Bibliotheca Polyglotta

15. (4) Περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἓν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις ὑπόληψιν (5) δυσχερῆ ἀπολύσαιτο (οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἴτε εἰπόντος (6) τινὸς εἴτε μή, ὥστε τοῦτο καθόλου)· ἄλλος τόπος ὥστε πρὸς (7) τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα ἀπαντᾶν, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ὡς οὐ (8) βλαβερὸν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ, ἢ ὡς οὐ τηλικοῦτον, ἢ οὐκ ἄδικον (9) ἢ οὐ μέγα, ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἢ οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος· περὶ γὰρ (10) τοιούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, ὥσπερ Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ναυσι(11)κράτην· ἔφη γὰρ ποιῆσαι ὃ ἔλεγεν καὶ βλάψαι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ (12) ἀδικεῖν.

. . . . .

like Gorgias’ eulogy of the Eleans, in which, without any preliminary sparring or fencing, he begins straight off with ‘Happy city of Elis!’ Part 15. In dealing with prejudice, one class of argument is that whereby you can dispel objectionable suppositions about yourself. It makes no practical difference whether such a supposition has been put into words or not, so that this distinction may be ignored. Another way is to meet any of the issues directly: to deny the alleged fact; or to say that you have done no harm, or none to him, or not as much as he says; or that you have done him no injustice, or not much; or that you have done nothing disgraceful, or nothing disgraceful enough to matter: these are the sort of questions on which the dispute hinges. Thus Iphicrates replying to Nausicrates,

ἢ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι ἀδικοῦντα, εἰ βλαβερόν, ἀλλ’ (13) οὖν καλόν, εἰ λυπηρόν, ἀλλ’ ὠφέλιμον, ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦ(14)τον.

.

admitted that he had done the deed alleged, and that he had done Nausicrates harm, but not that he had done him wrong.

ἄλλος τόπος ὡς ἐστὶν ἁμάρτημα ἢ ἀτύχημα ἢ (15) ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη τρέμειν οὐχ ὡς ὁ διαβάλ(16)λων ἔφη, ἵνα δοκῇ γέρων, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐ γὰρ ἑκόντι (17) εἶναι αὑτῷ ἔτη ὀγδοήκοντα. καὶ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τὸ (18) οὗ ἕνεκα, ὅτι οὐ βλάψαι ἐβούλετο ἀλλὰ τόδε, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο (19) ὃ διεβάλλετο ποιῆσαι, συνέβη δὲ βλαβῆναι· “δίκαιον δὲ (20) μισεῖν, εἰ ὅπως τοῦτο γένηται ἐποίουν.”

. . .

Or you may admit the wrong, but balance it with other facts, and say that, if the deed harmed him, at any rate it was honourable; or that, if it gave him pain, at least it did him good; or something else like that. Another way is to allege that your action was due to mistake, or bad luck, or necessity as Sophocles said he was not trembling, as his traducer maintained, in order to make people think him an old man, but because he could not help it; he would rather not be eighty years old.

ἄλλος, εἰ (21) ἐμπεριείληπται ὁ διαβάλλων, ἢ νῦν ἢ πρότερον, ἢ αὐτὸς (22) ἢ τῶν ἐγγύς τις.

.

You may balance your motive against your actual deed; saying, for instance, that you did not mean to injure him but to do so—and—so; that you did not do what you are falsely charged with doing—the damage was accidental—’I should indeed be a detestable person if I had deliberately intended this result.’

ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλοι ἐμπεριλαμβάνονται οὓς (23) ὁμολογοῦσιν μὴ ἐνόχους εἶναι τῇ διαβολῇ, οἷον εἰ, ὅτι καθάριος, (24) ὁ <δεῖνα> μοιχός, καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρα.

.

Another way is open when your calumniator, or any of his connexions, is or has been subject to the same grounds for suspicion.

ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλους (25) διέβαλεν ἢ ἄλλος <ἢ> αὐτός, ἢ ἄνευ διαβολῆς ὑπελαμβάνοντο (26) ὥσπερ αὐτὸς νῦν, οἳ πεφήνασιν οὐκ ἔνοχοι.

.

Yet another, when others are subject to the same grounds for suspicion but are admitted to be in fact innocent of the charge: e.g. ’Must I be a profligate because I am well—groomed? Then so—and—so must be one too.’

ἄλλος ἐκ (27) τοῦ ἀντιδιαβάλλειν τὸν διαβάλλοντα· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὃς (28) αὐτὸς ἄπιστος, οἱ τούτου λόγοι ἔσονται πιστοί.

.

Another, if other people have been calumniated by the same man or some one else, or, without being calumniated, have been suspected, like yourself now, and yet have been proved innocent.

ἄλλος, (29) εἰ γέγονεν κρίσις, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα ἐν (30) τῇ ἀντιδόσει κατηγοροῦντα ὡς ἀσεβής, ὅς γ’ ἐποίησε κελεύων (31) ἐπιορκεῖν,
ἡ γλῶσσ’ ὀμώμοχ’, ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.
(32) ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν τὰς ἐκ τοῦ Διονυσιακοῦ ἀγῶνος (33) κρίσεις εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἄγοντα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν δεδω(34)κέναι λόγον, ἢ δώσειν εἰ βούλεται κατηγορεῖν.

. . . .

Another way is to return calumny for calumny and say, ‘It is monstrous to trust the man’s statements when you cannot trust the man himself.’ Another is when the question has been already decided. So with Euripides’ reply to Hygiaenon, who, in the action for an exchange of properties, accused him of impiety in having written a line encouraging perjury—
My tongue hath sworn: no oath is on my soul.
Euripides said that his opponent himself was guilty in bringing into the law—courts cases whose decision belonged to the Dionysiac contests.

ἄλλος (35) ἐκ τοῦ διαβολῆς κατηγορεῖν, ἡλίκον, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἄλλας (36) κρίσεις ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πιστεύει τῷ πράγματι.

. .

’If I have not already answered for my words there, I am ready to do so if you choose to prosecute me there.’ Another method is to denounce calumny, showing what an enormity it is,

κοινὸς (1416b1) δ’ ἀμφοῖν [ὁ] τόπος τὸ σύμβολα λέγειν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ (2) ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτι οἰκεῖος τῷ Πριάμῳ· ἡ γὰρ Ἡσιόνη ἀδελφή· (3) ὁ δὲ ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ἐχθρὸς τῷ Πριάμῳ, ὁ Τελαμών, καὶ (4) ὅτι οὐ κατεῖπε τῶν κατασκόπων.

. . .

and in particular that it raises false issues, and that it means a lack of confidence in the merits of his case. The argument from evidential circumstances is available for both parties: thus in the Teucer Odysseus says that Teucer is closely bound to Priam, since his mother Hesione was Priam’s sister.

ἄλλος τῷ διαβάλλοντι, (5) τὸ ἐπαινοῦντα μικρὸν μακρῶς ψέξαι μέγα συντόμως, ἢ (6) πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ προθέντα, ὃ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα προφέρει ἓν (7) ψέξαι.

. .

Teucer replies that Telamon his father was Priam’s enemy, and that he himself did not betray the spies to Priam. Another method, suitable for the calumniator, is to praise some trifling merit at great length, and then attack some important failing concisely;

τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικώτατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι· τοῖς ἀγα(8)θοῖς γὰρ βλάπτειν πειρῶνται, μιγνύντες αὐτὰ τῷ κακῷ.

. .

or after mentioning a number of good qualities to attack one bad one that really bears on the question. This is the method of thoroughly skilful and unscrupulous prosecutors.

(9) κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ (10) τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἕνεκα πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν δια(11)βάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ (12) ἀπολυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τὸν Ὀδυσ(13)σέα προείλετο, τῷ μὲν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν (14) τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, τῷ δ’ ὅτι οὔ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ ἀντ(15)αγωνιστεῖν ὡς φαῦλον.

. . .

By mixing up the man’s merits with what is bad, they do their best to make use of them to damage him. There is another method open to both calumniator and apologist. Since a given action can be done from many motives, the former must try to disparage it by selecting the worse motive of two, the latter to put the better construction on it.

Permanent link

http://www2.hf.uio.no/common/apps/permlink/permlink.php?app=polyglotta&context=ctext&uid=d2b76266-1d51-11e7-ba66-0050569f23b2

Choose languages

Choose images, etc.

Choose languages

Choose display