Bibliotheca Polyglotta

[2.4.1] (34) Τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τί, τὴν φιλίαν καὶ (35) τὸ φιλεῖν ὁρισάμενοι λέγωμεν.

فأما من ¹ يصادقون ومن أجل أىّ شيء فإنّا حين نحدّ الصداقة نقول

1. Ar. من يصادقون man (obj.) yuṣādiqūna = Gr. τίνας ... φιλοῦσι.

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Quosdam diligunt et odiunt, et quare, amicitiam et amare determinantes dicimus.

Quos autem amant et odiunt, et propter quid, amicitiam et amare diffinientes dicamus.

Part 4. Let us now turn to Friendship and Enmity, and ask towards whom these feelings are entertained, and why. We will begin by defining and friendly feeling.

[2.4.2] ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλε(36)σθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ, καὶ τὸ (1381a1) κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων.

إن الصداق هي أن يكون الإنسان يهوى الخير لذلك من أجل ذاك وليس من أجل نفسه وأن يكون من جهة القوة فعّالا لذلك

. . .

Sit autem amare in volendo cuidam ea que opinatur bona, illius causa, sed non sui, et secundum potentiam operativum esse horum.

Sit itaque amare velle alicui que putat bona, illius gratia, sed non sui, et secundum posse activum esse horum.

We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about.

φίλος δέ ἐστιν ὁ φιλῶν (2) καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος· οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν (3) οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

فالصديق هو الذى يحبّ ويحبّ معا وقد يُظَنّ أنّ الأصدقاء هم الـ<ـذين يكونـ>ـون بهذه الحال أعنى أن يكون كلّ واحد منهم يظنّ بصاحبه المودّة

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Amicus enim est qui amat et invicem amatur; arbitrantur autem amici esse sic se habere ad invicem.

Amicus autem est qui amat et e contra amatur; putantur autem amici esse qui sic habere putantur ad invicem.

A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return: those who think they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends.

[2.4.3] τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φίλον (4) εἶναι τὸν συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα τοῖς (5) λυπηροῖς μὴ διά τι ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι’ ἐκεῖνον· γιγνομένων γὰρ (6) ὧν βούλονται χαίρουσιν πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, (7) ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως σημεῖον αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί.

فإذا كان هذا موضوعا فالصديق لا محالة [16] هو الذى يستلذّ الخير الذى يكون لصاحبه ويشركه في المؤذيات المحزنات ليس من أجل شيء آخر [17] ولكن من أجل ذاك فقط فإنّ هذا إذا كان هكذا فكلّ أحد يفرح به وأمّا الأضداد المعاندون [18] فيحزنون لذلك فعلامة الهوى إذًا المحزنات واللذيذات

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Hiis autem suppositis necesse amicum esse condelectantem bonis et condolentem tristabilibus non propter aliquid aliud, sed propter ilium; factis enim que volunt gaudent omnes, de contrariis vero tristantur, quare voluntatis signum tristitie et voluptates.

Hiis autem suppositis necesse amicum esse congaudentem bonis et condolentem tristibus, non propter aliquid alterum, sed propter ilium; factis enim hiis que volunt gaudent omnes, contrariis autem tristantur, quare voluntatis signum tristitie et delectationes.

This being assumed, it follows that your friend is the sort of man who shares your pleasure in what is good and your pain in what is unpleasant, for your sake and for no other reason. This pleasure and pain of his will be the token of his good wishes for you, since we all feel glad at getting what we wish for, and pained at getting what we do not.

[2.4.4] καὶ οἷς (8) δὴ ταὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς φίλοι καὶ οἱ τοῖς (9) αὐτοῖς ἐχθροί· ταὐτὰ γὰρ τούτοις βούλεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ὥστε (10) ἅπερ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βουλόμενος τούτῳ φαίνεται φίλος εἶναι.

ثمّ الذين تكون الخيرات والشرور [19] لهم هي بأعيانها لهؤلاء ثمّ الذين يستبين أنهم أصدقاء في الاتي فيها بأعيانها يكون الأعداء [20] فإنّ هؤلاء باضطرار يهوون هذه الأمور فإذا كان يهوى مثل هذا لذاك لا من أجل شيء آخر [21] استبان عند ذلك أنّه صديق [[L93]]

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Et cui aut utique eadem bona et mala, et amici eisdem et eisdem inimici; hec enim hos velle necesse, quemadmodum quod sibi ipsi et alii volens huic videtur amicus esse.

Et quibus iam eadem bona et mala, et qui eisdem amici et qui eisdem inimici; eadem enim has velle necesse, quare qui ea que sibi alii vult, huic videtur amicus esse.

Those, then, are friends to whom the same things are good and evil; and those who are, moreover, friendly or unfriendly to the same people; for in that case they must have the same wishes, and thus by wishing for each other what they wish for themselves, they show themselves each other’s friends.

[2.4.5] (11) καὶ τοὺς πεποιηκότας εὖ φιλοῦσιν, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κήδονται, (12) ἢ εἰ μεγάλα, ἢ εἰ προθύμως, ἢ εἰ ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, καὶ (13) αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ἢ οὓς ἂν οἴωνται βούλεσθαι ποιεῖν εὖ. [2.4.6] καὶ τοὺς (14) τῶν φίλων φίλους καὶ φιλοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ φιλοῦσιν. καὶ τοὺς (15) φιλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν φιλουμένων αὐτοῖς. [2.4.7] καὶ τοὺς τοῖς (16) αὐτοῖς ἐχθροὺς καὶ μισοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ μισοῦσιν, καὶ τοὺς (17) μισουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῖς μισουμένων· πᾶσιν γὰρ τούτοις (18) τὰ αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεται εἶναι καὶ αὐτοῖς, ὥστε βούλεσθαι τὰ (19) αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά, ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ φίλου. [2.4.8] ἔτι τοὺς εὐποιητικοὺς εἰς (20) χρήματα καὶ εἰς σωτηρίαν· διὸ τοὺς ἐλευθερίους καὶ ἀνδρείους (21) τιμῶσι [2.4.9] καὶ τοὺς δικαίους· τοιούτους δ’ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοὺς (22) μὴ ἀφ’ ἑτέρων ζῶντας· τοιοῦτοι δ’ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ (23) τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα.

ثمّ يحبّون أيضا الذين يحسنون إمّا إليهم أنفسهم وإمّا إلى [22] من يعنون به أو الذين فعلوا به الأمور الجسيمة بهشاشة ونشاط أو في مثل هذا الوقت [23] أو لقوا بسببهم مثل ذلك والذين <يظنّون أنهم> يهمّون بالإحسان إليهم وأصدقاء أصدقائهم [24] والذين يحبّون من أحبّوه هم والذين هم محبوبون من المحبوبين عندهم والذين يعادون أو يبغضون [28v1] من يبغضونه هم والذين يبغضهم المبغضون منهم لهؤلاء جميعا يُرون أنّ الخيرات التى [2] لأولئك هي لهم أيضا فقد يهوون لذلك أن تكون الخيرات التى لهم لأصدقائهم كما هي لهم [3] أعني الذين كانوا يحسنون إليهم فى المال وأفعال الكرم ولذلك ما قد يكرمون الأسخياء [4] والشجعاء والأبرار أيضا فقد يُظنّ بهذه الصفة الذين ليس معاشهم من أصحابهم لكن [5] من الكدّ والكسب ثمّ من هؤلاء أيضا الذين معاشهم من الحرث وأشياء أخر يعملونها [6] لأنفسهم

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Et facientes bene amant, aut ipsos aut de quibus curant, aut maxime, aut studiose, aut in hiis temporibus, et ipsorum causa, aut quos utique extimant velle facere bene. Et amicorum amicos et amantes quos ipsi amant. Et qui amantur ab hiis qui amantur ab ipsis. Et inimicos ipsis et odientes quos ipsi odiunt, et odiosos ab hiis qui odiunt ipsos; omnibus enim hiis hec bona videntur esse et ipsis, quare velle bona ipsis, quod est amici. Amplius bene effectivos ad pecunias et salutem; ideo liberales et viriles honorant et iustos; tales autem opinantur non viventes ab aliis; hii autem ab operari, et horum hii ab agricultura, et aliorum ipsimet operatores maxime.

Et eos qui fecerunt bene amant, aut ipis aut eis quos cordi habent, aut si magne aut prompte aut in talibus temporibus, et ipsorum gratia, et quoscumque putant velle bene facere. Et amicorum amicos et amantes quos ipsi diligunt. Et dilectos a dilectis sibi. Et eisdem inimicos et odientes quos ipsi odiunt, et eos qui habentur odio ab hiis qui odiuntur a se; omnibus enim hiis eadem bona videntur esse et sibi ipsis; quare velle que ipsis bona, quod quidem erat amici. Adhuc beneficos in pecunias et salutem; propter quod liberales et fortes honorant et iustos; tales autem putant non ab aliis viventes; tales autem qui ab operando, et horum qui ab agricultura, et aliorum qui ipsimet operantur maxime.

Again, we feel friendly to those who have treated us well, either ourselves or those we care for, whether on a large scale, or readily, or at some particular crisis; provided it was for our own sake. And also to those who we think wish to treat us well. And also to our friends’ friends, and to those who like, or are liked by, those whom we like ourselves. And also to those who are enemies to those whose enemies we are, and dislike, or are disliked by, those whom we dislike. For all such persons think the things good which we think good, so that they wish what is good for us; and this, as we saw, is what friends must do. And also to those who are willing to treat us well where money or our personal safety is concerned: and therefore we value those who are liberal, brave, or just. The just we consider to be those who do not live on others; which means those who work for their living, especially farmers and others who work with their own hands.

[2.4.10] (24) καὶ τοὺς σώφρονας, ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοι. καὶ τοὺς ἀπράγμονας (25) διὰ τὸ αὐτό. [2.4.11] καὶ οἷς βουλόμεθα φίλοι εἶναι, ἂν φαίνωνται (26) βουλόμενοι· εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἵ τ’ ἀγαθοὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱ (27) εὐδόκιμοι ἢ ἐν ἅπασιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς βελτίστοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυ(28)μαζομένοις ὑφ’ αὑτῶν ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυμάζουσιν αὐτούς.

فقد يُظنّ هؤلاء بزيادة أعفّاء غير ظلّامين ثمّ السليمة صدورهم من أجل هذه [7] العلّة أيضا والذين قد نهوى أن نصادقهم إن هم هووا ذلك وهؤلاء هم الخيار ذوو [8] الفضيلة ثمّ السعداء المنجحين إمّا في كل وإمّا في الفضائل أو في الّاتي قد يتعجّب منها [9] أو في الّاتي يتعجّب منهم فيها

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Et castos, quoniam non iniusti. Et inertes propter idem. Et quibus volumus amici esse, si videntur volentes; sunt autem tales boni secundum virtutem et bene experti aut in omnibus aut in optimis aut admirabilibus a se ipsis aut in admirantibus ipsos.

Et temperaios, quia non iniusti. Et eos qui sine negotiis propter idem. Et quibus volumus amici esse, si videantur volentes; sunt autem tales boni secundum virtutem et bene probati aut in omnibus aut in optimis aut in hiis que admirantur ab ipsis aut in quibus admirantur ipsos.

We also like temperate men, because they are not unjust to others; and, for the same reason, those who mind their own business. And also those whose friends we wish to be, if it is plain that they wish to be our friends: such are the morally good, and those well thought of by every one, by the best men, or by those whom we admire or who admire us.

[2.4.12] ἔτι (29) τοὺς ἡδεῖς συνδιαγαγεῖν καὶ συνδιημερεῦσαι· τοιοῦτοι δ’ (30) οἱ εὔκολοι καὶ μὴ ἐλεγκτικοὶ τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων καὶ μὴ (31) φιλόνικοι μηδὲ δυσέριδες (πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μαχη(32)τικοί, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι τἀναντία φαίνονται βούλεσθαι), [2.4.13] καὶ (33) οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ τῷ τωθάσαι καὶ τῷ ὑπομεῖναι· ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ γὰρ (34) ἀμφοτέρως σπεύδουσι τῷ πλησίον, δυνάμενοί τε σκώπτεσθαι (35) καὶ ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες.

ثمّ جميع الطيّبين أو اللذيذة عشرتهم وملازمتهم النهار كلّه [10] فإنّ مثل هؤلاء سهلة أخلاقهم وليسوا بموبّخين على الخطأ والإساءة ولا يشغبون ولا [11] يتعسرون ولا يتحرّشون وجميع هؤلاء الذين هم بهذه الصفات صخّابون والصخّابون قد [12] يرون أضدادا وكذلك الذين يكونون متهيّئين للضرب والصبر فكلاهما [[L94]] يوجدان [13] مسارعين إلى هذا وإلى عذل القريب إذا أمكنهم أن يعذلوا وإذا كان العذل من جهة [14] الشفقة

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Amplius delectabiles simul ducere et dietare; huiusmodi autem bene leves et non eligibiles (reprehensores) peccantium et non seditiosi neque rixosi (omnes enim hii pugnaces, qui oppugnantur vero contraria videntur velle), et apti ad iniuriandum et patiendum (durare); ad hec enim utrique student propinquam, patentes autem iniuriari et studiose offenduntur.

Adhuc delectabiles simul conversari et per diem simul commorari; tales autem tractabiles et non arguitivi peccatorum et non litigiosi neque cervicosi (omnes enirn tales pugnaces, pugnaces autem contraria videntur velle), et ydonei deridere et sufferre; ad eadem enim student ambo e vicino, patentes irrideri et suaviter irridentes.

And also those with whom it is pleasant to live and spend our days: such are the good—tempered, and those who are not too ready to show us our mistakes, and those who are not cantankerous or quarrelsome — such people are always wanting to fight us, and those who fight us we feel wish for the opposite of what we wish for ourselves — and those who have the tact to make and take a joke; here both parties have the same object in view, when they can stand being made fun of as well as do it prettily themselves.

[2.4.14] καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας τὰ ὑπ(36)άρχοντα ἀγαθά, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἃ φοβοῦνται μὴ ὑπ (1381b1) άρχειν αὐτοῖς. [2.4.15] καὶ τοὺς καθαρείους περὶ ὄψιν, περὶ ἀμπεχόνην, (2) περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. [2.4.16] καὶ τοὺς μὴ ὀνειδιστὰς μήτε τῶν ἁμαρ(3)τημάτων μήτε τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐλεγ(4)κτικοί. [2.4.17] καὶ τοὺς μὴ μνησικακοῦντας, μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν (5) ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλ’ εὐκαταλλάκτους· οἵους γὰρ ἂν ὑπολαμ(6)βάνωσιν εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς αὑτοὺς οἴονται. [2.4.18] (7) καὶ τοὺς μὴ κακολόγους μηδὲ εἰδότας μήτε τὰ τῶν πλησίον (8) κακὰ μήτε τὰ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀγαθά· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ταῦτα (9) δρᾷ. [2.4.19] καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀντιτείνοντας τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις ἢ σπουδά(10)ζουσιν· μαχητικοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς (11) σπουδαίως πως ἔχοντας, οἷον θαυμάζοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ σπου(12)δαίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς, [2.4.20] καὶ ταῦτα (13) μάλιστα πεπονθότας περὶ ἃ μάλιστα βούλονται αὐτοὶ ἢ (14) θαυμάζεσθαι ἢ σπουδαῖοι δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ἡδεῖς. [2.4.21] καὶ τοὺς (15) ὁμοίους καὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντας, ἐὰν μὴ παρενοχλῶσι μηδ’ (16) ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ ᾖ ὁ βίος· γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ “κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ”. [2.4.22] (17) καὶ τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντας, ὧν ἐνδέχεται ἅμα μετ(18)έχειν αὐτούς· εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὸ καὶ οὕτω συμβαίνει. [2.4.23] καὶ (19) πρὸς οὓς οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὥστε μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὰ πρὸς (20) δόξαν, μὴ καταφρονοῦντες. καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνονται τὰ (21) πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.

والذين يمدحونهم أيضا قد يرون أنّهم يشركونهم في الخيرات التي هي لهم [15] وعلى أنّهم قد يخافون في بعضها ألّا يكون لهم ثمّ الذين يرى لباسهم نظيفا طول أعمارهم [16] ثمّ الذين لا يعيّرون لا بالذنوب ولا بالعنايات فإنّ اللذين يفعلان ذلك جميعا موبّخان [17] والذين لا يصرّون علي الضغن ولا يقيمون على العذل واللحي لكنّهم يرضون سريعا فقد يظنّون [18] أنّهم كما هم لآخرين كذلك هم لهم أيضا والذين لا ينطقون بالشرّ ولا يعرفون شرور أقاربهم [19] ولا شرور أنفسهم لكنّ الخيرات لأنّهم أخيار وكذلك الذين لا يشغبون على الذين يغضبون <أو> [20] يجدّون فإنّ الذين هم على خلاف ذلك صخّابون ثم الذين هم لهم بهذه الحال ² أعني كالذين [21] يتعجّبون من أنفسهم ويظنّون بأنفسهم أنّهم أفاضل ثمّ الذين يفرحون بهم وبما هم لهم [22] ولا سيما إذا كانوا قد ألموا أو لقوا شيئا ثم الذين يهوون بزيادة أن يظنّوا عندهم [23] عجيبين أو متعجّبا منهم أو أفاضل أو لذيذين طيّبين أو الذين يبدعون الأمور التي هي بأعيانها [24] عندهم عجيبة إن لم يكونوا يتأذّون بهم أو يكون معاشهما ومكسبهما من ذلك الأمر [25] بعينه كالذي يكون بين الفاخراني والفاخراني ثم الذين يشتهون ما هم له مشتهون [29r1] أعني الأمر قد يمكن أن يشركوا فيه معا فإنّه إن لم يكن كذلك فقد يعرض حينئذ أيضا [2] [[L95]] عارض والذين هم عندهم لهذه الحال أعنى الذين لا يخزون عندهم من اللاتي هي للحمد أن تهاونوا بها والذين يخزون عندهم من الثقة الصادقة

2. بهذه الحال bi-hāḏihi ʾl-ḥāl = ὡσαύτως β Vet : σπουδαίως πως A

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Et laudantes existentia bona, et horum maxime que timent non esse ipsis. Et puros circa visum et circa vestitum et circa totam vitam. Et non iniuriosos vel improperantes neque peccata neque beneficia; utrique enim reprehensores. Et non malorum recordatores, neque conservatores delictorum, sed bene permutabiles; quales enim utique opinabuntur esse ad alios, et ad se ipsos opinantur. Et non maledicentes neque scientes neque vicinorum mala neque ipsorum, sed bona; bonus enim hoc agit. Et non contratendentibus iratis aut student; pugnaces enim tales. Et habentes ad se ipsos similiter, ut admirantes ipsos et studiosos extimantes et gaudentes ipsis, et hec maxime patientes circa que maxime volunt ipsi aut admirari aut studiosos videri esse aut delectabiles. Et similes et hec studentes, nisi impediantur neque ab ipso fuerit vita; fit autem sic ‘figulus figulo’. Et desiderantes se ipsos, que contingit simul ipsos participare; si vera non, idem et sic contingit. Et ad quos sic se habent quod non vereantur ea que sunt ad gloriam, non negligentes. Et ad quos verentur ea que sunt ad veritatem.

Et laudantes inexistentia bona, et horum maxime que timent non inesse sibi. Et mundos circa visum, circa vestitum, circa totam vitam. Et non exprobratores neque peccatorum neque beneficiorum; utrique enim arguitivi. Et non memorativos malorum, neque servativos impositionum, sed facile placabiles; quales enim utique existimaverint esse ad alios, et ad ipsos putant. Et non maliloquos neque scientes neque proximorum mala neque sua, sed bona; bonus enirn hoc agit. Et non contratendentes iratis neque studentibus; pugnaces enim qui tales. Et eos qui ad ipsos similiter habent, vel ut admirantes ipsos et studiosos existimantes et gaudentes ipsis, et hec maxirne passos circa que maxime ipsi volunt aut in admiratione esse aut studiosi videri esse aut delectabiles. Et similes et eadem exercentes, si non molestent neque ab eadem sit vita; fit enim ita ‘figulus figulo’. Et eadem desiderantes, que contingit simul participare ipsos; si autem non, idem sic accidit. Et ad quos ita se habent, ut non verecundentur ea que ad gloriam, non despicientes. Et ad quos verecundantur ea que ad veritatem.

And we also feel friendly towards those who praise such good qualities as we possess, and especially if they praise the good qualities that we are not too sure we do possess. And towards those who are cleanly in their person, their dress, and all their way of life. And towards those who do not reproach us with what we have done amiss to them or they have done to help us, for both actions show a tendency to criticize us. And towards those who do not nurse grudges or store up grievances, but are always ready to make friends again; for we take it that they will behave to us just as we find them behaving to every one else. And towards those who are not evil speakers and who are aware of neither their neighbours’ bad points nor our own, but of our good ones only, as a good man always will be. And towards those who do not try to thwart us when we are angry or in earnest, which would mean being ready to fight us. And towards those who have some serious feeling towards us, such as admiration for us, or belief in our goodness, or pleasure in our company; especially if they feel like this about qualities in us for which we especially wish to be admired, esteemed, or liked. And towards those who are like ourselves in character and occupation, provided they do not get in our way or gain their living from the same source as we do — for then it will be a case of ‘potter against potter’: Potter to potter and builder to builder begrudge their reward. And those who desire the same things as we desire, if it is possible for us both to share them together; otherwise the same trouble arises here too. And towards those with whom we are on such terms that, while we respect their opinions, we need not blush before them for doing what is conventionally wrong: as well as towards those before whom we should be ashamed to do anything really wrong.

[2.4.24] καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἢ ὑφ’ ὧν (22) ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἢ φιλοῦσιν (23) ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι. [2.4.25] καὶ οἷς ἂν τἀγαθὰ συμπράττωσιν, (24) ἐὰν μὴ μέλλῃ αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι μείζω κακά. [2.4.26] καὶ οἳ ὁμοίως (25) καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας καὶ τοὺς παρόντας φιλοῦσιν· διὸ καὶ τοὺς (26) περὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας τοιούτους πάντες φιλοῦσιν. καὶ ὅλως (27) τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας· μάλιστα (28) γὰρ φιλοῦσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοὺς φιλεῖν ἀγαθούς. [2.4.27] καὶ τοὺς μὴ (29) πλαττομένους πρὸς αὐτούς· τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα τὰ (30) ἑαυτῶν λέγοντες· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τὰ πρὸς (31) δόξαν οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα· εἰ οὖν ὁ αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, (32) ὁ μὴ αἰσχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι ἔοικεν.

والذين هم عندهم مكرّمون والذين يحبّون أن يحسدوهم ولا يغتالوا بهم ولا يحبّونهم أو يهوون أن يحبّونهم ويكونوا أصدقاءهم والذين يفعلون بهم الخيرات إن لم يكن يتبع ذلك شرّ هو أعظم أو أفظع والذين يحبّون الأباعد والأقارب بحال واحدة والذين توقّوا بالقرب ممّن هو بهذه الصفة فكل أحد يحبّهم والجملة الذين يودّون أصدقاءهم جدّا جدّا ولا يخذلونهم فإن الأصدقاء الخيار أحبّ إليهم من الخيار والذين ليس ودّهم بالترائي والتصنّع وكذلك الذين يُخبرونهم بمساوئهم فقد أنبأنا أنّهم عند الأصدقاء لا يخزون من اللاتي هنّ للحمد فالذي لا يخزي قد يودّ والذي يخزي لا يشبه الذي يودّ

. . . . . . . . . .

Et ad quos philotimi sunt, et a quibus zelari volunt et non invideri, has aut amant aut volunt amici esse. Et cum quibus bona operantur, si non debent ipsis esse maiora mala. Et similibus absentes et presentes amant; ideoque eos qui sunt circa mortuos tales omnes amant. Et universaliter valde philophilos et non derelinquentes; maxime autem diligunt bona diligere bonos. Et non perversos a bono ad se ipsos; huiusmodi autem et qui mala que sunt in eis dicentes; dictum est enim quoniam apud amicos ea que sunt ad gloriam non veremur; si igitur verecundus non amat, qui non verecundatur amanti assimulatur.

Et ad quos in amore honoris sunt, et a quibus zelari volunt et non invidiam pati, has aut amant aut volunt amici esse. Et cum quibus utique bona simul egerint, si non debeant ipsis fore mala maiora. Et hiis qui similiter et absentes et presentes diligunt; propter quod et eos qui circa mortuos sunt tales omnes diligunt. Et totaliter eos qui valde amatores amicorum et non derelinquentes; maxime enim amant bonorum amare bonos. Et non fictos ad se ipsos; tales autem et qui mala sua dicunt; dictum est enim quod ad amicos que ad gloriam non verecundamur; si igitur qui verecundatur non amat, qui non verecundatur amanti assimilatur.

Again, our rivals, and those whom we should like to envy us — though without ill—feeling — either we like these people or at least we wish them to like us. And we feel friendly towards those whom we help to secure good for themselves, provided we are not likely to suffer heavily by it ourselves. And those who feel as friendly to us when we are not with them as when we are — which is why all men feel friendly towards those who are faithful to their dead friends. And, speaking generally, towards those who are really fond of their friends and do not desert them in trouble; of all good men, we feel most friendly to those who show their goodness as friends. Also towards those who are honest with us, including those who will tell us of their own weak points: it has just been said that with our friends we are not ashamed of what is conventionally wrong, and if we do have this feeling, we do not love them; if therefore we do not have it, it looks as if we did love them.

καὶ τοὺς μὴ φοβερούς, (33) καὶ οὓς θαρροῦμεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ. [2.4.28] (34) εἴδη δὲ φιλίας ἑταιρεία οἰκειότης συγγένεια καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. [2.4.29] (35) ποιητικὰ δὲ φιλίας χάρις καὶ τὸ μὴ δεηθέντος ποιῆσαι καὶ (36) τὸ ποιήσαντα μὴ δηλῶσαι· αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὕτως ἕνεκα φαίνεται (37) καὶ οὐ διά τι ἕτερον.

والذين ليسوا مخوّفين والذين قد يثقون بهم أو يأمنونهم . فأمّا أنواع الصداقة فالصحبة والأنسة والوصلة ومهما كان من هذا النحو وأمّا فواعل الصداقة فالأيادي أو المنن وأن يفعل به حين لا يحتاج وإذا فعل لم يخبر وأن يستبين أنّه إنّما فعل من أجل ذاك لا من أجل شيء آخر

. لأنه ليس أحد يحبّ الذي يخافه . . .

Et non terribiles, et quibus confidimus; nullus, enim amat quem timet. Species autem amicitie clilectio et proprietas et cognatio et quot sunt talia. Effectiva autem amicitie gratia et facere non rogantis et non manifestare facientem; ipsius enim sic causa videtur et non per alium.

Et non timendos, et ad quos audemus; nullus enim quem timet amat. Species autem amici tie sodalitas et domesticitas et cognatio et quecumque talia. Factiva autem amicitie gratia et non requisitum facere et cum fecerit non rnanifestare; sic enim ipsius gratia videtur et non propter alterum.

We also like those with whom we do not feel frightened or uncomfortable — nobody can like a man of whom he feels frightened. Friendship has various forms—comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so on. Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason.

[2.4.30] (1382a1) περὶ δ’ ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ μισεῖν φανερὸν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναν(2)τίων ἔστι θεωρεῖν. ποιητικὰ δὲ ἔχθρας ὀργή, ἐπηρεασμός, δια(3)βολή. [2.4.31] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ (4) ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν· ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, (5) μισοῦμεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλ(6)λίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέ(7)πτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰατὸν (8) χρόνῳ, τὸ δ’ ἀνίατον. καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ· (9) αἴσθεσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, τῷ δ’ οὐδὲν διαφέρει. (10) ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ (11) ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ (12) παρουσία τῆς κακίας. καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δ’ οὐ (13) μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὔ. (14) καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἂν γενομένων ἐλεήσειεν, ὁ δ’ οὐδενός· ὁ μὲν (15) γὰρ ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται ᾧ ὀργίζεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἶναι.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

De inimicitia vera et odire palam quod ex contrariis oportet intueri. Effectiva enim inimicitie ira, temptatio, accusatio. Ira quidem igitur est ex hiis que sunt penes ipsum, inimicitia est et absque eis que sunt penes ipsum; si enim opinemur esse talem quidem, odimus. Et ira quidem semper est circa singularia, ut puta Calliam aut Socratem, odium autem et ad genera; furem enim et accusatorem odit unusquisque. Et hoc quidem curabile tempore, hoc vero incurabile. Et aut quidem tristari appetit aut ledendi potius; sentire autem vult qui irascitur, huic non differt. Sunt autem tristabilia quidem sensibilia omnia, maxime vera mala, minus vera sensitiva, iniustitia et insipientia; non enim contristatur presentia malitie. Et hoc quidem cum tristitia, hoc vera non cum tristitia; qui enim irascitur tristatur, odiens vera non. Et hic quidem utique multorum factorum miserebitur, hic vera nullius; hic quidem contrapati vult cui irascitur, hic vera non esse.

De inimicitia autem et odire manifestum qualiter ex contrariis oportet considerare. Factiva autem inimicitie ira, epireasmus, criminatio. Ira quidem igitur est ex hiis que ad se ipsum, inimicitia autem et sine hiis que ad se ipsum; si enim putemus esse talem, odimus. Et ira quidern semper circa singularia, puta Calliam aut Socratem, odium autem et ad genera; furem enim odit et calumpniatorem unusquisque. Et hoc quidem sanabile tempore, hoc autem insanabile. Et hoc quidem contristare appetit, hoc autem nocere magis; sentiri enim vult iratus, huic autem nichil differt. Sunt autem tristia quidem sensibilia omnia, que autem maxime mala minime sensibilia, iniustitia et imprudentia; nichil enim contristat presentia malitie. Et hoc quidem cum tristitia, hoc autem non cum tristitia; iratus quidetn eniin tristatur, odiens autem non. Et hic quidem multa si fiant miserebitur, hie autem pro nullo; hic quidem enim contra pati vult eum cui irascitur, hic autem non esse.

Enmity and Hatred should clearly be studied by reference to their opposites. Enmity may be produced by anger or spite or calumny. Now whereas anger arises from offences against oneself, enmity may arise even without that; we may hate people merely because of what we take to be their character. Anger is always concerned with individuals — a Callias or a Socrates — whereas hatred is directed also against classes: we all hate any thief and any informer. Moreover, anger can be cured by time; but hatred cannot. The one aims at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him harm; the angry man wants his victims to feel; the hater does not mind whether they feel or not. All painful things are felt; but the greatest evils, injustice and folly, are the least felt, since their presence causes no pain. And anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not; the angry man feels pain, but the hater does not. Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend him, but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has once hated: for the one would have the offenders suffer for what they have done; the other would have them cease to exist.

[2.4.32] (16) φανερὸν οὖν ἐν τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους (17) καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας (18) διαλύειν, καὶ δι’ ὀργὴν ἢ δι’ ἔχθραν ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἐφ’ ὁπο(19)τέραν ἂν προαιρῆταί τις ἄγειν.

. .

Manifestum enim ex hiis, quoniam contingit inimicos et amicos et existentes de1nonstrare et non existentes facere et dicentes dissolvere, et aut per odium aut iram altercantes utrum vult aliquis agere.

Manifestum igitur ex hiis quod contingit inimicos et amicos et existentes demonstrare et non existentes facere et dicentes dissolvere, aut propter iram aut propter inimicitiam vacillantes ad utrumcumque elegerit quis ducere.

It is plain from all this that we can prove people to be friends or enemies; if they are not, we can make them out to be so; if they claim to be so, we can refute their claim; and if it is disputed whether an action was due to anger or to hatred, we can attribute it to whichever of these we prefer.

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