πάντες δὴ (33) πάντα πράττουσι τὰ μὲν οὐ δι’ αὑτοὺς τὰ δὲ δι’ αὑτούς.
τῶν (34) μὲν οὖν μὴ δι’ αὑτοὺς τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δ’ (35) ἐξ ἀνάγκης,
τῶν δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βίᾳ τὰ δὲ φύ(36)σει,
ὥστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ δι’ αὑτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ (37) τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ βίᾳ.
ὅσα δὲ δι’ αὑτούς, καὶ ὧν (1369a1) αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι’ ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι’ ὄρεξιν, τὰ μὲν (2) διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ δι’ ἄλογον·
ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲν (3) βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅταν (4) οἰηθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν),
ἄλογοι δ’ ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία·
(5) ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι’ αἰτίας (6) ἑπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, δι’ ἔθος, διὰ λο(7)γισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν.
τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι (8) καθ’ ἡλικίαν ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἀλλ’ ἄττα τὰ πραττόμενα περί(9)εργον·
εἰ γὰρ συμβέβηκεν τοῖς νέοις ὀργίλοις εἶναι ἢ ἐπι(10)θυμητικοῖς, οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητα πράττουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ δι’ (11) ὀργὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν.
οὐδὲ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν, ἀλλὰ (12) συμβέβηκε τοῖς μὲν πένησι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν ἐπιθυμεῖν χρη(13)μάτων,
τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν (14) μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν·
ἀλλὰ πράξουσι καὶ οὗτοι οὐ διὰ (15) πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.
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Now every action of every person either is or is not due to that person himself.
Of those not due to himself some are due to chance, the others to necessity;
of these latter, again, some are due to compulsion, the others to nature.
Consequently all actions that are not due to a man himself are due either to chance or to nature or to compulsion.
All actions that are due to a man himself and caused by himself are due either to habit or to rational or irrational craving.
Rational craving is a craving for good, i.e. a wish — nobody wishes for anything unless he thinks it good.
Irrational craving is twofold, viz. anger and appetite.
Thus every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite.
It is superfluous further to distinguish actions according to the doers’ ages, moral states, or the like;
it is of course true that, for instance, young men do have hot tempers and strong appetites; still, it is not through youth that they act accordingly, but through anger or appetite.
Nor, again, is action due to wealth or poverty; it is of course true that poor men, being short of money, do have an appetite for it,
and that rich men, being able to command needless pleasures, do have an appetite for such pleasures:
but here, again, their actions will be due not to wealth or poverty but to appetite.
