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Aristoteles: Rhetorica
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18. (40) Περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως,  εὔκαιρόν ἐστι ποιεῖσθαι μάλιστα (1419a1) μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον εἰρηκὼς ᾖ, ὥστε ἑνὸς προσερωτηθέντος (2) συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοπον,  οἷον Περικλῆς Λάμπωνα ἐπήρετο (3) περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας ἱερῶν,  εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι (4) οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν,  ἤρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτός,  φά(5)σκοντος δὲ “καὶ πῶς, ἀτέλεστος ὤν;”  δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν (6) φανερὸν ᾖ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δῆλον ᾖ ὅτι δώσει·  πυθόμενον (7) μὲν γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερὸν (8) ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰπεῖν,  οἷον Σωκράτης, Μελήτου οὐ (9) φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν, εἰρηκότος δὲ ὡς δαιμόνιόν (10) τι λέγοι, ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἤτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶεν (11) ἢ θεῖόν τι,  φήσαντος δὲ “ἔστιν οὖν”, ἔφη, “ὅστις θεῶν μὲν (12) παῖδας οἴεται εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ οὔ;”  ἔτι ὅταν μέλλῃ ἢ ἐναντία (13) λέγοντα δείξειν ἢ παράδοξον. 
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Expressed as an enthymeme, this would run, ‘If we ought to come to terms when doing so will enable us to gain the greatest advantage, then we ought to come to terms in the hour of success.’  Part 18. Next as to Interrogation.  The best moment to a employ this is when your opponent has so answered one question that the putting of just one more lands him in absurdity.  Thus Pericles questioned Lampon about the way of celebrating the rites of the Saviour Goddess.  Lampon declared that no uninitiated person could be told of them.  Pericles then asked, ‘Do you know them yourself?’  ‘Yes’, answered Lampon. ’Why,’ said Pericles, ‘how can that be, when you are uninitiated?’  Another good moment is when one premiss of an argument is obviously true, and you can see that your opponent must say ‘yes’ if you ask him whether the other is true.  Having first got this answer about the other, do not go on to ask him about the obviously true one, but just state the conclusion yourself.  Thus, when Meletus denied that Socrates believed in the existence of gods but admitted that he talked about a supernatural power, Socrates proceeded to to ask whether ‘supernatural beings were not either children of the gods or in some way divine?’  ‘Yes’, said Meletus. ’Then’, replied Socrates, ‘is there any one who believes in the existence of children of the gods and yet not in the existence of the gods themselves?’ 
τέταρτον δὲ ὅταν μὴ ἐνῇ ἀλλ’ (14) ἢ σοφιστικῶς ἀποκρινάμενον λῦσαι·  ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτως ἀπο(15)κρίνηται, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δ’ οὔ, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ’ οὔ, ἢ πῇ (16) μὲν πῇ δ’ οὔ, θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντος.  ἄλλως δὲ μὴ (17) ἐγχείρει. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐνστῇ, κεκρατῆσθαι δόξεις·  οὐ γὰρ (18) οἷόν τε πολλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ·  διὸ (19) καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν δεῖ. 
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Another good occasion is when you expect to show that your opponent is contradicting either his own words or what every one believes.  A fourth is when it is impossible for him to meet your question except by an evasive answer.  If he answers ‘True, and yet not true’, or ‘Partly true and partly not true’, or ‘True in one sense but not in another’, the audience thinks he is in difficulties, and applauds his discomfiture.  In other cases do not attempt interrogation; for if your opponent gets in an objection, you are felt to have been worsted.  You cannot ask a series of questions owing to the incapacity of the audience to follow them; 
(20) ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα διαιροῦντα (21) λόγῳ καὶ μὴ συντόμως,  πρὸς δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐναντία τὴν (22) λύσιν φέροντα εὐθὺς τῇ ἀποκρίσει, πρὶν ἐπερωτῆσαι τὸ (23) ἐπιὸν ἢ συλλογίσασθαι·  οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν προορᾶν ἐν τίνι ὁ (24) λόγος. 
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and for this reason you should also make your enthymemes as compact as possible.  In replying, you must meet ambiguous questions by drawing reasonable distinctions, not by a curt answer.  In meeting questions that seem to involve you in a contradiction, offer the explanation at the outset of your answer, before your opponent asks the next question or draws his conclusion. 
φανερὸν δ’ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν Τοπικῶν καὶ τοῦτο (25) καὶ αἱ λύσεις.  καὶ συμπεραινομένου, ἐὰν ἐρώτημα ποιῇ τὸ (26) συμπέρασμα, τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν,  οἷον Σοφοκλῆς, ἐρωτώμενος (27) ὑπὸ Πεισάνδρου εἰ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προ(28)βούλοις, καταστῆσαι τοὺς τετρακοσίους, ἔφη “τί δέ; οὐ (29) πονηρά σοι ταῦτα ἐδόκει εἶναι;” ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν σὺ ταῦτα (30) ἔπραξας τὰ πονηρά;” “ναὶ”, ἔφη, “οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα βελτίω”. 
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For it is not difficult to see the drift of his argument in advance.  This point, however, as well as the various means of refutation, may be regarded as known to us from the Topics.  When your opponent in drawing his conclusion puts it in the form of a question, you must justify your answer. 
(31) καὶ ὡς ὁ Λάκων εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτώμενος εἰ δο(32)κοῦσιν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἀπολωλέναι ἅτεροι, ἔφη.  ὁ δὲ “οὐκοῦν (33) σὺ τούτοις ταὐτὰ ἔθου;” καὶ ὃς ἔφη.  “οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἄν”, (34) ἔφη, “καὶ σὺ ἀπόλοιο;” “οὐ δῆτα”, ἔφη, “οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα (35) λαβόντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔ, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ.”  διὸ (1419b1) οὔτε ἐπερωτᾶν δεῖ μετὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οὔτε τὸ συμπέρασμα (2) ἐπερωτᾶν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ πολὺ περιῇ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. 
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Thus when Sophocles was asked by Peisander whether he had, like the other members of the Board of Safety, voted for setting up the Four Hundred, he said ‘Yes.’ —’Why, did you not think it wicked?’ —’Yes.’ —’So you committed this wickedness?’ ‘Yes’, said Sophocles, ‘for there was nothing better to do.’  Again, the Lacedaemonian, when he was being examined on his conduct as ephor, was asked whether he thought that the other ephors had been justly put to death. ’Yes’, he said.  ’Well then’, asked his opponent, ‘did not you propose the same measures as they?’—’Yes.’  —’Well then, would not you too be justly put to death?’—’Not at all’, said he; ‘they were bribed to do it, and I did it from conviction’. 
(3) περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδή τινα δοκεῖ χρῆσιν ἔχειν ἐν (4) τοῖς ἀγῶσι,  καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν δια(5)φθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ, ὀρθῶς (6) λέγων,  εἴρηται πόσα εἴδη γελοίων ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιη(7)τικῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἁρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δ’ οὔ, ὅπως τὸ (8) ἁρμόττον αὑτῷ λήψεται.  ἔστι δ’ ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας (9) ἐλευθεριώτερον·ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἑτέρου. 
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Hence you should not ask any further questions after drawing the conclusion, nor put the conclusion itself in the form of a further question, unless there is a large balance of truth on your side.  As to jests. These are supposed to be of some service in controversy.  Gorgias said that you should kill your opponents’ earnestness with jesting and their jesting with earnestness; in which he was right.  Jests have been classified in the Poetics. Some are becoming to a gentleman, others are not; see that you choose such as become you. 
 
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