καὶ “οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ ξένος”·
(15) “ξένος” <γὰρ> “οὐ μᾶλλον ἤ σε δεῖ” τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ “οὐ δεῖ (16) τὸν ξένον ξένον ἀεὶ εἶναι”· ἀλλότριον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο.
τὸ αὐτὸ (17) καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον,
καλόν γ’ ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν ἄξιον·
(18) ταὐτὸ γάρ ἐστι τῷ εἰπεῖν “ἄξιόν γ’ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ὄντα (19) ἄξιον ἀποθανεῖν”, ἢ “ἄξιόν γ’ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ θανάτου ἄξιον (20) ὄντα”, ἢ “μὴ ποιοῦντα θανάτου ἄξια”.
τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶδος τὸ (21) αὐτὸ τῆς λέξεως τούτων·
ἀλλ’ ὅσῳ ἂν <ἐν> ἐλάττονι καὶ ἀντι(22)κειμένως λεχθῇ, τοσούτῳ εὐδοκιμεῖ μᾶλλον.
τὸ δ’ αἴτιον (23) ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ (24) ἐν ὀλίγῳ θᾶττον γίνεται.
δεῖ δ’ ἀεὶ προσεῖναι [ἢ] τὸ πρὸς (25) ὃν λέγεται [ἢ] ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς καὶ (26) μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον <ἔσται>· ἔστιν γὰρ ταῦτα χωρὶς ἔχειν,
οἷον “ἀπο(27)θνῄσκειν δεῖ μηθὲν ἁμαρτάνοντα” [ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀστεῖον], “τὴν (28) ἀξίαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον”, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀστεῖον,
ἀλλ’ <ἢ> ἐὰν (29) ἅμα ἄμφω ἔχῃ· “ἄξιόν γ’ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ἄξιον ὄντα τοῦ ἀπο(30)θανεῖν”.
ὅσῳ δ’ ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ, τοσούτῳ ἀστειότερον φαίνεται,
(31) οἷον εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα μεταφορὰ εἴη καὶ μεταφορὰ τοιαδὶ (32) καὶ ἀντίθεσις καὶ παρίσωσις, καὶ ἔχοι ἐνέργειαν.
(33) εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω, (34) αἱ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι τρόπον τινὰ μεταφοραί·
ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν (35) λέγονται, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορά,
οἷον “ἡ ἀσπίς”, φαμέν, (1413a1) “ἐστι φιάλη Ἄρεως”, καὶ “<τὸ> τόξον φόρμιγξ ἄχορδος”.
(2) οὕτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οὐχ ἁπλοῦν, τὸ δ’ εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα (3) ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην ἁπλοῦν.
καὶ εἰκάζουσιν δὲ οὕτως, (4) οἷον πιθήκῳ αὐλητήν, λύχνῳ ψακαζομένῳ [εἰς] μύωπα· (5) ἄμφω γὰρ συνάγεται.
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For instance, Anaschetos (proper name) ouk anaschetos: where you say that what is so—and—so in one sense is not so—and—so in another; well, if the man is unpleasant, the joke fits the facts.
Again, take—Thou must not be a stranger stranger than Thou should’st.
Do not the words ‘thou must not be’, &c., amount to saying that the stranger must not always be strange? Here again is the use of one word in different senses.
Of the same kind also is the much—praised verse of Anaxandrides:
Death is most fit before you do
Deeds that would make death fit for you.
This amounts to saying ‘it is a fit thing to die when you are not fit to die’, or ‘it is a fit thing to die when death is not fit for you’, i.e. when death is not the fit return for what you are doing.
The type of language employed—is the same in all these examples;
but the more briefly and antithetically such sayings can be expressed, the more taking they are,
for antithesis impresses the new idea more firmly and brevity more quickly.
They should always have either some personal application or some merit of expression, if they are to be true without being commonplace—two requirements not always satisfied simultaneously.
Thus ‘a man should die having done no wrong’ is true but dull: ‘the right man should marry the right woman’ is also true but dull.
No, there must be both good qualities together, as in ‘it is fitting to die when you are not fit for death’.
The more a saying has these qualitis, the livelier it appears:
if, for instance, its wording is metaphorical, metaphorical in the right way, antithetical, and balanced, and at the same time it gives an idea of activity.
Successful similes also, as has been said above, are in a sense metaphors,
since they always involve two relations like the proportional metaphor.
Thus: a shield, we say, is the ‘drinking—bowl of Ares’, and a bow is the ‘chordless lyre’.
This way of putting a metaphor is not ‘simple’, as it would be if we called the bow a lyre or the shield a drinking—bowl.
