ἔτι (21) εἰ ἐβούλετο καὶ μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω ἐκώλυεν, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ (22) ὠργίζετο, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐπεθύμει·
ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (23) ὧν ὀρέγονται, ἂν δύνωνται, ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι δι’ ἀκρα(24)σίαν, οἱ δ’ ἐπιεικεῖς ὅτι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.
καὶ εἰ (25) ἔμελλε [γίγνεσθαι], καὶ ποιεῖν· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ (26) ποιῆσαι.
καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ὅσα ἢ πέφυκε πρὸ ἐκείνου ἢ ἕνεκα (27) ἐκείνου,
οἷον εἰ ἤστραψε, καὶ ἐβρόντησεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπείρασε, (28) καὶ ἔπραξεν.
καὶ εἰ ὅσα ὕστερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ οὗ (29) ἕνεκα γίγνεται γέγονε, καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ τούτου ἕνεκα (30) γέγονεν,
οἷον εἰ ἐβρόντησε, καὶ ἤστραψεν, καὶ εἰ ἔπραξεν, (31) ἐπείρασεν.
ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ (32) δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντα.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι (33) φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις.
(1393a1) καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον·
τό τε γὰρ ἐν (2) δυνάμει καὶ ἐν βουλήσει ὂν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ (3) ὀργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ὄντα,
ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ὁρμῇ τοῦ (4) ποιεῖν ἢ μελλήσει ἔσται·
ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται μᾶλλον (5) τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ τὰ μὴ μέλλοντα.
καὶ εἰ προγέγονε ὅσα πρό(6)τερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι,
οἷον εἰ συννεφεῖ, εἰκὸς ὗσαι.
καὶ εἰ τὸ (7) ἕνεκα τούτου γέγονε, καὶ τοῦτο εἰκὸς γενέσθαι,
οἷον εἰ θεμέ(8)λιος, καὶ οἰκία.
(9) περὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μεί(10)ζονός τε καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ ὅλως μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν (11) προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐστιν φανερόν.
εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμ(12)βουλευτικοῖς περί τε μεγέθους ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος (13) ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλάττονος,
ὥστε ἐπεὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ (14) προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν,
οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ (15) καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι δι’ ἐκείνων ληπτέον τὰς (16) αὐξήσεις πᾶσιν.
τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔτι ζητεῖν περὶ μεγέθους (17) ἁπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κενολογεῖν ἐστιν·
κυριώτερα γάρ ἐστιν (18) πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τῶν καθόλου τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα τῶν πρα(19)γμάτων.
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That, further, he has done the thing in question either if he intended it and nothing external prevented him; or if he had the power to do it and was angry at the time; or if he had the power to do it and his heart was set upon it
—for people as a rule do what they long to do, if they can; bad people through lack of self—control; good people, because their hearts are set upon good things.
Again, that if a thing was ‘going to happen’, it has happened; if a man was ‘going to do something’, he has done it, for it is likely that the intention was carried out.
That if one thing has happened which naturally happens before another or with a view to it, the other has happened;
for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if an action has been attempted, it has been done.
That if one thing has happened which naturally happens after another, or with a view to which that other happens, then that other (that which happens first, or happens with a view to this thing) has also happened;
thus, if it has thundered it has lightened, and if an action has been done it has been attempted.
Of all these sequences some are inevitable and some merely usual.
The arguments for the non—occurrence of anything can obviously be found by considering the opposites of those that have been mentioned.
How questions of Future Fact should be argued is clear from the same considerations:
That a thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it; or if along with the power to do it there is a craving for the result, or anger, or calculation, prompting it.
That the thing will be done, in these cases, if the man is actually setting about it, or even if he means to do it later
—for usually what we mean to do happens rather than what we do not mean to do.
That a thing will happen if another thing which naturally happens before it has already happened;
thus, if it is clouding over, it is likely to rain.
That if the means to an end have occurred, then the end is likely to occur;
thus, if there is a foundation, there will be a house.
For arguments about the Greatness and Smallness of things, the greater and the lesser, and generally great things and small, what we have already said will show the line to take.
In discussing deliberative oratory we have spoken about the relative greatness of various goods, and about the greater and lesser in general.
Since therefore in each type oratory the object under discussion is some kind of good
—whether it is utility, nobleness, or justice—it is clear that every orator must obtain the materials of amplification through these channels.
To go further than this, and try to establish abstract laws of greatness and superiority, is to argue without an object;
in practical life, particular facts count more than generalizations.
