῷ (5) δ’ ἀπαθεῖ <ἢ> καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τοὐναντίον. 
وأما المعرفة بالمتكلم أي امرئ هو فإنها تُعيَّن بزيادة عند التشاور  وأما المعرفة بالسامع بأية حال هو ففي الحكومات  لأنه ليست أحكامهم فيمن أحبوه ومن قلوه شيئا واحدا ولا فيمن كانوا غضابا عليه أو كافّين عنه بل هي مختلفة البتة أو مختلفة في القدر والمبلغ  فإن الحاكم قد يتلون في الحكم على من يحكم عليه فأما الذي يحبه فيعتمد ألا يخسّره أو يخسّره اليسير وأما الذي يبغضه فخلاف ذلك  وكذلك أما الذي يُرى منشرحا حسن الظن فإنه يصير إلى خير إن كان الأمر المتوقع لذيذا  وأما الذي لا يكترث ويتعسر فخلاف ذلك 
(videri quidem igitur qualem quendam dicentem utilius in consultationibus est,  assentire vero qualiter auditorern in iustitiis);  non enim eadem videntur amantibus et odientibus, neque irascentibus et humiliter se habentibus, sed aut extra omne alia aut secundum magnitudinem alia;  diligenti enim de quo facit iudicium aut non iniustificare aut parva existimare iniustificare, odienti vero contrarium;  et desideranti quidem et bene speranti, si fuerit futurum delectabile, et erit et bonum [et erit] esse videtur,  dissuaso vero et difficili contrarium. 
(apparere quidem igitur qualem quendam dicentem utili us ad consilia est,  disponi autem aliqualiter auditorem ad litigia);  non enim eadem videntur amantibus et odientibus, neque iratis et mansuete se habentibus, sed aut omnino altcra aut secundum magnitudinem altera;  a1nanti quidem cnim eurn de quo facit iudicium aut non iniustum fecisse aut secundum parva videtur iniustum fecisse, odienti autem contrarium;  et concupiscenti quidem et confidenti, si sit quod futurum delectabile, et fore et bonum fore videtur,  desperato autem et aspernanti contrarium. 
That the orator’s own character should look right is particularly important in political speaking:  that the audience should be in the right frame of mind, in lawsuits.  When people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something totally different or the same thing with a different intensity:  when they feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgement, they regard him as having done little wrong, if any; when they feel hostile, they take the opposite view.  Again, if they are eager for, and have good hopes of, a thing that will be pleasant if it happens, they think that it certainly will happen and be good for them:  whereas if they are indifferent or annoyed, they do not think so. 
[2.1.5] (6) τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ (7) τὰ αἴτια·  τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι δι’ ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀπο(8)δείξεων.  ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια·  (9) διαψεύδονται γὰρ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἢ συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ δι’ (10) ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἢ διὰ τούτων τι·  [2.1.6] ἢ γὰρ δι’ ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς (11) δοξάζουσιν,  ἢ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα (12) λέγουσιν,  ἢ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν ἀλλ’ οὐκ εὖνοι, (13) διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας,  (14) καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. 
وقد يكون المتكلمون مصدقين لعلل ثلاث  إنا قد نصدق من قبل هذه الثلاثة الأوجه كلها دون التثبت  وهي اللب والفضيلة والألفة  فقد يكذب جميع الواصفين أو المشيرين إما من أجل عدم هذه العلل أجمع وإما من أجل عدم شيء منها  لأنهم إما أن يكونوا للجهل والخطل لا يصيبون الرأي  وإما أن يكونوا وهم على صواب في الرأي للخبث والشرارة لا ينطقون بما عليه ظنهم ورأيهم  وإما أن يكون ذوي لب فاضل لكنهم ليسوا بذوي إلف وأنس وقد يمكن حينئذ أن يكونوا وهم يعرفون التي هي أفضل لا يشيرون بها  وليس سوى هذه الخلال خلة 
Et ut sint fide digni dicentes tres sunt cause;  tot enim sunt per que credimus extra demonstrationes.  Sunt autem hec sapientia et virtus et dilectio;  mentiuntur enim de quibus dicunt et consiliantur aut per hec omnia aut horum aliquid;  aut enim per insipientiam non recte hoc opinantur,  aut opinantes recte per malitiam non que vident dicunt,  sapientes quidem et modesti [quidem] sunt, sed non eunoi, ideoque contingit non optima consultare cognoscentes,  et extra hec nichil. 
Eius quidem igitur quod est esse ipsos dicentes credibiles tres sunt cause;  tot enim sunt propter que credimus exceptis ostensionibus.  Sunt autem hec prudentia et virtus et benivolentia;  mentiuntur enim de hiis que dicunt et consulunt aut propter onmia hec aut propter horum aliquid;  aut enim propter imprudentiam non recte hoc sentiunt,  aut sentientes recte propter nequitiam non que sentinnt dicunt,  ant prudentes quidem et epieikei sunt sed non benivoli, propter quod contingit non optima consulere hec cognoscentes,  et preter hec nichil. 
There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator’s own character  — the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it:  good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.  False statements and bad advice are due to one or more of the following three causes.  Men either form a false opinion through want of good sense;  or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think;  or finally, they are both sensible and upright, but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course.  These are the only possible cases. 
ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα (15) ταῦτ’ ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις πιστόν. 
إذا وجدت للمرء يضطر أن يظن مصدقا عند السامعين 
Necesse est ergo omnia videntem hec habere esse auditoribus fidum. 
Necesse ergo cum qui existimatur omnia hec habere esse audientibus credibilem. 
It follows that any one who is thought to have all three of these good qualities will inspire trust in his audience. 
[2.1.7] ὅθεν μὲν οὖν (16) φρόνιμοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανεῖεν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς (17) διῃρημένων ληπτέον·  ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κἂν ἕτερόν τις κἂν (18) ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον·  περὶ δ’ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν (19) τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον. 
فأما ذوو اللب والأفاضل فقد يعرفون أو يمتحنون بأن يعتبروا على الصفات التي قدمنا في ذكر الفضائل  لأنه ليس لإنسان آخر أن يثبت هذا المعنى أيضا من تلك الصفات بأعيانها  وأما الإلف أو الأنس والصداقة فإنا قائلون فيها عند قولنا في الآلام 
Unde quidem sapientes et studiosi utique videantur, ex predictis circa virtutem surmendum;  ex eisdem enim quamvis aliud quis quam vis se ipsum construct talem;  de eunia vero et amicitia in hiis que sunt de passionibus dicendum est. 
Unde quidem igitur prudentes et studiosi apparebunt utique, ex hiis que circa virtutes divisa sunt sumendum;  ex eisdem enim aliquis et alterum utique et se ipsum astruet talem;  de benivolentia autem et amicitia in hiis que circa passiones nunc dicendum. 
The way to make ourselves thought to be sensible and morally good must be gathered from the analysis of goodness already given:  the way to establish your own goodness is the same as the way to establish that of others.  Good will and friendliness of disposition will form part of our discussion of the emotions, to which we must now turn. 
[2.1.8] ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλ(20)λοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ (21) ἡδονή,  οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ (22) τούτοις ἐναντία. 
فالآلام هي التي حين يتغير الحاكم بسببها تختلف أحكامه وقد تلزمها اللذة والأذى  وهي الغضب والرحمة والخوف وما كان نحو هذه ثم أضداد هذه أيضا 
Sunt autem passiones quecumque permutantes differunt ad iudicia, quibus consequitur tristitia et voluptas,  ut ira, misericordia, timor, et quecumque alia huiusmodi, et hiis contraria. 
Sunt autem passiones propter quascumque commoti differunt ad indicia ad quas sequitur tristitia et delectatio,  puta ira misericordia timor et quecumque alia talia, et hiis contraria. 
The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure.  Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. 
[2.1.9] δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία,  λέγω (23) δ’ οἷον περὶ ὀργῆς πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί, καὶ τίσιν (24) εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις·  εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἓν ἢ τὰ (25) δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἅπαντα δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη τὴν (26) ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν·  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
وقد ينبغي أن نعود فنقسم كل واحد منها ثلاثة أقسام  فأما كيف ذلك فإني أقول إنه على نحو ما نصنع في الغضب حين ننظر أن كيف وباية حال اذ كان المرء فهو غضوب وممَّ اعتيد أن يكون الغضب وعلى من  فإنه إن وجدت واحدة من هذه الخلال أو اثنتان حتى يوجد بعضها ولا يوجد بعض فليس يكون بذلك تهييج الغضب  وكذلك سائر الأخر 
Oportet dividere que sunt circa unumquodque ad tria,  dico autem tamquam de ira quomodo se habentes iracundi sunt, et quibus consueverunt irasci, et in qualibus;  si enim quidern unum aut duo habearnus horum, omnia vera non, impossibile utique erit iram bene facere;  similiter autem et in aliis. 
Oportet autem dividere que circa unumquodque in tria,  dico autem puta de ira qualiter dispositi iracundi sunt, et quibus consueverunt irasci, et in qualibus rebus;  si enim unum quidem aut duo habeamus horum, omnia autem non, impossibile utique erit iram efficere;  similiter autem et in aliis. 
We must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads.  Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them.  It is not enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in any one.  The same is true of the other emotions. 
ὥσπερ οὖν (27) καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις, οὕτω (28) καὶ περὶ τούτων ποιήσωμεν καὶ διέλωμεν τὸν εἰρημένον (29) τρόπον. 
فقد ينبغي كما كتبنا وصنفنا القضايا في تلك اللاتي قيلت أولا أن تفعل مثل ذلك في هذه أيضا ونفصلها بالنحو الذي ذكرنا 
Quemadmodum igitur et in predictis scripsimus propositiones, sic et in hiis faciemus et dividemus secundum predictum modum. 
Sicut igitur et de antepositis tradidimus propositiones, ita et de hiis faciamus et dividamus predicta modo. 
So just as earlier in this work we drew up a list of useful propositions for the orator, let us now proceed in the same way to analyse the subject before us. 
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