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Aristoteles: Rhetorica
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(13) ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗ Β 
المقالة الثانية من كتاب ريطوريقا
قال أرسطوطاليس 
. 
RETHORICE ARISTOTELIS PERIPATHETICI
LIBER SECUNDUS INCIPIT 
RETHORICORUM ARISTOTELIS
LIBER SECUNDUS 
BOOK II 
[2.1.1] (14) Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ (15) ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι,  καὶ (16) ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, (17) ταῦτ’ ἐστίν·  περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, (18) ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων. 
أما من أي الأشياء يكون الحث والنهي والمدح والذم والشكاية والاحتجاج  وأي الظنون وأي القضايا تصلح للتصديقات المستعملة في هذه الوجوه فالقول فيها على ما قد قدمنا فبيّنّا  فإنه من أجل تلك ومن هذه تقال التفكيرات وهذا الجنس من الكلام خاص بالأمور الوحدانية أي الجزئية 
.  .  . 
[1] Ex quibus quidem igitur oportet et persuadere et dissuadere, et vituperare et laudare, et accusare et respondere,  et que opiniones et propositiones utiles ad fidem horum hec sunt ·  de hiis enim et ex hiis entimemata dicuntur, sicut circa unumquodque dicere propria ad genus sermonum. 
[1] Ex quibus quidem igitur oportet et exhortari et dehortari, et vituperare et laudare, et accusare et defendere,  et quales sententie et propositiones utiles ad horum persuasiones, hec sunt;  de hiis enim et ex hiis enthymemata dicuntur, ut circa unumquodque est dicere propter genus sermonum. 
Part 1. We have now considered the materials to be used in supporting or opposing a political measure, in pronouncing eulogies or censures, and for prosecution and defence in the law courts.  We have considered the received opinions on which we may best base our arguments so as to convince our hearers  — those opinions with which our enthymemes deal, and out of which they are built, in each of the three kinds of oratory, according to what may be called the special needs of each. 
[2.1.2] (20) ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕνεκα (19) κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική  (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλὰς κρίνουσι (20) καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἐστίν),  ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον (21) ὁρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός,  ἀλλὰ καὶ αὑτὸν (22) ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν·  [2.1.3] πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει (23) πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἶτα καὶ ἐν (24) ταῖς δίκαις,  τό τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ (25) πρὸς αὑτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν πως διακεῖσθαι αὐτόν,  πρὸς δὲ (26) τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως τυγχάνωσιν. 
ومن أجل أن الريطورية إنما تكون في أمور الحكومة  لأنهم قد يحكمون في المَشورات ثم الأحكام أيضا من الحكومة  فقد يجب اضطرارا أن ينظر ليس في المثبت المصدق من الكلام فقط  وأن كيف يكون بل الذي يصير الحاكم إلى الضعف والميل أيضا  فإنه قد يختلف التصديق جدا ولا سيما في المَشورات ثم في الحكومات من بعد  بأن يعرف الحاكم أي امرئ هو وأن يكون مظنونا عندهم بالاستيجاب  ثم من هذا أيضا أن يعرفوا هم أنفسهم كيف هم وبأية حال هم 
.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Quoniam autem causa iudicii est rethorica  (et enim consultationes indicant et iustitia iudicium est),  necesse non solum adro sermonem intendere, qualiter dernonstrativus sit et credibilis,  sed et ipsum qualem quendam et iudicem construere;  multum enim dlffert ad fidem, maxime quidem in consultationibus, si que et in iudiciis,  tunc qualem quendam videri dicentem et arbitrari ad ipsos habere qualiter ipsum,  adhuc autem si et ipsi adiacentes qualiter adipiscuntur 
Quoniam autem gratia iudicii est rethorica  (et enim consilia iudicant et dika iudicium est),  necesse non sol urn ad orationem videre, qualiter demonstrativa erit et credibilis,  sed et ipsum qualem quendam et iudicem facere;  multum enim differt ad fidem, maxime quidem in consiliis, deinde autem et in litigiis,  qualem quendam apparere dicentem et [existimare] ad ipsos estimare habere qualiter ipsum,  ad hec autem si et ipsi dispositi aliqualiter existant 
But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions  — the hearers decide between one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict is a decision —  the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief;  he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind.  Particularly in political oratory, but also in lawsuits, it adds much to an orator’s influence  that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings towards his hearers;  and also that his hearers themselves should be in just the right frame of mind. 
[2.1.4] τὸ μὲν (27) οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς (28) συμβουλάς ἐστιν,  τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαί πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς (29) δίκας·  οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὐδ’ (30) ὀργιζομένοις καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ (1378a1) κατὰ μέγεθος ἕτερα·  τῷ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦντι περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται (2) τὴν κρίσιν ἢ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι (3) τοὐναντίον·  καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, ἐὰν ᾖ (4) τὸ ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται,  τῷ (5) δ’ ἀπαθεῖ <ἢ> καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τοὐναντίον. 
وأما المعرفة بالمتكلم أي امرئ هو فإنها تُعيَّن بزيادة عند التشاور  وأما المعرفة بالسامع بأية حال هو ففي الحكومات  لأنه ليست أحكامهم فيمن أحبوه ومن قلوه شيئا واحدا ولا فيمن كانوا غضابا عليه أو كافّين عنه بل هي مختلفة البتة أو مختلفة في القدر والمبلغ  فإن الحاكم قد يتلون في الحكم على من يحكم عليه فأما الذي يحبه فيعتمد ألا يخسّره أو يخسّره اليسير وأما الذي يبغضه فخلاف ذلك  وكذلك أما الذي يُرى منشرحا حسن الظن فإنه يصير إلى خير إن كان الأمر المتوقع لذيذا  وأما الذي لا يكترث ويتعسر فخلاف ذلك 
.  .  .  .  .  . 
(videri quidem igitur qualem quendam dicentem utilius in consultationibus est,  assentire vero qualiter auditorern in iustitiis);  non enim eadem videntur amantibus et odientibus, neque irascentibus et humiliter se habentibus, sed aut extra omne alia aut secundum magnitudinem alia;  diligenti enim de quo facit iudicium aut non iniustificare aut parva existimare iniustificare, odienti vero contrarium;  et desideranti quidem et bene speranti, si fuerit futurum delectabile, et erit et bonum [et erit] esse videtur,  dissuaso vero et difficili contrarium. 
(apparere quidem igitur qualem quendam dicentem utili us ad consilia est,  disponi autem aliqualiter auditorem ad litigia);  non enim eadem videntur amantibus et odientibus, neque iratis et mansuete se habentibus, sed aut omnino altcra aut secundum magnitudinem altera;  a1nanti quidem cnim eurn de quo facit iudicium aut non iniustum fecisse aut secundum parva videtur iniustum fecisse, odienti autem contrarium;  et concupiscenti quidem et confidenti, si sit quod futurum delectabile, et fore et bonum fore videtur,  desperato autem et aspernanti contrarium. 
That the orator’s own character should look right is particularly important in political speaking:  that the audience should be in the right frame of mind, in lawsuits.  When people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something totally different or the same thing with a different intensity:  when they feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgement, they regard him as having done little wrong, if any; when they feel hostile, they take the opposite view.  Again, if they are eager for, and have good hopes of, a thing that will be pleasant if it happens, they think that it certainly will happen and be good for them:  whereas if they are indifferent or annoyed, they do not think so. 
[2.1.5] (6) τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ (7) τὰ αἴτια·  τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι δι’ ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀπο(8)δείξεων.  ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια·  (9) διαψεύδονται γὰρ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἢ συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ δι’ (10) ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἢ διὰ τούτων τι·  [2.1.6] ἢ γὰρ δι’ ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς (11) δοξάζουσιν,  ἢ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα (12) λέγουσιν,  ἢ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν ἀλλ’ οὐκ εὖνοι, (13) διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας,  (14) καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. 
وقد يكون المتكلمون مصدقين لعلل ثلاث  إنا قد نصدق من قبل هذه الثلاثة الأوجه كلها دون التثبت  وهي اللب والفضيلة والألفة  فقد يكذب جميع الواصفين أو المشيرين إما من أجل عدم هذه العلل أجمع وإما من أجل عدم شيء منها  لأنهم إما أن يكونوا للجهل والخطل لا يصيبون الرأي  وإما أن يكونوا وهم على صواب في الرأي للخبث والشرارة لا ينطقون بما عليه ظنهم ورأيهم  وإما أن يكون ذوي لب فاضل لكنهم ليسوا بذوي إلف وأنس وقد يمكن حينئذ أن يكونوا وهم يعرفون التي هي أفضل لا يشيرون بها  وليس سوى هذه الخلال خلة 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Et ut sint fide digni dicentes tres sunt cause;  tot enim sunt per que credimus extra demonstrationes.  Sunt autem hec sapientia et virtus et dilectio;  mentiuntur enim de quibus dicunt et consiliantur aut per hec omnia aut horum aliquid;  aut enim per insipientiam non recte hoc opinantur,  aut opinantes recte per malitiam non que vident dicunt,  sapientes quidem et modesti [quidem] sunt, sed non eunoi, ideoque contingit non optima consultare cognoscentes,  et extra hec nichil. 
Eius quidem igitur quod est esse ipsos dicentes credibiles tres sunt cause;  tot enim sunt propter que credimus exceptis ostensionibus.  Sunt autem hec prudentia et virtus et benivolentia;  mentiuntur enim de hiis que dicunt et consulunt aut propter onmia hec aut propter horum aliquid;  aut enim propter imprudentiam non recte hoc sentiunt,  aut sentientes recte propter nequitiam non que sentinnt dicunt,  ant prudentes quidem et epieikei sunt sed non benivoli, propter quod contingit non optima consulere hec cognoscentes,  et preter hec nichil. 
There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator’s own character  — the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it:  good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.  False statements and bad advice are due to one or more of the following three causes.  Men either form a false opinion through want of good sense;  or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think;  or finally, they are both sensible and upright, but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course.  These are the only possible cases. 
ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα (15) ταῦτ’ ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις πιστόν. 
إذا وجدت للمرء يضطر أن يظن مصدقا عند السامعين 
. 
Necesse est ergo omnia videntem hec habere esse auditoribus fidum. 
Necesse ergo cum qui existimatur omnia hec habere esse audientibus credibilem. 
It follows that any one who is thought to have all three of these good qualities will inspire trust in his audience. 
[2.1.7] ὅθεν μὲν οὖν (16) φρόνιμοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανεῖεν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς (17) διῃρημένων ληπτέον·  ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κἂν ἕτερόν τις κἂν (18) ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον·  περὶ δ’ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν (19) τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον. 
فأما ذوو اللب والأفاضل فقد يعرفون أو يمتحنون بأن يعتبروا على الصفات التي قدمنا في ذكر الفضائل  لأنه ليس لإنسان آخر أن يثبت هذا المعنى أيضا من تلك الصفات بأعيانها  وأما الإلف أو الأنس والصداقة فإنا قائلون فيها عند قولنا في الآلام 
.  .  . 
Unde quidem sapientes et studiosi utique videantur, ex predictis circa virtutem surmendum;  ex eisdem enim quamvis aliud quis quam vis se ipsum construct talem;  de eunia vero et amicitia in hiis que sunt de passionibus dicendum est. 
Unde quidem igitur prudentes et studiosi apparebunt utique, ex hiis que circa virtutes divisa sunt sumendum;  ex eisdem enim aliquis et alterum utique et se ipsum astruet talem;  de benivolentia autem et amicitia in hiis que circa passiones nunc dicendum. 
The way to make ourselves thought to be sensible and morally good must be gathered from the analysis of goodness already given:  the way to establish your own goodness is the same as the way to establish that of others.  Good will and friendliness of disposition will form part of our discussion of the emotions, to which we must now turn. 
[2.1.8] ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλ(20)λοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ (21) ἡδονή,  οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ (22) τούτοις ἐναντία. 
فالآلام هي التي حين يتغير الحاكم بسببها تختلف أحكامه وقد تلزمها اللذة والأذى  وهي الغضب والرحمة والخوف وما كان نحو هذه ثم أضداد هذه أيضا 
.  . 
Sunt autem passiones quecumque permutantes differunt ad iudicia, quibus consequitur tristitia et voluptas,  ut ira, misericordia, timor, et quecumque alia huiusmodi, et hiis contraria. 
Sunt autem passiones propter quascumque commoti differunt ad indicia ad quas sequitur tristitia et delectatio,  puta ira misericordia timor et quecumque alia talia, et hiis contraria. 
The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure.  Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. 
[2.1.9] δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία,  λέγω (23) δ’ οἷον περὶ ὀργῆς πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί, καὶ τίσιν (24) εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις·  εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἓν ἢ τὰ (25) δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἅπαντα δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη τὴν (26) ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν·  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
وقد ينبغي أن نعود فنقسم كل واحد منها ثلاثة أقسام  فأما كيف ذلك فإني أقول إنه على نحو ما نصنع في الغضب حين ننظر أن كيف وباية حال اذ كان المرء فهو غضوب وممَّ اعتيد أن يكون الغضب وعلى من  فإنه إن وجدت واحدة من هذه الخلال أو اثنتان حتى يوجد بعضها ولا يوجد بعض فليس يكون بذلك تهييج الغضب  وكذلك سائر الأخر 
.  .  .  . 
Oportet dividere que sunt circa unumquodque ad tria,  dico autem tamquam de ira quomodo se habentes iracundi sunt, et quibus consueverunt irasci, et in qualibus;  si enim quidern unum aut duo habearnus horum, omnia vera non, impossibile utique erit iram bene facere;  similiter autem et in aliis. 
Oportet autem dividere que circa unumquodque in tria,  dico autem puta de ira qualiter dispositi iracundi sunt, et quibus consueverunt irasci, et in qualibus rebus;  si enim unum quidem aut duo habeamus horum, omnia autem non, impossibile utique erit iram efficere;  similiter autem et in aliis. 
We must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads.  Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them.  It is not enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in any one.  The same is true of the other emotions. 
ὥσπερ οὖν (27) καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις, οὕτω (28) καὶ περὶ τούτων ποιήσωμεν καὶ διέλωμεν τὸν εἰρημένον (29) τρόπον. 
فقد ينبغي كما كتبنا وصنفنا القضايا في تلك اللاتي قيلت أولا أن تفعل مثل ذلك في هذه أيضا ونفصلها بالنحو الذي ذكرنا 
. 
Quemadmodum igitur et in predictis scripsimus propositiones, sic et in hiis faciemus et dividemus secundum predictum modum. 
Sicut igitur et de antepositis tradidimus propositiones, ita et de hiis faciamus et dividamus predicta modo. 
So just as earlier in this work we drew up a list of useful propositions for the orator, let us now proceed in the same way to analyse the subject before us. 
[2.2.1] (30) Ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας [φαινομένης] (31) διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ <τι> τῶν αὐτοῦ, (32) τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος. 
فليكن الغضب حزنا أو أذى مع تشوق من المرء إلى عقوبة ترى من أجل صغر نفسه أو استهانة به أو بمن يتصل به 
. 
[2] Sit autem ira appetitus cum tristitia afflictione apparente propter apparentem despectum eorum que sunt ad ipsum aut ad ipsius aliquem non convenienter. 
[2] Sit aut em ira appetitus cum tristitia punitionis apparentis propter apparentem parvipensionem eorum que in ipsum aut in ipsius aliqua non convenienter. 
Part 2. Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends. 
[2.2.2] εἰ δὴ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, (33) ἀνάγκη τὸν ὀργιζόμενον ὀργίζεσθαι ἀεὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστόν τινι, (34) οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ,  καὶ ὅτι αὑτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τί (1378b1) πεποίηκεν ἢ ἤμελλεν,  καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονήν, (2) τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι·  ἡδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι (3) τεύξεσθαι ὧν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυνάτων (4) ἐφίεται αὑτῷ, ὁ δὲ ὀργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν αὑτῷ. 
فإن كان هذا هو الغضب فلا بد أن يكون الذي يغضب أبدا يغضب على واحد من الناس فردا أي على فلان وليس على الإنسان  وذلك لشيء فعله به أو أحد ممن هو منه بسبب  وأن يلزم كل غضب شيء من اللذة من قبل أنه يؤمل أن ينتقم  لأنه قد يلتذ إذا ظن أنه سيظفر بما قد يرى ممتنعا حتى تتوق نفسه إلى ذلك والذي يغضب أو يستشيط قد يتشوق في نفسه 
.  .  .  . 
Quoniam autem hoc est ira, necesse iracundum irasci semper alicui singularium, ut Cleoni, sed non homini,  et quod ipsum aut aliquid eorum que sunt in ipso fecit aut debebat,  et omni ire consequi quandam voluptatem, que est a spe tormentandi;  delectabile quidem enim posse invenire que desiderant, nullus autem apparentia impossibilia appetit, qui vera irascitur appetit sibi. 
Quoniam autern hoc est ira, necesse eum qui irascitur irasci semper singularium alicui, puta Cleoni, sed non homini,  et quia in ipsum aut in aliquid eorum que ipsius fecit aut facturus erat,  et ad omnem iram sequi aliquam delectationem a spe puniendi;  delectabile quidem enim existimare adipisci ea que appetuntur, nullus autem ea que apparent sibi impossibilia appetit, iratus autem appetit sibi possibilia. 
If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt towards some particular individual, e.g. Cleon, and not ‘man’ in general.  It must be felt because the other has done or intended to do something to him or one of his friends.  It must always be attended by a certain pleasure — that which arises from the expectation of revenge.  For since nobody aims at what he thinks he cannot attain, the angry man is aiming at what he can attain, and the belief that you will attain your aim is pleasant. 
διὸ (5) καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ·
(6) ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο
(7) ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται·  (8) ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἡδονή τις διά τε τοῦτο καὶ διότι δια(9)τρίβουσιν ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ·  ἡ οὖν τότε γινομένη (10) φαντασία ἡδονὴν ἐμποιεῖ, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἐνυπνίων. 
فما أحسن ما قيل في الغضب إن الذي يعتلج في صدر الرجل منه أحلى من العسل والشهد وإن له مثل الدخان 1   فقد يلزمه شيء من اللذة لهذا السبب ثم لأن الأوهام تدرس وتحيل ذكر الانتقام في الفكر  والمتبع الذي يكون في وهم المرء من ذلك يُحدث له لذة كالذي يحدث من الأحلام 
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Ideo bene dictum est de ira: ‘quare multo dulcius melle stillante in pectoribus hominum augetur’;  consequitur enim et voluptas quedam per hoc et propter quod conteruntur in tormentando in intellectu;  aut igitur huius facta fantasia voluptatem facit, quemadmodum ea que est sompniorum. 
Propter quod bene dictum est de ira: ‘que multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum crescit; ’  assequitur enim et delectatio quedam et propter hoc et propterea quia demorantur in puniendo mente;  que igitur tunc infit fantasia delectationem facit sicut que sompniorum. 
Hence it has been well said about wrath, Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb, dripping with sweetness, And spreads through the hearts of men.  It is also attended by a certain pleasure because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance,  and the images then called up cause pleasure, like the images called up in dreams. 
[2.2.3] ἐπεὶ δὲ (11) ἡ ὀλιγωρία ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαι(12)νόμενον  (καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τἀγαθὰ ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς (13) εἶναι, καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα πρὸς αὐτά·  ὅσα δὲ μηδέν τι ἢ μικρόν, (14) οὐδενὸς ἄξια ὑπολαμβάνομεν),  τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη ὀλιγωρίας, (15) καταφρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπηρεασμὸς καὶ ὕβρις·  [2.2.4] ὅ τε γὰρ κατα(16)φρονῶν ὀλιγωρεῖ  (ὅσα γὰρ οἴονται μηδενὸς ἄξια, τούτων (17) καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ μηδενὸς ἀξίων ὀλιγωροῦσιν),  καὶ ὁ (18) ἐπηρεάζων φαίνεται ὀλιγωρεῖν.  ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμὸς (19) ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς βουλήσεσιν μὴ ἵνα τι αὑτῷ ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὴ (20) ἐκείνῳ·  ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐχ ἵνα αὑτῷ τι, ὀλιγωρεῖ·  δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε (21) βλάψειν ὑπολαμβάνει, ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ οὐκ ὠλιγώρει,  οὔτ’ (22) ὠφελῆσαι ἂν οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου, ἐφρόντιζε γὰρ ἂν ὥστε (23) φίλος εἶναι·  καὶ ὁ ὑβρίζων δὲ ὀλιγωρεῖ·  ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ (24) πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ (25) ἵνα τι γίγνηται αὑτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅ τι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ἡσθῇ·  οἱ (26) γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται. 
وصغر النفس إنما يكون من قبل الظن بالشيء أنه لا قدر له ولا يستحق أن يعنى به  فإن الشرور والخيرات قد تظن مستوجبة للعناية واللوازم لهذه أيضا  وإنما نظن أنه لا يستحق شيئا بكل ما ظننا أنه ليس بشيء أو أنه يسير جدا  وانواع صغر النفس ثلاثة وهي التهاون والعيث والشتيمة  لان الذي يتهاون قد يصغر نفسه  وانما يتهاون المرء بالذين يظنّ انّهم ليسوا بأهل لشيء والذين ليسوا اهلا لشيء قد تصغر النفس فيهم    فانّ العيث عائق للارادات وقد يفعله الفاعل ليس لان يكون له شيء ولكن لكيلا يكون كذاك  ومن اجل انّه ليس في نفسه يصغر نفسه  فهو واضح انّه لا يظنّ في ذلك ضررا عليه ولو ظنّ ذلك لخوف فلم يكن يصغر نفسه  فامّا نفعه ان انتفع به فلا يستحق ان يقال فيه هاهنا شيء لانّه حينئذ يحتال لان يستعطف  كذلك الذي يشتم أيضا قد تصغر نفسه  فإن الشتيمة إضرار والإضرار أذى فيما يخزى منه المشتوم وليس في شيء يكون له ولكن فيما قد كان وإنه قد أحس به كيف هو  لأن الذين يفعلون خلاف ذلك لا يشتمون لكنهم يعاقبون 
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Amplius autem despectio est actio opinionis circa dignum apparens nulli  (et enim mala et bona digna extimamus studioso esse, et distensa ad hec;  quecumque vera non aut valde parva nullo digna arbitramur),  tres autem sunt species despectus, negligentia et temptatio et iniuria;  qui enim negligit despicit  (que enim considerant nullo digna esse, hec negligunt),  et temptans videtur negligere.  Est autem temptatio impedimentum consultationibus non ipsi,  sed quod non illi despicit;  palam enim non ledere arbitratur, timebat enim et non despiciebat,  neque proderit utique nichil dignum sermone, curabat enim sicut amicus esse;  et iniurians despicit;  est enim iniuria ledendi et tristandi in quibus verecundia est patienti, non quod aliquid fiat alii aut quoniam factum est, sed quomodo sentiat;  contrafacientes enim non iniuriantur, sed affiiguntur. 
Quoniam autem parvipensio est actus opinionis circa id quod nullo dignum videtur  (et enim mala et bona digna putamus studio esse, et tendentia ad hec;  quecumque autem nichil aut valde modica, nullo digna existimamus),  tres sunt species parvipensionis, despectus et epireasmus et contumeliatio;  qui enim despicit parvi pendit  (que enim putant nullo digna esse, hec despiciunt, que autem nullo digna parvi pendunt),  et que epireazat videtur despicere.  Est enim epireasmus impedimentum voluntatibus non ut aliquid sibi, sed ut non illi;  quoniam igitur non ut aliquid sibi, parvi pendit;  palam enim quod neque nociturum existimat (timeret enim et non parvi penderet)  neque prodesse utique nichil dignum verbo (curaret enim utique ut amicus esset);  et contumelians autem parvi pendit;  est enim contumeliatio nocendi et contristandi in quibus confusio est patienti, non ut aliquid fiat sibi aliud, sed ut delectetur;  qui enim contrafaciunt non contumelizant, sed puniunt. 
Now slighting is the actively entertained opinion of something as obviously of no importance.  We think bad things, as well as good ones, have serious importance; and we think the same of anything that tends to produce such things,  while those which have little or no such tendency we consider unimportant.  There are three kinds of slighting — contempt, spite, and insolence.  (1) Contempt is one kind of slighting:  you feel contempt for what you consider unimportant, and it is just such things that you slight.  (2) Spite is another kind;  it is a thwarting another man’s wishes, not to get something yourself but to prevent his getting it.  The slight arises just from the fact that you do not aim at something for yourself:  clearly you do not think that he can do you harm, for then you would be afraid of him instead of slighting him,  nor yet that he can do you any good worth mentioning, for then you would be anxious to make friends with him.  (3) Insolence is also a form of slighting,  since it consists in doing and saying things that cause shame to the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or because anything has happened to yourself, but simply for the pleasure involved.  (Retaliation is not ‘insolence’, but vengeance.) 
αἴτιον (27) δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῖς ὑβρίζουσιν, ὅτι οἴονται κακῶς δρῶντες (28) αὐτοὶ ὑπερέχειν μᾶλλον  (διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι ὑβρισταί· (29) ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὑβρίζοντες)·  ὕβρεως δὲ ἀτιμία, ὁ δ’ (30) ἀτιμάζων ὀλιγωρεῖ·  τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμήν, (31) οὔτε ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ·  διὸ λέγει ὀργιζόμενος ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς “ἠτίμησεν· ἑλὼν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς” (32) καὶ (33) “ὡς εἴ τιν’ ἀτίμητον μετανάστην,” (34) ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ὀργιζόμενος. 
والعلة فيما يجد الذين يشتمون اللذة أنهم يظنون إذا فعلوا ذلك أنهم أفضل من المشتومين  ولذلك ما يوجد الأحداث والأغنياء شتامين أو فحاشين فقد يظنون إذا شتموا أنهم أفضل من المشتوم  والشتيمة استهانة واحتقار وإنما يحتقر من ليس بأهل لشيء  وليس له شيء من الكرامة لا في خير ولا في شر  ولذلك ما قال اوميروس إن اغاممنن استهان باخليوس حيث غضب وسلبه كرامته يعني سرّيته وتركه كالطارئ المحتقر فغضب لذلك اخليوس 
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Causa autem voluptatis iniuriantibus quoniam extimant male agentes ipsos superhabundare magis  (ideo iuvenes et divites iniuriatores; superhabundare arbitrantur iniuriantes) ;  iniurie autem dedecus, qui enim dedecorat despicit;  quod nulli dignum nullum habet honorem, neque boni neque mali;  ideo dicit iratus Achilles: ‘dedecoravit; auferens enim habet decus auferens’, et ‘sicut aliquem advenam dedecoratum’, sicut per hec iratus. 
Causa autem delectationis contumelizantibus, quia putant quod ipsi male agentes excedant magis  (propter quod et iuvenes et divites contumeliosi; excellere enim putant contumelias inferentes);  contumeliationis autem dehonoratio, qui enim dehonorat parvi pendit;  quod enim nullo dignum nullum habet honorem, neque mali neque boni;  propter quod dicit iratus Achilles: ‘dehonoravit; accipiens enim habet venerationem ipse auferens,’ et, ‘ac si aliquem inhonoratum post exurgentem,’ tamquam propter hec iratus. 
The cause of the pleasure thus enjoyed by the insolent man is that he thinks himself greatly superior to others when ill—treating them.  That is why youths and rich men are insolent; they think themselves superior when they show insolence.  One sort of insolence is to rob people of the honour due to them; you certainly slight them thus;  for it is the unimportant, for good or evil, that has no honour paid to it.  So Achilles says in anger: He hath taken my prize for himself and hath done me dishonour, and Like an alien honoured by none, meaning that this is why he is angry. 
[II.2.7] προσήκειν δὲ οἴονται πολυωρεῖ(35)σθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡττόνων κατὰ γένος, κατὰ δύναμιν, κατ’ ἀρετήν, (1379a1) καὶ ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς ὑπερέχῃ πολύ,  οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ (2) πλούσιος πένητος  καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ῥητορικὸς ἀδυνάτου εἰπεῖν  (3) καὶ ἄρχων ἀρχομένου καὶ ἄρχειν ἄξιος οἰόμενος τοῦ ἄρχε(4)σθαι ἀξίου·  διὸ εἴρηται “θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλήων” (5) καὶ “ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον·” (6) ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. 
وقد يظن كثير من الناس أن لها حقا واجبا على الذين هم دونهم في الجنس والقوة والفضيلة وفي كل ما يوجد لهم عليهم فيه الفضل جملة  كفضل الأغنياء على الفقراء بالمال  وفضل البليغ على الضعيف عن المنطق بالمنطق  وفضل المتسلط <على المتسلط> عليه بالسلطان والذي يظن أنه يستحق أن يتسلط على الذي يستحق أن يتسلط (86) عليه  ولذلك ما قيل إن شدة الاستشاطة للملوك الذين نشئوا في الثروة وأشياء أخر تتصل بذلك فقد يمتعضون لعظم شأنهم 
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Con venire autem opinantur multipliciter diffiniri a minoribus secundum genus, secundum patentiam, secundum virtutem, et simpliciter in quo utique eadem multum superhabundat,  ut in pecuniis dives a mendico  et in dicendo rethoricus a potente dicere  et dominus domino et dominari dignus existimans dominari digno;  ideo dictum est: ‘ira autem magna est nobilium regum’, ‘sed tamen et denique portat iram ut perficiat’; vexantur (conturbantur)1 autem propter superhabundantiam. 
Convenire autem putant magni pendi a minoribus secundum genus, secundum potentiam, secundum virtutem, et totaliter in ipso in quo excedunt multum,  ut in pecuniis dives pauperem  et in loquendo rethoricus impotentem loqui  et principans subiectum et arbitratus dignus ad principandum eum qui dignus subici;  propter quod dictum est: ‘ira autem magna est a Iove educatorum regum,’ et, ‘alias autem et posterius habet iram; ' indignantur enim propter excellentiam. 
A man expects to be specially respected by his inferiors in birth, in capacity, in goodness, and generally in anything in which he is much their superior:  as where money is concerned a wealthy man looks for respect from a poor man;  where speaking is concerned, the man with a turn for oratory looks for respect from one who cannot speak;  the ruler demands the respect of the ruled, and the man who thinks he ought to be a ruler demands the respect of the man whom he thinks he ought to be ruling.  Hence it has been said: “Great is the wrath of kings, whose father is Zeus almighty,” and “Yea, but his rancour abideth long afterward also,” their great resentment being due to their great superiority. 
[II.2.8] ἔτι ὑφ’ ὧν τις οἴεται (7) εὖ πάσχειν δεῖν·  οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οὓς εὖ πεποίηκεν ἢ ποιεῖ, (8) αὐτὸς ἢ δι’ αὐτόν τις ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τις, ἢ βούλεται ἢ ἐβουλήθη. 
ثم الذين يتوقع منهم الإحسان  وذلك فيما لم يفعل أو لا يفعل إما به نفسه وإما بأحد ممن يتصل به إن كان هوى ذلك أو يهواه 
.  . 
Amplius ex quibus quis extimat bene pati oportere;  hii autem sunt quos bene fecit aut facit, aut ipse autem eum qui sunt in ipso aliquis aut per se, aut vult aut voluit. 
Adhuc a quibus aliquis putat debere bene pati;  isti autem sunt quibus bene fecit aut facit, aut ipse aut aliquis suorum aut per ipsum, aut volitum est aut volitum fuit. 
Then again a man looks for respect from those who he thinks owe him good treatment,  and these are the people whom he has treated or is treating well, or means or has meant to treat well, either himself, or through his friends, or through others at his request. 
[II.2.9] (9) φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἤδη πῶς τε ἔχοντες ὀργίζονται (10) αὐτοὶ καὶ τίσιν καὶ διὰ ποῖα. 
فقد يستبين من هذا القول كيف وبأية \ حال إذا كان المرء فهو غضوب وعلى من يغضب ومن أجل أي شيء يغضب 
. 
Manifestum igitur ex hiis utique qualiter se habentes irascuntur ipsi et quibusdam et per qualia. 
Manifestum igitur ex hiis iam qualiter habentes irascuntur ipsi et quibus et propter que. 
It will be plain by now, from what has been said, (1) in what frame of mind, (2) with what persons, and (3) on what grounds people grow angry. 
αὐτοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὅταν λυπῶνται·  (11) ἐφίεται γάρ τινος ὁ λυπούμενος·  ἐάν τε οὖν κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν (12) ὁτιοῦν ἀντικρούσῃ τις, οἷον τῷ διψῶντι πρὸς τὸ πιεῖν, ἐάν τε (13) μή, ὁμοίως ταὐτὸ φαίνεται ποιεῖν·  καὶ ἐάν τε ἀντιπράττῃ (14) τις ἐάν τε μὴ συμπράττῃ ἐάν τε ἄλλο τι ἐνοχλῇ οὕτως (15) ἔχοντα, πᾶσιν ὀργίζεται·  [II.2.10] διὸ κάμνοντες, πενόμενοι, <πολε(16)μοῦντες,> ἐρῶντες, διψῶντες, ὅλως ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ μὴ(17) (18) κατορθοῦντες ὀργίλοι εἰσὶ καὶ εὐπαρόρμητοι,  μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς (19) τοὺς τοῦ παρόντος ὀλιγωροῦντας,  οἷον κάμνων μὲν τοῖς πρὸς (20) τὴν νόσον,  πενόμενος δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πενίαν,  πολεμῶν δὲ (21) τοῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον,  ἐρῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα,  ὁμοίως (22) δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ‹εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο ὀλιγωρῇ τις›·  (23) προοδοποιεῖται γὰρ ἕκαστος πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου ὀργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ (24) ὑπάρχοντος πάθους·  [II.2.11] ἔτι δ’ ἐὰν τἀναντία τύχῃ προσδεχόμενος·  (25) λυπεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν,  ὥσπερ καὶ τέρπει τὸ (26) πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ἐὰν γένηται ὃ βούλεται·  διὸ καὶ ὧραι καὶ (27) χρόνοι καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ ἡλικίαι ἐκ τούτων φανεραί, ποῖαι (28) εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε,  καὶ ὅτε μᾶλλον ἐν (29) τούτοις εἰσί, μᾶλλον καὶ εὐκίνητοι. 
فإذا كان بهذه \ الحال أعني أن يكون مع الحزن أو الأذى  يتشوق إلى شيء  دخلته الموجدة من ساعته \ أو لم تدخله غير أنه يُرى فاعلا ذلك بعينه إن فعل به أحد شيئا وإن لم يفعل به  وكذلك \ إن كان شيء آخر يؤذيه فإنه إذا كان كذلك فقد يغضب على كل أو في كل  فالذين إذا مستهم \ فاقة أو مرض يشتهون البتة ولا يقومون شيئا فهم غضوبون وليسوا شهويين  وقد يغضبون بزيادة على الذين تصغر نفوسهم أو يتهاونون بالأمر الواقع  أما عند الوجع \ منهم فعلى الذين يتهاونون بالوجع  وأما في حال الفاقة منهم فعلى المتهاونين بالفاقة  وأما في الحرب فعلى المتهاونين بالحرب  وأما في الصداقة فعلى المتهاونين بالذين هم أصدقاء  وإن لم يكن شيء من هذا فغير ذلك مما يتهاون فيه المتهاون  فكل امرئ فقد يخرج إلى الغضب من قبل الألم الذي هو به  ثم إن صار إلى خلاف ما أمل  فقد يعرض للمرء الأذى والحزن الشديد بالأكثر إذا ظن ظنا ولم يكن ما أمل    وقد يستبين من هذا الذي ذكرنا في أي الأوقات والأزمنة والأسنان والأخلاق يكونون أيسر تحريكا نحو الغضب 2    
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Ipsi quidem enim, quando tristantur;  appetit enim aliquid qui tristatur;  si secundum visum igitur repercutit aliquis, ut sitienti ad bibendum, si vero non, similiter idem videtur facere;  et si ad invicem agit aliquis sive non simul operatur sive aliud quis impedit sic se habentem, omnibus irasci;  ideo laborantes mendici desiderantes sitientes, omnino concupiscentes et non rectificantes irascibiles sunt et bene mobiles,  maxime quidem despicientes presens,  ut puta laborans quidem existentibus ad egritudinem,  mendicans autem entibus ad mendicitatem,  bellans vero eis qui sunt in bello,  petens vero eis qui sunt ad petitionem,  similiter autem et alii, si vero non, et quoniam utique aliud parvipendit aliquid;  preparatur enim unusquisque ad uniuscuiusque iram ab existente passione;  amplius autem si contraria attigerit expectans;  tristatur enim magis multum transopinabile,  tamquam et exultat multum inopinabile, si fiat quod vult;  ideoque hore et anni et dispositiones et etates ex hiis manifeste, et que bene mobiles ad iram et quando,  et quoniam quando magis in hiis sunt, magis et bene mobiles. 
Ipsi quidem enim, cum tristantur;  appetit enim aliquid qui tristatur;  sive directe contra molestet quis, ut sitienti quantum ad bibere, sive non, idem videtur facere;  et sive contra agat aliquis sive non cooperetur sive in alio quis molestet sic habens omnibus irascitur;  propter quod infirmi, egentes, amantes, sitientes, totaliter concupiscentes et non assequentes iracundi sunt et facile commobiles,  maxime quidem ad presentes parvi pendentes,  puta laborans quidem eis qui ad egritudinem,  egentes autem eis qui ad egestatem,  bellans autem eis qui ad bellum,  amans autem eis qui ad amorem,  similiter autem et alii, si autem non et quodcumque aliud parvi pendat quis;  preparatur enim unusquisque ad uniuscuiusque iram ab inexistente passione;  adhuc autem si contraria extiterit suscipiens;  contristat enim magis quod multum inopinatum,  sicut et delectat quod multum inopinatum, si fiat quod volitum est;  propter quod et tempora et hore et dispositiones et etates ex hiis manifeste, et que facile mobiles ad iram et quando et ubi,  et quod quando magis in hiis sunt, magis etiam facile mobiles. 
(1) The frame of mind is that of one in which any pain is being felt.  In that condition, a man is always aiming at something.  Whether, then, another man opposes him either directly in any way, as by preventing him from drinking when he is thirsty, or indirectly, the act appears to him just the same;  whether some one works against him, or fails to work with him, or otherwise vexes him while he is in this mood, he is equally angry in all these cases.  Hence people who are afflicted by sickness or poverty or love or thirst or any other unsatisfied desires are prone to anger and easily roused:  especially against those who slight their present distress.  Thus a sick man is angered by disregard of his illness,  a poor man by disregard of his poverty,  a man waging war by disregard of the war he is waging,  a lover by disregard of his love,  and so throughout, any other sort of slight being enough if special slights are wanting.  Each man is predisposed, by the emotion now controlling him, to his own particular anger.  Further, we are angered if we happen to be expecting a contrary result:  for a quite unexpected evil is specially painful,  just as the quite unexpected fulfilment of our wishes is specially pleasant.  Hence it is plain what seasons, times, conditions, and periods of life tend to stir men easily to anger, and where and when this will happen;  and it is plain that the more we are under these conditions the more easily we are stirred. 
[II.2.12] (30) αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὀργήν,  ὀργί(31)ζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ χλευάζουσιν καὶ σκώ(32)πτουσιν (ὑβρίζουσι γάρ),  καὶ τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα βλάπτουσιν ὅσα (33) ὕβρεως σημεῖα·  ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἃ μήτε ἀντί τινος (34) μήτ’ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ποιοῦσιν·  ἤδη γὰρ δοκεῖ δι’ ὕβριν. 
  وعلى من يغضبون وبمن يهزؤون يعينون وبمن يعيرون [L 87] وإنما يشتمون أو يستهينون  بالذين هم بهذه الحال أعني الذين يضرون بهم فعلامات الشتم أو الاستهانة بالغة ما بلغت  تعدو أن تكون من هذا النحو أعني التي لا ينتفع بها الفاعلون في شيء  فقد يظن واجبا أن يكون من الشتم والاستهانة 
.  .  .  .  . 
Hii quidem igitur sic se habentes bene mobiles ad iram,  irascuntur autem deridentibus et deliciosis; vituperant (iniuriantur enim);  et ledentibus talia quecumque iniurie signa;  necesse talia esse que nee contra aliquem nee auxilium facientibus;  utique enim videtur per iniuriam. 
Ipsi quidem igitur sic habentes facile mobiles ad iram.  Irascuntur autem et deridentibus et subsannantibus et conviciantibus (contumeliam enim inferunt),  et in talibus nocentibus quecumque sunt contumelie signa;  necesse autem talia esse que neque pro aliquo neque proficua facientibus;  iam enim videntur in contumeliam. 
These, then, are the frames of mind in which men are easily stirred to anger.  The persons with whom we get angry are those who laugh, mock, or jeer at us, for such conduct is insolent.  Also those who inflict injuries upon us that are marks of insolence.  These injuries must be such as are neither retaliatory nor profitable to the doers:  for only then will they be felt to be due to insolence. 
[II.2.13] καὶ (35) τοῖς κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ καταφρονοῦσι περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ μάλιστα (36) σπουδάζουσιν,  οἷον οἱ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐάν τις (37) εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν,  οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐάν τις εἰς τὴν ἰδέαν, (38) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων·  [II.2.14] ταῦτα δὲ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν (39) ὑποπτεύσωσι μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὑτοῖς, ἢ ὅλως ἢ μὴ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ (1379b1) μὴ δοκεῖν·  ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴωνται ὑπερέχειν ἐν τού(2)τοις ἐν οἷς σκώπτονται, οὐ φροντίζουσιν. 
فعل الذين يسيئون القول ويستخفون بالمجتهدين فضل اجتهاد في الفضيلة  كالذين يشرفون بالفلسفة إن امرؤ شرف بها  أو بما أشبهها إن كان شيء يشبهها وكذلك سائر الأخر  فأما هؤلاء فكم بالحري يظنون أنه ليست لهم في ذلك منفعة البتة أو يظنون بلا قوة أو لا يظنون  لكنهم إن ظنوا أن لهم في اللاتي يعيرون بها منفعة عظيمة 3  
.  .  .  .  . 
Et male dicentibus et spernentibus ea circa que maxime student,  tamquam qui in phllosophia diliguntur honorabiles si quis ad philosophiam,  hii vero in ydea si quis ad ydeam, similiter autem et in aliis;  hec autem multo magis, si insidiantur non esse ipsis, aut omnino aut non fortiter aut non videri;  quoniam autem si vehementer arbitrantur esse in hiis in quibus iniuriam patiantur, non curant. 
Et obloquentibus et despicientibus ea circa que ipsi maxime student,  puta qui in philosophia amant honorari si quis in philosophiam,  qui autem in specie si quis in speciem, similiter aute1n et in aliis;  hec autem multo magis, si suspicati fuerint non existere ipsis, aut totaliter aut non fortiter, aut non videri;  sed cum valde putent existere in hiis in quibus subsannantur, non curant. 
Also those who speak ill of us, and show contempt for us, in connexion with the things we ourselves most care about:  thus those who are eager to win fame as philosophers get angry with those who show contempt for their philosophy;  those who pride themselves upon their appearance get angry with those who show contempt for their appearance and so on in other cases.  We feel particularly angry on this account if we suspect that we are in fact, or that people think we are, lacking completely or to any effective extent in the qualities in question.  For when we are convinced that we excel in the qualities for which we are jeered at, we can ignore the jeering. 
[II.2.15] καὶ τοῖς φίλοις (3) μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις·  οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον (4) πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἢ μή. 
فهم بالأكثر يخالون للرحمة أو العطف  لأنهم يظنون أنهم قريب من أن ينالون منهم فعل حسن إلا أن 
.  . 
Et amicis magis quam non amicis;  extimant convenire magis ab ipsis bene pati aut non. 
Et amicis magis quam non amicis;  arbitrantur enirn con venire magis ab ipsis bene pati quam non. 
Again, we are angrier with our friends than with other people,  since we feel that our friends ought to treat us well and not badly. 
[II.2.16] καὶ τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τιμᾶν ἢ (5) φροντίζειν, ἐὰν πάλιν μὴ οὕτως ὁμιλῶσιν·  καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ (6) τούτων οἴονται καταφρονεῖσθαι· ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιεῖν. 
يكونوا إنما يعيرون أو يخالون باللاتي قد اعتيدت وإن لم يعودوا فيلقوهم بمثل ذلك ثانية  فإنهم قد يظنون بهؤلاء أيضا التهاون بهم 
.  . 
Et consuetis honorare aut curare, si iterum non sic mitigentur;  et enim ab hiis putant despici; hec enim utique facere. 
Et hiis qui consueverunt honorare aut curare, si iterum non ita se habeant;  et enim ab hiis putant despici; eadem enim utique facerent. 
We are angry with those who have usually treated us with honour or regard, if a change comes and they behave to us otherwise:  for we think that they feel contempt for us, or they would still be behaving as they did before. 
καὶ (7) τοῖς μὴ ἀντιποιοῦσιν εὖ μηδὲ τὴν ἴσην ἀνταποδιδοῦσιν. 
وكذلك يظنون بالذين لا يعودون فيحسنون والذين لا يكافئون بالاستيجاب 
. 
Et non contrafacientibus bene neque equalitatem retribuentes. 
Et hiis qui non contra bene faciunt neque equalem retribuunt. 
And with those who do not return our kindnesses or fail to return them adequately, 
[II.2.17] καὶ (8) τοῖς τἀναντία ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν ἥττους ὦσιν.  καταφρονεῖν (9) γὰρ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι φαίνονται,  καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς ἡττόνων οἱ (10) δ’ ὡς παρὰ ἡττόνων. 
والذين يفعلون بهم المخالفات والذين هم عندهم بحال خسيسة  فكل هؤلاء ونحوهم قد يظنون متهاونين  أما بعضهم ففي الأمور الخسيسة وأما بعضهم ففي التي هي أخس 
.  .  . 
Et facientibus contraria ipsis, quamvis minores sint.  Despicere enim omnes hii videntur,  et hii quidem tamquam minora, hii vera tamquam iuxta minora. 
Et hiis qui contraria faciunt ipsis, si minores fuerint.  Despicere enim omnes tales videntur,  et hii quidem ut minores, hii autem ut comparatione minores. 
and with those who oppose us though they are our inferiors:  for all such persons seem to feel contempt for us;  those who oppose us seem to think us inferior to themselves, and those who do not return our kindnesses seem to think that those kindnesses were conferred by inferiors. 
[II.2.18] καὶ τοῖς ἐν μηδενὶ λόγῳ οὖσιν, ἄν τι (11) ὀλιγωρῶσι, μᾶλλον·  ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ τῆς ὀλιγωρίας (12) πρὸς τοὺς μὴ προσήκοντας, προσήκει δὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι μὴ ὀλι(13)γωρεῖν·  [II.2.19] τοῖς δὲ φίλοις, ἐάν τε μὴ εὖ λέγωσιν ἢ ποιῶσιν,  καὶ (14) ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐὰν τἀναντία,  καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθάνωνται δεομένων, (15) ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀντιφῶντος Πλήξιππος τῷ Μελεάγρῳ·  ὀλιγωρίας (16) γὰρ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι σημεῖον·  ὧν γὰρ φροντίζομεν οὐ (17) λανθάνει. 
والتي ليست فيها كلمة البتة  وأيضا الغضب موضوع تحت صغر النفس في الواجبات فليس ينبغي أن تصغر النفس في الأمور اليسيرة  فأما الأصدقاء فقد يجب الغضب عليهم إن لم يقولوا جميلا  وأكثر من ذلك  وإن كانوا لا يحسون أو يألمون للمتضادات المخالفات إذا أصابت أصدقاءهم وإذا مستهم حاجة كمثل [L 88] ما يقال في فيليخيفوس صاحب أنطيفون بمالاغروس  ولا حس أو لا ألم دليل على صغر النفس والتهاون  ثم إن هم أحزنوا أو أذوا من يعنون به 4  
.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Et existentibus nulli rationi, si quid despiciunt magis;  subiacct enim ira despectioni ad non convenientes, con venit autem minoribus non despicere;  amicis vera, sive non bene dicant aut faciant,  et amplius magis si contraria,  et si non tangunt indigentia, quemadmodum Antphontis Plexippus Meleagro;  despectionis enim non tangere signum;  que curamus non latere. 
Et hiis qui in nulla proportione sunt, si quid parvi pendant, magis;  supponitur enim ira parvipensionis ad non convenientes, convenit autem minoribus non parvi pendere;  amicis autem, si non bene dicant vel faciant,  et adhuc magis si contraria,  et si non intendant indirogentibus, sicut Plexippus Antifontis Meleagro;  parvipensionis enim non intendere signum;  ea enim que curamus non latent. 
And we feel particularly angry with men of no account at all, if they slight us.  For, by our hypothesis, the anger caused by the slight is felt towards people who are not justified in slighting us, and our inferiors are not thus justified.  Again, we feel angry with friends if they do not speak well of us or treat us well;  and still more, if they do the contrary;  or if they do not perceive our needs, which is why Plexippus is angry with Meleager in Antiphon’s play;  for this want of perception shows that they are slighting us  — we do not fail to perceive the needs of those for whom we care. 
[II.2.20] καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχαίρουσι ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καὶ ὅλως (18) εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀτυχίαις·  ἢ γὰρ ἐχθροῦ ἢ ὀλι(19)γωροῦντος σημεῖον. 
   
.  . 
Et gaudentibus infelicitatibus et universaliter bene putantibus in infelicitatibus ipsorum;  aut enim inimici aut despicientis signum. 
Et exultantibus in infortuniis et totaliter hiis qui boni animi in ipsorum infortuniis;  aut enim inimici aut parvi pendentis signum. 
Again we are angry with those who rejoice at our misfortunes or simply keep cheerful in the midst of our misfortunes,  since this shows that they either hate us or are slighting us. 
καὶ τοῖς μὴ φροντίζουσιν ἐὰν λυπήσωσιν·  (20) διὸ καὶ τοῖς κακὰ ἀγγέλλουσιν ὀργίζονται. 
  فقد يغضبون على من أساءوا به الظن 
.  . 
Et non sollicitis entibus si tristabuntur;  ideo mala nuntiantibus irascuntur. 
Et hiis qui non curant si contristaverint;  propter quod mala annuntiantibus irascuntur. 
Also with those who are indifferent to the pain they give us:  this is why we get angry with bringers of bad news. 
[II.2.21] καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἀκούουσι (21) περὶ αὐτῶν ἢ θεωμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν φαῦλα·  ὅμοιοι γάρ εἰσιν ἢ (22) ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἢ ἐχθροῖς·  οἱ γὰρ φίλοι συναλγοῦσιν, θεώμενοι δὲ (23) τὰ οἰκεῖα φαῦλα πάντες ἀλγοῦσιν. 
وعلى الذين يتهاونون بما يبلغون عنهم أو يرون بهم من سوء  فإنهم يشبهون عندهم الأعداء إذا صغرت أنفسهم أو تهاونوا  لأن كل الذين يمضهم أمر أصدقائهم قد يألمون أو يجزعون إذا رأوا بهم سوءا 
.  .  . 
Et audientibus de ipsis aut videntibus ipsorum mala;  silniles enim sunt aut despicientibus aut inimicis;  amici enim condolent, inspicientes autem propria mala omnes dolent. 
Et hiis qui aut audiunt de ipsis aut inspiciunt ea que ipsorum mala;  silniles enim sunt aut parvi pendentibus aut inimicis;  amici enirn condolcnt, inspicientes autem propria mala omnes dolent. 
And with those who listen to stories about us or keep on looking at our weaknesses;  this seems like either slighting us or hating us;  for those who love us share in all our distresses and it must distress any one to keep on looking at his own weaknesses. 
[II.2.22] ἔτι τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσι πρὸς (24) πέντε, πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, [πρὸς] οὓς θαυμάζουσιν, ὑφ’ (25) ὧν βούλονται θαυμάζεσθαι, ἢ οὓς αἰσχύνονται, ἢ ἐν τοῖς (26) αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς·  ἄν τις ἐν τούτοις ὀλιγωρῇ, ὀργίζονται (27) μᾶλλον. 
ثم قد يغضبون على الذين يتهاونون أو بصغر أنفسهم في خمسة أصناف وذلك في الذين يكرمونهم وفي الذين يتعجبون منهم وفي الذين يحبون أن يكونوا عندهم عجيبين أو متعجبا منهم وفي الذين هم يستخزون منهم وفي اللاتي يكون فيها الخزى والفضيحة  إن امرء صغرت نفسه أو تهاون بذلك فقد يشتد الغضب منهم على الذين يتهاونون أو تصغر نفوسهم 
.  . 
Amplius despicientibus ad quinque, apud quos philotimunte, ad quos mirantur, a quibus, volunt admirari, ad quos verentur, in verentibus ipsos;  in hiis si quis despicit, irascuntur magis. 
Adhuc parvi pendentibus ad quinque, ad quos sunt in am ore honoris, ad quos sunt in admiratione, a quibus volunt in admiratione haberi, ad quos verecundantur aut in confundentibus ipsos;  in hiis si quis parvi pendat, irascuntur magis. 
Further, with those who slight us before five classes of people: namely, (1) our rivals, (2) those whom we admire, (3) those whom we wish to admire us, (4) those for whom we feel reverence, (5) those who feel reverence for us:  if any one slights us before such persons, we feel particularly angry. 
[II.2.23] καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀλιγωροῦσιν ὑπὲρ ὧν αὐτοῖς (28) αἰσχρὸν μὴ βοηθεῖν, οἷον γονεῖς, τέκνα, γυναῖκας, ἀρχομένους.  (29) καὶ τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδοῦσιν·  παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον γὰρ ἡ (30) ὀλιγωρία. 
وفي هذه الأصناف كالذين لا يؤازرونهم على الجميل وذلك كغضب الآباء على البنين والنساء على الذين يتسلطن عليهم  ثم على الذين لا يكافون بالمنة  فإن النقصان في الواجب من صغر النفس أو التهاون 
.  .  . 
Et despicientibus ad hec super qui bus ipsis malum non auxiliantur, ut puta parentes, filios, uxores, dominantes.  Et non retribuentibus gratias;  iuxta decens enim despectio. 
Et hiis qui in talibus parvi pendunt in quibus turpe est ipsis non auxiliari, puta parentes, pueros, uxores, subiectos.  Et gratiam non reddentibus;  preter conveniens enim parvipensio. 
Again, we feel angry with those who slight us in connexion with what we are as honourable men bound to champion — our parents, children, wives, or subjects.  And with those who do not return a favour,  since such a slight is unjustifiable. 
[II.2.24] καὶ τοῖς εἰρωνευομένοις πρὸς σπουδάζοντας·  (31) καταφρονητικὸν γὰρ ἡ εἰρωνεία. 
وعلى الذين يهزلون عند الذين يجدون  لأن الهزل تهاون 
.  . 
Et yronizantibus ad studentes;  despectibile enim yronia. 
Et yronizantibus ad studentes;  despectivum enim yronia. 
Also with those who reply with humorous levity when we are speaking seriously,  for such behaviour indicates contempt. 
[II.2.25] καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων εὐποιη(32)τικοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν·  καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο καταφρονητικόν, (33) τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν, ὧν πάντας, καὶ αὐτόν. 
وعلى الذين يحسنون إلى آخرين إن لم يكونوا يحسنون إليهم  لأن هذا أيضا من التهاون أعني الأمر لا يستوي فيه المرء بالكل 
.  . 
Et aliis bene facientibus, si non et ipsis;  et enim hoc despectibile, non dignari omnes et ipsum. 
Et hiis qui sunt aliis benefactivi, si non et ipsis;  et enim hoc despectivum, non dignificare ipsum, quibus omnes. 
And with those who treat us less well than they treat everybody else;  it is another mark of contempt that they should think we do not deserve what every one else deserves. 
[II.2.26] ποιητικὸν δ’ ὀργῆς καὶ (34) ἡ λήθη,  οἷον καὶ ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων, οὕτως οὖσα περὶ μικρόν·  (35) ὀλιγωρίας γὰρ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡ λήθη σημεῖον εἶναι·  δι’ ἀμέλειαν (36) μὲν γὰρ ἡ λήθη γίγνεται, ἡ δ’ ἀμέλεια ὀλιγωρία τίς (37) ἐστιν. 
ثم مما يفعل فعل الغضب أيضا النسيان  كالذي قد يعرض في الأسماء وكذلك مهما كان في الأمور اليسيرة  لأن النسيان أيضا قد يظن دليلا على صغر النفس  وذلك [L89] أن النسيان إنما يكون عن التواني والتواني شيء من صغر النفس 
.  .  .  . 
Effectivum autem ire et oblivio,  ut puta et ea que est nominum, circa parvum;  despcctionis enim videtur et oblivio signum esse;  ob negligentiam quidem enim oblivio fit, negligentia enim despectio est. 
Factivurn autern ire et oblivio,  velut et que nominum, existens circa modicum;  parvipensionis enim videtur et oblivio signum esse;  propter incuriam quidem enim oblivio fit, incuria autem parvipensio est. 
Forgetfulness, too, causes anger,  as when our own names are forgotten, trifling as this may be;  since forgetfulness is felt to be another sign that we are being slighted;  it is due to negligence, and to neglect us is to slight us. 
[II.2.27] (1380a1) οἷς μὲν οὖν ὀργίζονται καὶ ὡς ἔχοντες καὶ διὰ ποῖα, (2) ἅμα εἴρηται·  δῆλον δ’ ὅτι δέοι ἂν κατασκευάζειν τῷ λόγῳ (3) τοιούτους οἷοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν,  καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους (4) τούτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ’ οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἵοις (5) ὀργίζονται. 
أما على من يغضبون وبأية حال يكونون غضابا ومن أجل أي شيء يغضبون فقد قيل  ثم هو معلوم أنه يمكن أن يثبت بهذا القول أن كيف يوجد الذين يكون لهم صغر النفس  فأما أضداد هؤلاء أعني الغضاب فقد يستدل عليهم من قبل الغضاب والأشياء التي في مثلها يغضبون 
.  .  . 
Quibus quidem igitur irascuntur et quomodo se habentes et per qualia, dictum est;  manifestum autem tamquam oporteat ipsum construere sermone hos putantes irascibiliter habent,  et contrarios hiis reos existentes in quibus irascuntur, et tales qui quibus irascuntur. 
Quibus quidem igitur irascuntur et quomodo habentes et propter que, dictum est;  palam autem quomodo oportebit utique ipsum efficere oratione tales quales existentes iracunde habent,  et contrarios hiis reos existentes in quibus irascuntur, et tales qualibus irascuntur. 
The persons with whom we feel anger, the frame of mind in which we feel it, and the reasons why we feel it, have now all been set forth.  Clearly the orator will have to speak so as to bring his hearers into a frame of mind that will dispose them to anger,  and to represent his adversaries as open to such charges and possessed of such qualities as do make people angry. 
[II.3.1] (6) Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐναντίον τῷ πραΰνεσθαι καὶ (7) ὀργὴ πραότητι, ληπτέον πῶς ἔχοντες πρᾶοί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς (8) τίνας πράως ἔχουσι καὶ διὰ τίνων πραΰνονται. 
فمن أجل أن ضد الغضب السكون وإن يسكن المرء هو ضد لأن يغضب فقد ينبغي أن ننظر كيف وبأية حال إذا كانوا فهم سكون وعند من يكونون سكونا وفي أي الأشياء يكونون كذلك 
. 
Quoniam autem irasci contrarium est mitem esse et ira mitigationi, sumendum qualiter se habentes mites sunt et ad quos humiliter se habent et per que mitigantur. 
Quoniam autem irasci contrarium est ei quod est mitescere et ira mansuetudini, sumendum qualiter se habentes mites sunt et ad quos mansuete se habent et per que mitescunt. 
Part 3. Since growing calm is the opposite of growing angry, and calmness the opposite of anger, we must ascertain in what frames of mind men are calm, towards whom they feel calm, and by what means they are made so. 
[II.3.2] ἔστω δὴ (9) πράϋνσις κατάστασις καὶ ἠρέμησις ὀργῆς. 
فالسكون هو وقار الغضب وفتوره 
. 
Est autem mitigatio cessatio et quietatio ire. 
Sit itaque mansuefactio destitutio et quietatio ire. 
Growing calm may be defined as a settling down or quieting of anger. 
[II.3.3] εἰ οὖν ὀργίζονται (10) τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσιν, ὀλιγωρία δ’ ἑκούσιον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς (11) μηδὲν τούτων ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀκουσίως ποιοῦσιν ἢ φαινομένοις (12) τοιούτοις πρᾶοί εἰσιν. 
وإذا كانوا إنما يغضبون على الذين تصغر نفوسهم أو يتهاونون ثم في الذي يكون من ذلك بالمشيئة أعني من صغر النفس والتهاون فهو معلوم أن الذين لا يفعلون شيئا من هذا أو يغعلونه بلا مشيئة وعمد أو يظنون كذلك فهم عن هؤلاء سكون كافّون 
. 
Si igitur irascuntur despicientibus, despectus autem est voluntarium, palam quoniam et nichil horum facientibus aut involuntarie facientibus aut talibus apparentibus mites sunt. 
Si igitur irascuntur parvi pendentibus, parvipensio autem est voluntarium, manifestum quod et hiis qui nichil horum faciunt aut involuntarie faciunt aut apparentibus talibus mites sunt. 
Now we get angry with those who slight us; and since slighting is a voluntary act, it is plain that we feel calm towards those who do nothing of the kind, or who do or seem to do it involuntarily. 
[II.3.4] καὶ τοῖς τἀναντία ὧν ἐποίησαν βουλο(13)μένοις. 
وعن بعض الذين يفعلون بهم المتضادات المخالفات بمشيئة وعمد 
. 
Et volentibus contraria eorum que fecerunt. 
Et volentibus contraria eorum que fecerunt. 
Also towards those who intended to do the opposite of what they did do. 
καὶ ὅσοι καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς αὑτοὺς τοιοῦτοι·  οὐδεὶς γὰρ (14) αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ δοκεῖ ὀλιγωρεῖν. 
والذين يفعلون بهم كل ما كان مما قد يفعلونه هم بأنفسهم  فإنه ليس يظن بأحد أنه تصغر نفسه في نفسه 
.  . 
Et quicumque et ad se ipsos tales;  nullus enim ipse se ipsum videtur despicere. 
Et hiis qui et ad se ipsos tales;  nullus enim ipse se ipsum videtur parvi pendere. 
Also towards those who treat themselves as they have treated us:  since no one can be supposed to slight himself. 
[II.3.5] καὶ τοῖς ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ μετα(15)μελομένοις·  ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες δίκην τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς (16) πεποιημένοις παύονται τῆς ὀργῆς·  σημεῖον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν (17) οἰκετῶν κολάσεως·  τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας καὶ ἀρνουμέ(18)νους μᾶλλον κολάζομεν,  πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας δικαίως (19) κολάζεσθαι παυόμεθα θυμούμενοι·  αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ἀναισχυντία (20) τὸ τὰ φανερὰ ἀρνεῖσθαι,  ἡ δ’ ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία καὶ (21) καταφρόνησις·  ὧν γοῦν πολὺ καταφρονοῦμεν, οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα. 
ثم عن الذين يقرون ويرجعون أو ينقلبون  فمن أجل أن الحكم واجب لهم عليهم قد يفترون عن الاغتمام بما فعل بهم  وعلامة ذلك في العقوبة التي تكون بالفعل  فإنا قد نعاقب بزيادة الذين يجيبون ويجحدون  فأما الذين يقرون أن العقوبة تقع بهم عدلا فقد نفتر عن (لـ ٩٠) الغضب عليهم  وقد تكون علة الجحود للأمر الظاهر وقاحة الوجه  والوقاحة صغر نفس واستهانة  فإن الذين لا تستهين بهم جدا لا يخزى منهم 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Et despicientibus et penitentibus;  sicut habentes occasionem in tristando in factis cessant ab ira;  signum autem a tormento clientum;  negantes enim et contradicentes magis tormentamus,  apud confitentes autem iuste tormentari cessamus irascibiles;  causa autem quoniam inverecundia in negando manifesta,  inverecundia vera despectio et negligentia;  quecumque multum negligimus, non verecundamur. 
Et hiis qui confitentur et penitent;  tamquam enim habentes satisfactionem id quod est tristari de factis cessant ab ira;  signum autern in servorum castigatione;  negantes quidem enim et contradicentes magis flagellamus,  ad confitentes autem iuste flagellari quietamur ab ira;  causa autem quia inreverentia est manifesta negari, inrerverentia autem parvipensio et despectus;  inrerverentia autem parvipensio et despectus;  quos enim multum despicimus, non reveremur. 
Also towards those who admit their fault and are sorry:  since we accept their grief at what they have done as satisfaction, and cease to be angry.  The punishment of servants shows this:  those who contradict us and deny their offence we punish all the more,  but we cease to be incensed against those who agree that they deserved their punishment.  The reason is that it is shameless to deny what is obvious,  and those who are shameless towards us slight us and show contempt for us:  anyhow, we do not feel shame before those of whom we are thoroughly contemptuous. 
[II.3.6] (22) καὶ τοῖς ταπεινουμένοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ἀντιλέγουσιν·  (23) φαίνονται γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν ἥττους εἶναι,  οἱ δ’ ἥττους φοβοῦνται, (24) φοβούμενος δὲ οὐδεὶς ὀλιγωρεῖ·  ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ταπεινου(25)μένους παύεται ἡ ὀργή, καὶ οἱ κύνες δηλοῦσιν οὐ δάκνοντες (26) τοὺς καθίζοντας. 
ثم الذين يذلون ولا يجيبون  لأنهم يرون مقرّين بالنقص  فأما أولئك فهم أقل خوفا لأنه ليس أحدا يخاف فتصغر نفسه  فأما أن يكون الغضب قد يفتر عن الذين يذلون ويتواضعون فقد يدل على ذلك فعل الكلاب أيضا حين تكف عن الجلوس 
.  .  .  . 
Et humiliantibus penes eos et non contradicentibus;  videntur enim confiteri minores esse,  qui minores timent, timens autem nullus despicit;  quoniam autem apud humiliantes se cessat ira, et canes manifestant non mordentes sedentes. 
Et humiliatis ad ipsum et non contradicentibus;  videntur enim confiteri minores esse,  qui autem minores timent, timens autem nullus parvi pendit;  quod autem ad humiliatos cessat ira, et canes manifestant non mordentes eos qui resident. 
Also we feel calm towards those who humble themselves before us and do not gainsay us;  we feel that they thus admit themselves our inferiors,  and inferiors feel fear, and nobody can slight any one so long as he feels afraid of him.  That our anger ceases towards those who humble themselves before us is shown even by dogs, who do not bite people when they sit down. 
[II.3.7] καὶ τοῖς σπουδάζουσι πρὸς [τοὺς] σπουδάζον(27)τας·  δοκεῖ γὰρ σπουδάζεσθαι ἀλλ’ οὐ καταφρονεῖσθαι. 
وتنهش المستعجلين  وقد يظن ذلك ذعرا وليس استهانة 
.  . 
Et studentibus ad studentes;  videtur studiosum fieri, sed non negligi. 
Et studiosis ad studiosos;  videtur enim haberi in pretia, sed non despici. 
We also feel calm towards those who are serious when we are serious,  because then we feel that we are treated seriously and not contemptuously. 
[II.3.8] καὶ τοῖς (28) μείζω κεχαρισμένοις.  καὶ τοῖς δεομένοις καὶ παραιτουμένοις·  (29) ταπεινότεροι γάρ. 
ثم عن الذين هم مفراحون جدا جدا  والذين هم محتاجون والذين يستعفّون أو يحتجرون  فإنهم أشد تواضعا وذلة 
.  .  . 
Et maius regratiantibus.  Et indigentibus et petentibus;  humiliores enim. 
Et quibus maiora data fuerunt.  Et deprecantibus et excusantibus;  humiliores enim. 
Also towards those who have done us more kindnesses than we have done them.  Also towards those who pray to us and beg for mercy,  since they humble themselves by doing so. 
[II.3.9] καὶ τοῖς μὴ ὑβρισταῖς μηδὲ χλευασταῖς (30) μηδ’ ὀλιγώροις εἰς μηδένα ἢ μὴ εἰς χρηστοὺς μηδ’ εἰς τοιού(31)τους οἷοί περ αὐτοί· 
ثم الذين لا يشتمون أو يستهينون ولا يدعبون ولا تصغر نفوسهم في أحد البتة أو في كثير من الناس 
. 
Et non iniuriantibus neque deliciosis neque despicientibus aut ad nullum aut non ad utiles aut non tales quales ipsi; 
Et non contumeliatoribus neque subsannatoribus neque contemptoribus aut in nullum aut non in bonos aut non in tales quales ipsi; 
Also towards those who do not insult or mock at or slight any one at all, or not any worthy person or any one like ourselves. 
[II.3.10] ὅλως δ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖ σκοπεῖν (32) τὰ πραΰνοντα.  καὶ οὓς φοβοῦνται ἢ αἰσχύνονται, ἕως ἂν (33) οὕτως ἔχωσιν, οὐκ ὀργίζονται·  ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἅμα φοβεῖσθαι (34) καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι. 
والجملة أن التي فيها يكون السكون ينبغي أن ننظر فيها بزيادة من قبل الأضداد  ثم عن الذين يهابونهم أو يستحيون منهم فإنهم ما داموا لهم على تلك الحال فليس يغضبون عليهم  لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون المرء يخاف ويغضب معا 
.  .  . 
omnino autem ex contrariis oportet intueri mitia.  Et quos timent et verentur; quousque enim sic se habent, non irascuntur;  impossibile enim est simul timeri et irasci. 
totaliter autem ex contrariis oportet intendere ea que mansuefaciunt.  Et quos timent aut verecundantur; donec enim sic habeant, non irascuntur;  impossibile enim simul timere et irasci. 
In general, the things that make us calm may be inferred by seeing what the opposites are of those that make us angry.  We are not angry with people we fear or respect, as long as we fear or respect them;  you cannot be afraid of a person and also at the same time angry with him. 
[II.3.11] καὶ τοῖς δι’ ὀργὴν ποιήσασιν ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται (35) ἢ ἧττον ὀργίζονται·  οὐ γὰρ δι’ ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πρᾶξαι·  (36) οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος ὀλιγωρεῖ·  ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀλιγωρία ἄλυπον, (1380b1) ἡ δ’ ὀργὴ μετὰ λύπης.  καὶ τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς. 
ثم عن الذين فعلوا شيئا من أجل الغضب فإنهم إما ألا يغضبوا عليهم وإما أن يغضبوا غضبا يسيرا  لأنه لا يظن بهم أنهم فعلوا ذلك لصغر النفس  ذلك أنه ليس من أحد يغضب فتصغر نفسه  لأن صغر النفس ليس فيه حزن أو أذى فأما الغضب فمع حزن أو أذى  ثم عن الذين يخزون ويستحيون 
.  .  .  .  . 
Et facientibus per iram aut non irascuntur aut minus irascuntur;  non enim per despectum videntur operari;  null us enim iratus despicit;  despectio quidem intristabile, ira vero cum tristitia.  Et verentibus ipsos. 
Et hiis qui propter iram fecerunt aut non irascuntur aut minus irascuntur;  non enim propter parvipensionem videntur egisse;  nullus enim qui irascitur parvi pendit;  parvipensio quidem enim sine tristitia, ira autem cum tristitia.  Et reverentibus ipsos. 
Again, we feel no anger, or comparatively little, with those who have done what they did through anger:  we do not feel that they have done it from a wish to slight us,  for no one slights people when angry with them,  since slighting is painless, and anger is painful.  Nor do we grow angry with those who reverence us. 
[II.3.12] (2) καὶ ἔχοντες δὲ ἐναντίως τῷ ὀργίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι πρᾶοί (3) εἰσιν,  οἷον ἐν παιδιᾷ, ἐν γέλωτι, ἐν ἑορτῇ, ἐν εὐημερίᾳ, ἐν (4) κατορθώσει, ἐν πληρώσει,  ὅλως ἐν ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ ἡδονῇ μὴ (5) ὑβριστικῇ καὶ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικεῖ.  ἔτι κεχρονικότες καὶ μὴ (6) ὑπόγυιοι τῇ ὀργῇ ὄντες· παύει γὰρ ὀργὴν ὁ χρόνος·  [II.3.13] παύει δὲ (7) καὶ ἑτέρου ὀργὴν μείζω ἡ παρ’ ἄλλου ληφθεῖσα τιμωρία (8) πρότερον·  διὸ εὖ Φιλοκράτης, εἰπόντος τινός, ὀργιζομένου τοῦ (9) δήμου, “Τί οὐκ ἀπολογεῖ;”,  “Οὔπω γε”, ἔφη. “Ἀλλὰ πότε”; (10) “Ὅταν ἴδω ἄλλον διαβεβλημένον”·  πρᾶοι γὰρ γίγνονται ὅταν (11) εἰς ἄλλον τὴν ὀργὴν ἀναλώσωσιν, ὃ συνέβη ἐπὶ Ἐργοφίλου·  (12) μᾶλλον γὰρ χαλεπαίνοντες ἢ Καλλισθένει ἀφεῖσαν διὰ τὸ (13) Καλλισθένους τῇ προτεραίᾳ καταγνῶναι θάνατον. 
ثم إذا كان الغضب في تلك الحال ضدا أو خلافا لما ينبغي فهو معلوم أنهم يكونون في تلك الحال سكونا (لـ ٩١)  كاللاتي تكون في حال الأدب وفي حال المزاح وفي حال الغضب و في حال اللهو وفي التقويم وفي سد الحاجة  وبالجملة كل ما كان بلا حزن وبلذة غير دنية وبحسن الأمل والرجاء  ثم إذا طال بهم الزمان ولم يخامرهم الغضب فإن الزمان قد يسكّن الغضب  وقد يسكّن الغضب العظيم الأخذ بالثأر من آخر أولا  فما أحسن ما قال فيلوقراطيس حين قال له رجل من السوقة وهو غضبان ما لك لا ترد؟ :  فقال : لم يأن لذلك بعد حتى أرى آخرًا مجدلًا مطروحًا  فقد يسكنون إذا يبيدوا غضبهم في آخرين كمثل الذي حدث في أيام ارغوفيلوس  ولا سيما حيث كانوا يتعسّرون في أمر قليثانيس إذ كان قليثانيس بالأمس يذمّ الموت 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Et habentes opposite irasci palam quoniam mites sunt  in ludo, derisione, in festivitate, in euimeria, in rectificatione, in complemento,  universaliter in non tristitia et voluptate non iniuriosa et in spe honesta.  Amplius autem et diuturni et non recentes existentes in ira; tempus enim facit iram cessare;  cessare autem facit et alterius ira maior et ab alia sumptum tormentum prius;  ideo et Philocrates, dicente aliquo, irato populo, ‘quid non respondet?’,  ‘non autem ’, dixit, ‘sed quandoque, quando utique alium video percussum (accusatum)’;  mites enim fiunt quando utique in alium iram destruent, ut puta contingit in Ergofilo;  magis enim difficultantes cognoscere mortem. 
Et habentes autem contrarie ei quod est irasci palam quia mites sunt,  puta in ludo, in risu, in festo, in prosperitate, in directione, in consummatione,  totaliter in non tristitia et delectatione non contumeliosa et in spe optima.  Adhuc autem qui a longo tempore et non de novo in ira entes; quietat enim iram tempus;  quietat autem et alterius ira maior et ab alia recepta punitio prius;  propter quod bene Filocrates, dicente quodam, irato populo: ‘cur non respondes? ’,  ‘nondum,’ ait, ‘sed tunc cum alium videro crimina tum’;  mites enim fiunt, cum in alium iram expenderint, quale accidit in Ergophilo;  magis enim sevientes quam Callisteni dimisissent propterea quod precedenti die Callistenis mortem sententiaverant. 
As to the frame of mind that makes people calm, it is plainly the opposite to that which makes them angry,  as when they are amusing themselves or laughing or feasting; when they are feeling prosperous or successful or satisfied; when,  in fine, they are enjoying freedom from pain, or inoffensive pleasure, or justifiable hope.  Also when time has passed and their anger is no longer fresh, for time puts an end to anger.  And vengeance previously taken on one person puts an end to even greater anger felt against another person.  Hence Philocrates, being asked by some one, at a time when the public was angry with him, ‘Why don’t you defend yourself?’  did right to reply, ‘The time is not yet.’ ‘Why, when is the time?’ ‘When I see someone else calumniated.’  For men become calm when they have spent their anger on somebody else. This happened in the case of Ergophilus:  though the people were more irritated against him than against Callisthenes, they acquitted him because they had condemned Callisthenes to death the day before. 
[II.3.14] καὶ ἐὰν (14) ἕλωσιν.  καὶ ἐὰν μεῖζον κακὸν πεπονθότες ὦσιν ἢ ὃ ὀργιζό(15)μενοι ἂν ἔδρασαν·  ὥσπερ εἰληφέναι γὰρ οἴονται τιμωρίαν. 
ثم إن ألفى أولئك  قد لقوا شرًا عظيمًا فقد يفتر غضبهم عليهم  وكأنهم يظنون أنهم قد أخذوا بثأرهم 
.  .  . 
Et si accipiant.  Et si maius malum patiantur aut irati operati sunt;  quemadmodum enim recipere tormenta (tormentum) arbitrantur. 
Et si absorbeantur.  Et si maius malum passi fuerint quam irati intulissent;  velut enim accepisse punitionem existimantur. 
Again, men become calm if they have convicted the offender;  or if he has already suffered worse things than they in their anger would have themselves inflicted upon him;  for they feel as if they were already avenged. 
[II.3.15] (16) καὶ ἐὰν ἀδικεῖν οἴωνται αὐτοὶ καὶ δικαίως πάσχειν, οὐ (17) γίγνεται [ἡ] ὀργὴ1 πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον·  οὐ γὰρ ἔτι παρὰ τὸ προσ(18)ῆκον νομίζουσι πάσχειν, ἡ δ’ ὀργὴ τοῦτο ἦν·  διὸ δεῖ τῷ (19) λόγῳ προκολάζειν·  ἀγανακτοῦσιν γὰρ ἧττον κολαζόμενοι καὶ (20) οἱ δοῦλοι. 
ثم إن ظنوا بأنفسهم أنهم ظالمون أو أنهم يألمون بعدل فليس يكون الغضب عند العدل  لأنهم لا يظنون أنه يفعل بهم غير الواجب وفي هذا يكون الغضب  ولذلك ما ينبغي أن تكون العقوبة أولًا بالكلام  وقد يتذمّر أقلّ ذلك العبيد حين يعاقبون 
.  .  .  . 
Et si opinantur iniustificare et iuste pati; non fit enim ira ad iustum;  neque enim amplius ad decens extimant pati, ira vero hoc fuit;  ideo sermoni tormentat;  solliciti sunt magis tormentati et famuli. 
Et si iniustum facere putaverint ipsi et iure pati; non fit enim ira ad iustum;  non enirn adhuc preter conveniens putant pati, ira autem hoc erat;  propter quod sermone oportet preobiurgare;  indignantur enim minus et servi qui flagellantur, 
Or if they feel that they themselves are in the wrong and are suffering justly (for anger is not excited by what is just),  since men no longer think then that they are suffering without justification; and anger, as we have seen, means this.  Hence we ought always to inflict a preliminary punishment in words:  if that is done, even slaves are less aggrieved by the actual punishment. 
[II.3.16] καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθήσεσθαι οἴωνται ὅτι δι’ αὑτοὺς καὶ (21) ἀνθ’ ὧν ἔπαθον·  ἡ γὰρ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸν καθ’ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν·  (22) δῆλον δ’ ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ·  διὸ ὀρθῶς πεποίηται
φάσθαι Ὀδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον,
(23) ὡς οὐ τετιμωρημένος εἰ μὴ ᾔσθετο καὶ ὑφ’ ὅτου καὶ ἀνθ’ (24) ὅτου·  ὥστε οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι μὴ αἰσθάνονται ὀργίζονται,  (25) οὔτε τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ἔτι, ὡς πεπονθόσι τε τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ (26) οὐκ ἀλγήσουσιν οὐδ’ αἰσθησομένοις, οὗ οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφίεν(27)ται·  διὸ εὖ περὶ τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὁ ποιητής, παῦσαι βουλόμενος (28) τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τῆς ὀργῆς τεθνεῶτος,
(29) κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων. 
ثم إن ظنوا أنهم لا يشعرون ما الذي يجب عليهم بسبب ما لقوا منهم  فأما إن الغضب إنما يكون على كل واحد  فهو معلوم من قبل الحد  فبحق ما قيل لأدوسوس إنك لست فتّاح المدائن ليعلموا هل يشعر بأنهم يؤذونه أم لا  وكذلك كل ما كان لا يشعر فإنهم لا يغضبون عليه  ولا على الهالكين أيضا [L92] من قبل أنهم قد صاروا إلى /تلك/ الآخر فليس يحيفون عليهم  فما أحسن ما حكى الشاعر عن اقطور أنه قال حيث أراد أن يسكّن غضب اخليوس على ذلك الذي هلك حيث يقول للهالك إنك الآن معانق الأرض البكماء التي أنت فيها أبدًا 
.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Et si non sentiri opinantur quoniam per ipsos et pro quibus passi sunt;  ira enim singularium est;  palam autem ex diffinitione;  ideo recte factum est: ‘dici Ulixem predatorem urbium ’, sicut non tormentatus nisi senserit et a quo et cuius rei causa;  quare neque aliis quicumque non sentiunt irascuntur,  neque amplius mortuis, sicut patientibus ultimum, et non dolent, neque senticntibus, quod irascibiles appetunt;  ideo bene de Hectare poeta, cessare volens Achillem ab ira mortui: ‘surdam terrain tormentat iratus ’. 
si non percipi putent quod propter se et pro quibus patiebantur;  ira enim singularium est;  palam autem ex diffinitione;  propter quod recte poesi factum est: dixisse Ulixem urbium predatorem, ‘tamquam non punitus nisi sciat et a quo et pro quo;  quare neque aliis quicumque non sentiunt irascuntur,  neque mortuis adhuc, velut passis extremum et non dolituris neque sentientibus, quod irati appetunt;  propter quod bene de Hectare mortua poeta, quietare volens Achillem ab ira: ‘surdam utique terrarn cruciat iratus. ’ 
We also feel calm if we think that the offender will not see that he is punished on our account and because of the way he has treated us.  For anger has to do with individuals.  This is plain from the definition.  Hence the poet has well written:Say that it was Odysseus, sacker of cities, implying that Odysseus would not have considered himself avenged unless the Cyclops perceived both by whom and for what he had been blinded.  Consequently we do not get angry with any one who cannot be aware of our anger,  and in particular we cease to be angry with people once they are dead, for we feel that the worst has been done to them, and that they will neither feel pain nor anything else that we in our anger aim at making them feel.  And therefore the poet has well made Apollo say, in order to put a stop to the anger of Achilles against the dead Hector,For behold in his fury he doeth despite to the senseless clay. 
[II.3.17] (30) δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τοῖς καταπραΰνειν βουλομένοις ἐκ τούτων (31) τῶν τόπων λεκτέον,  αὑτοὺς μὲν παρασκευάζουσι τοιούτους, (32) οἷς δ’ ὀργίζονται ἢ φοβεροὺς ἢ αἰσχύνης ἀξίους ἢ κεχαρισμέ(33)νους ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ ὑπεραλγοῦντας τοῖς πεποιημένοις. 
فهو معلوم أن الذين يريدون أن يسكّنوا أو يخفضوا الغضب قد ينبغي أن يستعملوا هذه المواضع  أعني التي منها يتهيّأ مثل هذه الوجوه فأما الذين عليهم يكون الغضب فقد يفتر الغضب عنهم بأن يكونوا إما مخوّفين أو مستحيًى منهم وإما مفراحين وإما أن يكونوا فعلوا ذلك بلا مشيئة أو قد لقوا ما هو أشد وأعظم أو قد بادوا ودرجوا 
.  . 
Palam igitur quoniam volentibus mitigari ex hiis locis sumendum,  ipsos quidem enim construunt tales, quibus autem irascuntur aut terribiles aut verecundia dignos aut gratiosos aut non voluntarios aut superdolentes factis. 
Palam igitur quod mansucfacere volentibus ex hiis locis dicendum,  ipsos quidem enirn procurant fieri tales, quibus autem irascuntur aut terribiles aut reverentia dignos aut gratiosos aut involuntarios aut dolentes de factis. 
It is now plain that when you wish to calm others you must draw upon these lines of argument;  you must put your hearers into the corresponding frame of mind, and represent those with whom they are angry as formidable, or as worthy of reverence, or as benefactors, or as involuntary agents, or as much distressed at what they have done. 
[2.4.1] (34) Τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τί, τὴν φιλίαν καὶ (35) τὸ φιλεῖν ὁρισάμενοι λέγωμεν. 
فأما من 5 يصادقون ومن أجل أىّ شيء فإنّا حين نحدّ الصداقة نقول 
. 
Quosdam diligunt et odiunt, et quare, amicitiam et amare determinantes dicimus. 
Quos autem amant et odiunt, et propter quid, amicitiam et amare diffinientes dicamus. 
Part 4. Let us now turn to Friendship and Enmity, and ask towards whom these feelings are entertained, and why. We will begin by defining and friendly feeling. 
[2.4.2] ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλε(36)σθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά,  ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτοῦ,  καὶ τὸ (1381a1) κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. 
إن الصداق هي أن يكون الإنسان يهوى الخير لذلك  من أجل ذاك وليس من أجل نفسه  وأن يكون من جهة القوة فعّالا لذلك 
.  .  . 
Sit autem amare in volendo cuidam ea que opinatur bona,  illius causa, sed non sui,  et secundum potentiam operativum esse horum. 
Sit itaque amare velle alicui que putat bona,  illius gratia, sed non sui,  et secundum posse activum esse horum. 
We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good things,  not for your own sake but for his,  and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about. 
φίλος δέ ἐστιν ὁ φιλῶν (2) καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος·  οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν (3) οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους. 
فالصديق هو الذى يحبّ ويحبّ معا  وقد يُظَنّ أنّ الأصدقاء هم الـ<ـذين يكونـ>ـون بهذه الحال أعنى أن يكون كلّ واحد منهم يظنّ بصاحبه المودّة 
.  . 
Amicus enim est qui amat et invicem amatur;  arbitrantur autem amici esse sic se habere ad invicem. 
Amicus autem est qui amat et e contra amatur;  putantur autem amici esse qui sic habere putantur ad invicem. 
A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return:  those who think they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends. 
[2.4.3] τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φίλον (4) εἶναι τὸν συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα τοῖς (5) λυπηροῖς μὴ διά τι ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι’ ἐκεῖνον·  γιγνομένων γὰρ (6) ὧν βούλονται χαίρουσιν πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, (7) ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως σημεῖον αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. 
فإذا كان هذا موضوعا فالصديق لا محالة [16] هو الذى يستلذّ الخير الذى يكون لصاحبه ويشركه في المؤذيات المحزنات ليس من أجل شيء آخر [17] ولكن من أجل ذاك فقط  فإنّ هذا إذا كان هكذا فكلّ أحد يفرح به وأمّا الأضداد المعاندون [18] فيحزنون لذلك فعلامة الهوى إذًا المحزنات واللذيذات 
.  . 
Hiis autem suppositis necesse amicum esse condelectantem bonis et condolentem tristabilibus non propter aliquid aliud, sed propter ilium;  factis enim que volunt gaudent omnes, de contrariis vero tristantur, quare voluntatis signum tristitie et voluptates. 
Hiis autem suppositis necesse amicum esse congaudentem bonis et condolentem tristibus, non propter aliquid alterum, sed propter ilium;  factis enim hiis que volunt gaudent omnes, contrariis autem tristantur, quare voluntatis signum tristitie et delectationes. 
This being assumed, it follows that your friend is the sort of man who shares your pleasure in what is good and your pain in what is unpleasant, for your sake and for no other reason.  This pleasure and pain of his will be the token of his good wishes for you, since we all feel glad at getting what we wish for, and pained at getting what we do not. 
[2.4.4] καὶ οἷς (8) δὴ ταὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς φίλοι καὶ οἱ τοῖς (9) αὐτοῖς ἐχθροί·  ταὐτὰ γὰρ τούτοις βούλεσθαι ἀνάγκη,  ὥστε (10) ἅπερ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βουλόμενος τούτῳ φαίνεται φίλος εἶναι. 
ثمّ الذين تكون الخيرات والشرور [19] لهم هي بأعيانها لهؤلاء ثمّ الذين يستبين أنهم أصدقاء في الاتي فيها بأعيانها يكون الأعداء [20]  فإنّ هؤلاء باضطرار يهوون هذه الأمور  فإذا كان يهوى مثل هذا لذاك لا من أجل شيء آخر [21] استبان عند ذلك أنّه صديق [[L93]]  
.  .  . 
Et cui aut utique eadem bona et mala, et amici eisdem et eisdem inimici;  hec enim hos velle necesse,  quemadmodum quod sibi ipsi et alii volens huic videtur amicus esse. 
Et quibus iam eadem bona et mala, et qui eisdem amici et qui eisdem inimici;  eadem enim has velle necesse,  quare qui ea que sibi alii vult, huic videtur amicus esse. 
Those, then, are friends to whom the same things are good and evil; and those who are, moreover, friendly or unfriendly to the same people;  for in that case they must have the same wishes,  and thus by wishing for each other what they wish for themselves, they show themselves each other’s friends. 
[2.4.5] (11) καὶ τοὺς πεποιηκότας εὖ φιλοῦσιν, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κήδονται, (12) ἢ εἰ μεγάλα, ἢ εἰ προθύμως, ἢ εἰ ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, καὶ (13) αὐτῶν ἕνεκα,  ἢ οὓς ἂν οἴωνται βούλεσθαι ποιεῖν εὖ.  [2.4.6] καὶ τοὺς (14) τῶν φίλων φίλους καὶ φιλοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ φιλοῦσιν. καὶ τοὺς (15) φιλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν φιλουμένων αὐτοῖς.  [2.4.7] καὶ τοὺς τοῖς (16) αὐτοῖς ἐχθροὺς καὶ μισοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ μισοῦσιν, καὶ τοὺς (17) μισουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῖς μισουμένων·  πᾶσιν γὰρ τούτοις (18) τὰ αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεται εἶναι καὶ αὐτοῖς, ὥστε βούλεσθαι τὰ (19) αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά, ὅπερ ἦν τοῦ φίλου.  [2.4.8] ἔτι τοὺς εὐποιητικοὺς εἰς (20) χρήματα καὶ εἰς σωτηρίαν·  διὸ τοὺς ἐλευθερίους καὶ ἀνδρείους (21) τιμῶσι [2.4.9] καὶ τοὺς δικαίους·  τοιούτους δ’ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοὺς (22) μὴ ἀφ’ ἑτέρων ζῶντας·  τοιοῦτοι δ’ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ (23) τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα. 
ثمّ يحبّون أيضا الذين يحسنون إمّا إليهم أنفسهم وإمّا إلى [22] من يعنون به أو الذين فعلوا به الأمور الجسيمة بهشاشة ونشاط أو في مثل هذا الوقت [23] أو لقوا بسببهم مثل ذلك  والذين <يظنّون أنهم> يهمّون بالإحسان إليهم  وأصدقاء أصدقائهم [24] والذين يحبّون من أحبّوه هم والذين هم محبوبون من المحبوبين عندهم  والذين يعادون أو يبغضون [28v1] من يبغضونه هم والذين يبغضهم المبغضون منهم  لهؤلاء جميعا يُرون أنّ الخيرات التى [2] لأولئك هي لهم أيضا فقد يهوون لذلك أن تكون الخيرات التى لهم لأصدقائهم كما هي لهم [3]  أعني الذين كانوا يحسنون إليهم فى المال وأفعال الكرم  ولذلك ما قد يكرمون الأسخياء [4] والشجعاء والأبرار أيضا   فقد يُظنّ بهذه الصفة الذين ليس معاشهم من أصحابهم  لكن [5] من الكدّ والكسب ثمّ من هؤلاء أيضا الذين معاشهم من الحرث وأشياء أخر يعملونها [6] لأنفسهم  
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Et facientes bene amant, aut ipsos aut de quibus curant, aut maxime, aut studiose, aut in hiis temporibus, et ipsorum causa,  aut quos utique extimant velle facere bene.  Et amicorum amicos et amantes quos ipsi amant. Et qui amantur ab hiis qui amantur ab ipsis.  Et inimicos ipsis et odientes quos ipsi odiunt, et odiosos ab hiis qui odiunt ipsos;  omnibus enim hiis hec bona videntur esse et ipsis, quare velle bona ipsis, quod est amici.  Amplius bene effectivos ad pecunias et salutem;  ideo liberales et viriles honorant et iustos;  tales autem opinantur non viventes ab aliis;  hii autem ab operari, et horum hii ab agricultura, et aliorum ipsimet operatores maxime. 
Et eos qui fecerunt bene amant, aut ipis aut eis quos cordi habent, aut si magne aut prompte aut in talibus temporibus, et ipsorum gratia,  et quoscumque putant velle bene facere.  Et amicorum amicos et amantes quos ipsi diligunt. Et dilectos a dilectis sibi.  Et eisdem inimicos et odientes quos ipsi odiunt, et eos qui habentur odio ab hiis qui odiuntur a se;  omnibus enim hiis eadem bona videntur esse et sibi ipsis; quare velle que ipsis bona, quod quidem erat amici.  Adhuc beneficos in pecunias et salutem;  propter quod liberales et fortes honorant et iustos;  tales autem putant non ab aliis viventes;  tales autem qui ab operando, et horum qui ab agricultura, et aliorum qui ipsimet operantur maxime. 
Again, we feel friendly to those who have treated us well, either ourselves or those we care for, whether on a large scale, or readily, or at some particular crisis; provided it was for our own sake.  And also to those who we think wish to treat us well.  And also to our friends’ friends, and to those who like, or are liked by, those whom we like ourselves.  And also to those who are enemies to those whose enemies we are, and dislike, or are disliked by, those whom we dislike.  For all such persons think the things good which we think good, so that they wish what is good for us; and this, as we saw, is what friends must do.  And also to those who are willing to treat us well where money or our personal safety is concerned:  and therefore we value those who are liberal, brave, or just.  The just we consider to be those who do not live on others;  which means those who work for their living, especially farmers and others who work with their own hands. 
[2.4.10] (24) καὶ τοὺς σώφρονας, ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοι.  καὶ τοὺς ἀπράγμονας (25) διὰ τὸ αὐτό.  [2.4.11] καὶ οἷς βουλόμεθα φίλοι εἶναι, ἂν φαίνωνται (26) βουλόμενοι·  εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἵ τ’ ἀγαθοὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν καὶ οἱ (27) εὐδόκιμοι ἢ ἐν ἅπασιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς βελτίστοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυ(28)μαζομένοις ὑφ’ αὑτῶν ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυμάζουσιν αὐτούς. 
فقد يُظنّ هؤلاء بزيادة أعفّاء غير ظلّامين  ثمّ السليمة صدورهم من أجل هذه [7] العلّة أيضا  والذين قد نهوى أن نصادقهم إن هم هووا ذلك  وهؤلاء هم الخيار ذوو [8] الفضيلة ثمّ السعداء المنجحين إمّا في كل وإمّا في الفضائل أو في الّاتي قد يتعجّب منها [9] أو في الّاتي يتعجّب منهم فيها 
.  .  .  . 
Et castos, quoniam non iniusti.  Et inertes propter idem.  Et quibus volumus amici esse, si videntur volentes;  sunt autem tales boni secundum virtutem et bene experti aut in omnibus aut in optimis aut admirabilibus a se ipsis aut in admirantibus ipsos. 
Et temperaios, quia non iniusti.  Et eos qui sine negotiis propter idem.  Et quibus volumus amici esse, si videantur volentes;  sunt autem tales boni secundum virtutem et bene probati aut in omnibus aut in optimis aut in hiis que admirantur ab ipsis aut in quibus admirantur ipsos. 
We also like temperate men, because they are not unjust to others;  and, for the same reason, those who mind their own business.  And also those whose friends we wish to be, if it is plain that they wish to be our friends:  such are the morally good, and those well thought of by every one, by the best men, or by those whom we admire or who admire us. 
[2.4.12] ἔτι (29) τοὺς ἡδεῖς συνδιαγαγεῖν καὶ συνδιημερεῦσαι·  τοιοῦτοι δ’ (30) οἱ εὔκολοι καὶ μὴ ἐλεγκτικοὶ τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων  καὶ μὴ (31) φιλόνικοι μηδὲ δυσέριδες  (πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μαχη(32)τικοί, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι τἀναντία φαίνονται βούλεσθαι),  [2.4.13] καὶ (33) οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ τῷ τωθάσαι καὶ τῷ ὑπομεῖναι·  ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ γὰρ (34) ἀμφοτέρως σπεύδουσι τῷ πλησίον, δυνάμενοί τε σκώπτεσθαι (35) καὶ ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες. 
ثمّ جميع الطيّبين أو اللذيذة عشرتهم وملازمتهم النهار كلّه [10]  فإنّ مثل هؤلاء سهلة أخلاقهم وليسوا بموبّخين على الخطأ والإساءة  ولا يشغبون ولا [11] يتعسرون ولا يتحرّشون  وجميع هؤلاء الذين هم بهذه الصفات صخّابون والصخّابون قد [12] يرون أضدادا  وكذلك الذين يكونون متهيّئين للضرب والصبر  فكلاهما [[L94]] يوجدان [13] مسارعين إلى هذا وإلى عذل القريب إذا أمكنهم أن يعذلوا وإذا كان العذل من جهة [14] الشفقة 
.  .  .  .  .  . 
Amplius delectabiles simul ducere et dietare;  huiusmodi autem bene leves et non eligibiles (reprehensores) peccantium  et non seditiosi neque rixosi  (omnes enim hii pugnaces, qui oppugnantur vero contraria videntur velle),  et apti ad iniuriandum et patiendum (durare);  ad hec enim utrique student propinquam, patentes autem iniuriari et studiose offenduntur. 
Adhuc delectabiles simul conversari et per diem simul commorari;  tales autem tractabiles et non arguitivi peccatorum  et non litigiosi neque cervicosi  (omnes enirn tales pugnaces, pugnaces autem contraria videntur velle),  et ydonei deridere et sufferre;  ad eadem enim student ambo e vicino, patentes irrideri et suaviter irridentes. 
And also those with whom it is pleasant to live and spend our days:  such are the good—tempered, and those who are not too ready to show us our mistakes,  and those who are not cantankerous or quarrelsome  — such people are always wanting to fight us, and those who fight us we feel wish for the opposite of what we wish for ourselves —  and those who have the tact to make and take a joke;  here both parties have the same object in view, when they can stand being made fun of as well as do it prettily themselves. 
[2.4.14] καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας τὰ ὑπ(36)άρχοντα ἀγαθά,  καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἃ φοβοῦνται μὴ ὑπ (1381b1) άρχειν αὐτοῖς.  [2.4.15] καὶ τοὺς καθαρείους περὶ ὄψιν, περὶ ἀμπεχόνην, (2) περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.  [2.4.16] καὶ τοὺς μὴ ὀνειδιστὰς μήτε τῶν ἁμαρ(3)τημάτων μήτε τῶν εὐεργετημάτων·  ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐλεγ(4)κτικοί.  [2.4.17] καὶ τοὺς μὴ μνησικακοῦντας, μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν (5) ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλ’ εὐκαταλλάκτους·  οἵους γὰρ ἂν ὑπολαμ(6)βάνωσιν εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς αὑτοὺς οἴονται.  [2.4.18] (7) καὶ τοὺς μὴ κακολόγους μηδὲ εἰδότας μήτε τὰ τῶν πλησίον (8) κακὰ μήτε τὰ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀγαθά·  ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς ταῦτα (9) δρᾷ.  [2.4.19] καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀντιτείνοντας τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις ἢ σπουδά(10)ζουσιν·  μαχητικοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι.  καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς (11) σπουδαίως πως ἔχοντας,  οἷον θαυμάζοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ σπου(12)δαίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς,  [2.4.20] καὶ ταῦτα (13) μάλιστα πεπονθότας περὶ ἃ μάλιστα βούλονται αὐτοὶ ἢ (14) θαυμάζεσθαι ἢ σπουδαῖοι δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ἡδεῖς.  [2.4.21] καὶ τοὺς (15) ὁμοίους καὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύοντας,  ἐὰν μὴ παρενοχλῶσι μηδ’ (16) ἀπὸ ταὐτοῦ ᾖ ὁ βίος·  γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ “κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ”.  [2.4.22] (17) καὶ τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντας, ὧν ἐνδέχεται ἅμα μετ(18)έχειν αὐτούς·  εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὸ καὶ οὕτω συμβαίνει.  [2.4.23] καὶ (19) πρὸς οὓς οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὥστε μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὰ πρὸς (20) δόξαν, μὴ καταφρονοῦντες.  καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνονται τὰ (21) πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. 
والذين يمدحونهم أيضا قد يرون أنّهم يشركونهم في الخيرات التي هي لهم [15]  وعلى أنّهم قد يخافون في بعضها ألّا يكون لهم  ثمّ الذين يرى لباسهم نظيفا طول أعمارهم [16]  ثمّ الذين لا يعيّرون لا بالذنوب ولا بالعنايات  فإنّ اللذين يفعلان ذلك جميعا موبّخان [17]  والذين لا يصرّون علي الضغن ولا يقيمون على العذل واللحي لكنّهم يرضون سريعا  فقد يظنّون [18] أنّهم كما هم لآخرين كذلك هم لهم أيضا  والذين لا ينطقون بالشرّ ولا يعرفون شرور أقاربهم [19] ولا شرور أنفسهم لكنّ الخيرات  لأنّهم أخيار  وكذلك الذين لا يشغبون على الذين يغضبون <أو> [20] يجدّون  فإنّ الذين هم على خلاف ذلك صخّابون  ثم الذين هم لهم بهذه الحال 6   أعني كالذين [21] يتعجّبون من أنفسهم ويظنّون بأنفسهم أنّهم أفاضل ثمّ الذين يفرحون بهم وبما هم لهم [22]  ولا سيما إذا كانوا قد ألموا أو لقوا شيئا ثم الذين يهوون بزيادة أن يظنّوا عندهم [23] عجيبين أو متعجّبا منهم أو أفاضل أو لذيذين طيّبين  أو الذين يبدعون الأمور التي هي بأعيانها [24] عندهم عجيبة   إن لم يكونوا يتأذّون بهم أو يكون معاشهما ومكسبهما من ذلك الأمر [25] بعينه  كالذي يكون بين الفاخراني والفاخراني  ثم الذين يشتهون ما هم له مشتهون [29r1] أعني الأمر قد يمكن أن يشركوا فيه معا   فإنّه إن لم يكن كذلك فقد يعرض حينئذ أيضا [2] [[L95]] عارض  والذين هم عندهم لهذه الحال أعنى الذين لا يخزون عندهم من اللاتي هي للحمد أن تهاونوا بها  والذين يخزون عندهم من الثقة الصادقة 
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Et laudantes existentia bona,  et horum maxime que timent non esse ipsis.  Et puros circa visum et circa vestitum et circa totam vitam.  Et non iniuriosos vel improperantes neque peccata neque beneficia;  utrique enim reprehensores.  Et non malorum recordatores, neque conservatores delictorum, sed bene permutabiles;  quales enim utique opinabuntur esse ad alios, et ad se ipsos opinantur.  Et non maledicentes neque scientes neque vicinorum mala neque ipsorum, sed bona;  bonus enim hoc agit.  Et non contratendentibus iratis aut student;  pugnaces enim tales.  Et habentes ad se ipsos similiter,  ut admirantes ipsos et studiosos extimantes et gaudentes ipsis,  et hec maxime patientes circa que maxime volunt ipsi aut admirari aut studiosos videri esse aut delectabiles.  Et similes et hec studentes,  nisi impediantur neque ab ipso fuerit vita;  fit autem sic ‘figulus figulo’.  Et desiderantes se ipsos, que contingit simul ipsos participare;  si vera non, idem et sic contingit.  Et ad quos sic se habent quod non vereantur ea que sunt ad gloriam, non negligentes.  Et ad quos verentur ea que sunt ad veritatem. 
Et laudantes inexistentia bona,  et horum maxime que timent non inesse sibi.  Et mundos circa visum, circa vestitum, circa totam vitam.  Et non exprobratores neque peccatorum neque beneficiorum;  utrique enim arguitivi.  Et non memorativos malorum, neque servativos impositionum, sed facile placabiles;  quales enim utique existimaverint esse ad alios, et ad ipsos putant.  Et non maliloquos neque scientes neque proximorum mala neque sua, sed bona;  bonus enirn hoc agit.  Et non contratendentes iratis neque studentibus;  pugnaces enim qui tales.  Et eos qui ad ipsos similiter habent,  vel ut admirantes ipsos et studiosos existimantes et gaudentes ipsis,  et hec maxirne passos circa que maxime ipsi volunt aut in admiratione esse aut studiosi videri esse aut delectabiles.  Et similes et eadem exercentes,  si non molestent neque ab eadem sit vita;  fit enim ita ‘figulus figulo’.  Et eadem desiderantes, que contingit simul participare ipsos;  si autem non, idem sic accidit.  Et ad quos ita se habent, ut non verecundentur ea que ad gloriam, non despicientes.  Et ad quos verecundantur ea que ad veritatem. 
And we also feel friendly towards those who praise such good qualities as we possess,  and especially if they praise the good qualities that we are not too sure we do possess.  And towards those who are cleanly in their person, their dress, and all their way of life.  And towards those who do not reproach us with what we have done amiss to them or they have done to help us,  for both actions show a tendency to criticize us.  And towards those who do not nurse grudges or store up grievances, but are always ready to make friends again;  for we take it that they will behave to us just as we find them behaving to every one else.  And towards those who are not evil speakers and who are aware of neither their neighbours’ bad points nor our own, but of our good ones only,  as a good man always will be.  And towards those who do not try to thwart us when we are angry or in earnest,  which would mean being ready to fight us.  And towards those who have some serious feeling towards us,  such as admiration for us, or belief in our goodness, or pleasure in our company;  especially if they feel like this about qualities in us for which we especially wish to be admired, esteemed, or liked.  And towards those who are like ourselves in character and occupation,  provided they do not get in our way or gain their living from the same source as we do  — for then it will be a case of ‘potter against potter’: Potter to potter and builder to builder begrudge their reward.  And those who desire the same things as we desire, if it is possible for us both to share them together;  otherwise the same trouble arises here too.  And towards those with whom we are on such terms that, while we respect their opinions, we need not blush before them for doing what is conventionally wrong:  as well as towards those before whom we should be ashamed to do anything really wrong. 
[2.4.24] καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἢ ὑφ’ ὧν (22) ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἢ φιλοῦσιν (23) ἢ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι.  [2.4.25] καὶ οἷς ἂν τἀγαθὰ συμπράττωσιν, (24) ἐὰν μὴ μέλλῃ αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι μείζω κακά.  [2.4.26] καὶ οἳ ὁμοίως (25) καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας καὶ τοὺς παρόντας φιλοῦσιν·  διὸ καὶ τοὺς (26) περὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας τοιούτους πάντες φιλοῦσιν.  καὶ ὅλως (27) τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας·  μάλιστα (28) γὰρ φιλοῦσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοὺς φιλεῖν ἀγαθούς.  [2.4.27] καὶ τοὺς μὴ (29) πλαττομένους πρὸς αὐτούς·  τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα τὰ (30) ἑαυτῶν λέγοντες·  εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τὰ πρὸς (31) δόξαν οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα·  εἰ οὖν ὁ αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, (32) ὁ μὴ αἰσχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι ἔοικεν. 
والذين هم عندهم مكرّمون والذين يحبّون أن يحسدوهم ولا يغتالوا بهم ولا يحبّونهم أو يهوون أن يحبّونهم ويكونوا أصدقاءهم  والذين يفعلون بهم الخيرات إن لم يكن يتبع ذلك شرّ هو أعظم أو أفظع  والذين يحبّون الأباعد والأقارب بحال واحدة  والذين توقّوا بالقرب ممّن هو بهذه الصفة فكل أحد يحبّهم  والجملة الذين يودّون أصدقاءهم جدّا جدّا ولا يخذلونهم  فإن الأصدقاء الخيار أحبّ إليهم من الخيار  والذين ليس ودّهم بالترائي والتصنّع  وكذلك الذين يُخبرونهم بمساوئهم  فقد أنبأنا أنّهم عند الأصدقاء لا يخزون من اللاتي هنّ للحمد  فالذي لا يخزي قد يودّ والذي يخزي لا يشبه الذي يودّ 
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Et ad quos philotimi sunt, et a quibus zelari volunt et non invideri, has aut amant aut volunt amici esse.  Et cum quibus bona operantur, si non debent ipsis esse maiora mala.  Et similibus absentes et presentes amant;  ideoque eos qui sunt circa mortuos tales omnes amant.  Et universaliter valde philophilos et non derelinquentes;  maxime autem diligunt bona diligere bonos.  Et non perversos a bono ad se ipsos;  huiusmodi autem et qui mala que sunt in eis dicentes;  dictum est enim quoniam apud amicos ea que sunt ad gloriam non veremur;  si igitur verecundus non amat, qui non verecundatur amanti assimulatur. 
Et ad quos in amore honoris sunt, et a quibus zelari volunt et non invidiam pati, has aut amant aut volunt amici esse.  Et cum quibus utique bona simul egerint, si non debeant ipsis fore mala maiora.  Et hiis qui similiter et absentes et presentes diligunt;  propter quod et eos qui circa mortuos sunt tales omnes diligunt.  Et totaliter eos qui valde amatores amicorum et non derelinquentes;  maxime enim amant bonorum amare bonos.  Et non fictos ad se ipsos;  tales autem et qui mala sua dicunt;  dictum est enim quod ad amicos que ad gloriam non verecundamur;  si igitur qui verecundatur non amat, qui non verecundatur amanti assimilatur. 
Again, our rivals, and those whom we should like to envy us — though without ill—feeling — either we like these people or at least we wish them to like us.  And we feel friendly towards those whom we help to secure good for themselves, provided we are not likely to suffer heavily by it ourselves.  And those who feel as friendly to us when we are not with them as when we are  — which is why all men feel friendly towards those who are faithful to their dead friends.  And, speaking generally, towards those who are really fond of their friends and do not desert them in trouble;  of all good men, we feel most friendly to those who show their goodness as friends.  Also towards those who are honest with us,  including those who will tell us of their own weak points:  it has just been said that with our friends we are not ashamed of what is conventionally wrong,  and if we do have this feeling, we do not love them; if therefore we do not have it, it looks as if we did love them. 
καὶ τοὺς μὴ φοβερούς, (33) καὶ οὓς θαρροῦμεν·  οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ.  [2.4.28] (34) εἴδη δὲ φιλίας ἑταιρεία οἰκειότης συγγένεια καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.  [2.4.29] (35) ποιητικὰ δὲ φιλίας χάρις καὶ τὸ μὴ δεηθέντος ποιῆσαι καὶ (36) τὸ ποιήσαντα μὴ δηλῶσαι·  αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὕτως ἕνεκα φαίνεται (37) καὶ οὐ διά τι ἕτερον. 
والذين ليسوا مخوّفين والذين قد يثقون بهم أو يأمنونهم  .  فأمّا أنواع الصداقة فالصحبة والأنسة والوصلة ومهما كان من هذا النحو  وأمّا فواعل الصداقة فالأيادي أو المنن وأن يفعل به حين لا يحتاج وإذا فعل لم يخبر  وأن يستبين أنّه إنّما فعل من أجل ذاك لا من أجل شيء آخر 
.  لأنه ليس أحد يحبّ الذي يخافه  .  .  . 
Et non terribiles, et quibus confidimus;  nullus, enim amat quem timet.  Species autem amicitie clilectio et proprietas et cognatio et quot sunt talia.  Effectiva autem amicitie gratia et facere non rogantis et non manifestare facientem;  ipsius enim sic causa videtur et non per alium. 
Et non timendos, et ad quos audemus;  nullus enim quem timet amat.  Species autem amici tie sodalitas et domesticitas et cognatio et quecumque talia.  Factiva autem amicitie gratia et non requisitum facere et cum fecerit non rnanifestare;  sic enim ipsius gratia videtur et non propter alterum. 
We also like those with whom we do not feel frightened or uncomfortable  — nobody can like a man of whom he feels frightened.  Friendship has various forms—comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so on.  Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done,  which shows that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason. 
[2.4.30] (1382a1) περὶ δ’ ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ μισεῖν φανερὸν ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναν(2)τίων ἔστι θεωρεῖν.  ποιητικὰ δὲ ἔχθρας ὀργή, ἐπηρεασμός, δια(3)βολή.  [2.4.31] ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ (4) ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν·  ἂν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, (5) μισοῦμεν.  καὶ ἡ μὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλ(6)λίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει,  τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέ(7)πτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας.  καὶ τὸ μὲν ἰατὸν (8) χρόνῳ, τὸ δ’ ἀνίατον.  καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ·  (9) αἴσθεσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, τῷ δ’ οὐδὲν διαφέρει.  (10) ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ (11) ἥκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ ἡ (12) παρουσία τῆς κακίας.  καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δ’ οὐ (13) μετὰ λύπης·  ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὔ.  (14) καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἂν γενομένων ἐλεήσειεν, ὁ δ’ οὐδενός·  ὁ μὲν (15) γὰρ ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται ᾧ ὀργίζεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εἶναι. 
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De inimicitia vera et odire palam quod ex contrariis oportet intueri.  Effectiva enim inimicitie ira, temptatio, accusatio.  Ira quidem igitur est ex hiis que sunt penes ipsum, inimicitia est et absque eis que sunt penes ipsum;  si enim opinemur esse talem quidem, odimus.  Et ira quidem semper est circa singularia, ut puta Calliam aut Socratem,  odium autem et ad genera; furem enim et accusatorem odit unusquisque.  Et hoc quidem curabile tempore, hoc vero incurabile.  Et aut quidem tristari appetit aut ledendi potius;  sentire autem vult qui irascitur, huic non differt.  Sunt autem tristabilia quidem sensibilia omnia, maxime vera mala, minus vera sensitiva, iniustitia et insipientia; non enim contristatur presentia malitie.  Et hoc quidem cum tristitia, hoc vera non cum tristitia;  qui enim irascitur tristatur, odiens vera non.  Et hic quidem utique multorum factorum miserebitur, hic vera nullius;  hic quidem contrapati vult cui irascitur, hic vera non esse. 
De inimicitia autem et odire manifestum qualiter ex contrariis oportet considerare.  Factiva autem inimicitie ira, epireasmus, criminatio.  Ira quidem igitur est ex hiis que ad se ipsum, inimicitia autem et sine hiis que ad se ipsum;  si enim putemus esse talem, odimus.  Et ira quidern semper circa singularia, puta Calliam aut Socratem,  odium autem et ad genera; furem enim odit et calumpniatorem unusquisque.  Et hoc quidem sanabile tempore, hoc autem insanabile.  Et hoc quidem contristare appetit, hoc autem nocere magis;  sentiri enim vult iratus, huic autem nichil differt.  Sunt autem tristia quidem sensibilia omnia, que autem maxime mala minime sensibilia, iniustitia et imprudentia; nichil enim contristat presentia malitie.  Et hoc quidem cum tristitia, hoc autem non cum tristitia;  iratus quidetn eniin tristatur, odiens autem non.  Et hic quidem multa si fiant miserebitur, hie autem pro nullo;  hic quidem enim contra pati vult eum cui irascitur, hic autem non esse. 
Enmity and Hatred should clearly be studied by reference to their opposites.  Enmity may be produced by anger or spite or calumny.  Now whereas anger arises from offences against oneself, enmity may arise even without that;  we may hate people merely because of what we take to be their character.  Anger is always concerned with individuals — a Callias or a Socrates —  whereas hatred is directed also against classes: we all hate any thief and any informer.  Moreover, anger can be cured by time; but hatred cannot.  The one aims at giving pain to its object, the other at doing him harm;  the angry man wants his victims to feel; the hater does not mind whether they feel or not.  All painful things are felt; but the greatest evils, injustice and folly, are the least felt, since their presence causes no pain.  And anger is accompanied by pain, hatred is not;  the angry man feels pain, but the hater does not.  Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend him, but the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has once hated:  for the one would have the offenders suffer for what they have done; the other would have them cease to exist. 
[2.4.32] (16) φανερὸν οὖν ἐν τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους (17) καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας (18) διαλύειν,  καὶ δι’ ὀργὴν ἢ δι’ ἔχθραν ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἐφ’ ὁπο(19)τέραν ἂν προαιρῆταί τις ἄγειν. 
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Manifestum enim ex hiis, quoniam contingit inimicos et amicos et existentes de1nonstrare et non existentes facere et dicentes dissolvere,  et aut per odium aut iram altercantes utrum vult aliquis agere. 
Manifestum igitur ex hiis quod contingit inimicos et amicos et existentes demonstrare et non existentes facere et dicentes dissolvere,  aut propter iram aut propter inimicitiam vacillantes ad utrumcumque elegerit quis ducere. 
It is plain from all this that we can prove people to be friends or enemies; if they are not, we can make them out to be so; if they claim to be so, we can refute their claim;  and if it is disputed whether an action was due to anger or to hatred, we can attribute it to whichever of these we prefer. 
5. (20) Ποῖα δὲ φοβοῦνται καὶ τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ὧδ’ ἔσται (21) φανερόν. 
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Que autem timent et quos et qualiter se habentes, hie autem erit manifestum. 
Qualia autem timent et quos et qualiter habentes, ita est manifestum. 
Part 5. To turn next to Fear, what follows will show things and persons of which, and the states of mind in which, we feel afraid. 
[2.5.1] ἔστω δὴ ὁ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας (22) μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ·  οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ (23) κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ’ ὅσα (24) λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται,  καὶ ταῦτα ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω (25) ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν.  τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα (26) οὐ φοβοῦνται·  ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι (27) οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. 
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Sit utique timor tristitia quedam aut turbatio ex fantasia futuri mali aut corruptibilis aut tristabilis;  non enim omnia mala timentur, ut puta si fuerit iniustus aut tardus, sed quecumque aut tristitias magnas aut corruptiones possunt,  et hec si non fuerint longe, sed prope videntur sicut futura.  .  . 
Sit itaque timor tristitia quedam vel turbatio ex fantasia futuri mali aut corruptivi aut contristativi;  non enim omnia mala timentur, puta si erit iniustus aut tardus, sed quecumque aut tristitias magnas aut corruptiones possunt,  et hec si non longe sed prope videantur ut in proximo futura.  .  . 
Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future.  Of destructive or painful evils only; for there are some evils, e.g. wickedness or stupidity, the prospect of which does not frighten us: I mean only such as amount to great pains or losses.  And even these only if they appear not remote but so near as to be imminent:  we do not fear things that are a very long way off:  for instance, we all know we shall die, but we are not troubled thereby, because death is not close at hand. 
εἰ δὴ ὁ φόβος τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, (28) ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν (29) μεγάλην τοῦ φθείρειν ἢ βλάπτειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην (30) συντεινούσας·  διὸ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν τοιούτων φοβερά·  ἐγγὺς (31) γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ φοβερόν·  τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ (32) πλησιασμός. 
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From this definition it will follow that fear is caused by whatever we feel has great power of destroying or of harming us in ways that tend to cause us great pain.  Hence the very indications of such things are terrible,  making us feel that the terrible thing itself is close at hand;  the approach of what is terrible is just what we mean by ‘danger’. 
(33) τοιαῦτα δὲ ἔχθρα τε καὶ ὀργὴ δυναμένων ποιεῖν (34) τι  (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι βούλονται τε καὶ δύνανται, ὥστε ἐγγύς εἰσιν (35) τοῦ ποιεῖν),  καὶ ἀδικία δύναμιν ἔχουσα·  τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι γὰρ ὁ (1382b1) ἄδικος ἄδικος. 
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Such indications are the enmity and anger of people who have power to do something to us;  for it is plain that they have the will to do it, and so they are on the point of doing it.  Also injustice is in possession of power;  for it is the unjust man’s will to do evil that makes him unjust. 
καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑβριζομένη δύναμιν ἔχουσα  (δῆλον (2) γὰρ ὅτι προαιρεῖται μὲν ὅταν ὑβρίζηται, ἀεί, δύναται δὲ νῦν),  (3) καὶ φόβος τῶν δυναμένων τι ποιῆσαι·  ἐν παρασκευῇ γὰρ ἀνάγκη (4) εἶναι καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον·  ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ πολλοὶ χείρους καὶ ἥττους τοῦ (5) κερδαίνειν καὶ δειλοὶ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, φοβερὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (6) πολὺ τὸ ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ αὐτὸν εἶναι,  ὥστε οἱ συνειδότες πεποιηκότι (7) τι δεινὸν φοβεροὶ ἢ κατειπεῖν ἢ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν. 
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Also outraged virtue in possession of power;  for it is plain that, when outraged, it always has the will to retaliate, and now it has the power to do so.  Also fear felt by those who have the power to do something to us,  since such persons are sure to be ready to do it.  And since most men tend to be bad — slaves to greed, and cowards in danger — it is, as a rule, a terrible thing to be at another man’s mercy;  and therefore, if we have done anything horrible, those in the secret terrify us with the thought that they may betray or desert us. 
καὶ οἱ δυνάμενοι (8) ἀδικεῖν τοῖς δυναμένοις ἀδικεῖσθαι·  ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (9) ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὅταν δύνωνται.  καὶ οἱ ἠδικημένοι ἢ (10) νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι·  ἀεὶ γὰρ τηροῦσι καιρόν.  καὶ οἱ ἠδικη(11)κότες, ἂν δύναμιν ἔχωσι, φοβεροί, δεδιότες τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν·  (12) ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο φοβερόν.  καὶ οἱ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνταγω(13)νισταί, ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ὑπάρχειν ἀμφοῖν·  ἀεὶ γὰρ (14) πολεμοῦσι πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους. 
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And those who can do us wrong are terrible to us when we are liable to be wronged;  for as a rule men do wrong to others whenever they have the power to do it.  And those who have been wronged, or believe themselves to be wronged, are terrible;  for they are always looking out for their opportunity.  Also those who have done people wrong, if they possess power, since they stand in fear of retaliation:  we have already said that wickedness possessing power is terrible.  Again, our rivals for a thing cause us fear when we cannot both have it at once;  for we are always at war with such men. 
καὶ οἱ τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν (15) φοβεροί·  μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν δύναιντο βλάπτειν αὐτούς, εἰ καὶ τοὺς (16) κρείττους.  καὶ οὓς φοβοῦνται οἱ κρείττους αὐτῶν, διὰ ταὐτό.  (17) καὶ οἱ τοὺς κρείττους αὐτῶν ἀνῃρηκότες,  καὶ οἱ τοῖς ἥττοσιν (18) αὐτῶν ἐπιτιθέμενοι·  ἢ γὰρ ἤδη φοβεροὶ ἢ αὐξηθέντες.  καὶ (19) τῶν ἠδικημένων καὶ ἐχθρῶν ἢ ἀντιπάλων οὐχ οἱ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ (20) παρρησιαστικοί, ἀλλὰ οἱ πρᾶοι καὶ εἴρωνες καὶ πανοῦργοι·  (21) ἄδηλοι γὰρ εἰ ἐγγύς, ὥστε οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω.  πάντα (22) δὲ τὰ φοβερὰ φοβερώτερα ὅσα ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἐπανορθώσασθαι (23) μὴ ἐνδέχεται,  ἀλλ’ ἢ ὅλως ἀδύνατα, ἢ μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ (24) τοῖς ἐναντίοις.  καὶ ὧν βοήθειαι μή εἰσιν ἢ μὴ ῥᾴδιαι. 
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We also fear those who are to be feared by stronger people than ourselves:  if they can hurt those stronger people, still more can they hurt us;  and, for the same reason, we fear those whom those stronger people are actually afraid of.  Also those who have destroyed people stronger than we are.  Also those who are attacking people weaker than we are:  either they are already formidable, or they will be so when they have thus grown stronger.  Of those we have wronged, and of our enemies or rivals, it is not the passionate and outspoken whom we have to fear, but the quiet, dissembling, unscrupulous;  since we never know when they are upon us, we can never be sure they are at a safe distance.  All terrible things are more terrible if they give us no chance of retrieving a blunder,  either no chance at all, or only one that depends on our enemies and not ourselves.  Those things are also worse which we cannot, or cannot easily, help. 
ὡς δ’ (25) ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐφ’ ἑτέρων γιγνόμενα ἢ μέλ(26)λοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν.  (27) τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ καὶ ἃ φοβοῦνται σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰ (28) μέγιστα ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, ὡς δὲ διακείμενοι αὐτοὶ φοβοῦνται, νῦν (29) λέγωμεν.  εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ φόβος μετὰ προσδοκίας τινὸς τοῦ πεί(30)σεσθαί τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται τῶν (31) οἰομένων μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν,  οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἃ μὴ οἴονται <ἂν> παθεῖν (32) οὐδὲ τούτους ὑφ’ ὧν μὴ οἴονται, οὐδὲ τότε ὅτε μὴ οἴονται.  (33) ἀνάγκη τοίνυν φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἄν, καὶ (34) τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε.  οὐκ οἴονται δὲ παθεῖν (1383a1) ἂν οὔτε οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μεγάλαις ὄντες καὶ δοκοῦντες  (διὸ (2) ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ὀλίγωροι καὶ θρασεῖς, ποιεῖ δὲ τοιούτους πλοῦ(3)τος ἰσχὺς πολυφιλία δύναμις),  οὔτε οἱ ἤδη πεπονθέναι πάντα (4) νομίζοντες τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀπεψυγμένοι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ὥσπερ (5) οἱ ἀποτυμπανιζόμενοι ἤδη·  ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινα ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι (6) σωτηρίας, περὶ οὗ ἀγωνιῶσιν.  σημεῖον δέ· ὁ γὰρ φόβος (7) βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ, καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀνελ(8)πίστων·  ὥστε δεῖ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν ᾖ βέλτιον (9) τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἷον παθεῖν  (καὶ γὰρ (10) ἄλλοι μείζους ἔπαθον),  καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους δεικνύναι πάσχον(11)τας ἢ πεπονθότας,  καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφ’ ὧν οὐκ ᾤοντο, καὶ (12) ταῦτα <ἃ> καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ ᾤοντο. 
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Speaking generally, anything causes us to feel fear that when it happens to, or threatens, others cause us to feel pity.  The above are, roughly, the chief things that are terrible and are feared. Let us now describe the conditions under which we ourselves feel fear.  If fear is associated with the expectation that something destructive will happen to us, plainly nobody will be afraid who believes nothing can happen to him;  we shall not fear things that we believe cannot happen to us, nor people who we believe cannot inflict them upon us; nor shall we be afraid at times when we think ourselves safe from them.  It follows therefore that fear is felt by those who believe something to be likely to happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in a particular form, and at a particular time.  People do not believe this when they are, or think they a are, in the midst of great prosperity,  and are in consequence insolent, contemptuous, and reckless — the kind of character produced by wealth, physical strength, abundance of friends, power:  nor yet when they feel they have experienced every kind of horror already and have grown callous about the future, like men who are being flogged and are already nearly dead  — if they are to feel the anguish of uncertainty, there must be some faint expectation of escape.  This appears from the fact that fear sets us thinking what can be done, which of course nobody does when things are hopeless.  Consequently, when it is advisable that the audience should be frightened, the orator must make them feel that they really are in danger of something,  pointing out that it has happened to others who were stronger than they are,  and is happening, or has happened, to people like themselves,  at the hands of unexpected people, in an unexpected form, and at an unexpected time. 
(13) ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φόβου φανερὸν τί ἐστιν, καὶ τῶν φοβερῶν, (14) καὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔχοντες δεδίασι,  φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων καὶ τὸ (15) θαρρεῖν τί ἐστι,  καὶ περὶ ποῖα θαρραλέοι εἰσὶ καὶ πῶς διακεί(16)μενοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν·  τό τε γὰρ θάρσος τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ (17) <φόβῳ, καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον τῷ> φοβερῷ,  ὥστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἡ (18) ἐλπὶς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων, τῶν δὲ φοβερῶν <ὡς> ἢ (19) μὴ ὄντων ἢ πόρρω ὄντων.  ἔστι δὲ θαρραλέα τά τε δεινὰ πόρρω (20) ὄντα καὶ τὰ σωτήρια ἐγγύς,  καὶ ἐπανορθώσεις ἂν ὦσι καὶ βοή(21)θειαι πολλαὶ ἢ μεγάλαι ἢ ἄμφω,  καὶ μήτε ἠδικημένοι μήτε (22) ἠδικηκότες ὦσιν,  ἀνταγωνισταί τε ἢ μὴ ὦσιν ὅλως, ἢ μὴ (23) ἔχωσιν δύναμιν,  ἢ δύναμιν ἔχοντες ὦσι φίλοι ἢ πεποιηκότες (24) εὖ ἢ πεπονθότες,  ἢ ἂν πλείους ὦσιν οἷς ταὐτὰ συμφέρει, (25) ἢ κρείττους, ἢ ἄμφω. 
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Having now seen the nature of fear, and of the things that cause it, and the various states of mind in which it is felt,  we can also see what Confidence is,  about what things we feel it, and under what conditions.  It is the opposite of fear, and what causes it is the opposite of what causes fear;  it is, therefore, the expectation associated with a mental picture of the nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible:  it may be due either to the near presence of what inspires confidence or to the absence of what causes alarm.  We feel it if we can take steps — many, or important, or both — to cure or prevent trouble;  if we have neither wronged others nor been wronged by them;  if we have either no rivals at all or no strong ones;  if our rivals who are strong are our friends or have treated us well or been treated well by us;  or if those whose interest is the same as ours are the more numerous party, or the stronger, or both. 
(25) αὐτοὶ δ’ οὕτως ἔχοντες θαρραλέοι (26) εἰσίν, ἂν πολλὰ κατωρθωκέναι οἴωνται καὶ μὴ πεπονθέναι,  ἢ (27) ἐὰν πολλάκις ἐληλυθότες εἰς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ διαπεφευγότες (28) ὦσι·  διχῶς γὰρ ἀπαθεῖς γίγνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι,  ἢ τῷ μὴ (29) πεπειρᾶσθαι ἢ τῷ βοηθείας ἔχειν,  ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ (30) θάλατταν κινδύνοις οἵ τε ἄπειροι χειμῶνος θαρροῦσι τὰ (31) μέλλοντα καὶ οἱ βοηθείας ἔχοντες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. 
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As for our own state of mind, we feel confidence if we believe we have often succeeded and never suffered reverses,  or have often met danger and escaped it safely.  For there are two reasons why human beings face danger calmly:  they may have no experience of it, or they may have means to deal with it:  thus when in danger at sea people may feel confident about what will happen either because they have no experience of bad weather, or because their experience gives them the means of dealing with it. 
καὶ (32) ὅταν τοῖς ὁμοίοις φοβερὸν μὴ ᾖ, μηδὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι καὶ ὧν (33) κρείττους οἴονται εἶναι·  οἴονται δὲ ὧν κεκρατήκασιν ἢ αὐτῶν (34) ἢ τῶν κρειττόνων ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων.  καὶ ἂν ὑπάρχειν αὑτοῖς (35) οἴωνται πλείω καὶ μείζω, οἷς ὑπερέχοντες φοβεροί εἰσιν·  (1383b1) ταῦτα δέ ἐστι πλῆθος χρημάτων καὶ ἰσχὺς σωμάτων καὶ (2) φίλων καὶ χώρας καὶ τῶν πρὸς πόλεμον παρασκευῶν, ἢ πασῶν (3) ἢ τῶν μεγίστων.  καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἠδικηκότες ὦσιν μηδένα ἢ μὴ (4) πολλοὺς ἢ μὴ τούτους παρ’ ὧν φοβοῦνται,  καὶ ὅλως ἂν τὰ πρὸς (5) τοὺς θεοὺς αὐτοῖς καλῶς ἔχῃ,  τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ σημείων (6) καὶ λογίων·  θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὀργή,  τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἀλλ’ ἀδι(7)κεῖσθαι ὀργῆς ποιητικόν,  τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπολαμβάνεται βοηθεῖν (8) τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις. 
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We also feel confident whenever there is nothing to terrify other people like ourselves, or people weaker than ourselves, or people than whom we believe ourselves to be stronger  — and we believe this if we have conquered them, or conquered others who are as strong as they are, or stronger.  Also if we believe ourselves superior to our rivals in the number and importance of the advantages that make men formidable  — wealth, physical strength, strong bodies of supporters, extensive territory, and the possession of all, or the most important, appliances of war.  Also if we have wronged no one, or not many, or not those of whom we are afraid;  and generally, if our relations with the gods are satisfactory,  as will be shown especially by signs and oracles.  The fact is that anger makes us confident  — that anger is excited by our knowledge that we are not the wrongers but the wronged,  and that the divine power is always supposed to be on the side of the wronged. 
καὶ ὅταν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἢ μηδὲν ἂν παθεῖν (9) [μηδὲ πείσεσθαι] ἢ κατορθώσειν οἴωνται. 
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Also when, at the outset of an enterprise, we believe that we cannot and shall not fail, or that we shall succeed completely. 
καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν (10) φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται. 
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— So much for the causes of fear and confidence. 
6. (11) Ποῖα δ’ αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, καὶ πρὸς τίνας (12) καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. 
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Part 6. We now turn to Shame and Shamelessness; what follows will explain the things that cause these feelings, and the persons before whom, and the states of mind under which, they are felt. 
ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη (13) τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν (14) κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων,  ἡ δ’ ἀναισχυν(15)τία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.  εἰ δή (16) ἐστιν αἰσχύνη ἡ ὁρισθεῖσα, ἀνάγκη αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς (17) τοιούτοις τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ὧν (18) φροντίζει·  τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅσα ἀπὸ κακίας ἔργα ἐστίν,  οἷον (19) τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν ἀσπίδα ἢ φυγεῖν· ἀπὸ δειλίας γάρ. 
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Shame may be defined as pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit;  and shamelessness as contempt or indifference in regard to these same bad things.  If this definition be granted, it follows that we feel shame at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to ourselves or to those we care for.  These evils are, in the first place, those due to moral badness.  Such are throwing away one’s shield or taking to flight; for these bad things are due to cowardice. 
καὶ τὸ (20) ἀποστερῆσαι παρακαταθήκην [ἢ ἀδικῆσαι]· ἀπὸ ἀδικίας γάρ. 
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Also, withholding a deposit or otherwise wronging people about money; for these acts are due to injustice. 
(21) καὶ τὸ συγγενέσθαι αἷς οὐ δεῖ ἢ οὗ οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ· ἀπὸ (22) ἀκολασίας γάρ. 
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Also, having carnal intercourse with forbidden persons, at wrong times, or in wrong places; for these things are due to licentiousness. 
καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἢ αἰσχρῶν ἢ (23) ἀπὸ ἀδυνάτων, οἷον πενήτων ἢ τεθνεώτων,  ὅθεν καὶ ἡ (24) παροιμία τὸ ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φέρειν·  ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας γὰρ καὶ (25) ἀνελευθερίας. 
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Also, making profit in petty or disgraceful ways, or out of helpless persons, e.g. the poor, or the dead  — whence the proverb ‘He would pick a corpse’s pocket’;  for all this is due to low greed and meanness. 
καὶ τὸ μὴ βοηθεῖν, δυνάμενον, εἰς χρήματα, ἢ (26) ἧττον βοηθεῖν.  καὶ τὸ βοηθεῖσθαι παρὰ τῶν ἧττον εὐπόρων,  (27) καὶ δανείζεσθαι ὅτε δόξει αἰτεῖν,  καὶ αἰτεῖν ὅτε ἀπαιτεῖν,  (28) καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν ὅτε αἰτεῖν,  καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἃ δόξει αἰτεῖν,  καὶ τὸ (29) ἀποτετυχηκότα μηδὲν ἧττον·  πάντα γὰρ ἀνελευθερίας ταῦτα (30) σημεῖα, 
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Also, in money matters, giving less help than you might, or none at all,  or accepting help from those worse off than yourself;  so also borrowing when it will seem like begging;  begging when it will seem like asking the return of a favour;  asking such a return when it will seem like begging;  praising a man in order that it may seem like begging;  and going on begging in spite of failure:  all such actions are tokens of meanness. 
τὸ δ’ ἐπαινεῖν παρόντας κολακείας,  καὶ τὸ τἀγαθὰ (31) μὲν ὑπερεπαινεῖν τὰ δὲ φαῦλα συναλείφειν,  καὶ τὸ ὑπεραλγεῖν (32) ἀλγοῦντι παρόντα, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα τοιαῦτα·  κολακείας (33) γὰρ σημεῖα. 
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Also, praising people to their face,  and praising extravagantly a man’s good points and glozing over his weaknesses,  and showing extravagant sympathy with his grief when you are in his presence, and all that sort of thing;  all this shows the disposition of a flatterer. 
καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπομένειν πόνους οὓς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι (1384a1) ἢ τρυφῶντες ἢ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντες ἢ ὅλως οἱ ἀδυνατώ(2)τεροι·  πάντα γὰρ μαλακίας σημεῖα. 
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Also, refusing to endure hardships that are endured by people who are older, more delicately brought up, of higher rank, or generally less capable of endurance than ourselves:  for all this shows effeminacy. 
καὶ τὸ ὑφ’ ἑτέρου εὖ (3) πάσχειν, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις, καὶ ὃ εὖ ἐποίησεν ὀνειδίζειν·  (4) μικροψυχίας γὰρ πάντα καὶ ταπεινότητος σημεῖα. 
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Also, accepting benefits, especially accepting them often, from another man, and then abusing him for conferring them:  all this shows a mean, ignoble disposition. 
καὶ τὸ (5) περὶ αὑτοῦ πάντα λέγειν καὶ ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τἀλλότρια (6) αὑτοῦ φάσκειν·  ἀλαζονείας γάρ. 
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Also, talking incessantly about yourself, making loud professions, and appropriating the merits of others;  for this is due to boastfulness. 
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν (7) ἄλλων ἑκάστης τῶν τοῦ ἤθους κακιῶν τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα (8) καὶ τὰ ὅμοια·  αἰσχρὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀναίσχυντα. 
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The same is true of the actions due to any of the other forms of badness of moral character, of the tokens of such badness, &c.:  they are all disgraceful and shameless. 
καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ τῶν (9) καλῶν ὧν πάντες μετέχουσιν, ἢ οἱ ὅμοιοι πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, (10) μὴ μετέχειν  —ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω ὁμοεθνεῖς, πολίτας, ἡλικιώ(11)τας, συγγενεῖς, ὅλως τοὺς ἐξ ἴσου—  αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἤδη τὸ μὴ (12) μετέχειν οἷον παιδεύσεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.  (13) πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μᾶλλον, ἂν δι’ ἑαυτὸν φαίνηται·  οὕτω γὰρ (14) ἤδη ἀπὸ κακίας μᾶλλον, ἂν αὐτὸς ᾖ αἴτιος τῶν ὑπαρξάντων (15) ἢ ὑπαρχόντων ἢ μελλόντων. 
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Another sort of bad thing at which we feel shame is, lacking a share in the honourable things shared by every one else, or by all or nearly all who are like ourselves.  By ‘those like ourselves’ I mean those of our own race or country or age or family, and generally those who are on our own level.  Once we are on a level with others, it is a disgrace to be, say, less well educated than they are; and so with other advantages:  all the more so, in each case, if it is seen to be our own fault:  wherever we are ourselves to blame for our present, past, or future circumstances, it follows at once that this is to a greater extent due to our moral badness. 
πάσχοντες δὲ ἢ πεπονθότες (16) ἢ πεισόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσχύνονται ὅσα εἰς ἀτιμίαν φέρει (17) καὶ ὀνείδη·  ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ εἰς ὑπηρετήσεις ἢ σώματος ἢ (18) ἔργων αἰσχρῶν, ὧν ἐστιν τὸ ὑβρίζεσθαι. 
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We are moreover ashamed of having done to us, having had done, or being about to have done to us acts that involve us in dishonour and reproach;  as when we surrender our persons, or lend ourselves to vile deeds, e.g. when we submit to outrage. 
καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰς ἀκολα(19)σίαν καὶ ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα, τὰ δ’ εἰς βίαν ἄκοντα·  ἀπὸ (20) ἀνανδρίας γὰρ ἢ δειλίας ἡ ὑπομονὴ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι. 
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And acts of yielding to the lust of others are shameful whether willing or unwilling (yielding to force being an instance of unwillingness),  since unresisting submission to them is due to unmanliness or cowardice. 
(21) ἃ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνονται, ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα·  ἐπεὶ (22) δὲ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, καὶ ταύτης (23) αὐτῆς χάριν ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης (24) φροντίζει ἀλλ’ ἢ διὰ τοὺς δοξάζοντας, ἀνάγκη τούτους (25) αἰσχύνεσθαι ὧν λόγον ἔχει·  λόγον δὲ ἔχει τῶν θαυμαζόντων, (26) καὶ οὓς θαυμάζει, καὶ ὑφ’ ὧν βούλεται θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ (27) πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμεῖται, καὶ ὧν μὴ καταφρονεῖ τῆς δόξης·  (28) θαυμάζεσθαι μὲν οὖν βούλονται ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ θαυμάζουσι (29) τούτους ὅσοι τι ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῶν τιμίων,  ἢ παρ’ ὧν τυγχά(30)νουσιν δεόμενοι σφόδρα τινὸς ὧν ἐκεῖνοι κύριοι, οἷον οἱ (31) ἐρῶντες·  φιλοτιμοῦνται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους·  φροντίζουσι δ’ (32) ὡς ἀληθευόντων τῶν φρονίμων, τοιοῦτοι δ’ οἵ τε πρεσβύτεροι (33) καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι. 
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These things, and others like them, are what cause the feeling of shame.  Now since shame is a mental picture of disgrace, in which we shrink from the disgrace itself and not from its consequences, and we only care what opinion is held of us because of the people who form that opinion, it follows that the people before whom we feel shame are those whose opinion of us matters to us.  Such persons are: those who admire us, those whom we admire, those by whom we wish to be admired, those with whom we are competing, and those whose opinion of us we respect.  We admire those, and wish those to admire us, who possess any good thing that is highly esteemed;  or from whom we are very anxious to get something that they are able to give us — as a lover feels.  We compete with our equals.  We respect, as true, the views of sensible people, such as our elders and those who have been well educated. 
καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ (34) μᾶλλον  (ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ)·  διὰ (35) τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς (1384b1) προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα. 
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And we feel more shame about a thing if it is done openly, before all men’s eyes.  Hence the proverb, ‘shame dwells in the eyes’.  For this reason we feel most shame before those who will always be with us and those who notice what we do, since in both cases eyes are upon us. 
καὶ τοὺς (2) μὴ περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐνόχους·  δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τἀναντία δοκεῖ τούτοις. 
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We also feel it before those not open to the same imputation as ourselves:  for it is plain that their opinions about it are the opposite of ours. 
(3) καὶ τοὺς μὴ συγγνωμονικοὺς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἁμαρτάνειν·  ἃ (4) γάρ τις αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα λέγεται τοῖς πέλας οὐ νεμεσᾶν,  (5) ὥστε ἃ μὴ ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι νεμεσᾷ. 
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Also before those who are hard on any one whose conduct they think wrong;  for what a man does himself, he is said not to resent when his neighbours do it:  so that of course he does resent their doing what he does not do himself. 
καὶ τοὺς ἐξαγγελτικοὺς (6) πολλοῖς·  οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει μὴ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐξαγγέλλειν·  (7) ἐξαγγελτικοὶ δὲ οἵ τε ἠδικημένοι, διὰ τὸ παρατηρεῖν,  καὶ οἱ (8) κακολόγοι· εἴπερ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἁμαρτάνοντας, ἔτι μᾶλλον (9) τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας. 
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And before those who are likely to tell everybody about you;  not telling others is as good as not be lieving you wrong.  People are likely to tell others about you if you have wronged them, since they are on the look out to harm you;  or if they speak evil of everybody, for those who attack the innocent will be still more ready to attack the guilty. 
καὶ οἷς ἡ διατριβὴ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πέλας (10) ἁμαρτίαις,  οἷον χλευασταῖς καὶ κωμῳδοποιοῖς·  κακολόγοι γάρ (11) πως οὗτοι καὶ ἐξαγγελτικοί. 
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And before those whose main occupation is with their neighbours’ failings  — people like satirists and writers of comedy;  these are really a kind of evil—speakers and tell—tales. 
καὶ ἐν οἷς μηδὲν ἀποτετυχή(12)κασιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θαυμαζόμενοι διάκεινται·  διὸ καὶ τοὺς (13) πρῶτον δεηθέντας τι αἰσχύνονται  ὡς οὐδέν πω ἠδοξηκότες (14) ἐν αὐτοῖς·  τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἄρτι βουλόμενοι φίλοι εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ (15) βέλτιστα τεθέανται·  διὸ εὖ ἔχει ἡ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου ἀπόκρισις (16) πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους),  καὶ τῶν πάλαι γνωρίμων οἱ μηδὲν (17) συνειδότες. 
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And before those who have never yet known us come to grief, since their attitude to us has amounted to admiration so far:  that is why we feel ashamed to refuse those a favour who ask one for the first time  — we have not as yet lost credit with them.  Such are those who are just beginning to wish to be our friends;  for they have seen our best side only (hence the appropriateness of Euripides’ reply to the Syracusans):  and such also are those among our old acquaintances who know nothing to our discredit. 
αἰσχύνονται δὲ οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ τὰ ῥηθέντα (18) αἰσχυντηλὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα,  οἷον οὐ μόνον ἀφροδισιά(19)ζοντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῦ,  καὶ οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντες (20) τὰ αἰσχρά, ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγοντες. 
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And we are ashamed not merely of the actual shameful conduct mentioned, but also of the evidences of it:  not merely, for example, of actual sexual intercourse, but also of its evidences;  and not merely of disgraceful acts but also of disgraceful talk. 
ὁμοίως δὲ οὐ τοὺς εἰρημένους (21) μόνον αἰσχύνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς δηλώσοντας αὐτοῖς, οἷον (22) θεράποντας καὶ φίλους τούτων. 
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Similarly we feel shame not merely in presence of the persons mentioned but also of those who will tell them what we have done, such as their servants or friends. 
ὅλως δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται (23) οὔθ’ ὧν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἀληθεύειν  (οὐδεὶς (24) γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία αἰσχύνεται),  οὔτε ταὐτὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους (25) καὶ τοὺς ἀγνῶτας,  ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν (26) δοκοῦντα τοὺς δ’ ἄπωθεν τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. 
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And, generally, we feel no shame before those upon whose opinions we quite look down as untrustworthy  (no one feels shame before small children or animals);  nor are we ashamed of the same things before intimates as before strangers,  but before the former of what seem genuine faults, before the latter of what seem conventional ones. 
(27) αὐτοὶ δὲ ὧδε διακείμενοι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἄν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ (28) ὑπάρχοιεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντες οὕτως τινὲς οἵους ἔφαμεν (29) εἶναι οὓς αἰσχύνονται. 
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The conditions under which we shall feel shame are these: first, having people related to us like those before whom, as has been said, we feel shame. 
ἦσαν δ’ οὗτοι ἢ <οἱ> θαυμαζόμενοι ἢ (30) θαυμάζοντες ἢ ὑφ’ ὧν βούλονται θαυμάζεσθαι,  ἢ ὧν δέονταί (31) τινα χρείαν ἧς μὴ τεύξονται ἄδοξοι ὄντες,  καὶ οὗτοι ἢ (32) ὁρῶντες  (ὥσπερ Κυδίας περὶ τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας ἐδημηγό(33)ρησεν·  ἠξίου γὰρ ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περιεστάναι (34) κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἕλληνας,  ὡς ὁρῶντας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους (35) ἃ ἂν ψηφίσωνται),  ἢ ἂν πλησίον ὦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι,  ἢ μέλλωσιν (36) αἰσθήσεσθαι·  διὸ καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι ἀτυχοῦντες ὑπὸ τῶν ζηλούντων (1385a1) ποτὲ οὐ βούλονται·  θαυμασταὶ γὰρ οἱ ζηλωταί. 
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These are, as was stated, persons whom we admire, or who admire us, or by whom we wish to be admired,  or from whom we desire some service that we shall not obtain if we forfeit their good opinion.  These persons may be actually looking on  (as Cydias represented them in his speech on land assignments in Samos,  when he told the Athenians to imagine the Greeks to be standing all around them,  actually seeing the way they voted and not merely going to hear about it afterwards):  or again they may be near at hand,  or may be likely to find out about what we do.  This is why in misfortune we do not wish to be seen by those who once wished themselves like us;  for such a feeling implies admiration. 
καὶ ὅταν (2) ἔχωσιν ἃ καταισχύνουσιν ἔργα καὶ πράγματα ἢ αὑτῶν ἢ προ(3)γόνων ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν πρὸς οὓς ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς ἀγχιστεία τις. 
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And men feel shame when they have acts or exploits to their credit on which they are bringing dishonour, whether these are their own, or those of their ancestors, or those of other persons with whom they have some close connexion. 
(4) καὶ ὅλως ὑπὲρ ὧν αἰσχύνονται αὐτοί·  εἰσὶ δ’ οὗτοι οἱ εἰρημέ(5)νοι καὶ οἱ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀναφερόμενοι,  ἢ ὧν διδάσκαλοι ἢ (6) σύμβουλοι γεγόνασιν,  ἢ ἐὰν ὦσιν ἕτεροι ὅμοιοι πρὸς οὓς (7) φιλοτιμοῦνται·  πολλὰ γὰρ αἰσχυνόμενοι διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους (8) καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. 
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Generally, we feel shame before those for whose own misconduct we should also feel it  — those already mentioned; those who take us as their models;  those whose teachers or advisers we have been;  or other people, it may be, like ourselves, whose rivals we are.  For there are many things that shame before such people makes us do or leave undone. 
καὶ μέλλοντες ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ (9) ἐν φανερῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι τοῖς συνειδόσιν αἰσχυντηλοὶ (10) μᾶλλον εἰσίν·  ὅθεν καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητής, μέλλων ἀποτυμ(11)πανίζεσθαι ὑπὸ Διονυσίου, εἶπεν, ἰδὼν τοὺς συναποθνῄσκειν (12) μέλλοντας ἐγκαλυπτομένους ὡς ᾔεσαν διὰ τῶν πυλῶν, “τί (13) ἐγκαλύπτεσθε;” ἔφη· “ἦ μὴ αὔριόν τις ὑμᾶς ἴδῃ τούτων;”  (14) περὶ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνης ταῦτα· περὶ δὲ ἀναισχυντίας δῆλον (15) ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐπορήσομεν. 
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And we feel more shame when we are likely to be continually seen by, and go about under the eyes of, those who know of our disgrace.  Hence, when Antiphon the poet was to be cudgelled to death by order of Dionysius, and saw those who were to perish with him covering their faces as they went through the gates, he said, ‘Why do you cover your faces? Is it lest some of these spectators should see you to—morrow?’  So much for Shame; to understand Shamelessness, we need only consider the converse cases, and plainly we shall have all we need. 
7. (16) Τίσιν δὲ χάριν ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, (17) ὁρισαμένοις τὴν χάριν δῆλον ἔσται. 
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Part 7. To take Kindness next: the definition of it will show us towards whom it is felt, why, and in what frames of mind. 
ἔστω δὴ χάρις, καθ’ ἣν ὁ (18) ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ἔχειν, ὑπουργία τῷ δεομένῳ μὴ ἀντί τινος, (19) μηδ’ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι ἀλλ’ ἵνα τι ἐκείνῳ·  μεγάλη δὲ (20) ἂν ᾖ σφόδρα δεόμενος, ἢ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἢ ἐν καιροῖς (21) τοιούτοις, ἢ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα. 
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Kindness — under the influence of which a man is said to ‘be kind’ may be defined as helpfulness towards some one in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the person helped.  Kindness is great if shown to one who is in great need, or who needs what is important and hard to get, or who needs it at an important and difficult crisis; or if the helper is the only, the first, or the chief person to give the help. 
δεήσεις δέ εἰσιν αἱ (22) ὀρέξεις, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα αἱ μετὰ λύπης τοῦ μὴ γιγνομέ(23)νου. 
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Natural cravings constitute such needs; and in particular cravings, accompanied by pain, for what is not being attained. 
τοιαῦται δὲ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, οἷον ἔρως, καὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ (24) σώματος κακώσεσιν καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις·  καὶ γὰρ ὁ κινδυνεύων (25) ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ὁ λυπούμενος·  διὸ οἱ ἐν πενίᾳ παριστάμενοι καὶ (26) φυγαῖς, κἂν μικρὰ ὑπηρετήσωσιν, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δεήσεως (27) καὶ τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένοι, οἷον ὁ ἐν Λυκείῳ τὸν φορμὸν (28) δούς. 
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The appetites are cravings for this kind: sexual desire, for instance, and those which arise during bodily injuries and in dangers;  for appetite is active both in danger and in pain.  Hence those who stand by us in poverty or in banishment, even if they do not help us much, are yet really kind to us, because our need is great and the occasion pressing; for instance, the man who gave the mat in the Lyceum. 
ἀνάγκη οὖν μάλιστα μὲν εἰς ταὐτὰ ἔχειν τὴν ὑπουρ(29)γίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς ἴσα ἢ μείζω·  ὥστε ἐπεὶ φανερὸν καὶ οἷς (30) καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς γίγνεται χάρις καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ (31) τούτων παρασκευαστέον,  τοὺς μὲν δεικνύντας ἢ ὄντας ἢ (32) γεγενημένους ἐν τοιαύτῃ λύπῃ καὶ δεήσει, τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρετη(33)κότας ἐν τοιαύτῃ χρείᾳ τοιοῦτόν τι ἢ ὑπηρετοῦντας. 
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The helpfulness must therefore meet, preferably, just this kind of need; and failing just this kind, some other kind as great or greater.  We now see to whom, why, and under what conditions kindness is shown; and these facts must form the basis of our arguments.  We must show that the persons helped are, or have been, in such pain and need as has been described, and that their helpers gave, or are giving, the kind of help described, in the kind of need described. 
φανε(34)ρὸν δὲ καὶ ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἐνδέχεται τὴν χάριν καὶ ποιεῖν (1385b1) ἀχαρίστους·  ἢ γὰρ ὅτι αὑτῶν ἕνεκα ὑπηρετοῦσιν ἢ ὑπηρέτη(2)σαν (τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἦν χάρις),  ἢ ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης συνέπεσεν ἢ (3) συνηναγκάσθησαν,  ἢ ὅτι ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔδωκαν, εἴτε (4) εἰδότες εἴτε μή·  ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ τὸ ἀντί τινος, ὥστε οὐδ’ (5) οὕτως ἂν εἴη χάρις. 
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We can also see how to eliminate the idea of kindness and make our opponents appear unkind:  we may maintain that they are being or have been helpful simply to promote their own interest—this, as has been stated, is not kindness;  or that their action was accidental, or was forced upon them;  or that they were not doing a favour, but merely returning one, whether they know this or not  — in either case the action is a mere return, and is therefore not a kindness even if the doer does not know how the case stands. 
καὶ περὶ ἁπάσας τὰς κατηγορίας σκε(6)πτέον·  ἡ γὰρ χάρις ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ ἢ τοσόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ἢ (7) πότε ἢ ποῦ. 
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In considering this subject we must look at all the categories  an act may be an act of kindness because (1) it is a particular thing, (2) it has a particular magnitude or (3) quality, or (4) is done at a particular time or (5) place. 
σημεῖον δὲ εἰ ἔλαττον μὴ ὑπηρέτησαν, καὶ εἰ (8) τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἢ ταὐτὰ ἢ ἴσα ἢ μείζω·  δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐδὲ (9) ταῦτα ἡμῶν ἕνεκα. 
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As evidence of the want of kindness, we may point out that a smaller service had been refused to the man in need; or that the same service, or an equal or greater one, has been given to his enemies;  these facts show that the service in question was not done for the sake of the person helped. 
ἢ εἰ φαῦλα εἰδώς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ (10) δεῖσθαι φαύλων. 
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Or we may point out that the thing desired was worthless and that the helper knew it: no one will admit that he is in need of what is worthless. 
8. (11) Καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀχαριστεῖν εἴρηται·  ποῖα (12) δ’ ἐλεεινὰ καὶ τίνας ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, λέγωμεν. 
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Part 8. So much for Kindness and Unkindness.  Let us now consider Pity, asking ourselves what things excite pity, and for what persons, and in what states of our mind pity is felt. 
(13) ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ (14) λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν,  ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν (15) ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνη(16)ται·  δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσειν ὑπάρχειν (17) τοιοῦτον οἷον οἴεσθαι παθεῖν ἄν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν (18) αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἷον εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ ἢ (19) ὅμοιον ἢ παραπλήσιον·  διὸ οὔτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες (20) ἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔτι παθεῖν οἴονται· πεπόνθασι γάρ), (21) οὔτε οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι, ἀλλ’ ὑβρίζουσιν·  εἰ γὰρ (22) ἅπαντα οἴονται ὑπάρχειν τἀγαθά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν(23)δέχεσθαι παθεῖν μηδὲν κακόν·  καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν. 
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Pity may be defined as a feeling of pain caused by the sight of some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it,  and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon.  In order to feel pity, we must obviously be capable of supposing that some evil may happen to us or some friend of ours, and moreover some such evil as is stated in our definition or is more or less of that kind.  It is therefore not felt by those completely ruined, who suppose that no further evil can befall them, since the worst has befallen them already;  nor by those who imagine themselves immensely fortunate — their feeling is rather presumptuous insolence,  for when they think they possess all the good things of life, it is clear that the impossibility of evil befalling them will be included, this being one of the good things in question. 
εἰ(24)σὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἷοι νομίζειν παθεῖν ἄν, οἵ τε πεπονθότες ἤδη (25) καὶ διαπεφευγότες,  καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ (26) δι’ ἐμπειρίαν,  καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον, καὶ (27) οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι· εὐλόγιστοι γάρ. 
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Those who think evil may befall them are such as have already had it befall them and have safely escaped from it;  elderly men, owing to their good sense and their experience;  weak men, especially men inclined to cowardice; and also educated people, since these can take long views. 
καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχουσι γονεῖς (28) ἢ τέκνα ἢ γυναῖκες·  αὐτοῦ τε γὰρ ταῦτα, καὶ οἷα παθεῖν τὰ (29) εἰρημένα. 
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Also those who have parents living, or children, or wives;  for these are our own, and the evils mentioned above may easily befall them. 
καὶ οἱ μήτε ἐν ἀνδρείας πάθει ὄντες, οἷον ἐν ὀργῇ (30) ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα),  μήτε ἐν ὑβρι(31)στικῇ διαθέσει (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἀλόγιστοι τοῦ πείσεσθαί τι),  ἀλλ’ (32) οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων, μήτ’ αὖ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦ(33)σιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι, διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει. 
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And those who neither moved by any courageous emotion such as anger or confidence (these emotions take no account of the future),  nor by a disposition to presumptuous insolence (insolent men, too, take no account of the possibility that something evil will happen to them),  nor yet by great fear (panic—stricken people do not feel pity, because they are taken up with what is happening to themselves); only those feel pity who are between these two extremes. 
(34) κἂν οἴωνταί τινας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν·  ὁ γὰρ μηδένα οἰόμενος (1386a1) πάντας οἰήσεται ἀξίους εἶναι κακοῦ. 
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In order to feel pity we must also believe in the goodness of at least some people;  if you think nobody good, you will believe that everybody deserves evil fortune. 
καὶ ὅλως δὴ ὅταν ἔχῃ (2) οὕτως ὥστ’ ἀναμνησθῆναι τοιαῦτα συμβεβηκότα ἢ αὑτῷ ἤ <τῳ> (3) τῶν αὑτοῦ, ἢ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι αὑτῷ ἤ τῳ τῶν αὑτοῦ. 
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And, generally, we feel pity whenever we are in the condition of remembering that similar misfortunes have happened to us or ours, or expecting them to happen in the future. 
(4) ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἐλεοῦσιν εἴρηται, ἃ δ’ ἐλεοῦσιν ἐκ (5) τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ δῆλον·  ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν (6) φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλεεινά, καὶ ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὅσων ἡ (7) τύχη αἰτία κακῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων. 
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So much for the mental conditions under which we feel pity. What we pity is stated clearly in the definition.  All unpleasant and painful things excite pity if they tend to destroy pain and annihilate; and all such evils as are due to chance, if they are serious. 
ἔστι δὲ ὀδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ (8) φθαρτικὰ θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γῆρας (9) καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια,  ὧν δ’ ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν (10) ἀφιλία, ὀλιγοφιλία (διὸ καὶ τὸ διασπᾶσθαι ἀπὸ φίλων καὶ (11) συνήθων ἐλεεινόν), αἶσχος, ἀσθένεια, ἀναπηρία,  καὶ τὸ ὅθεν (12) προσῆκεν ἀγαθόν τι ὑπάρξαι κακόν τι συμβῆναι, καὶ τὸ (13) πολλάκις τοιοῦτον,  καὶ τὸ πεπονθότος γενέσθαι τι ἀγαθόν, (14) οἷον Διοπείθει τὰ παρὰ βασιλέως τεθνεῶτι κατεπέμφθη,  (15) καὶ τὸ ἢ μηδὲν γεγενῆσθαι ἀγαθὸν ἢ γενομένων μὴ εἶναι (16) ἀπόλαυσιν. 
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The painful and destructive evils are: death in its various forms, bodily injuries and afflictions, old age, diseases, lack of food.  The evils due to chance are: friendlessness, scarcity of friends (it is a pitiful thing to be torn away from friends and companions), deformity, weakness, mutilation;  evil coming from a source from which good ought to have come; and the frequent repetition of such misfortunes.  Also the coming of good when the worst has happened: e.g. the arrival of the Great King’s gifts for Diopeithes after his death.  Also that either no good should have befallen a man at all, or that he should not be able to enjoy it when it has. 
(17) ἐφ’ οἷς μὲν οὖν ἐλεοῦσι, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν·  (18) ἐλεοῦσι δὲ τούς τε γνωρίμους, ἂν μὴ σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὦσιν (19) οἰκειότητι (περὶ δὲ τούτους ὥσπερ περὶ αὑτοὺς μέλλοντας (20) ἔχουσιν·  διὸ καὶ ὁ Ἀμάσιος ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ υἱεῖ ἀγομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ (21) ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ἐδάκρυσεν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ φίλῳ προσ(22)αιτοῦντι·  τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ δεινόν·  τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν (23) ἕτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις (24) τῷ ἐναντίῳ χρήσιμον·  <οὐ γὰρ> ἔτι ἐλεοῦσιν ἐγγὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ (25) δεινοῦ ὄντος),  καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσιν κατὰ ἡλικίαν, κατὰ (26) ἤθη, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη·  ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ (27) τούτοις μᾶλλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτῷ ἂν ὑπάρξαι·  ὅλως γὰρ καὶ (28) ἐνταῦθα δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ὅσα ἐφ’ αὑτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπ’ (29) ἄλλων γιγνόμενα ἐλεοῦσιν. 
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The grounds, then, on which we feel pity are these or like these.  The people we pity are: those whom we know, if only they are not very closely related to us — in that case we feel about them as if we were in danger ourselves.  For this reason Amasis did not weep, they say, at the sight of his son being led to death, but did weep when he saw his friend begging:  the latter sight was pitiful, the former terrible,  and the terrible is different from the pitiful; it tends to cast out pity, and often helps to produce the opposite of pity.  Again, we feel pity when the danger is near ourselves.  Also we pity those who are like us in age, character, disposition, social standing, or birth;  for in all these cases it appears more likely that the same misfortune may befall us also.  Here too we have to remember the general principle that what we fear for ourselves excites our pity when it happens to others. 
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐγγὺς φαινόμενα τὰ πάθη (30) ἐλεεινά ἐστιν,  τὰ δὲ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γενόμενα ἢ ἐσόμενα (31) οὔτε ἐλπίζοντες οὔτε μεμνημένοι ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν ἢ οὐχ (32) ὁμοίως,  ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ φωναῖς (33) καὶ ἐσθῆσι καὶ ὅλως ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι  (ἐγγὺς (34) γὰρ ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι τὸ κακόν, πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιοῦντες ἢ (35) ὡς μέλλοντα ἢ ὡς γεγονότα·  καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ μέλλοντα (1386b1) διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα),  <καὶ> διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα, οἷον (2) ἐσθῆτάς τε τῶν πεπονθότων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα,  καὶ τὰς (3) πράξεις καὶ λόγους καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἐν τῷ πάθει ὄντων, (4) οἷον ἤδη τελευτώντων. 
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Further, since it is when the sufferings of others are close to us that they excite our pity  (we cannot remember what disasters happened a hundred centuries ago, nor look forward to what will happen a hundred centuries hereafter, and therefore feel little pity, if any, for such things):  it follows that those who heighten the effect of their words with suitable gestures, tones, dress, and dramatic action generally, are especially successful in exciting pity:  they thus put the disasters before our eyes, and make them seem close to us, just coming or just past.  Anything that has just happened, or is going to happen soon, is particularly piteous:  so too therefore are the tokens and the actions of sufferers — the garments and the like of those who have already suffered;  the words and the like of those actually suffering — of those, for instance, who are on the point of death. 
καὶ μάλιστα τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἐν (5) τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς ὄντας ἐλεεινόν·  ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ (6) τὸ ἐγγὺς φαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔλεον, καὶ ὡς ἀναξίου (7) ὄντος καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινομένου τοῦ πάθους. 
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Most piteous of all is it when, in such times of trial, the victims are persons of noble character:  whenever they are so, our pity is especially excited, because their innocence, as well as the setting of their misfortunes before our eyes, makes their misfortunes seem close to ourselves. 
9. (8) Ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὃ καλοῦσι νεμεσᾶν·  (9) τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντι(10)κείμενόν ἐστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους τὸ λυπεῖ(11)σθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις. 
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Part 9. Most directly opposed to pity is the feeling called Indignation.  Pain at unmerited good fortune is, in one sense, opposite to pain at unmerited bad fortune, and is due to the same moral qualities. 
καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη ἤθους (12) χρηστοῦ·  δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξίως πράττουσι κακῶς (13) συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὖ νεμεσᾶν·  ἄδικον γὰρ τὸ (14) παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γιγνόμενον·  διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ (15) νεμεσᾶν. 
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Both feelings are associated with good moral character;  it is our duty both to feel sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to feel indignation at unmerited prosperity;  for whatever is undeserved is unjust,  and that is why we ascribe indignation even to the gods. 
(16) δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν (17) ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον, ὡς σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νεμεσᾶν, (18) ἔστι δ’ ἕτερον·  λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν (19) καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ,  ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ (20) ὁμοίου. 
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It might indeed be thought that envy is similarly opposed to pity, on the ground that envy it closely akin to indignation, or even the same thing. But it is not the same.  It is true that it also is a disturbing pain excited by the prosperity of others.  But it is excited not by the prosperity of the undeserving but by that of people who are like us or equal with us. 
τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ δι’ (21) αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν·  οὐ γὰρ ἔτι (22) ἔσται τὸ μὲν φθόνος, τὸ δὲ νέμεσις, ἀλλὰ φόβος,  ἐὰν διὰ (23) τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαῦλον (24) ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου εὐπραξίας. 
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The two feelings have this in common, that they must be due not to some untoward thing being likely to befall ourselves, but only to what is happening to our neighbour.  The feeling ceases to be envy in the one case and indignation in the other, and becomes fear,  if the pain and disturbance are due to the prospect of something bad for ourselves as the result of the other man’s good fortune. 
φανερὸν δ’ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ (25) τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις·  ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς (26) ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθήσεται ἢ ἄλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς (27) ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν,  οἷον τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαι(28)φόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμωρίας, οὐδεὶς ἂν λυπηθείη χρηστός·  (29) δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δ’ αὔτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς (30) εὖ πράττουσι κατ’ ἀξίαν·  ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν (31) τὸν ἐπιεικῆ·  ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἂν ἅπερ τῷ ὁμοίῳ, (32) καὶ αὑτῷ. 
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The feelings of pity and indignation will obviously be attended by the converse feelings of satisfaction.  If you are pained by the unmerited distress of others, you will be pleased, or at least not pained, by their merited distress.  Thus no good man can be pained by the punishment of parricides or murderers.  These are things we are bound to rejoice at, as we must at the prosperity of the deserving;  both these things are just, and both give pleasure to any honest man,  since he cannot help expecting that what has happened to a man like him will happen to him too. 
καὶ ἔστιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δ’ (33) ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου·  ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ (1387a1) φθονερός·  ἐφ’ ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, (2) ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτον ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου (3) χαίρειν·  διὸ κωλυτικὰ μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτ’ ἐστί, διαφέρει (4) δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν (5) ἅπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα. 
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All these feelings are associated with the same type of moral character. And their contraries are associated with the contrary type;  the man who is delighted by others’ misfortunes is identical with the man who envies others’ prosperity.  For any one who is pained by the occurrence or existence of a given thing must be pleased by that thing’s non—existence or destruction.  We can now see that all these feelings tend to prevent pity (though they differ among themselves, for the reasons given), so that all are equally useful for neutralizing an appeal to pity. 
(6) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν λέγωμεν, τίσιν τε νεμε(7)σῶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες αὐτοί, εἶτα μετὰ ταῦτα (8) περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
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We will first consider Indignation — reserving the other emotions for subsequent discussion — and ask with whom, on what grounds, and in what states of mind we may be indignant. 
φανερὸν δ’ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·  εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ (9) νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίως εὐπραγεῖν,  (10) πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (11) νεμεσᾶν·  οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, (12) νεμεσήσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων (13) εἰσίν),  ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅσων (14) ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄξιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ φύσει ἔχοντες (15) ἀγαθά, οἷον εὐγένειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. 
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These questions are really answered by what has been said already.  Indignation is pain caused by the sight of undeserved good fortune.  It is, then, plain to begin with that there are some forms of good the sight of which cannot cause it.  Thus a man may be just or brave, or acquire moral goodness: but we shall not be indignant with him for that reason, any more than we shall pity him for the contrary reason.  Indignation is roused by the sight of wealth, power, and the like—by all those things, roughly speaking, which are deserved by good men and by those who possess the goods of nature — noble birth, beauty, and so on. 
ἐπεὶ δὲ (16) τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐγγύς τι φαίνεται τοῦ φύσει,  ἀνάγκη τοῖς ταὐτὸ (17) ἔχουσιν ἀγαθόν, ἐὰν νεωστὶ ἔχοντες τυγχάνωσι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο (18) εὐπραγῶσι, μᾶλλον νεμεσᾶν·  μᾶλλον γὰρ λυποῦσιν οἱ νεωστὶ (19) πλουτοῦντες τῶν πάλαι καὶ διὰ γένος·  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντες (20) καὶ δυνάμενοι καὶ πολύφιλοι καὶ εὔτεκνοι καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν (21) τοιούτων. 
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Again, what is long established seems akin to what exists by nature;  and therefore we feel more indignation at those possessing a given good if they have as a matter of fact only just got it and the prosperity it brings with it.  The newly rich give more offence than those whose wealth is of long standing and inherited.  The same is true of those who have office or power, plenty of friends, a fine family, &c. 
καὶ ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν γίγνηται αὐτοῖς, (22) ὡσαύτως·  καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μᾶλλον λυποῦσιν οἱ νεόπλουτοι (23) ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἢ οἱ ἀρχαιόπλουτοι.  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (24) ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
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We feel the same when these advantages of theirs secure them others.  For here again, the newly rich give us more offence by obtaining office through their riches than do those whose wealth is of long standing;  and so in all other cases. 
αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δοκοῦσι τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν (25) οἱ δ’ οὔ·  τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ οὕτω φαινόμενον ἔχειν ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὥστε (26) οἱ ἕτεροι οὐ τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν. 
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The reason is that what the latter have is felt to be really their own, but what the others have is not;  what appears to have been always what it is is regarded as real, and so the possessions of the newly rich do not seem to be really their own. 
καὶ ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ (27) τοῦ τυχόντος ἄξιον,  ἀλλά τις ἔστιν ἀναλογία καί τι ἁρμόττον,  (28) οἷον ὅπλων κάλλος οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ ἁρμόττει ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ,  (29) καὶ γάμοι διαφέροντες οὐ τοῖς νεωστὶ πλουσίοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς (30) εὐγενέσιν·  ἂν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὢν μὴ τοῦ ἁρμόττοντος τυγχάνῃ, (31) νεμεσητόν. 
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Further, it is not any and every man that deserves any given kind of good;  there is a certain correspondence and appropriateness in such things;  thus it is appropriate for brave men, not for just men, to have fine weapons,  and for men of family, not for parvenus, to make distinguished marriages.  Indignation may therefore properly be felt when any one gets what is not appropriate for him, though he may be a good man enough. 
καὶ <τὸ> τὸν ἥττω τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν,  (32) μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται,
Αἴαντος δ’ ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο·
(34) Ζεὺς γὰρ οἱ νεμέσασχ’, ὅτ’ ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο·  (1387b1) εἰ δὲ μή, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ὁ ἥττων τῷ κρείττονι,  οἷον εἰ ὁ (2) μουσικὸς τῷ δικαίῳ·  βέλτιον γὰρ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς μου(3)σικῆς. 
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It may also be felt when any one sets himself up against his superior,  especially against his superior in some particular respect — whence the linesOnly from battle he shrank with Aias Telamon’s son;Zeus had been angered with him, had he fought with a mightier one;  but also, even apart from that, when the inferior in any sense contends with his superior;  a musician, for instance, with a just man,  for justice is a finer thing than music. 
(4) οἷς μὲν οὖν νεμεσῶσι καὶ διὰ τί, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον·  ταῦτα (5) γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν. 
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Enough has been said to make clear the grounds on which, and the persons against whom,  Indignation is felt—they are those mentioned, and others like him. 
αὐτοὶ δὲ νεμεσητικοί εἰσιν, ἐὰν (6) ἄξιοι τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν καὶ ταῦτα (7) κεκτημένοι·  τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων ἠξιῶσθαι τοὺς μὴ ὁμοίους οὐ (8) δίκαιον. 
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As for the people who feel it; we feel it if we do ourselves deserve the greatest possible goods and moreover have them,  for it is an injustice that those who are not our equals should have been held to deserve as much as we have. 
δεύτερον δέ, ἂν ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι τυγχά(9)νωσιν·  κρίνουσί τε γὰρ εὖ, καὶ τὰ ἄδικα μισοῦσι.  καὶ ἐὰν (10) φιλότιμοι καὶ ὀρεγόμενοί τινων πραγμάτων, καὶ μάλιστ’ <ἂν> (11) περὶ ταῦτα φιλότιμοι ὦσιν ὧν ἕτεροι ἀνάξιοι ὄντες τυγχάνουσιν.  (12) καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοὶ αὑτοὺς ὧν ἑτέρους μὴ ἀξιοῦσι, (13) νεμεσητικοὶ τούτοις καὶ τούτων·  διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνδραποδώδεις (14) καὶ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀφιλότιμοι οὐ νεμεσητικοί·  οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν οὗ (15) ἑαυτοὺς οἴονται ἀξίους εἶναι. 
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Or, secondly, we feel it if we are really good and honest people;  our judgement is then sound, and we loathe any kind of injustice.  Also if we are ambitious and eager to gain particular ends, especially if we are ambitious for what others are getting without deserving to get it.  And, generally, if we think that we ourselves deserve a thing and that others do not, we are disposed to be indignant with those others so far as that thing is concerned.  Hence servile, worthless, unambitious persons are not inclined to Indignation,  since there is nothing they can believe themselves to deserve. 
(16) φανερὸν δ’ ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ ποίοις ἀτυχοῦσι καὶ κακο(17)πραγοῦσιν ἢ μὴ τυγχάνουσι χαίρειν ἢ ἀλύπως ἔχειν δεῖ·  ἐκ γὰρ (18) τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι δῆλα, ὥστ’ ἐὰν τούς τε (19) κριτὰς τοιούτους παρασκευάσῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας (20) ἐλεεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐλεεῖσθαι, δείξῃ ἀναξίους ὄντας τυγ(21)χάνειν ἀξίους δὲ μὴ τυγχάνειν, ἀδύνατον ἐλεεῖν. 
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From all this it is plain what sort of men those are at whose misfortunes, distresses, or failures we ought to feel pleased, or at least not pained: by considering the facts described we see at once what their contraries are.  If therefore our speech puts the judges in such a frame of mind as that indicated and shows that those who claim pity on certain definite grounds do not deserve to secure pity but do deserve not to secure it, it will be impossible for the judges to feel pity. 
10. (22) Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι φθονοῦσι καὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες,  (23) εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ φαινομένῃ τῶν (24) εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους, μὴ ἵνα τι αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ (25) δι’ ἐκείνους·  φθονήσουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οἷς εἰσί τινες (26) ὅμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται·  ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγ(27)γένειαν, καθ’ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρ(28)χοντα. 
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Part 10. To take Envy next: we can see on what grounds, against what persons, and in what states of mind we feel it.  Envy is pain at the sight of such good fortune as consists of the good things already mentioned; we feel it towards our equals; not with the idea of getting something for ourselves, but because the other people have it.  We shall feel it if we have, or think we have, equals;  and by ‘equals’ I mean equals in birth, relationship, age, disposition, distinction, or wealth. 
καὶ οἷς μικρὸν ἐλλείπει τοῦ μὴ πάντα ὑπάρχειν (διὸ (29) οἱ μεγάλα πράττοντες καὶ οἱ εὐτυχοῦντες φθονεροί εἰσιν)·  (30) πάντας γὰρ οἴονται τὰ αὑτῶν φέρειν.  καὶ οἱ τιμώμενοι ἐπί (31) τινι διαφερόντως, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἢ εὐδαιμονίᾳ.  καὶ (32) οἱ φιλότιμοι φθονερώτεροι τῶν ἀφιλοτίμων.  καὶ οἱ δοξόσοφοι·  (33) φιλότιμοι γὰρ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. καὶ ὅλως οἱ φιλόδοξοι περί τι φθο(34)νεροὶ περὶ τοῦτο.  καὶ οἱ μικρόψυχοι· πάντα γὰρ μεγάλα δοκεῖ (35) αὐτοῖς εἶναι.  ἐφ’ οἷς δὲ φθονοῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἴρηται·  (1388a1) ἐφ’ οἷς γὰρ φιλοδοξοῦσι καὶ φιλοτιμοῦνται ἔργοις ἢ κτήμασι (2) καὶ ὀρέγονται δόξης, καὶ ὅσα εὐτυχήματά ἐστιν, σχεδὸν περὶ (3) πάντα φθόνος ἔστι, καὶ μάλιστα ὧν αὐτοὶ ἢ ὀρέγονται ἢ (4) οἴονται δεῖν αὑτοὺς ἔχειν, ἢ ὧν τῇ κτήσει μικρῷ ὑπερέχουσιν (5) ἢ μικρῷ ἐλλείπουσιν. 
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We feel envy also if we fall but a little short of having everything; which is why people in high place and prosperity feel it  —they think every one else is taking what belongs to themselves.  Also if we are exceptionally distinguished for some particular thing, and especially if that thing is wisdom or good fortune.  Ambitious men are more envious than those who are not.  So also those who profess wisdom; they are ambitious to be thought wise.  Indeed, generally, those who aim at a reputation for anything are envious on this particular point.  And small—minded men are envious, for everything seems great to them.  The good things which excite envy have already been mentioned.  The deeds or possessions which arouse the love of reputation and honour and the desire for fame, and the various gifts of fortune, are almost all subject to envy; and particularly if we desire the thing ourselves, or think we are entitled to it, or if having it puts us a little above others, or not having it a little below them. 
φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οἷς φθονοῦσιν· ἅμα γὰρ (6) εἴρηται· τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ (7) δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν·  ὅθεν εἴρηται
τὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπίσταται. 
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It is clear also what kind of people we envy; that was included in what has been said already: we envy those who are near us in time, place, age, or reputation.  Hence the line: Ay, kin can even be jealous of their kin. 
(8) καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται· φιλοτιμοῦνται γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς (9) εἰρημένους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μυριοστὸν ἔτος ὄντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς (10) ἐσομένους ἢ τεθνεῶτας οὐδείς, οὐδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἐφ’ Ἡρα(11)κλείαις στήλαις.  οὐδ’ ὧν πολὺ οἴονται παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἢ παρὰ (12) τοῖς ἄλλοις λείπεσθαι, οὐδ’ ὧν πολὺ ὑπερέχειν, ὡσαύτως καὶ (13) πρὸς τούτους καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.  ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγω(14)νιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐφιεμένους (15) φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν,  διόπερ εἴρηται
(16) καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ. 
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Also our fellow—competitors, who are indeed the people just mentioned—we do not compete with men who lived a hundred centuries ago, or those not yet born, or the dead, or those who dwell near the Pillars of Hercules,  or those whom, in our opinion or that of others, we take to be far below us or far above us. So too we compete with those who follow the same ends as ourselves:  we compete with our rivals in sport or in love, and generally with those who are after the same things; and it is therefore these whom we are bound to envy beyond all others.  Hence the saying: Potter against potter. 
(17) καὶ ὧν ἢ κεκτημένων ἢ κατορθούντων ὄνειδος αὐτοῖς (εἰσὶν (18) δὲ καὶ οὗτοι <οἱ> ἐγγὺς καὶ ὅμοιοι)·  δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι παρ’ αὐτοὺς (19) οὐ τυγχάνουσι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο λυποῦν ποιεῖ τὸν (20) φθόνον.  καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἢ κεκτημένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς(21) (22) προσῆκεν ἢ ἐκέκτηντό ποτε·  διὸ πρεσβύτεροί τε νεωτέροις καὶ (23) οἱ πολλὰ δαπανήσαντες εἰς ταὐτὸ τοῖς ὀλίγα φθονοῦσιν.  καὶ (24) τοῖς ταχὺ οἱ ἢ μόλις τυχόντες ἢ μὴ τυχόντες φθονοῦσιν.  δῆλον (25) δὲ καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς (26) ἔχοντες·  ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, οὕτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς (27) ἐναντίοις ἡσθήσονται. 
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We also envy those whose possession of or success in a thing is a reproach to us: these are our neighbours and equals;  for it is clear that it is our own fault we have missed the good thing in question; this annoys us, and excites envy in us.  We also envy those who have what we ought to have, or have got what we did have once.  Hence old men envy younger men, and those who have spent much envy those who have spent little on the same thing.  And men who have not got a thing, or not got it yet, envy those who have got it quickly.  We can also see what things and what persons give pleasure to envious people, and in what states of mind they feel it:  the states of mind in which they feel pain are those under which they will feel pleasure in the contrary things. 
ὥστε ἂν αὐτοὶ μὲν παρασκευασθῶσιν (28) οὕτως ἔχειν, οἱ δ’ ἐλεεῖσθαι ἢ τυγχάνειν τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιοῦν(29)τες ὦσιν οἷοι οἱ εἰρημένοι, δῆλον ὡς οὐ τεύξονται ἐλέου (30) παρὰ τῶν κυρίων. 
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If therefore we ourselves with whom the decision rests are put into an envious state of mind, and those for whom our pity, or the award of something desirable, is claimed are such as have been described, it is obvious that they will win no pity from us. 
11. (31) Πῶς δὲ ἔχοντες ζηλοῦσι καὶ τὰ ποῖα καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν, ἐνθένδ’ (32) ἐστὶ δῆλον·  εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ζῆλος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ (33) παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων καὶ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ (34) τοὺς ὁμοίους τῇ φύσει, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ (35) ἔστιν  διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ (36) φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων·  ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὑτὸν παρασκευάζει (37) διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ (38) ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον),  ἀνάγκη δὴ ζηλωτικοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς (1388b1) ἀξιοῦντας αὑτοὺς ἀγαθῶν ὧν μὴ ἔχουσιν, <ἐνδεχομένων αὐ(2)τοῖς λαβεῖν>·  οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀξιοῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀδύνατα διὸ οἱ (3) νέοι καὶ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι. 
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Part 11. We will next consider Emulation, showing in what follows its causes and objects, and the state of mind in which it is felt.  Emulation is pain caused by seeing the presence, in persons whose nature is like our own, of good things that are highly valued and are possible for ourselves to acquire; but it is felt not because others have these goods, but because we have not got them ourselves.  It is therefore a good feeling felt by good persons, whereas envy is a bad feeling felt by bad persons.  Emulation makes us take steps to secure the good things in question, envy makes us take steps to stop our neighbour having them.  Emulation must therefore tend to be felt by persons who believe themselves to deserve certain good things that they have not got,  it being understood that no one aspires to things which appear impossible. It is accordingly felt by the young and by persons of lofty disposition. 
καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει τοιαῦτα (4) ἀγαθὰ ἃ τῶν ἐντίμων ἄξιά ἐστιν ἀνδρῶν·  ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα (5) πλοῦτος καὶ πολυφιλία καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα·  ὡς γὰρ (6) προσῆκον αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι, οἷα προσήκει τοῖς ἀγαθῶς (7) ἔχουσι, ζηλοῦσι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν.  καὶ οὓς οἱ ἄλλοι (8) ἀξιοῦσιν.  καὶ ὧν πρόγονοι ἢ συγγενεῖς ἢ οἰκεῖοι ἢ τὸ ἔθνος ἢ (9) ἡ πόλις ἔντιμοι, ζηλωτικοὶ περὶ ταῦτα·  οἰκεῖα γὰρ οἴονται (10) αὑτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἄξιοι <εἶναι> τούτων. 
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Also by those who possess such good things as are deserved by men held in honour  —these are wealth, abundance of friends, public office, and the like;  on the assumption that they ought to be good men, they are emulous to gain such goods because they ought, in their belief, to belong to men whose state of mind is good.  Also by those whom all others think deserving.  We also feel it about anything for which our ancestors, relatives, personal friends, race, or country are specially honoured,  looking upon that thing as really our own, and therefore feeling that we deserve to have it. 
εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ζηλωτὰ τὰ (11) ἔντιμα ἀγαθά, ἀνάγκη τάς τε ἀρετὰς εἶναι τοιαύτας, καὶ ὅσα τοῖς (12) ἄλλοις ὠφέλιμα καὶ εὐεργετικά  (τιμῶσι γὰρ τοὺς εὐεργετοῦν(13)τας καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθούς),  καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πλη(14)σίον ἔστιν, οἷον πλοῦτος καὶ κάλλος μᾶλλον ὑγιείας. 
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Further, since all good things that are highly honoured are objects of emulation, moral goodness in its various forms must be such an object, and also all those good things that are useful and serviceable to others:  for men honour those who are morally good, and also those who do them service.  So with those good things our possession of which can give enjoyment to our neighbours—wealth and beauty rather than health. 
φανερὸν (15) δὲ καὶ οἱ ζηλωτοὶ τίνες·  οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κεκτη(16)μένοι ζηλωτοί· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὰ εἰρημένα, οἷον ἀνδρεία (17) σοφία ἀρχή  (οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες πολλοὺς δύνανται εὖ ποιεῖν), (18) στρατηγοί, ῥήτορες, πάντες οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμενοι.  καὶ οἷς (19) πολλοὶ ὅμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι, ἢ πολλοὶ γνώριμοι, ἢ φίλοι (20) πολλοί, ἢ οὓς πολλοὶ θαυμάζουσιν, ἢ οὓς αὐτοὶ θαυμάζουσιν.  (21) καὶ ὧν ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια λέγονται ἢ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν ἢ ὑπὸ λογο(22)γράφων. 
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We can see, too, what persons are the objects of the feeling.  They are those who have these and similar things—those already mentioned, as courage, wisdom, public office.  Holders of public office—generals, orators, and all who possess such powers—can do many people a good turn.  Also those whom many people wish to be like; those who have many acquaintances or friends; those whom admire, or whom we ourselves admire;  and those who have been praised and eulogized by poets or prose—writers. 
καταφρονοῦσιν δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐναντίον γὰρ ζήλῳ (23) καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν.  ἀνάγκη (24) δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὥστε ζηλῶσαί τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσθαι (25) καταφρονητικοὺς εἶναι τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅσοι τὰ (26) ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν·  διὸ πολλάκις (27) καταφρονοῦσιν τῶν εὐτυχούντων, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγα(28)θῶν ὑπάρχῃ αὐτοῖς ἡ τύχη. 
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Persons of the contrary sort are objects of contempt: for the feeling and notion of contempt are opposite to those of emulation.  Those who are such as to emulate or be emulated by others are inevitably disposed to be contemptuous of all such persons as are subject to those bad things which are contrary to the good things that are the objects of emulation: despising them for just that reason.  Hence we often despise the fortunate, when luck comes to them without their having those good things which are held in honour. 
(29) δι’ ὧν μὲν οὖν τὰ πάθη ἐγγίγνεται καὶ διαλύεται, ἐξ ὧν αἱ (30) πίστεις γίγνονται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴρηται. 
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This completes our discussion of the means by which the several emotions may be produced or dissipated, and upon which depend the persuasive arguments connected with the emotions. 
12. (31) τὰ δὲ ἤθη ποῖοί τινες κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὰς (32) ἡλικίας καὶ τὰς τύχας, διέλθωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα. 
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Part 12. Let us now consider the various types of human character, in relation to the emotions and moral qualities, showing how they correspond to our various ages and fortunes. 
λέγω δὲ πάθη (33) μὲν ὀργὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν [πρό(34)τερον],  ἕξεις δὲ ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας, εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων (35) πρότερον, καὶ ποῖα προαιροῦνται ἕκαστοι, καὶ ποίων πρακτι(36)κοί.  ἡλικίαι δέ εἰσι νεότης καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ γῆρας.  τύχην δὲ (1389a1) λέγω εὐγένειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τἀναντία τούτοις (2) καὶ ὅλως εὐτυχίαν καὶ δυστυχίαν. 
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By emotions I mean anger, desire, and the like; these we have discussed already.  By moral qualities I mean virtues and vices; these also have been discussed already, as well as the various things that various types of men tend to will and to do.  By ages I mean youth, the prime of life, and old age.  By fortune I mean birth, wealth, power, and their opposites—in fact, good fortune and ill fortune. 
(3) οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἤθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν (4) ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι.  καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα (5) ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι τῇ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύ(6)της,  εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἁψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ (7) σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι ταχέως δὲ παύονται  (ὀξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ (8) βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι καὶ (9) πεῖναι),  καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἷοι ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ ὀργῇ.  (10) καὶ ἥττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ· διὰ γὰρ φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἀνέχονται (11) ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ’ ἀγανακτοῦσιν ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖσθαι.  καὶ (12) φιλότιμοι μέν εἰσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι (ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπι(13)θυμεῖ ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις),  καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα (14) μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοχρήματοι (φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστα διὰ τὸ μήπω (15) ἐνδείας πεπειρᾶσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ Πιττακοῦ ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα (16) εἰς Ἀμφιάραον),  καὶ οὐ κακοήθεις ἀλλ’ εὐήθεις διὰ τὸ μήπω (17) τεθεωρηκέναι πολλὰς πονηρίας,  καὶ εὔπιστοι διὰ τὸ μήπω (18) πολλὰ ἐξηπατῆσθαι,  καὶ εὐέλπιδες· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, (19) οὕτω διάθερμοί εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως·  ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ (20) τὸ μὴ πολλὰ ἀποτετυχηκέναι. 
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To begin with the Youthful type of character. Young men have strong passions, and tend to gratify them indiscriminately.  Of the bodily desires, it is the sexual by which they are most swayed and in which they show absence of self—control.  They are changeable and fickle in their desires, which are violent while they last, but quickly over:  their impulses are keen but not deep—rooted, and are like sick people’s attacks of hunger and thirst.  They are hot—tempered, and quick—tempered, and apt to give way to their anger;  bad temper often gets the better of them, for owing to their love of honour they cannot bear being slighted, and are indignant if they imagine themselves unfairly treated.  While they love honour, they love victory still more; for youth is eager for superiority over others, and victory is one form of this.  They love both more than they love money, which indeed they love very little, not having yet learnt what it means to be without it—this is the point of Pittacus’ remark about Amphiaraus.  They look at the good side rather than the bad, not having yet witnessed many instances of wickedness.  They trust others readily, because they have not yet often been cheated.  They are sanguine; nature warms their blood as though with excess of wine;  and besides that, they have as yet met with few disappointments. 
καὶ ζῶσι τὰ πλεῖστα ἐλπίδι·  ἡ (21) μὲν γὰρ ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστιν ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ παροιχο(22)μένου, τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς (23) βραχύ·  τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μεμνῆσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἷόν τε, (24) ἐλπίζειν δὲ πάντα. 
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Their lives are mainly spent not in memory but in expectation;  for expectation refers to the future, memory to the past, and youth has a long future before it and a short past behind it:  on the first day of one’s life one has nothing at all to remember, and can only look forward. 
καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοί εἰσι διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον (25) (ἐλπίζουσι γὰρ ῥᾳδίως),  καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι (θυμώδεις γὰρ καὶ (26) εὐέλπιδες, ὧν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ θαρρεῖν ποιεῖ·  οὔτε (27) γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, τό τε ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθόν τι (28) θαρραλέον ἐστίν),  καὶ αἰσχυντηλοί (οὐ γάρ πω καλὰ ἕτερα ὑπο(29)λαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ πεπαίδευνται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου μόνον),  καὶ (30) μεγαλόψυχοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπείνωνται, ἀλλὰ (31) τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄπειροί εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὑτὸν μεγάλων (32) μεγαλοψυχία· τοῦτο δ’ εὐέλπιδος).  καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται πράτ(33)τειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων·  τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ (34) τῷ λογισμῷ, ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἡ δὲ (35) ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ.  καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν (1389b1) ἄλλων ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ (2) συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν, ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους.  καὶ ἅπαντα (3) ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἁμαρτάνουσι,  παρὰ τὸ Χιλώ(4)νειον (πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσι γὰρ ἄγαν καὶ (5) μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὁμοίως),  καὶ εἰδέναι ἅπαντα (6) οἴονται καὶ διισχυρίζονται (τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιόν ἐστιν καὶ τοῦ (7) πάντα ἄγαν),  καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν, οὐ (8) κακουργίαν.  καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ βελ(9)τίους ὑπολαμβάνειν (τῇ γὰρ αὑτῶν ἀκακίᾳ τοὺς πέλας με(10)τροῦσιν, ὥστε ἀνάξια πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτούς),  καὶ (11) φιλογέλωτες, διὸ καὶ φιλευτράπελοι· ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πεπαι(12)δευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν. 
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They are easily cheated, owing to the sanguine disposition just mentioned.  Their hot tempers and hopeful dispositions make them more courageous than older men are;  the hot temper prevents fear, and the hopeful disposition creates confidence; we cannot feel fear so long as we are feeling angry, and any expectation of good makes us confident.  They are shy, accepting the rules of society in which they have been trained, and not yet believing in any other standard of honour.  They have exalted notions, because they have not yet been humbled by life or learnt its necessary limitations; moreover, their hopeful disposition makes them think themselves equal to great things—and that means having exalted notions.  They would always rather do noble deeds than useful ones:  their lives are regulated more by moral feeling than by reasoning; and whereas reasoning leads us to choose what is useful, moral goodness leads us to choose what is noble.  They are fonder of their friends, intimates, and companions than older men are, because they like spending their days in the company of others, and have not yet come to value either their friends or anything else by their usefulness to themselves.  All their mistakes are in the direction of doing things excessively and vehemently.  They disobey Chilon’s precept by overdoing everything, they love too much and hate too much, and the same thing with everything else.  They think they know everything, and are always quite sure about it; this, in fact, is why they overdo everything.  If they do wrong to others, it is because they mean to insult them, not to do them actual harm.  They are ready to pity others, because they think every one an honest man, or anyhow better than he is: they judge their neighbour by their own harmless natures, and so cannot think he deserves to be treated in that way.  They are fond of fun and therefore witty, wit being well—bred insolence. 
13. (13) Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν νέων τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἦθος, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύ(14)τεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις τὰ (15) πλεῖστα ἔχουσιν ἤθη·  διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι καὶ (16) πλείω ἐξηπατῆσθαι καὶ ἐξημαρτηκέναι,  καὶ τὰ πλείω φαῦλα (17) εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὔτε διαβεβαιοῦνται οὐδέν, ἧττόν τε (18) ἄγανται πάντα ἢ δεῖ. 
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Part 13. Such, then is the character of the Young. The character of Elderly Men—men who are past their prime—may be said to be formed for the most part of elements that are the contrary of all these.  They have lived many years; they have often been taken in, and often made mistakes;  and life on the whole is a bad business. The result is that they are sure about nothing and under—do everything. 
καὶ οἴονται, ἴσασι δ’ οὐδέν, καὶ ἀμφι(19)δοξοῦντες προστιθέασιν ἀεὶ τὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα, καὶ πάντα (20) λέγουσιν οὕτως, παγίως δ’ οὐδέν.  καὶ κακοήθεις εἰσίν· ἔστι (21) γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα. 
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They ‘think’, but they never ‘know’; and because of their hesitation they always add a ‘possibly’or a ‘perhaps’, putting everything this way and nothing positively.  They are cynical; that is, they tend to put the worse construction on everything. 
ἔτι δὲ (22) καχύποπτοί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἄπιστοι δὲ δι’ ἐμπειρίαν.  (23) καὶ οὔτε φιλοῦσιν σφόδρα οὔτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ (24) τὴν Βίαντος ὑποθήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦ(25)σιν ὡς φιλήσοντες. 
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Further, their experience makes them distrustful and therefore suspicious of evil.  Consequently they neither love warmly nor hate bitterly, but following the hint of Bias they love as though they will some day hate and hate as though they will some day love. 
καὶ μικρόψυχοι διὰ τὸ τεταπεινῶσθαι (26) ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου·  οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ ἀλλὰ τῶν (27) πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσι. 
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They are small—minded, because they have been humbled by life:  their desires are set upon nothing more exalted or unusual than what will help them to keep alive. 
καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἓν γάρ τι τῶν (28) ἀναγκαίων ἡ οὐσία, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἴσασιν ὡς (29) χαλεπὸν τὸ κτήσασθαι καὶ ῥᾴδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν. 
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They are not generous, because money is one of the things they must have, and at the same time their experience has taught them how hard it is to get and how easy to lose. 
καὶ δειλοὶ (30) καὶ πάντα προφοβητικοί·  ἐναντίως γὰρ διάκεινται τοῖς νέοις· (31) κατεψυγμένοι γάρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί, ὥστε προωδοπεποίηκε (32) τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ·  καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος κατάψυξίς τίς ἐστιν. 
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They are cowardly, and are always anticipating danger;  unlike that of the young, who are warm—blooded, their temperament is chilly; old age has paved the way for cowardice;  fear is, in fact, a form of chill. 
καὶ (33) φιλόζωοι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ (34) ἀπόντος εἶναι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὗ ἐνδεεῖς, τούτου (35) μάλιστα ἐπιθυμεῖν.  καὶ φίλαυτοι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ· μικροψυχία (36) γάρ τις καὶ αὕτη. 
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They love life; and all the more when their last day has come, because the object of all desire is something we have not got, and also because we desire most strongly that which we need most urgently.  They are too fond of themselves; this is one form that small—mindedness takes. 
καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς (37) τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοι εἶναι·  τὸ μὲν γὰρ (1390a1) συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς. 
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Because of this, they guide their lives too much by considerations of what is useful and too little by what is noble  —for the useful is what is good for oneself, and the noble what is good absolutely. 
καὶ ἀν(2)αίσχυντοι μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυντηλοί·  διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν (3) ὁμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι τοῦ δοκεῖν.  (4) καὶ δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν (τὰ γὰρ πλείω τῶν γιγνο(5)μένων φαῦλά ἐστιν· ἀποβαίνει γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον), (6) καὶ ἔτι διὰ τὴν δειλίαν.  καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ (7) ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γὰρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν ὀλίγον τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς (8) πολύ, ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡ δὲ μνήμη τῶν (9) παροιχομένων·  ὅπερ αἴτιον καὶ τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς· (10) διατελοῦσι γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα λέγοντες· ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι γὰρ (11) ἥδονται.  καὶ οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς μὲν ἀσθενεῖς δέ εἰσιν, καὶ αἱ ἐπι(12)θυμίαι αἱ μὲν ἐκλελοίπασιν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσιν, ὥστε οὔτ’ (13) ἐπιθυμητικοὶ οὔτε πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ (14) τὸ κέρδος· 
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They are not shy, but shameless rather;  caring less for what is noble than for what is useful, they feel contempt for what people may think of them.  They lack confidence in the future; partly through experience—for most things go wrong, or anyhow turn out worse than one expects; and partly because of their cowardice.  They live by memory rather than by hope; for what is left to them of life is but little as compared with the long past; and hope is of the future, memory of the past.  This, again, is the cause of their loquacity; they are continually talking of the past, because they enjoy remembering it.  Their fits of anger are sudden but feeble. Their sensual passions have either altogether gone or have lost their vigour: consequently they do not feel their passions much, and their actions are inspired less by what they do feel than by the love of gain. 
διὸ σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ τηλικοῦτοι· αἵ τε γὰρ (15) ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκασι καὶ δουλεύουσι τῷ κέρδει.  καὶ μᾶλλον (16) ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος·  ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς τοῦ (17) συμφέροντος τὸ δ’ ἦθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν.  καὶ τἀδικήματα (18) ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν. 
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Hence men at this time of life are often supposed to have a self—controlled character; the fact is that their passions have slackened, and they are slaves to the love of gain.  They guide their lives by reasoning more than by moral feeling;  reasoning being directed to utility and moral feeling to moral goodness.  If they wrong others, they mean to injure them, not to insult them. 
ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ (19) γέροντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ ταὐτὰ τοῖς νέοις·  οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ (20) φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι’ ἀσθένειαν·  πάντα γὰρ οἴονται ἐγγὺς (21) εἶναι αὑτοῖς παθεῖν, τοῦτο δ’ ἦν ἐλεητικόν·  ὅθεν ὀδυρτικοί (22) εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ (23) ὀδυρτικὸν τῷ φιλογέλωτι.  (24) τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἤθη τοιαῦτα,  (25) ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἤθει (26) λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους,  οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς χρώμενοι (27) τοῖς λόγοις τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι. 
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Old men may feel pity, as well as young men, but not for the same reason.  Young men feel it out of kindness; old men out of weakness,  imagining that anything that befalls any one else might easily happen to them, which, as we saw, is a thought that excites pity.  Hence they are querulous, and not disposed to jesting or laughter—the love of laughter being the very opposite of querulousness.  Such are the characters of Young Men and Elderly Men.  People always think well of speeches adapted to, and reflecting, their own character:  and we can now see how to compose our speeches so as to adapt both them and ourselves to our audiences. 
14. (28) Οἱ δ’ ἀκμάζοντες φανερὸν ὅτι μεταξὺ τούτων τὸ ἦθος ἔσον(29)ται ἑκατέρων, ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν ὑπερβολήν,  καὶ οὔτε σφόδρα (30) θαρροῦντες (θρασύτης γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον) οὔτε λίαν φοβούμενοι, (31) καλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντες,  οὔτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες οὔτε (32) πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς κρίνοντες μᾶλλον,  (33) καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον (1390b1) ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω, καὶ οὔτε πρὸς φειδὼ οὔτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν (2) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἁρμόττον,  ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ πρὸς (3) ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ σώφρονες μετ’ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι μετὰ (4) σωφροσύνης.  ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς γέρουσι διῄρηται (5) ταῦτα·  εἰσὶν γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ (6) πρεσβύτεροι σώφρονες καὶ δειλοί. 
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Part 14. As for Men in their Prime, clearly we shall find that they have a character between that of the young and that of the old, free from the extremes of either.  They have neither that excess of confidence which amounts to rashness, nor too much timidity, but the right amount of each.  They neither trust everybody nor distrust everybody, but judge people correctly.  Their lives will be guided not by the sole consideration either of what is noble or of what is useful, but by both; neither by parsimony nor by prodigality, but by what is fit and proper.  So, too, in regard to anger and desire; they will be brave as well as temperate, and temperate as well as brave;  these virtues are divided between the young and the old;  the young are brave but intemperate, the old temperate but cowardly. 
ὡς δὲ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, (7) ὅσα μὲν διῄρηνται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν ὠφελίμων, (8) ταῦτα ἄμφω ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπουσιν, (9) τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἁρμόττον.  ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα (10) ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐτῶν μέχρι τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, ἡ δὲ (11) ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἑνὸς δεῖν πεντήκοντα. 
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To put it generally, all the valuable qualities that youth and age divide between them are united in the prime of life, while all their excesses or defects are replaced by moderation and fitness.  The body is in its prime from thirty to five—and—thirty; the mind about forty—nine. 
(12) περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων ἠθῶν (13) ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα. 
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Part 15. So much for the types of character that distinguish youth, old age, and the prime of life. 
15. (14) Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνομένων ἀγαθῶν, δι’ ὅσα αὐτῶν (15) καὶ τὰ ἤθη ποιὰ ἄττα συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, λέγωμεν (16) ἐφεξῆς. 
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We will now turn to those Gifts of Fortune by which human character is affected. 
εὐγενείας μὲν οὖν ἦθός ἐστι τὸ φιλοτιμότερον εἶναι (17) τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτήν·  ἅπαντες γάρ, ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τι, πρὸς (18) τοῦτο σωρεύειν εἰώθασιν, ἡ δ’ εὐγένεια ἐντιμότης προγόνων (19) ἐστίν.  καὶ καταφρονητικὸν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐστὶν τοῖς προ(20)γόνοις αὑτῶν, διότι πόρρω ταὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐγγὺς γιγνόμενα (21) ἐντιμότερα καὶ εὐαλαζόνευτα.  ἔστι δὲ εὐγενὲς μὲν κατὰ τὴν (22) τοῦ γένους ἀρετήν, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς (23) φύσεως·  ὅπερ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς εὐγενέσιν, (24) ἀλλ’ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελεῖς·  φορὰ γὰρ τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς (25) γένεσιν ἀνδρῶν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γιγνομένοις, (26) καὶ ἐνίοτε ἂν ᾖ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνονται διά τινος χρόνου (27) ἄνδρες περιττοί, κἄπειτα πάλιν ἀναδίδωσιν.  ἐξίσταται δὲ (28) τὰ μὲν εὐφυᾶ γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἤθη,  οἷον οἱ ἀπ’ Ἀλκιβιά(29)δου καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου,  τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς (30) ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα,  οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος καὶ Περι(31)κλέους καὶ Σωκράτους. 
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First let us consider Good Birth. Its effect on character is to make those who have it more ambitious;  it is the way of all men who have something to start with to add to the pile, and good birth implies ancestral distinction.  The well—born man will look down even on those who are as good as his own ancestors, because any far—off distinction is greater than the same thing close to us, and better to boast about.  Being well—born, which means coming of a fine stock, must be distinguished from nobility, which means being true to the family nature  —a quality not usually found in the well—born, most of whom are poor creatures.  In the generations of men as in the fruits of the earth, there is a varying yield; now and then, where the stock is good, exceptional men are produced for a while, and then decadence sets in.  A clever stock will degenerate towards the insane type of character,  like the descendants of Alcibiades or of the elder Dionysius;  a steady stock towards the fatuous and torpid type,  like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates. 
16. (32) Τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἃ ἕπεται ἤθη, ἐπιπολῆς ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἅπασιν·  (33) ὑβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως (34) τοῦ πλούτου (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχοντες ἅπαντα τἀγαθὰ οὕτω διά (1391a1) κεινται·  ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος οἷον τιμή τις τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἄλλων, διὸ (2) φαίνεται ὤνια ἅπαντα εἶναι αὐτοῦ),  καὶ τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλά(3)κωνες,  τρυφεροὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς (4) εὐδαιμονίας,  σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι διὰ τὸ πάντας εἰωθέ(5)ναι διατρίβειν περὶ τὸ ἐρώμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. (6) καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ζηλοῦν τοὺς ἄλλους ἃ καὶ αὐτοί. 
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Part 16. The type of character produced by Wealth lies on the surface for all to see.  Wealthy men are insolent and arrogant; their possession of wealth affects their understanding; they feel as if they had every good thing that exists;  wealth becomes a sort of standard of value for everything else, and therefore they imagine there is nothing it cannot buy.  They are luxurious and ostentatious;  luxurious, because of the luxury in which they live and the prosperity which they display;  ostentatious and vulgar, because, like other people’s, their minds are regularly occupied with the object of their love and admiration, and also because they think that other people’s idea of happiness is the same as their own. 
ἅμα δὲ καὶ (7) εἰκότως τοῦτο πάσχουσιν(πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ δεόμενοι τῶν (8) ἐχόντων·  ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ (9) πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἱέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον (10) γενέσθαι κρεῖττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν·  “πλούσιον” εἰπεῖν· τοὺς (11) σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις δια(12)τρίβοντας), καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀξίους εἶναι ἄρχειν·  ἔχειν γὰρ (13) οἴονται ὧν ἕνεκεν ἄρχειν ἄξιον.  καὶ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, ἀνοήτου (14) εὐδαίμονος ἦθος <ἦθος> πλούτου ἐστίν.  διαφέρει δὲ τοῖς (15) νεωστὶ κεκτημένοις καὶ τοῖς πάλαι τὰ ἤθη τῷ ἅπαντα μᾶλλον (16) καὶ φαυλότερα τὰ κακὰ ἔχειν τοὺς νεοπλούτους (ὥσπερ γὰρ (17) ἀπαιδευσία πλούτου ἐστὶ τὸ νεόπλουτον εἶναι),  καὶ ἀδικήματα (18) ἀδικοῦσιν οὐ κακουργικά, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὑβριστικὰ τὰ δὲ ἀκρα(19)τευτικά, οἷον εἰς αἰκίαν καὶ μοιχείαν. 
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It is indeed quite natural that they should be affected thus; for if you have money, there are always plenty of people who come begging from you.  Hence the saying of Simonides about wise men and rich men, in answer to Hiero’s wife, who asked him whether it was better to grow rich or wise.  ’Why, rich,’ he said; ‘for I see the wise men spending their days at the rich men’s doors.’ Rich men also consider themselves worthy to hold public office;  for they consider they already have the things that give a claim to office.  In a word, the type of character produced by wealth is that of a prosperous fool.  There is indeed one difference between the type of the newly—enriched and those who have long been rich: the newly—enriched have all the bad qualities mentioned in an exaggerated and worse form——to be newly—enriched means, so to speak, no education in riches.  The wrongs they do others are not meant to injure their victims, but spring from insolence or self—indulgence, e.g. those that end in assault or in adultery. 
17. (20) Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα φανερά (21) ἐστιν ἤθη. 
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Part 17. As to Power: here too it may fairly be said that the type of character it produces is mostly obvious enough. 
τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει δύναμις τῷ πλούτῳ (22) τὰ δὲ βελτίω·  φιλοτιμότεροι γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρωδέστεροί εἰσιν τὰ (23) ἤθη οἱ δυνάμενοι τῶν πλουσίων διὰ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἔργων ὅσα (24) ἐξουσία αὐτοῖς πράττειν διὰ τὴν δύναμιν,  καὶ σπουδαστικώ(25)τεροι διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶναι, ἀναγκαζόμενοι σκοπεῖν τὰ (26) περὶ τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ σεμνότεροι ἢ βαρύτεροι·  ποιεῖ γὰρ σε(27)μνοτέρους τὸ ἀξίωμα, διὸ μετριάζουσιν,  ἔστι δὲ ἡ σεμνότης (28) μαλακὴ καὶ εὐσχήμων βαρύτης·  κἂν ἀδικῶσιν, οὐ μικρα(29)δικηταί εἰσιν ἀλλὰ μεγαλάδικοι. 
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Some elements in this type it shares with the wealthy type, others are better.  Those in power are more ambitious and more manly in character than the wealthy, because they aspire to do the great deeds that their power permits them to do.  Responsibility makes them more serious: they have to keep paying attention to the duties their position involves.  They are dignified rather than arrogant, for the respect in which they are held inspires them with dignity and therefore with moderation  —dignity being a mild and becoming form of arrogance.  If they wrong others, they wrong them not on a small but on a great scale. 
(30) ἡ δ’ εὐτυχία κατὰ μόριά τε τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχει τὰ ἤθη (31)  (εἰς γὰρ ταῦτα συντείνουσιν αἱ μέγισται δοκοῦσαι εἶναι εὐτυ(32)χίαι),  καὶ ἔτι εἰς εὐτεκνίαν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθὰ παρα(33)σκευάζει ἡ εὐτυχία πλεονεκτεῖν.  ὑπερηφανώτεροι μὲν οὖν καὶ (1391b1) ἀλογιστότεροι διὰ τὴν εὐτυχίαν εἰσίν,  ἓν δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ βέλτι(2)στον ἦθος τῇ εὐτυχίᾳ,  ὅτι φιλόθεοί εἰσι καὶ ἔχουσιν πρὸς τὸ (3) θεῖόν πως, πιστεύοντες διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης.  (4) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν καθ’ ἡλικίαν καὶ τύχην ἠθῶν εἴρηται·  τὰ (5) γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φανερά ἐστιν, (6) οἷον πένητος καὶ ἀτυχοῦς ἦθος καὶ ἀδυνάτου. 
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Good fortune in certain of its branches produces the types of character belonging to the conditions just described,  since these conditions are in fact more or less the kinds of good fortune that are regarded as most important.  It may be added that good fortune leads us to gain all we can in the way of family happiness and bodily advantages.  It does indeed make men more supercilious and more reckless;  but there is one excellent quality that goes with it  —piety, and respect for the divine power, in which they believe because of events which are really the result of chance.  This account of the types of character that correspond to differences of age or fortune may end here;  for to arrive at the opposite types to those described, namely, those of the poor, the unfortunate, and the powerless, we have only to ask what the opposite qualities are. 
18. (7) Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν πιθανῶν λόγων χρῆσις πρὸς κρίσιν ἐστί  (περὶ (8) ὧν γὰρ ἴσμεν καὶ κεκρίκαμεν οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ λόγου),  ἔστι δ’ ἐάν (9) τε πρὸς ἕνα τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος προτρέπῃ ἢ ἀποτρέπῃ,  (10) οἷον οἱ νουθετοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες  (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον (11) κριτὴς ὁ εἷς· ὃν γὰρ δεῖ πεῖσαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἁπλῶς (12) κριτής),  ἐάν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάν τε πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν (13) λέγῃ τις,  ὁμοίως (τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖν (14) τὰ ἐναντία, πρὸς ἃ ὥσπερ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται),  (15) ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς  (ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν (16) τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν,  ὅλως δὲ μόνος ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς (17) κριτὴς ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὁ τὰ ζητούμενα κρίνων·  τά (18) τε γὰρ ἀμφισβητούμενα ζητεῖται πῶς ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ὧν βου(19)λεύονται),  περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ἠθῶν ἐν τοῖς συμ(20)βουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον  —ὥστε διωρισμένον ἂν εἴη πῶς (21) τε καὶ διὰ τίνων τοὺς λόγους ἠθικοὺς ποιητέον. 
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Part 18. The use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions.  (When we know a thing, and have decided about it, there is no further use in speaking about it.)  This is so even if one is addressing a single person and urging him to do or not to do something,  as when we scold a man for his conduct or try to change his views:  the single person is as much your ‘judge’ as if he were one of many; we may say, without qualification, that any one is your judge whom you have to persuade.  Nor does it matter whether we are arguing against an actual opponent or against a mere proposition;  in the latter case we still have to use speech and overthrow the opposing arguments, and we attack these as we should attack an actual opponent.  Our principle holds good of ceremonial speeches also;  the ‘onlookers’ for whom such a speech is put together are treated as the judges of it.  Broadly speaking, however, the only sort of person who can strictly be called a judge is the man who decides the issue in some matter of public controversy;  that is, in law suits and in political debates, in both of which there are issues to be decided.  In the section on political oratory an account has already been given of the types of character that mark the different constitutions.  The manner and means of investing speeches with moral character may now be regarded as fully set forth. 
(22) ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον μὲν γένος τῶν λόγων ἕτερον ἦν τὸ (23) τέλος,  περὶ ἁπάντων δ’ αὐτῶν εἰλημμέναι δόξαι καὶ προτά(24)σεις εἰσὶν ἐξ ὧν τὰς πίστεις φέρουσιν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ (25) ἐπιδεικνύμενοι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες,  ἔτι δὲ ἐξ ὧν ἠθικοὺς (26) τοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων διώρισται,  (27) λοιπὸν ἡμῖν διελθεῖν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν. 
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Each of the main divisions of oratory has, we have seen, its own distinct purpose.  With regard to each division, we have noted the accepted views and propositions upon which we may base our arguments—for political, for ceremonial, and for forensic speaking.  We have further determined completely by what means speeches may be invested with the required moral character.  We are now to proceed to discuss the arguments common to all oratory. 
πᾶσι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον (28) τῷ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου προσχρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις,  (29) καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἔσται τοὺς δὲ ὡς γέγονε πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι. 
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All orators, besides their special lines of argument, are bound to use, for instance, the topic of the Possible and Impossible;  and to try to show that a thing has happened, or will happen in future. 
(30) ἔτι δὲ <τὸ> περὶ μεγέθους κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων·  (31) χρῶνται γὰρ πάντες τῷ μειοῦν καὶ αὔξειν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες (32) καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἢ ἀπολογού (1392a1) μενοι. 
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Again, the topic of Size is common to all oratory;  all of us have to argue that things are bigger or smaller than they seem, whether we are making political speeches, speeches of eulogy or attack, or prosecuting or defending in the law—courts. 
τούτων δὲ διορισθέντων περὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων κοινῇ (2) πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι ἔχομεν, καὶ περὶ παραδειγμάτων,  (3) ὅπως τὰ λοιπὰ προσθέντες ἀποδῶμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρό(4)θεσιν. 
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Having analysed these subjects, we will try to say what we can about the general principles of arguing by ‘enthymeme’ and ‘example’,  by the addition of which we may hope to complete the project with which we set out. 
ἔστιν δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ μὲν αὔξειν οἰκειότατον τοῖς (5) ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται,  τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς τοῖς δικανικοῖς (6) (περὶ τούτων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις),  τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐσόμενον τοῖς (7) συμβουλευτικοῖς. 
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Of the above—mentioned general lines of argument, that concerned with Amplification is—as has been already said—most appropriate to ceremonial speeches;  that concerned with the Past, to forensic speeches, where the required decision is always about the past;  that concerned with Possibility and the Future, to political speeches. 
19. (8) Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου λέγωμεν. 
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Part 19. Let us first speak of the Possible and Impossible. 
ἂν (9) δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾖ δυνατὸν ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον (10) δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι δυνατόν,  οἷον εἰ δυνατὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑγιασθῆ(11)ναι, καὶ νοσῆσαι·  ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων ᾗ ἐναν(12)τία. 
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It may plausibly be argued: That if it is possible for one of a pair of contraries to be or happen, then it is possible for the other:  e.g. if a man can be cured, he can also fall ill;  for any two contraries are equally possible, in so far as they are contraries. 
καὶ εἰ τὸ ὅμοιον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον·  καὶ εἰ τὸ χαλε(13)πώτερον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ῥᾷον·  καὶ εἰ τὸ σπουδαῖον καὶ καλὸν (14) γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ ὅλως δυνατὸν γενέσθαι·  χαλεπώτερον (15) γὰρ καλὴν οἰκίαν ἢ οἰκίαν εἶναι.  καὶ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ δύναται γενέ(16)σθαι, καὶ τὸ τέλος·  οὐδὲν γὰρ γίγνεται οὐδ’ ἄρχεται γίγνεσθαι (17) τῶν ἀδυνάτων,  οἷον τὸ σύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι οὔτ’ ἂν (18) ἄρξαιτο γίγνεσθαι οὔτε γίγνεται.  καὶ οὗ τὸ τέλος, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ (19) δυνατή·  ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνεται. 
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That if of two similar things one is possible, so is the other.  That if the harder of two things is possible, so is the easier.  That if a thing can come into existence in a good and beautiful form, then it can come into existence generally;  thus a house can exist more easily than a beautiful house.  That if the beginning of a thing can occur, so can the end;  for nothing impossible occurs or begins to occur;  thus the commensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side neither occurs nor can begin to occur.  That if the end is possible, so is the beginning;  for all things that occur have a beginning. 
καὶ εἰ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ (20) οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῇ γενέσει δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον,  οἷον (21) εἰ ἄνδρα γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ παῖδα (πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο (22) γίγνεται), καὶ εἰ παῖδα, καὶ ἄνδρα (καὶ ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐκείνη).  καὶ (23) ὧν ἢ ἔρως ἢ ἐπιθυμία φύσει ἐστίν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀδυνάτων ἐρᾷ (24) οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.  καὶ ὧν ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ (25) τέχναι, δυνατὸν ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι.  καὶ ὅσων ἡ (26) ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἃ ἡμεῖς ἀναγκάσαιμεν ἂν (27) ἢ πείσαιμεν· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὧν κρείττους ἢ κύριοι ἢ φίλοι.  καὶ (28) ὧν τὰ μέρη δυνατά, καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ ὧν τὸ ὅλον δυνατόν, καὶ (29) τὰ μέρη ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ·  εἰ γὰρ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλὶς καὶ (30) χιτὼν δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ ὑποδήματα δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ (31) εἰ ὑποδήματα, καὶ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλίς καὶ χιτών.  καὶ εἰ τὸ (1392b1) γένος ὅλον τῶν δυνατῶν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ (2) τὸ γένος,  οἷον εἰ πλοῖον γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ τριήρη, καὶ (3) εἰ τριήρη, καὶ πλοῖον.  καὶ εἰ θάτερον τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα πεφυ(4)κότων, καὶ θάτερον,  οἷον εἰ διπλάσιον, καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ εἰ (5) ἥμισυ, διπλάσιον.  καὶ εἰ ἄνευ τέχνης καὶ παρασκευῆς δυνα(6)τὸν γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον διὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας δυνατόν, 
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That if that which is posterior in essence or in order of generation can come into being, so can that which is prior:  thus if a man can come into being, so can a boy, since the boy comes first in order of generation; and if a boy can, so can a man, for the man also is first.  That those things are possible of which the love or desire is natural; for no one, as a rule, loves or desires impossibilities.  That things which are the object of any kind of science or art are possible and exist or come into existence.  That anything is possible the first step in whose production depends on men or things which we can compel or persuade to produce it, by our greater strength, our control of them, or our friendship with them.  That where the parts are possible, the whole is possible; and where the whole is possible, the parts are usually possible.  For if the slit in front, the toe—piece, and the upper leather can be made, then shoes can be made; and if shoes, then also the front slit and toe—piece.  That if a whole genus is a thing that can occur, so can the species; and if the species can occur, so can the genus:  thus, if a sailing vessel can be made, so also can a trireme; and if a trireme, then a sailing vessel also.  That if one of two things whose existence depends on each other is possible, so is the other; for instance,  if ‘double’, then ‘half’, and if ‘half’, then ‘double’.  That if a thing can be produced without art or preparation, it can be produced still more certainly by the careful application of art to it. 
ὅθεν (7) καὶ Ἀγάθωνι εἴρηται (8)
καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε τῆς τέχνης πράσσειν,
τὰ δὲ (9) ἡμῖν ἀνάγκῃ καὶ τύχῃ προσγίγνεται.
  (10) καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἥττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις δυνατόν, καὶ (11) τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον,  ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἴναι (12) εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὔθυνος ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὑρεῖν.  περὶ (13) δὲ ἀδυνάτου δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις (14) ὑπάρχει.  (15) εἰ δὲ γέγονεν, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.  πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, εἰ τὸ (16) ἧττον γίγνεσθαι πεφυκὸς γέγονεν, γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μᾶλ(17)λον.  καὶ εἰ τὸ ὕστερον εἰωθὸς γίγνεσθαι γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρό(18)τερον γέγονεν,  οἷον εἰ ἐπιλέλησται, καὶ ἔμαθέ ποτε τοῦτο.  (19) καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο, πέπραχε·  πάντες γάρ, ὅταν (20) δυνάμενοι βουληθῶσι, πράττουσιν· ἐμποδὼν γὰρ οὐδέν. 
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Hence Agathon has said: To some things we by art must needs attain, Others by destiny or luck we gain.  That if anything is possible to inferior, weaker, and stupider people, it is more so for their opposites;  thus Isocrates said that it would be a strange thing if he could not discover a thing that Euthynus had found out.  As for Impossibility, we can clearly get what we want by taking the contraries of the arguments stated above.  Questions of Past Fact may be looked at in the following ways:  First, that if the less likely of two things has occurred, the more likely must have occurred also.  That if one thing that usually follows another has happened, then that other thing has happened;  that, for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, he has also once learnt it.  That if a man had the power and the wish to do a thing, he has done it;  for every one does do whatever he intends to do whenever he can do it, there being nothing to stop him. 
ἔτι (21) εἰ ἐβούλετο καὶ μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω ἐκώλυεν, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ (22) ὠργίζετο, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐπεθύμει·  ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (23) ὧν ὀρέγονται, ἂν δύνωνται, ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι δι’ ἀκρα(24)σίαν, οἱ δ’ ἐπιεικεῖς ὅτι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.  καὶ εἰ (25) ἔμελλε [γίγνεσθαι], καὶ ποιεῖν· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ (26) ποιῆσαι.  καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ὅσα ἢ πέφυκε πρὸ ἐκείνου ἢ ἕνεκα (27) ἐκείνου,  οἷον εἰ ἤστραψε, καὶ ἐβρόντησεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπείρασε, (28) καὶ ἔπραξεν.  καὶ εἰ ὅσα ὕστερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ οὗ (29) ἕνεκα γίγνεται γέγονε, καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ τούτου ἕνεκα (30) γέγονεν,  οἷον εἰ ἐβρόντησε, καὶ ἤστραψεν, καὶ εἰ ἔπραξεν, (31) ἐπείρασεν.  ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ (32) δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντα.  περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι (33) φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις.  (1393a1) καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον·  τό τε γὰρ ἐν (2) δυνάμει καὶ ἐν βουλήσει ὂν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ (3) ὀργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ὄντα,  ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ὁρμῇ τοῦ (4) ποιεῖν ἢ μελλήσει ἔσται·  ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται μᾶλλον (5) τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ τὰ μὴ μέλλοντα.  καὶ εἰ προγέγονε ὅσα πρό(6)τερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι,  οἷον εἰ συννεφεῖ, εἰκὸς ὗσαι.  καὶ εἰ τὸ (7) ἕνεκα τούτου γέγονε, καὶ τοῦτο εἰκὸς γενέσθαι,  οἷον εἰ θεμέ(8)λιος, καὶ οἰκία.  (9) περὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μεί(10)ζονός τε καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ ὅλως μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν (11) προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐστιν φανερόν.  εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμ(12)βουλευτικοῖς περί τε μεγέθους ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος (13) ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλάττονος,  ὥστε ἐπεὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ (14) προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν,  οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ (15) καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι δι’ ἐκείνων ληπτέον τὰς (16) αὐξήσεις πᾶσιν.  τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔτι ζητεῖν περὶ μεγέθους (17) ἁπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κενολογεῖν ἐστιν·  κυριώτερα γάρ ἐστιν (18) πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τῶν καθόλου τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα τῶν πρα(19)γμάτων. 
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That, further, he has done the thing in question either if he intended it and nothing external prevented him; or if he had the power to do it and was angry at the time; or if he had the power to do it and his heart was set upon it  —for people as a rule do what they long to do, if they can; bad people through lack of self—control; good people, because their hearts are set upon good things.  Again, that if a thing was ‘going to happen’, it has happened; if a man was ‘going to do something’, he has done it, for it is likely that the intention was carried out.  That if one thing has happened which naturally happens before another or with a view to it, the other has happened;  for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if an action has been attempted, it has been done.  That if one thing has happened which naturally happens after another, or with a view to which that other happens, then that other (that which happens first, or happens with a view to this thing) has also happened;  thus, if it has thundered it has lightened, and if an action has been done it has been attempted.  Of all these sequences some are inevitable and some merely usual.  The arguments for the non—occurrence of anything can obviously be found by considering the opposites of those that have been mentioned.  How questions of Future Fact should be argued is clear from the same considerations:  That a thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it; or if along with the power to do it there is a craving for the result, or anger, or calculation, prompting it.  That the thing will be done, in these cases, if the man is actually setting about it, or even if he means to do it later  —for usually what we mean to do happens rather than what we do not mean to do.  That a thing will happen if another thing which naturally happens before it has already happened;  thus, if it is clouding over, it is likely to rain.  That if the means to an end have occurred, then the end is likely to occur;  thus, if there is a foundation, there will be a house.  For arguments about the Greatness and Smallness of things, the greater and the lesser, and generally great things and small, what we have already said will show the line to take.  In discussing deliberative oratory we have spoken about the relative greatness of various goods, and about the greater and lesser in general.  Since therefore in each type oratory the object under discussion is some kind of good  —whether it is utility, nobleness, or justice—it is clear that every orator must obtain the materials of amplification through these channels.  To go further than this, and try to establish abstract laws of greatness and superiority, is to argue without an object;  in practical life, particular facts count more than generalizations. 
(20) περὶ μὲν οὖν δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ πότερον γέγονεν (21) ἢ οὐ γέγονεν καὶ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ (22) μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων, εἰρήσθω ταῦτα. 
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Enough has now been said about these questions of possibility and the reverse, of past or future fact, and of the relative greatness or smallness of things. 
20. (23) Λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πίστεων ἅπασιν εἰπεῖν, ἐπείπερ (24) εἴρηται περὶ τῶν ἰδίων.  εἰσὶ δ’ αἱ κοιναὶ πίστεις δύο τῷ γένει, (25) παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα·  ἡ γὰρ γνώμη μέρος ἐνθυμήματός (26) ἐστιν. 
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Part 20. The special forms of oratorical argument having now been discussed, we have next to treat of those which are common to all kinds of oratory.  These are of two main kinds, ‘Example’ and ‘Enthymeme’;  for the ‘Maxim’ is part of an enthymeme. 
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν· ὅμοιον (27) γὰρ ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ παράδειγμα, ἡ δ’ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή.  (28) παραδειγμάτων δὲ εἴδη δύο·  ἓν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν παραδείγμα(29)τος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγενομένα, ἓν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν (30) ποιεῖν.  τούτου δὲ ἓν μὲν παραβολὴ ἓν δὲ λόγοι, οἷον οἱ Αἰσώ(31)πειοι καὶ Λιβυκοί. 
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We will first treat of argument by Example, for it has the nature of induction, which is the foundation of reasoning.  This form of argument has two varieties;  one consisting in the mention of actual past facts, the other in the invention of facts by the speaker.  Of the latter, again, there are two varieties, the illustrative parallel and the fable (e.g. the fables of Aesop, those from Libya). 
ἔστιν δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν τοιόνδε (32) τι,  ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς βασιλέα παρασκευάζεσθαι (33) καὶ μὴ ἐᾶν Αἴγυπτον χειρώσασθαι·  καὶ γὰρ πρότερον Δαρεῖος (1393b1) οὐ πρότερον διέβη πρὶν Αἴγυπτον ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη,  καὶ (2) πάλιν Ξέρξης οὐ πρότερον ἐπεχείρησεν πρὶν ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν (3) δὲ διέβη, ὥστε καὶ οὗτος ἐὰν λάβῃ, διαβήσεται, διὸ οὐκ ἐπι(4)τρεπτέον. 
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As an instance of the mention of actual facts, take the following.  The speaker may argue thus: ‘We must prepare for war against the king of Persia and not let him subdue Egypt.  For Darius of old did not cross the Aegean until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross.  And Xerxes, again, did not attack us until he had seized Egypt; but once he had seized it, he did cross. If therefore the present king seizes Egypt, he also will cross, and therefore we must not let him.’ 
παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι οὐ (5) δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν·  ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοὺς (6) ἀθλητὰς κληροίη μὴ οἳ δύνανται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλ’ οἳ ἂν (7) λάχωσιν, ἢ τῶν πλωτήρων ὅντινα δεῖ κυβερνᾶν κληρώσειεν, (8) ὡς δέον τὸν λαχόντα ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον.  λόγος δέ, οἷος (9) ὁ Στησιχόρου περὶ Φαλάριδος καὶ <ὁ> Αἰσώπου ὑπὲρ τοῦ δημα(10)γωγοῦ.  Στησίχορος μὲν γὰρ ἑλομένων στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα (11) τῶν Ἱμεραίων Φάλαριν καὶ μελλόντων φυλακὴν διδόναι τοῦ (12) σώματος, τἆλλα διαλεχθεὶς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς λόγον ὡς ἵππος (13) κατεῖχε λειμῶνα μόνος,  ἐλθόντος δ’ ἐλάφου καὶ διαφθείροντος (14) τὴν νομὴν βουλόμενος τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον ἠρώτα τινὰ (15) ἄνθρωπον εἰ δύναιτ’ ἂν μετ’ αὐτοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον,  (16) ὁ δ’ ἔφησεν, ἐὰν λάβῃ χαλινὸν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβῇ ἐπ’ αὐτὸν (17) ἔχων ἀκόντια·  συνομολογήσας δὲ καὶ ἀναβάντος ἀντὶ τοῦ (18) τιμωρήσασθαι αὐτὸς ἐδούλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.  “οὕτω δὲ καὶ (19) ὑμεῖς”, ἔφη, “ὁρᾶτε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρή(20)σασθαι τὸ αὐτὸ πάθητε τῷ ἵππῳ·  τὸν μὲν γὰρ χαλινὸν ἔχετε (21) ἤδη, ἑλόμενοι στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα·  ἑὰν δὲ φυλακὴν δῶτε (22) καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐάσητε, δουλεύσετε ἤδη Φαλάριδι”.  Αἴσωπος δὲ (23) ἐν Σάμῳ δημηγορῶν κρινομένου δημαγωγοῦ περὶ θανάτου ἔφη  (24) ἀλώπεκα διαβαίνουσαν ποταμὸν ἀπωσθῆναι εἰς φάραγγα,  οὐ (25) δυναμένην δὲ ἐκβῆναι πολὺν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν καὶ κυνοραι(26)στὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς,  ἐχῖνον δὲ πλανώμενον, ὡς εἶδεν (27) αὐτήν, κατοικτείραντα ἐρωτᾶν εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτῆς τοὺς κυνοραι(28)στάς, τὴν δὲ οὐκ ἐᾶν·  ἐρομένου δὲ διὰ τί, “ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν” φάναι (29) “ἤδη μου πλήρεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὀλίγον ἕλκουσιν αἷμα, ἐὰν δὲ τούτους (30) ἀφέλητε, ἕτεροι ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες ἐκπιοῦνταί μου τὸ λοιπὸν (31) αἷμα”.  “ἀτὰρ καὶ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Σάμιοι, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτι (32) βλάψει (πλούσιος γάρ ἐστιν),  ἐὰν δὲ τοῦτον ἀποκτείνητε, ἕτεροι (1394a1) ἥξουσι πένητες, οἳ ὑμᾶς ἀναλώσουσι τὰ λοιπὰ κλέπτοντες.” (2)  εἰσὶ δ’ οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, (3) ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπόν, λόγους (4) δὲ ῥᾷον·  ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἄν τις (5) δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὁρᾶν, ὅπερ ῥᾷόν ἐστιν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας. 
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The illustrative parallel is the sort of argument Socrates used: e.g. ’Public officials ought not to be selected by lot.  That is like using the lot to select athletes, instead of choosing those who are fit for the contest; or using the lot to select a steersman from among a ship’s crew, as if we ought to take the man on whom the lot falls, and not the man who knows most about it.’  Instances of the fable are that of Stesichorus about Phalaris, and that of Aesop in defence of the popular leader.  When the people of Himera had made Phalaris military dictator, and were going to give him a bodyguard, Stesichorus wound up a long talk by telling them the fable of the horse who had a field all to himself.  Presently there came a stag and began to spoil his pasturage. The horse, wishing to revenge himself on the stag, asked a man if he could help him to do so.  The man said, ‘Yes, if you will let me bridle you and get on to your back with javelins in my hand’.  The horse agreed, and the man mounted; but instead of getting his revenge on the stag, the horse found himself the slave of the man.  ’You too’, said Stesichorus, ‘take care lest your desire for revenge on your enemies, you meet the same fate as the horse.  By making Phalaris military dictator, you have already let yourselves be bridled.  If you let him get on to your backs by giving him a bodyguard, from that moment you will be his slaves.’  Aesop, defending before the assembly at Samos a poular leader who was being tried for his life, told this story:  A fox, in crossing a river, was swept into a hole in the rocks;  and, not being able to get out, suffered miseries for a long time through the swarms of fleas that fastened on her.  A hedgehog, while roaming around, noticed the fox; and feeling sorry for her asked if he might remove the fleas. But the fox declined the offer;  and when the hedgehog asked why, she replied, ‘These fleas are by this time full of me and not sucking much blood; if you take them away, others will come with fresh appetites and drink up all the blood I have left.’  ‘So, men of Samos’, said Aesop, ‘my client will do you no further harm; he is wealthy already.  But if you put him to death, others will come along who are not rich, and their peculations will empty your treasury completely.’  Fables are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies; and they have one advantage—they are comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past events.  You will in fact frame them just as you frame illustrative parallels: all you require is the power of thinking out your analogy, a power developed by intellectual training. 
ῥᾴω (6) μὲν οὖν πορίσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν λόγων, χρησιμώτερα δὲ πρὸς (7) τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων· ὅμοια γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (8) πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς γεγονόσιν.  (9) δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παραδείγμασι οὐκ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐν(10)θυμήματα ὡς ἀποδείξεσιν (ἡ γὰρ πίστις διὰ τούτων),  ἔχοντα (11) δὲ ὡς μαρτυρίοις, ἐπιλόγῳ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν·  προ(12)τιθέμενα μὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἐπαγωγῇ, τοῖς δὲ ῥητορικοῖς οὐκ (13) οἰκεῖον ἐπαγωγὴ πλὴν ἐν ὀλίγοις,  ἐπιλεγόμενα δὲ μαρτυρίοις, (14) ὁ δὲ μάρτυς πανταχοῦ πιθανός·  διὸ καὶ προτιθέντι μὲν ἀνάγκη (15) πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐπιλέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἓν ἱκανόν·  μάρτυς γὰρ χρηστὸς (16) καὶ εἷς χρήσιμος. 
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But while it is easier to supply parallels by inventing fables, it is more valuable for the political speaker to supply them by quoting what has actually happened, since in most respects the future will be like what the past has been.  Where we are unable to argue by Enthymeme, we must try to demonstrate our point by this method of Example, and to convince our hearers thereby.  If we can argue by Enthymeme, we should use our Examples as subsequent supplementary evidence.  They should not precede the Enthymemes: that will give the argument an inductive air, which only rarely suits the conditions of speech—making.  If they follow the enthymemes, they have the effect of witnesses giving evidence, and this alway tells.  For the same reason, if you put your examples first you must give a large number of them; if you put them last, a single one is sufficient;  even a single witness will serve if he is a good one. 
(17) πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη παραδειγμάτων, καὶ πῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ πότε (18) χρηστέον, εἴρηται. 
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It has now been stated how many varieties of argument by Example there are, and how and when they are to be employed. 
21. (19) Περὶ δὲ γνωμολογίας, ῥηθέντος τί ἐστιν γνώμη μάλιστ’ ἂν (20) γένοιτο φανερὸν περὶ ποίων τε καὶ πότε καὶ τίσιν ἁρμόττει (21) χρῆσθαι τῷ γνωμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. 
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Part 21. We now turn to the use of Maxims, in order to see upon what subjects and occasions, and for what kind of speaker, they will appropriately form part of a speech. This will appear most clearly when we have defined a maxim. 
ἔστι δὴ γνώμη (22) ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον,  οἷον ποῖός (23) τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου, οὔτε περὶ πάντων,  οἷον ὅτι τὸ (24) εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, (25) καὶ <ἃ> αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν,  ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ (26) ἐνθύμημα ὁ περὶ τοιούτων συλλογισμός ἐστιν,  σχεδὸν τὰ (27) συμπεράσματα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντος (28) τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γνῶμαί εἰσιν,  οἷον (29)
χρὴ δ’ οὔ ποθ’ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ’ ἀνήρ (30)
παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.
  (30) τοῦτο μὲν οὖν γνώμη· προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ (31) τί ἐνθύμημά ἐστιν τὸ ἅπαν, οἷον  (32)
χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἧς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας,
(33)φθόνον παρ’ ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ,
  (1394b1) καὶ τὸ
οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις πάντ’ ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ,
  (2) καὶ τὸ (3)
οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὅστις ἔστ’ ἐλεύθερος
(4) γνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἐχομένῳ ἐνθύμημα,
(5) ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστιν ἢ τύχης.
  (6) εἰ δή ἐστιν γνώμη τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀνάγκη τέτταρα εἴδη εἶναι (7) γνώμης·  ἢ γὰρ μετ’ ἐπιλόγου ἔσται ἢ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου. 
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It is a statement; not a particular fact,  such as the character of Iphicrates, but of a general kind; nor is it about any and every subject  —e.g. ’straight is the contrary of curved’ is not a maxim——but only about questions of practical conduct, courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided.  Now an Enthymeme is a syllogism dealing with such practical subjects.  It is therefore roughly true that the premisses or conclusions of Enthymemes, considered apart from the rest of the argument, are Maxims:  e.g.
Never should any man whose wits are sound
Have his sons taught more wisdom than their fellows.
  Here we have a Maxim; add the reason or explanation, and the whole thing is an Enthymeme; thus—  It makes them idle; and therewith they earn
Ill—will and jealousy throughout the city.  Again,
There is no man in all things prosperous,
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There is no man among us all is free,
are maxims; but the latter, taken with what follows it, is an Enthymeme—
For all are slaves of money or of chance.
  From this definition of a maxim it follows that there are four kinds of maxims.  In the first Place, the maxim may or may not have a supplement. 
ἀπο(8)δείξεως μὲν οὖν δεόμεναί εἰσιν ὅσαι παράδοξόν τι λέγουσιν (9) ἢ ἀμφισβητούμενον·  ὅσαι δὲ μηδὲν παράδοξον, ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου.  (10) τούτων δ’ ἀνάγκη τὰς μὲν διὰ τὸ προεγνῶσθαι μηδὲν δεῖσθαι (11) ἐπιλόγου,  οἷον
(12) ἀνδρὶ δ’ ὑγιαίνειν ἄριστόν ἐστιν,
ὥς γ’ ἐμὶν δοκεῖ (13) (φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτω),  τὰς δ’ ἅμα λεγομένας (14) δήλας εἶναι ἐπιβλέψασιν,  οἷον
(15) οὐδεὶς ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ.
 
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Proof is needed where the statement is paradoxical or disputable;  no supplement is wanted where the statement contains nothing paradoxical,  either because the view expressed is already a known truth,  e.g. Chiefest of blessings is health for a man, as it seemeth to me,
this being the general opinion:  or because, as soon as the view is stated, it is clear at a glance,  e.g. No love is true save that which loves for ever. 
(16) τῶν δὲ μετ’ ἐπιλόγου αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος εἰσίν,  (17) ὥσπερ
(18) χρὴ δ’ οὔ ποθ’ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων,
  (19) αἱ δ’ ἐνθυμηματικαὶ μέν, οὐκ ἐνθυμήματος δὲ μέρος·  αἵπερ (20) καὶ μάλιστ’ εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. εἰσὶν δ’ αὗται ἐν ὅσαις ἐμφαίνεται (21) τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ αἴτιον,  οἷον ἐν τῷ
(22) ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φύλασσε θνητὸς ὤν·
  (23) τὸ μὲν γὰρ φάναι “μὴ δεῖν φυλάττειν” γνώμη, τὸ δὲ προσ(24)κείμενον “θνητὸν ὄντα” τὸ διὰ τί. 
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Of the Maxims that do have a supplement attached, some are part of an Enthymeme,  e.g. Never should any man whose wits are sound, &c.  Others have the essential character of Enthymemes, but are not stated as parts of Enthymemes;  these latter are reckoned the best; they are those in which the reason for the view expressed is simply implied,  e.g. O mortal man, nurse not immortal wrath.  To say ‘it is not right to nurse immortal wrath’ is a maxim; the added words ‘mortal man’ give the reason. 
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ (25) θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν. 
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Similarly, with the words Mortal creatures ought to cherish mortal, not immortal thoughts. 
(26) φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πόσα τε εἴδη γνώμης, (27) καὶ περὶ ποῖον ἕκαστον ἁρμόττει·  περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισ(28)βητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων μὴ ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου,  ἀλλ’ ἢ προθέντα τὸν (29) ἐπίλογον γνώμῃ χρῆσθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι  (οἷον εἴ τις εἴποι
(30) “ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε φθονεῖσθαι δεῖ οὔτ’ ἀργὸν εἶναι, (31) οὔ φημι χρῆναι παιδεύεσθαι”),
ἢ τοῦτο προειπόντα ἐπειπεῖν (32) τὰ ἔμπροσθεν·  περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δὲ προστι(33)θέντα τὸ διότι στρογγυλώτατα. 
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What has been said has shown us how many kinds of Maxims there are, and to what subjects the various kinds are appropriate.  They must not be given without supplement if they express disputed or paradoxical views:  we must, in that case, either put the supplement first and make a maxim of the conclusion,  e.g. you might say, ‘For my part, since both unpopularity and idleness are undesirable, I hold that it is better not to be educated’; or you may say this first, and then add the previous clause.  Where a statement, without being paradoxical, is not obviously true, the reason should be added as concisely as possible. 
ἁρμόττει δ’ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις (34) καὶ τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα καὶ τὰ αἰνιγματώδη,  οἷον εἴ (1395a1) τις λέγει ὅπερ Στησίχορος ἐν Λοκροῖς εἶπεν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ὑβρι(2)στὰς εἶναι, ὅπως μὴ οἱ τέττιγες χαμόθεν ᾄδωσιν. 
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In such cases both laconic and enigmatic sayings are suitable:  thus one might say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians, ‘Insolence is better avoided, lest the cicalas chirp on the ground’. 
ἁρμόττει δὲ (3) γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικίᾳ μὲν πρεσβυτέρων, περὶ δὲ τούτων ὧν (4) ἔμπειρός τίς ἐστιν,  ὥστε τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα γνωμο(5)λογεῖν ἀπρεπὲς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μυθολογεῖν, περὶ δὲ ὧν ἄπειρος, (6) ἠλίθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον.  σημεῖον δὲ ἱκανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῖκοι (7) μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀποφαίνονται. 
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The use of Maxims is appropriate only to elderly men, and in handling subjects in which the speaker is experienced.  For a young man to use them is—like telling stories—unbecoming; to use them in handling things in which one has no experience is silly and ill—bred:  a fact sufficiently proved by the special fondness of country fellows for striking out maxims, and their readiness to air them. 
(8) καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἁρμόττει (9) ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἢ ἀρχόμενον ἢ (10) ἀποδείξαντα. 
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To declare a thing to be universally true when it is not is most appropriate when working up feelings of horror and indignation in our hearers; especially by way of preface, or after the facts have been proved. 
χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ (11) κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ὦσι χρήσιμοι·  διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοιναί, ὡς (12) ὁμολογούντων πάντων, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν,  οἷον παρακαλοῦντι (13) ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους
εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης,  (14) καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττους ὄντας
(14) ξυνὸς Ἐνυάλιος,  (15) καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα καὶ μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα
(16) νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει. 
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Even hackneyed and commonplace maxims are to be used, if they suit one’s purpose:  just because they are commonplace, every one seems to agree with them, and therefore they are taken for truth.  Thus, any one who is calling on his men to risk an engagement without obtaining favourable omens may quote One omen of all is hest, that we fight for our fatherland.  Or, if he is calling on them to attack a stronger force—The War—God showeth no favour.  Or, if he is urging people to destroy the innocent children of their enemies—Fool, who slayeth the father and leaveth his sons to avenge him. 
(17) ἔτι ἔνιαι τῶν παροιμιῶν καὶ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷον παροιμία (18) “Ἀττικὸς πάροικος”.  δεῖ δὲ τὰς γνώμας λέγειν καὶ παρὰ τὰ (19) δεδημοσιευμένα (λέγω δὲ δεδημοσιευμένα οἷον τὸ “γνῶθι σαυ(20)τὸν” καὶ τὸ “μηδὲν ἄγαν”), ὅταν ἢ τὸ ἦθος φαίνεσθαι μέλλῃ (21) βέλτιον ἢ παθητικῶς εἰρημένη.  ἔστι δὲ παθητικὴ μὲν οἷον (22) εἴ τις ὀργιζόμενος φαίη ψεῦδος εἶναι ὡς δεῖ γιγνώσκειν αὑτόν·  (23) οὗτος γοῦν εἰ ἐγίγνωσκεν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε στρατηγεῖν (24) ἠξίωσε·  τὸ δὲ ἦθος βέλτιον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ὥσπερ φασίν, φιλεῖν (25) ὡς μισήσοντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μισεῖν ὡς φιλήσοντας. 
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Some proverbs are also maxims, e.g. the proverb ‘An Attic neighbour’.  You are not to avoid uttering maxims that contradict such sayings as have become public property (I mean such sayings as ‘know thyself’ and ‘nothing in excess’) if doing so will raise your hearers’ opinion of your character, or convey an effect of strong emotion  —e.g. an angry speaker might well say, ‘It is not true that we ought to know ourselves:  anyhow, if this man had known himself, he would never have thought himself fit for an army command.’  It will raise people’s opinion of our character to say, for instance, ‘We ought not to follow the saying that bids us treat our friends as future enemies: much better to treat our enemies as future friends.’ 
δεῖ δὲ τῇ (26) λέξει τὴν προαίρεσιν συνδηλοῦν,  εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπι(27)λέγειν,  οἷον οὕτως εἰπόντα, ὅτι “δεῖ δὲ φιλεῖν οὐχ ὥσπερ φασίν, (28) ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀεὶ φιλήσοντα·  ἐπιβούλου γὰρ θάτερον”, ἢ ὧδε, “οὐκ (29) ἀρέσκει δέ μοι τὸ λεγόμενον·  δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἀληθινὸν φίλον ὡς (30) φιλήσοντα ἀεὶ φιλεῖν”,  καὶ “οὐδὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν· δεῖ γὰρ (31) τούς γε κακοὺς ἄγαν μισεῖν”. 
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The moral purpose should be implied partly by the very wording of our maxim.  Failing this, we should add our reason:  e.g. having said ‘We should treat our friends, not as the saying advises, but as if they were going to be our friends always’,  we should add ‘for the other behaviour is that of a traitor’: or we might put it, I disapprove of that saying.  A true friend will treat his friend as if he were going to be his friend for ever’;  and again, ‘Nor do I approve of the saying nothing in excess: we are bound to hate bad men excessively.’ 
(1395b1) ἔχουσι δ’ εἰς τοὺς λόγους βοήθειαν μεγάλην μίαν μὲν διὰ (2) τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκροατῶν· χαίρουσι γὰρ ἐάν τις καθόλου (3) λέγων ἐπιτύχῃ τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν.  ὃ (4) δὲ λέγω δῆλον ἔσται ὧδε, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πῶς δεῖ αὐτὰς θηρεύειν.  (5) ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνώμη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἀπόφανσις καθόλου ἐστίν, (6) χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένου ὃ κατὰ μέρος προϋπολαμβά(7)νοντες τυγχάνουσι·  οἷον εἴ τις γείτοσι τύχοι κεχρημένος ἢ (8) τέκνοις φαύλοις, ἀποδέξαιτ’ ἂν τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐδὲν γειτο(9)νίας χαλεπώτερον ἢ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἠλιθιώτερον τεκνοποιίας,  (10) ὥστε δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι ποῖα τυγχάνουσι προϋπολαμβάνον(11)τες, εἶθ’ οὕτως περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν.  ταύτην τε δὴ (12) ἔχει μίαν χρῆσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν, καὶ ἑτέραν κρείττω· ἠθικοὺς (13) γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους.  ἦθος δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις (14) δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις·  αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν διὰ τὸ (15) ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προ(16)αιρέσεων,  ὥστε, ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοήθη (17) φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα. 
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One great advantage of Maxims to a speaker is due to the want of intelligence in his hearers, who love to hear him succeed in expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they hold themselves about particular cases.  I will explain what I mean by this, indicating at the same time how we are to hunt down the maxims required.  The maxim, as has been already said, a general statement and people love to hear stated in general terms what they already believe in some particular connexion:  e.g. if a man happens to have bad neighbours or bad children, he will agree with any one who tells him, ‘Nothing is more annoying than having neighbours’, or, ‘Nothing is more foolish than to be the parent of children.’  The orator has therefore to guess the subjects on which his hearers really hold views already, and what those views are, and then must express, as general truths, these same views on these same subjects.  This is one advantage of using maxims. There is another which is more important—it invests a speech with moral character.  There is moral character in every speech in which the moral purpose is conspicuous:  and maxims always produce this effect, because the utterance of them amounts to a general declaration of moral principles:  so that, if the maxims are sound, they display the speaker as a man of sound moral character. 
(18) περὶ μὲν οὖν γνώμης, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ πόσα εἴδη ταύτης (19) καὶ πῶς χρηστέον αὐτῇ καὶ τίνα ὠφέλειαν ἔχει, εἰρήσθω (20) ταῦτα. 
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So much for the Maxim—its nature, varieties, proper use, and advantages. 
22. (21) Περὶ δ’ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἴπωμεν τίνα τρόπον δεῖ (22) ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους·  ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκάτερον (23) τούτων ἐστίν.  ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός ἐστιν, (24) εἴρηται πρότερον,  καὶ πῶς συλλογισμός,  καὶ τί διαφέρει τῶν (25) διαλεκτικῶν·  οὔτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν οὔτε πάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας (26) συνάγειν·  τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία (27) διὰ τὸ φανερὰ λέγειν. 
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Part 22. We now come to the Enthymemes, and will begin the subject with some general consideration of the proper way of looking for them,  and then proceed to what is a distinct question, the lines of argument to be embodied in them.  It has already been pointed out that the Enthymeme is a syllogism,  and in what sense it is so.  We have also noted the differences between it and the syllogism of dialectic.  Thus we must not carry its reasoning too far back,  or the length of our argument will cause obscurity: nor must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion, or we shall waste words in saying what is manifest. 
τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ πιθανωτέρους (28) εἶναι τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις,  (29) ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους παρ’ ὄχλῳ μουσι(30)κωτέρως λέγειν·  οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου λέγουσιν, οἱ (31) δ’ ἐξ ὧν ἴσασι, καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς·  ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν (32) δοκούντων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ὡρισμένων λεκτέον,  οἷον ἢ τοῖς κρί(1396a1)νουσιν ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται, καὶ τοῦτο διότι οὕτως φαίνεται (2) δῆλον εἶναι ἅπασιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις·  καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν (3) ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. 
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It is this simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences  —makes them, as the poets tell us, ‘charm the crowd’s ears more finely’.  Educated men lay down broad general principles; uneducated men argue from common knowledge and draw obvious conclusions.  We must not, therefore, start from any and every accepted opinion, but only from those we have defined  —those accepted by our judges or by those whose authority they recognize: and there must, moreover, be no doubt in the minds of most, if not all, of our judges that the opinions put forward really are of this sort.  We should also base our arguments upon probabilities as well as upon certainties. 
(4) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ συλ(5)λογίζεσθαι εἴτε πολιτικῷ συλλογισμῷ εἴθ’ ὁποιῳοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον (6) κατὰ τούτου ἔχειν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια·  μηδὲν γὰρ (7) ἔχων ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοις συνάγειν.  λέγω δ’ οἷον πῶς ἂν (8) δυναίμεθα συμβουλεύειν Ἀθηναίοις εἰ πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ (9) πολεμητέον, μὴ ἔχοντες τίς ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν, πότερον ναυ(10)τικὴ ἢ πεζικὴ ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ αὕτη πόση, καὶ πρόσοδοι τίνες ἢ (11) φίλοι καὶ ἐχθροί, εἶτα τίνας πολέμους πεπολεμήκασι καὶ πῶς, (12) καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα·  ἢ ἐπαινεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλα(13)μῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν (14) Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.  ἐκ γὰρ τῶν (15) ὑπαρχόντων ἢ δοκούντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες.  (16) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τί (17) ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν,  οἷον ὅτι τοὺς (18) Ἕλληνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον (19) συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας ἠνδραποδίσαντο, Αἰγινή(20)τας καὶ Ποτιδαιάτας, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, [καὶ] εἴ τι ἄλλο (21) τοιοῦτον ἁμάρτημα ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.  ὡς δ’ αὔτως καὶ οἱ κατ(22)ηγοροῦντες καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοπού(23)μενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται.  οὐδὲν δὲ διαφέρει περὶ (24) Ἀθηναίων ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἢ θεοῦ, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο (25) δρᾶν·  καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύοντα τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, καὶ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ (26) ψέγοντα, καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, τὰ (27) ὑπάρχοντα ἢ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον,  ἵν’ ἐκ τούτων (28) λέγωμεν, ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες εἴ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ὑπ(29)άρχει, κατηγοροῦντες δ’ ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι εἴ τι δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, (30) συμβουλεύοντες δ’ εἴ τι συμφέρον ἢ βλαβερόν. 
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The first thing we have to remember is this. Whether our argument concerns public affairs or some other subject, we must know some, if not all, of the facts about the subject on which we are to speak and argue.  Otherwise we can have no materials out of which to construct arguments.  I mean, for instance, how could we advise the Athenians whether they should go to war or not, if we did not know their strength, whether it was naval or military or both, and how great it is; what their revenues amount to; who their friends and enemies are; what wars, too, they have waged, and with what success; and so on?  Or how could we eulogize them if we knew nothing about the sea—fight at Salamis, or the battle of Marathon, or what they did for the Heracleidae, or any other facts like that?  All eulogy is based upon the noble deeds——real or imaginary——that stand to the credit of those eulogized.  On the same principle, invectives are based on facts of the opposite kind: the orator looks to see what base deeds——real or imaginary——stand to the discredit of those he is attacking,  such as treachery to the cause of Hellenic freedom, or the enslavement of their gallant allies against the barbarians (Aegina, Potidaea, &c.), or any other misdeeds of this kind that are recorded against them.  So, too, in a court of law: whether we are prosecuting or defending, we must pay attention to the existing facts of the case.  It makes no difference whether the subject is the Lacedaemonians or the Athenians, a man or a god; we must do the same thing.  Suppose it to be Achilles whom we are to advise, to praise or blame, to accuse or defend; here too we must take the facts, real or imaginary;  these must be our material, whether we are to praise or blame him for the noble or base deeds he has done, to accuse or defend him for his just or unjust treatment of others, or to advise him about what is or is not to his interest. 
ὁμοίως δὲ (31) τούτοις καὶ περὶ πράγματος ὁτουοῦν,  οἷον περὶ δικαιοσύνης, (32) εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ (33) καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ·  ὥστ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντες οὕτω φαίνονται ἀπο(34)δεικνύντες, ἐάν τε ἀκριβέστερον ἐάν τε μαλακώτερον συλ(1396b1)λογίζωνται  (οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἁπάντων λαμβάνουσιν ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν περὶ (2) ἕκαστον ὑπαρχόντων),  καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον (3) ἄλλως δεικνύναι,  φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπι(4)κοῖς, πρῶτον περὶ ἕκαστον ἔχειν ἐξειλεγμένα περὶ τῶν ἐν(5)δεχομένων καὶ τῶν ἐπικαιροτάτων,  περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐξ ὑπογυίου (6) γιγνομένων ζητεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον,  ἀποβλέποντα μὴ εἰς (7) ἀόριστα ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος,  καὶ περιγρά(8)φοντα ὅ τι πλεῖστα καὶ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος·  ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ (9) ἂν πλείω ἔχῃ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τοσούτῳ ῥᾷον δεικνύναι,  ὅσῳ (10) δ’ ἐγγύτερον, τοσούτῳ οἰκειότερα καὶ ἧττον κοινά. 
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T  he same thing applies to any subject whatever.  Thus, in handling the question whether justice is or is not a good, we must start with the real facts about justice and goodness.  We see, then, that this is the only way in which any one ever proves anything, whether his arguments are strictly cogent or not:  not all facts can form his basis, but only those that bear on the matter in hand:  nor, plainly, can proof be effected otherwise by means of the speech.  Consequently, as appears in the Topics, we must first of all have by us a selection of arguments about questions that may arise and are suitable for us to handle;  and then we must try to think out arguments of the same type for special needs as they emerge;  not vaguely and indefinitely, but by keeping our eyes on the actual facts of the subject we have to speak on,  and gathering in as many of them as we can that bear closely upon it:  for the more actual facts we have at our command, the more easily we prove our case; 
λέγω δὲ (11) κοινὰ μὲν τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι τῶν (12) ἡμιθέων καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ Ἴλιον ἐστρατεύσατο·  ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ (13) ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος τὸν (14) Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖ ἢ Διομήδην·  ἴδια δὲ ἃ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ συμ(15)βέβηκεν ἢ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ,  οἷον τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἕκτορα τὸν (16) ἄριστον τῶν Τρώων καὶ τὸν Κύκνον, ὃς ἐκώλυσεν ἅπαντας (17) ἀποβαίνειν ἄτρωτος ὤν, καὶ ὅτι νεώτατος καὶ οὐκ ἔνορκος ὢν (18) ἐστράτευσεν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. 
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and the more closely they bear on the subject, the more they will seem to belong to that speech only instead of being commonplaces.  By ‘commonplaces’ I mean, for example, eulogy of Achilles because he is a human being or a demi—god, or because he joined the expedition against Troy:  these things are true of many others, so that this kind of eulogy applies no better to Achilles than to Diomede.  The special facts here needed are those that are true of Achilles alone; 
(19) εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς πρῶτος οὗτος ὁ τοπικός, (20) τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων λέγωμεν·  στοιχεῖον δὲ λέγω (21) καὶ τόπον ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό. 
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such facts as that he slew Hector, the bravest of the Trojans, and Cycnus the invulnerable, who prevented all the Greeks from landing, and again that he was the youngest man who joined the expedition, and was not bound by oath to join it, and so on.  Here, again, we have our first principle of selection of Enthymemes—that which refers to the lines of argument selected. 
πρῶτον δὲ εἴπωμεν περὶ ὧν (22) ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν πρῶτον. ἔστιν γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἴδη (23) δύο·  τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἐστιν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, τὰ δ’ (24) ἐλεγκτικά,  καὶ διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἔλεγχος (25) καὶ συλλογισμός.  ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ ἐξ (26) ὁμολογουμένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομολο(27)γούμενα συνάγειν.  (28) σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν (29) χρησίμων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἔχονται οἱ τόποι·  ἐξειλεγμέναι γὰρ (30) αἱ προτάσεις περὶ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν,  ὥστε ἐξ ὧν δεῖ φέρειν τὰ (31) ἐνθυμήματα τόπων περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, ἢ καλοῦ ἢ αἰσχροῦ, (32) ἢ δικαίου ἢ ἀδίκου, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ παθημάτων καὶ (33) ἕξεων ὡσαύτως, εἰλημμένοι ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσι πρότερον οἱ τόποι. 
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We will now consider the various elementary classes of enthymemes. (By an ‘elementary class’ of enthymeme I mean the same thing as a ‘line of argument’.)  We will begin, as we must begin, by observing that there are two kinds of enthymemes.  One kind proves some affirmative or negative proposition; the other kind disproves one.  The difference between the two kinds is the same as that between syllogistic proof and disproof in dialectic.  The demonstrative enthymeme is formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; the refutative, by the conjunction of incompatible propositions.  We may now be said to have in our hands the lines of argument for the various special subjects that it is useful or necessary to handle,  having selected the propositions suitable in various cases. 
(1397a1) ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον καθόλου περὶ ἁπάντων λάβωμεν,  καὶ (2) λέγωμεν παρασημαινόμενοι τοὺς ἐλεγκτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀπο(3)δεικτικούς,  καὶ τοὺς τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων, οὐκ ὄντων (4) δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπεί περ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν. 
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We have, in fact, already ascertained the lines of argument applicable to enthymemes about good and evil, the noble and the base, justice and injustice, and also to those about types of character, emotions, and moral qualities.  Let us now lay hold of certain facts about the whole subject, considered from a different and more general point of view.  In the course of our discussion we will take note of the distinction between lines of proof and lines of disproof: 
δηλωθέντων δὲ (5) τούτων περὶ τῶν λύσεων καὶ ἐνστάσεων διορίσωμεν, πόθεν δεῖ (6) πρὸς τὰ ἐνθυμήματα φέρειν. 
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and also of those lines of argument used in what seems to be enthymemes, but are not, since they do not represent valid syllogisms. 
23. (7) Ἔστι δὲ εἷς μὲν τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων·  (8) δεῖ γὰρ σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει, ἀν(9)αιροῦντα μὲν εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ὑπάρχει,  (10) οἷον ὅτι τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερόν. 
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Having made all this clear, we will proceed to classify Objections and Refutations, showing how they can be brought to bear upon enthymemes.  Part 23. 1. One line of positive proof is based upon consideration of the opposite of the thing in question.  Observe whether that opposite has the opposite quality. If it has not, you refute the original proposition; if it has, you establish it. 
(11) ἢ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ·
“εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἴτιος τῶν παρ(12)όντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεῖ ἐπανορθώσασθαι”.
  εἴ περ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῖς κακῶς δεδρακόσιν
(13) ἀκουσίως δίκαιον εἰς ὀργὴν πεσεῖν,
(14) οὐδ’ ἂν ἀναγκασθείς τις εὖ δράσῃ τινά,
(15)προσῆκον εἶναι τῷδ’ ὀφείλεσθαι χάριν.
  (16)
ἀλλ’ εἴ περ ἔστιν ἐν βροτοῖς ψευδηγορεῖν
(17) πιθανά, νομίζειν χρή σε καὶ τοὐναντίον,
(18) ἄπιστ’ ἀληθῆ πολλὰ συμβαίνειν βροτοῖς.
(19) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων· 
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E.g. ‘Temperance is beneficial; for licentiousness is hurtful’.  Or, as in the Messenian speech, ‘If war is the cause of our present troubles, peace is what we need to put things right again’.  Or
—For if not even evil—doers should
Anger us if they meant not what they did,
Then can we owe no gratitude to such
As were constrained to do the good they did us. 
ὁμοίως γὰρ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν (20) ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν,  οἷον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· καὶ γὰρ (21) ἂν τὸ δικαίως, νῦν δ’ οὐχ αἱρετὸν τὸ δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν. 
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Or
—Since in this world liars may win belief,
Be sure of the opposite likewise—that this world
Hears many a true word and believes it not.  2. Another line of proof is got by considering some modification of the key—word, and arguing that what can or cannot be said of the one, can or cannot be said of the other: 
(22) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα·  εἰ γὰρ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ (23) καλῶς ἢ δικαίως ποιῆσαι, θατέρῳ τὸ πεπονθέναι, καὶ εἰ <τὸ> (24) κελεῦσαι, καὶ τὸ πεποιηκέναι,  οἷον ὡς ὁ τελώνης Διομέδων (25) περὶ τῶν τελῶν, “εἰ γὰρ μηδ’ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν τὸ πωλεῖν, οὐδ’ (26) ἡμῖν τὸ ὠνεῖσθαι”.  καὶ εἰ τῷ πεπονθότι τὸ καλῶς ἢ δικαίως (27) ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ ποιήσαντι.  ἔστι δ’ ἐν τούτῳ παραλογίσασθαι·  (28) εἰ γὰρ δικαίως ἔπαθέν τι, [δικαίως πέπονθεν,] ἀλλ’ ἴσως οὐχ (29) ὑπὸ σοῦ·  διὸ δεῖ σκοπεῖν χωρὶς εἰ ἄξιος ὁ παθὼν παθεῖν καὶ ὁ (1397b1) ποιήσας ποιῆσαι, εἶτα χρῆσθαι ὁποτέρως ἁρμόττει·  ἐνίοτε γὰρ (2) διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλ(3)κμαίωνι τῷ Θεοδέκτου  “μητέρα δὲ τὴν σὴν οὔ τις ἐστύγει βροτῶν;” (4) φησὶ δὲ ἀποκρινόμενος “ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρὴ σκοπεῖν”·  (5) ἐρομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀλφεσιβοίας πῶς, ὑπολαβών φησιν (6) “τὴν μὲν θανεῖν ἔκριναν, ἐμὲ δὲ μὴ κτανεῖν.”  (7) καὶ ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη καὶ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων Νικά(8)νορα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ δικαίως ἐκρίθησαν ἀποκτεῖναι, δικαίως ἔδοξεν (9) ἀποθανεῖν.  καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ κελεύει (10) κρίνεσθαι εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν τὸ ἀπο(11)κτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα. 
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e.g. ’just’ does not always mean ‘beneficial’, or ‘justly’ would always mean ‘beneficially’, whereas it is not desirable to be justly put to death.  3. Another line of proof is based upon correlative ideas.  If it is true that one man noble or just treatment to another, you argue that the other must have received noble or just treatment; or that where it is right to command obedience, it must have been right to obey the command.  Thus Diomedon, the tax—farmer, said of the taxes: ‘If it is no disgrace for you to sell them, it is no disgrace for us to buy them’.  Further, if ‘well’ or ‘justly’ is true of the person to whom a thing is done, you argue that it is true of the doer.  But it is possible to draw a false conclusion here.  It may be just that A should be treated in a certain way, and yet not just that he should be so treated by B.  Hence you must ask yourself two distinct questions: (1) Is it right that A should be thus treated? (2) Is it right that B should thus treat him? and apply your results properly, according as your answers are Yes or No.  Sometimes in such a case the two answers differ: you may quite easily have a position like that in the Alcmaeon of Theodectes:  And was there none to loathe thy mother’s crime? to which question Alcmaeon in reply says, Why, there are two things to examine here.  And when Alphesiboea asks what he means, he rejoins: They judged her fit to die, not me to slay her.  Again there is the lawsuit about Demosthenes and the men who killed Nicanor; as they were judged to have killed him justly, it was thought that he was killed justly. 
(12) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον,  οἷον “εἰ μηδ’ οἱ θεοὶ πάντα (13) ἴσασιν, σχολῇ οἵ γε ἄνθρωποι”·  τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν “εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον (14) ἂν ὑπάρχοι μὴ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ’ ᾧ ἧττον”.  τὸ δ’ ὅτι (15) τοὺς πλησίον τύπτει ὅς γε καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἐκ τοῦ “εἰ τὸ ἧττον (16) <ὑπάρχον> ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει”·  τοὺς γὰρ (17) πατέρας ἧττον τύπτουσιν ἢ τοὺς πλησίον·  ἢ δὴ οὕτως γε ἢ (18) εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἢ εἰ ᾧ ἧττον ὑπάρχει <ὑπ(19)άρχει>, ὁπότερον δεῖ δεῖξαι, εἴθ’ ὅτι ὑπάρχει εἴθ’ ὅτι οὔ.  ἔτι εἰ (20) μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὅθεν εἴρηται (20)
καὶ σὸς μὲν οἰκτρὸς παῖδας ἀπολέσας πατήρ·  (21) Οἰνεὺς δ’ ἄρ’ οὐχὶ [τὸν Ἑλλάδος] κλεινὸν ἀπολέσας γόνον; (22) καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μηδὲ Θησεὺς ἠδίκησεν, οὐδ’ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ (23) μηδ’ οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδ’ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ Πάτροκλον Ἕ(24)κτωρ, καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ἀλέξανδρος.  καὶ εἰ μηδ’ ἄλλοι τεχνῖται (25) φαῦλοι, οὐδ’ οἱ φιλόσοφοι.  καὶ εἰ μηδ’ οἱ στρατηγοὶ φαῦλοι (26) ὅτι θανατοῦνται πολλάκις, οὐδ’ οἱ σοφισταί.  καὶ ὅτι “εἰ δεῖ (27) τὸν ἰδιώτην τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὑμᾶς τῆς (28) τῶν Ἑλλήνων”. 
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And in the case of the man who was killed at Thebes, the judges were requested to decide whether it was unjust that he should be killed, since if it was not, it was argued that it could not have been unjust to kill him.  4. Another line of proof is the ‘a fortiori’.  Thus it may be argued that if even the gods are not omniscient, certainly human beings are not.  The principle here is that, if a quality does not in fact exist where it is more likely to exist, it clearly does not exist where it is less likely.  Again, the argument that a man who strikes his father also strikes his neighbours follows from the principle that, if the less likely thing is true, the more likely thing is true also;  for a man is less likely to strike his father than to strike his neighbours.  The argument, then, may run thus. Or it may be urged that, if a thing is not true where it is more likely, it is not true where it is less likely; or that, if it is true where it is less likely, it is true where it is more likely: according as we have to show that a thing is or is not true.  This argument might also be used in a case of parity, as in the lines: Thou hast pity for thy sire, who has lost his sons:  Hast none for Oeneus, whose brave son is dead? And, again, ‘if Theseus did no wrong, neither did Paris’; or ‘the sons of Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Paris’; or ‘if Hector did well to slay Patroclus, Paris did well to slay Achilles’.  And ‘if other followers of an art are not bad men, neither are philosophers’.  And ‘if generals are not bad men because it often happens that they are condemned to death, neither are sophists’. 
(29) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸν χρόνον σκοπεῖν,  οἷον ὡς Ἰφικράτης (30) ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον, ὅτι “εἰ πρὶν ποιῆσαι ἠξίουν τῆς (31) εἰκόνος τυχεῖν ἐὰν ποιήσω, ἔδοτε ἄν·  ποιήσαντι δ’ ἆρ’ οὐ (32) δώσετε; μὴ τοίνυν μέλλοντες μὲν ὑπισχνεῖσθε, παθόντες δ’ (33) ἀφαιρεῖσθε”.  καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Θηβαίους διιέναι Φίλιππον εἰς (1398a1) τὴν Ἀττικήν, ὅτι εἰ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Φωκεῖς ἠξίου, ὑπέσχοντο (2) ἄν·  ἄτοπον οὖν εἰ διότι προεῖτο καὶ ἐπίστευσεν μὴ διήσουσιν. 
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And the remark that ‘if each individual among you ought to think of his own city’s reputation, you ought all to think of the reputation of Greece as a whole’.  5. Another line of argument is based on considerations of time.  Thus Iphicrates, in the case against Harmodius, said, ‘if before doing the deed I had bargained that, if I did it, I should have a statue, you would have given me one.  Will you not give me one now that I have done the deed? You must not make promises when you are expecting a thing to be done for you, and refuse to fulfil them when the thing has been done.’  And, again, to induce the Thebans to let Philip pass through their territory into Attica, it was argued that ‘if he had insisted on this before he helped them against the Phocians, they would have promised to do it. 
(3) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθ’ αὑτοῦ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα,  (4) οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ.  διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος ᾧ ἐχρήσατο (5) Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα, ἐπερόμενος εἰ προδοίη ἂν (6) τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν·  οὐ φάσκοντος δέ, εἶτα εἶπεν “σὺ (7) μὲν ὢν Ἀριστοφῶν οὐκ ἂν προδοίης, ἐγὼ δ’ ὢν Ἰφικράτης;” (8) δεῖ δὲ ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἂν δοκοῦντα ἀδικῆσαι ἐκεῖνον·  εἰ δὲ μή, (9) γελοῖον ἂν φανείη, <οἷον> εἰ πρὸς Ἀριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα (10) τοῦτό τις [ἂν] εἴπειεν ἄλλος πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου·  (11) ὅλως γὰρ βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ φεύγοντος· (12) τοῦτ’ οὖν ἐξελέγχειν δεῖ.  καθόλου δὲ ἄτοπός ἐστιν, ὅταν τις (13) ἐπιτιμᾷ ἄλλοις ἃ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ ἢ ποιήσειεν ἂν, ἢ προτρέπῃ (14) ποιεῖν ἃ αὐτὸς μὴ ποιεῖ μηδὲ ποιήσειεν ἄν. 
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It is monstrous, therefore, that just because he threw away his advantage then, and trusted their honour, they should not let him pass through now’.  6. Another line is to apply to the other speaker what he has said against yourself. It is an excellent turn to give to a debate,  as may be seen in the Teucer.  It was employed by Iphicrates in his reply to Aristophon.  ’Would you’, he asked, ‘take a bribe to betray the fleet?’ ‘No’, said Aristophon; and Iphicrates replied, ‘Very good: if you, who are Aristophon, would not betray the fleet, would I, who am Iphicrates?’ Only, it must be recognized beforehand that the other man is more likely than you are to commit the crime in question.  Otherwise you will make yourself ridiculous; it is Aristeides who is prosecuting, you cannot say that sort of thing to him.  The purpose is to discredit the prosecutor, who as a rule would have it appear that his character is better than that of the defendant, a pretension which it is desirable to upset. 
(15) ἄλλος ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ,  οἷον τί τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστιν· “ἆρα (16) θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον;  καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, (17) τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι.” καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης, (18) ὅτι γενναιότατος ὁ βέλτιστος·  καὶ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστο(19)γείτονι οὐδὲν πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν γενναῖον πρὶν γενναῖόν τι (20) πρᾶξαι.  καὶ ὅτι συγγενέστερος αὐτός·  “τὰ γοῦν ἔργα συγ(21)γενέστερά ἐστι τὰ ἐμὰ τοῖς Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἢ (22) τὰ σά”.  καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὅτι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογή(23)σειαν τοὺς μὴ κοσμίους οὐχ ἑνὸς σώματος ἀγαπᾶν ἀπόλαυσιν.  (24) καὶ δι’ ὃ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον·  ὕβριν (25) γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως καὶ εὖ παθόν(26)τας ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς.  πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὁρισάμενοι καὶ λαβόν(27)τες τὸ τί ἐστι συλλογίζονται περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν. 
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But the use of such an argument is in all cases ridiculous if you are attacking others for what you do or would do yourself, or are urging others to do what you neither do nor would do yourself.  7. Another line of proof is secured by defining your terms.  Thus, ‘What is the supernatural? Surely it is either a god or the work of a god.  Well, any one who believes that the work of a god exists, cannot help also believing that gods exist.’ Or take the argument of Iphicrates, ‘Goodness is true nobility;  neither Harmodius nor Aristogeiton had any nobility before they did a noble deed’.  He also argued that he himself was more akin to Harmodius and Aristogeiton than his opponent was.  ’At any rate, my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than yours are’.  Another example may be found in the Alexander. ’Every one will agree that by incontinent people we mean those who are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one love.’  A further example is to be found in the reason given by Socrates for not going to the court of Archelaus.  He said that ‘one is insulted by being unable to requite benefits, as well as by being unable to requite injuries’. 
(28) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς,  οἷον ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς περὶ τοῦ (29) ὀρθῶς. 
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All the persons mentioned define their term and get at its essential meaning, and then use the result when reasoning on the point at issue.  8. Another line of argument is founded upon the various senses of a word. 
(30) ἄλλος ἐκ διαιρέσεως,  οἷον εἰ πάντες τριῶν ἕνεκεν ἀδικοῦσιν (31) (ἢ τοῦδε γὰρ ἕνεκα ἢ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε), καὶ διὰ μὲν τὰ δύο (32) ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδ’ αὐτοί φασιν. 
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Such a word is ‘rightly’, as has been explained in the Topics.  9. Another line is based upon logical division. 
(33) ἄλλος ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς,  οἷον ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας, ὅτι περὶ (1398b1) τῶν τέκνων αἱ γυναῖκες πανταχοῦ διορίζουσι τἀληθές·  (2) τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ἀθήνησι Μαντίᾳ τῷ ῥήτορι ἀμφισβητοῦντι (3) πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἀπέφηνεν ἡ μήτηρ,  τοῦτο δὲ Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου (4) καὶ Στίλβωνος ἀμφισβητούντων ἡ Δωδωνὶς ἀπέδειξεν Ἰσμη(5)νίου τὸν υἱόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Θετταλίσκον Ἰσμηνίου ἐνόμιζον.  (6) καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ Νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, “εἰ τοῖς κακῶς ἐπι(7)μεληθεῖσι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἵππων οὐ παραδιδόασι τοὺς οἰκείους, (8) οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνατρέψασι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ναῦς <τὰς οἰκείας>, (9) οὐκοῦν εἰ ὁμοίως ἐφ’ ἁπάντων, καὶ τοῖς κακῶς φυλάξασι τὴν (10) ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ χρηστέον ἐστὶν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν σωτηρίαν”.  καὶ (11) ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας, ὅτι πάντες τοὺς σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν·  “Πάριοι γοῦν (12) Ἀρχίλοχον καίπερ βλάσφημον ὄντα τετιμήκασι, καὶ Χῖοι (13) Ὅμηρον οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην, καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφῶ καίπερ (14) γυναῖκα οὖσαν,  καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλωνα καὶ τῶν γερόντων (15) ἐποίησαν ἥκιστα φιλόλογοι ὄντες,  καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν, (16) καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ τιμῶσι (17) ἔτι καὶ νῦν,  καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις χρησάμενοι (18) εὐδαιμόνησαν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς Λυκούργου, καὶ Θήβησιν (19) ἅμα οἱ προστάται φιλόσοφοι ἐγένοντο καὶ εὐδαιμόνησεν ἡ (20) πόλις”. 
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Thus, ‘All men do wrong from one of three motives, A, B, or C: in my case A and B are out of the question, and even the accusers do not allege C’.  10. Another line is based upon induction.  Thus from the case of the woman of Peparethus it might be argued that women everywhere can settle correctly the facts about their children.  Another example of this occurred at Athens in the case between the orator Mantias and his son, when the boy’s mother revealed the true facts:  and yet another at Thebes, in the case between Ismenias and Stilbon, when Dodonis proved that it was Ismenias who was the father of her son Thettaliscus, and he was in consequence always regarded as being so.  A further instance of induction may be taken from the Law of Theodectes: ‘If we do not hand over our horses to the care of men who have mishandled other people’s horses, nor ships to those who have wrecked other people’s ships, and if this is true of everything else alike, then men who have failed to secure other people’s safety are not to be employed to secure our own.’  Another instance is the argument of Alcidamas: ‘Every one honours the wise’.  Thus the Parians have honoured Archilochus, in spite of his bitter tongue; the Chians Homer, though he was not their countryman; the Mytilenaeans Sappho, though she was a woman;  the Lacedaemonians actually made Chilon a member of their senate, though they are the least literary of men;  the Italian Greeks honoured Pythagoras; the inhabitants of Lampsacus gave public burial to Anaxagoras, though he was an alien, and honour him even to this day. 
(21) ἄλλος ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου,  (22) μάλιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ ἀεί, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ’ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι, (23) ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, ἢ ἀγαθοί,  ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ (24) κρίνοντες, ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οἷς μὴ οἷόν τε (25) ἐναντίον κρίνειν, οἷον τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ οἷς μὴ καλὸν ἐναντίον (26) κρίνειν, οἷον θεοῖς ἢ πατρὶ ἢ διδασκάλοις,  ὥσπερ ὃ εἰς (27) Μιξιδημίδην εἶπεν Αὐτοκλῆς, [εἰ] ταῖς μὲν σεμναῖς θεαῖς (28) καλῶς εἶχεν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ δοῦναι τὰ δίκαια, Μιξιδημίδῃ (29) δ’ οὔ.  ἢ ὥσπερ Σαπφώ, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ (30) γὰρ οὕτω κεκρίκασιν· ἀπέθνησκον γὰρ ἄν.  ἢ ὥσπερ Ἀρί(31)στιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς ᾤετο· (32) “ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γ’ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν”, ἔφη, “οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον”, λέγων (33) τὸν Σωκράτη,  καὶ Ἡγησίπολις ἐν Δελφοῖς ἠρώτα τὸν θεόν, (34) πρότερον κεχρημένος Ὀλυμπίασιν, εἰ αὐτῷ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ (1399a1) ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν,  καὶ περὶ τῆς (2) Ἑλένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἔγραψεν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἴπερ Θησεὺς (3) ἔκρινεν, καὶ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὅτι αἱ θεαὶ προέκριναν,  καὶ (4) περὶ Εὐαγόρου, ὅτι σπουδαῖος, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης φησίν· (5) “Κόνων γοῦν δυστυχήσας, πάντας τοὺς ἄλλους παραλιπών, (6) ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθεν”. 
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(It may be argued that peoples for whom philosophers legislate are always prosperous) on the ground that the Athenians became prosperous under Solon’s laws and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus, while at Thebes no sooner did the leading men become philosophers than the country began to prosper.  11. Another line of argument is founded upon some decision already pronounced, whether on the same subject or on one like it or contrary to it.  Such a proof is most effective if every one has always decided thus; but if not every one, then at any rate most people; or if all, or most, wise or good men have thus decided,  or the actual judges of the present question, or those whose authority they accept, or any one whose decision they cannot gainsay because he has complete control over them, or those whom it is not seemly to gainsay, as the gods, or one’s father, or one’s teachers.  Thus Autocles said, when attacking Mixidemides, that it was a strange thing that the Dread Goddesses could without loss of dignity submit to the judgement of the Areopagus, and yet Mixidemides could not.  Or as Sappho said, ‘Death is an evil thing; the gods have so judged it, or they would die’.  Or again as Aristippus said in reply to Plato when he spoke somewhat too dogmatically, as Aristippus thought: ‘Well, anyhow, our friend’, meaning Socrates, ‘never spoke like that’.  And Hegesippus, having previously consulted Zeus at Olympia, asked Apollo at Delphi ‘whether his opinion was the same as his father’s’, implying that it would be shameful for him to contradict his father.  Thus too Isocrates argued that Helen must have been a good woman, because Theseus decided that she was; and Paris a good man, because the goddesses chose him before all others; 
(7) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν μερῶν,  ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς ποία κίνησις (8) ἡ ψυχή· ἥδε γὰρ ἢ ἥδε.  παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους (9) τοῦ Θεοδέκτου· “εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἠσέβηκεν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ (10) τετίμηκεν ὧν ἡ πόλις νομίζει;” 
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and Evagoras also, says Isocrates, was good, since when Conon met with his misfortune he betook himself to Evagoras without trying any one else on the way.  12. Another line of argument consists in taking separately the parts of a subject.  Such is that given in the Topics: ‘What sort of motion is the soul? for it must be this or that.’ 
(11) ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων συμβαίνει ὥστε ἕπεσθαί (12) τι τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος (13) προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, (14) καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ ψέγειν,  οἷον “τῇ παιδεύσει τὸ φθονεῖσθαι ἀκο(15)λουθεῖ κακὸν <ὄν>, τὸ δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν·  οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ (16) παιδεύεσθαι, φθονεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ δεῖ·  δεῖ μὲν οὖν παιδεύεσθαι, (17) σοφὸν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ”. 
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The Socrates of Theodectes provides an example: ‘What temple has he profaned? What gods recognized by the state has he not honoured?’  13. Since it happens that any given thing usually has both good and bad consequences, another line of argument consists in using those consequences as a reason for urging that a thing should or should not be done, for prosecuting or defending any one, for eulogy or censure.  E.g. education leads both to unpopularity, which is bad, and to wisdom, which is good.  Hence you either argue, ‘It is therefore not well to be educated, since it is not well to be unpopular’: 
ὁ τόπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ Καλλίππου τέχνη, (18) προσλαβοῦσα τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τἆλλα ὡς εἴρηται.  (19) ἄλλος, ὅταν περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένοιν ἢ προτρέπειν (20) ἢ ἀποτρέπειν δέῃ, [καὶ] τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ ἐπ’ (21) ἀμφοῖν χρῆσθαι.  διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ τυχόντα (22) ἀντιτίθεται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τἀναντία·  οἷον ἱέρεια οὐκ εἴα τὸν (23) υἱὸν δημηγορεῖν· “ἐὰν μὲν γάρ”, ἔφη, “τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ (24) ἄνθρωποί σε μισήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ θεοί·  δεῖ μὲν (25) οὖν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τὰ δίκαια λέγῃς, οἱ θεοί σε (26) φιλήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ ἄνθρωποι”.  τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ ταὐτὸ (27) τῷ λεγομένῳ, τὸ ἕλος πρίασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἅλας·  καὶ ἡ βλαίσωσις (28) τοῦτο ἐστίν, ὅταν δυοῖν ἐναντίοιν ἑκατέρῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν (29) ἕπηται, ἐναντία ἑκάτερα ἑκατέροις. 
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or you answer, ‘No, it is well to be educated, since it is well to be wise’.  The Art of Rhetoric of Callippus is made up of this line of argument, with the addition of those of Possibility and the others of that kind already described.  14. Another line of argument is used when we have to urge or discourage a course of action that may be done in either of two opposite ways, and have to apply the method just mentioned to both.  The difference between this one and the last is that, whereas in the last any two things are contrasted, here the things contrasted are opposites.  For instance, the priestess enjoined upon her son not to take to public speaking: ‘For’, she said, ‘if you say what is right, men will hate you; if you say what is wrong, the gods will hate you.’  The reply might be, ‘On the contrary, you ought to take to public speaking: for if you say what is right the gods will love you; if you say what is wrong, men will love you.’  This amounts to the proverbial ‘buying the marsh with the salt’. 
(30) ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ταὐτὰ φανερῶς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ἀφανῶς, (31) ἀλλὰ φανερῶς μὲν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπαινοῦσι μάλιστα, (32) ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα μᾶλλον βούλονται,  ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι (33) συνάγειν θάτερον·  τῶν γὰρ παραδόξων οὗτος ὁ τόπος κυριώ(34)τατός ἐστιν. 
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It is just this situation, viz. when each of two opposites has both a good and a bad consequence opposite respectively to each other, that has been termed divarication.  15. Another line of argument is this: The things people approve of openly are not those which they approve of secretly: openly, their chief praise is given to justice and nobleness; but in their hearts they prefer their own advantage.  Try, in face of this, to establish the point of view which your opponent has not adopted. 
(35) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ταῦτα συμβαίνειν,  οἷον ὁ Ἰφικράτης, (36) τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, νεώτερον ὄντα τῆς ἡλικίας, ὅτι μέγας ἦν (37) λειτουργεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, εἶπεν ὅτι εἰ τοὺς μεγάλους (38) τῶν παίδων ἄνδρας νομίζουσι, τοὺς μικροὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν (1399b1) παῖδας εἶναι ψηφιοῦνται,  καὶ Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ Νόμῳ, ὅτι (2) “πολίτας μὲν ποιεῖσθε τοὺς μισθοφόρους, οἷον Στράβακα καὶ (3) Χαρίδημον, διὰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν·  φυγάδας δ’ οὐ ποιήσεσθε (4) τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἀνήκεστα διαπεπραγμένους;” 
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This is the most effective of the forms of argument that contradict common opinion.  16. Another line is that of rational correspondence.  E.g. Iphicrates, when they were trying to compel his son, a youth under the prescribed age, to perform one of the state duties because he was tall, said ‘If you count tall boys men, you will next be voting short men boys’.  And Theodectes in his Law said, ‘You make citizens of such mercenaries as Strabax and Charidemus, as a reward of their merits; 
(5) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐὰν ᾖ ταὐτόν, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὧν (6) συμβαίνει ταὐτά·  οἷον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσε(7)βοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν (8) λέγουσιν·  ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεούς (9) ποτε.  καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐξ ἑκάστου λαμβάνειν (10) ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεί·  “μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ περὶ Ἰσοκράτους (11) ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν”.  καὶ ὅτι τὸ (12) διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς (13) κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον.  ληπτέον δ’ ὁπό(14)τερον ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον. 
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will you not make exiles of such citizens as those who have done irreparable harm among the mercenaries?’  17. Another line is the argument that if two results are the same their antecedents are also the same.  For instance, it was a saying of Xenophanes that to assert that the gods had birth is as impious as to say that they die;  the consequence of both statements is that there is a time when the gods do not exist.  This line of proof assumes generally that the result of any given thing is always the same:  e.g. ’you are going to decide not about Isocrates, but about the value of the whole profession of philosophy.’  Or, ‘to give earth and water’ means slavery; or, ‘to share in the Common Peace’ means obeying orders. 
(15) ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ταὐτὸ ἀεὶ αἱρεῖσθαι ὕστερον καὶ πρότερον, (16) ἀλλ’ ἀνάπαλιν,  οἷον τόδε τὸ ἐνθύμημα, “ἦ φεύγοντες μὲν (17) ἐμαχόμεθα ὅπως κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα (18) ὅπως μὴ μαχώμεθα;”  ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μένειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεσθαι (19) ᾑροῦντο, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ μὴ μάχεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ μένειν. 
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We are to make either such assumptions or their opposite, as suits us best.  18. Another line of argument is based on the fact that men do not always make the same choice on a later as on an earlier occasion, but reverse their previous choice.  E.g. the following enthymeme: ‘When we were exiles, we fought in order to return; now we have returned, it would be strange to choose exile in order not to have to fight.’ 
(20) ἄλλος τὸ οὗ ἕνεκ’ ἂν εἴη ἢ γένοιτο, τούτου ἕνεκα φάναι (21) εἶναι ἢ γεγενῆσθαι,  οἷον εἰ δοίη [ἄν] τίς τινι ἵν’ ἀφελόμενος (22) λυπήσῃ,  ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται,
πολλοῖς ὁ δαίμων οὐ κατ’ εὔνοιαν φέρων
(23) μεγάλα δίδωσιν εὐτυχήματ’, ἀλλ’ ἵνα
(24) τὰς συμφορὰς λάβωσιν ἐπιφανεστέρας.  (25) καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος,
(26) οὐχ ὡς κτάνωσι θῆρ’, ὅπως δὲ μάρτυρες
(27) ἀρετῆς γένωνται Μελεάγρῳ πρὸς Ἑλλάδα.  (28) καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Αἴαντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προ(29)είλετο Ὀδυσσέα οὐ τιμῶν, ἀλλ’ ἵνα ἥττων ᾖ ὁ ἀκολουθῶν· (30) ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τούτου ἕνεκα ποιῆσαι. 
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on occasion, that is, they chose to be true to their homes at the cost of fighting, and on the other to avoid fighting at the cost of deserting their homes.  19. Another line of argument is the assertion that some possible motive for an event or state of things is the real one:  e.g. that a gift was given in order to cause pain by its withdrawal.  This notion underlies the lines:
God gives to many great prosperity,
Not of good God towards them, but to make
The ruin of them more conspicuous.  Or take the passage from the Meleager of Antiphon: To slay no boar, but to be witnesses
Of Meleager’s prowess unto Greece. 
(31) ἄλλος, κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ τοῖς συμ(32)βουλεύουσι, σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, (33) καὶ ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσιν·  ταῦτα γάρ (34) ἐστιν ἃ ἐὰν μὲν ὑπάρχῃ δεῖ πράττειν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, (35) μὴ πράττειν,  οἷον, εἰ δυνατὸν καὶ ῥᾴδιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἢ αὐτῷ (36) ἢ φίλοις ἢ βλαβερὸν ἐχθροῖς,  κἂν ᾖ ἐπιζήμιον, εἰ ἐλάττων ἡ (37) ζημία τοῦ πράγματος,  καὶ προτρέπονται [δ’] ἐκ τούτων καὶ (1400a1) ἀποτρέπονται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.  ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ (2) κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται·  ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων (3) ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προτρεπόντων κατηγοροῦσιν.  ἔστι (4) δ’ ὁ τόπος οὗτος ὅλη τέχνη ἥ τε Παμφίλου καὶ ἡ Καλλίππου. 
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Or the argument in the Ajax of Theodectes, that Diomede chose out Odysseus not to do him honour, but in order that his companion might be a lesser man than himself—such a motive for doing so is quite possible.  20. Another line of argument is common to forensic and deliberative oratory, namely, to consider inducements and deterrents, and the motives people have for doing or avoiding the actions in question.  These are the conditions which make us bound to act if they are for us, and to refrain from action if they are against us:  that is, we are bound to act if the action is possible, easy, and useful to ourselves or our friends or hurtful to our enemies;  this is true even if the action entails loss, provided the loss is outweighed by the solid advantage.  A speaker will urge action by pointing to such conditions, and discourage it by pointing to the opposite.  These same arguments also form the materials for accusation or defence  —the deterrents being pointed out by the defence, and the inducements by the prosecution. 
(5) ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων μὲν γίγνεσθαι ἀπίστων δέ,  ὅτι (6) οὐκ ἂν ἔδοξαν, εἰ μὴ ἦν ἢ ἐγγὺς ἦν. καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον·  ἢ γὰρ (7) τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰ εἰκότα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν·  εἰ οὖν ἄπιστον καὶ (8) μὴ εἰκός, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη·  οὐ γὰρ διά γε τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανὸν (9) δοκεῖ οὕτως·  οἷον Ἀνδροκλῆς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πιτθεὺς κατηγορῶν (10) τοῦ νόμου,  ἐπεὶ ἐθορύβησαν αὐτῷ εἰπόντι, “δέονται οἱ (11) νόμοι νόμου τοῦ διορθώσοντος,  καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἰχθύες ἁλός, (12) καίτοι οὐκ εἰκὸς οὐδὲ πιθανὸν ἐν ἅλμῃ τρεφομένους δεῖσθαι (13) ἁλός, καὶ τὰ στέμφυλα ἐλαίου, καίτοι ἄπιστον, ἐξ ὧν ἔλαιον (14) γίγνεται, ταῦτα δεῖσθαι ἐλαίου”. 
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As for the defence,...This topic forms the whole Art of Rhetoric both of Pamphilus and of Callippus.  21. Another line of argument refers to things which are supposed to happen and yet seem incredible.  We may argue that people could not have believed them, if they had not been true or nearly true: even that they are the more likely to be true because they are incredible.  For the things which men believe are either facts or probabilities:  if, therefore, a thing that is believed is improbable and even incredible, it must be true,  since it is certainly not believed because it is at all probable or credible.  An example is what Androcles of the deme Pitthus said in his well—known arrangement of the law.  The audience tried to shout him down when he observed that the laws required a law to set them right. 
(15) ἄλλος ἐλεγκτικός, τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα σκοπεῖν, εἴ τι (16) ἀνομολογούμενον ἐκ τόπων καὶ χρόνων καὶ πράξεων καὶ (17) λόγων, χωρὶς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος,  οἷον “καὶ φησὶ (18) μὲν φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς, συνώμοσεν δὲ τοῖς τριάκοντα”,  χωρὶς δ’ (19) ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ, “καὶ φησὶ μὲν εἶναί με φιλόδικον, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ (20) ἀποδεῖξαι δεδικασμένον οὐδεμίαν δίκην”,  χωρὶς δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ (21) καὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, “καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὐ δεδάνεικε πώποτε (22) οὐδέν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς λέλυμαι ὑμῶν”. 
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’Why’, he went on, ‘fish need salt, improbable and incredible as this might seem for creatures reared in salt water; and olive—cakes need oil, incredible as it is that what produces oil should need it.’  22. Another line of argument is to refute our opponent’s case by noting any contrasts or contradictions of dates, acts, or words that it anywhere displays; and this in any of the three following connexions.  (1) Referring to our opponent’s conduct, e.g. ’He says he is devoted to you, yet he conspired with the Thirty.’  (2) Referring to our own conduct, e.g. ’He says I am litigious, and yet he cannot prove that I have been engaged in a single lawsuit.’ 
(23) ἄλλος τοῖς προδιαβεβλημένοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις καὶ πρά(24)γμασιν, ἢ δοκοῦσι, τὸ λέγειν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ παραδόξου· (25) ἔστιν γάρ τι δι’ ὃ φαίνεται·  οἷον, ὑποβεβλημένης τινὸς τὸν (26) αὑτῆς υἱόν, διὰ τὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι ἐδόκει συνεῖναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, (27) λεχθέντος δὲ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐλύθη ἡ διαβολή·  καὶ οἷον ἐν τῷ Αἴαντι (28) τῷ Θεοδέκτου Ὀδυσσεὺς λέγει πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα διότι ἀνδρει(29)ότερος ὢν τοῦ Αἴαντος οὐ δοκεῖ. 
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(3) Referring to both of us together, e.g. ’He has never even lent any one a penny, but I have ransomed quite a number of you.’  23. Another line that is useful for men and causes that have been really or seemingly slandered, is to show why the facts are not as supposed; pointing out that there is a reason for the false impression given.  Thus a woman, who had palmed off her son on another woman, was thought to be the lad’s mistress because she embraced him; but when her action was explained the charge was shown to be groundless. 
(30) ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου, ἄν τε ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι ἔστι, κἂν μὴ (31) ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν·  ἅμα γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ οὗ αἴτιον, (32) καὶ ἄνευ αἰτίου οὐθὲν ἔστιν,  οἷον Λεωδάμας ἀπολογούμενος (33) ἔλεγε, κατηγορήσαντος Θρασυβούλου ὅτι ἦν στηλίτης γεγονὼς (34) ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει, ἀλλ’ ἐκκέκοπται ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα·  οὐκ (35) ἐνδέχεσθαι ἔφη· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν πιστεύειν αὑτῷ τοὺς τριάκοντα (36) ἐγγεγραμμένης τῆς ἔχθρας πρὸς τὸν δῆμον. 
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Another example is from the Ajax of Theodectes, where Odysseus tells Ajax the reason why, though he is really braver than Ajax, he is not thought so.  24. Another line of argument is to show that if the cause is present, the effect is present, and if absent, absent.  For by proving the cause you at once prove the effect, and conversely nothing can exist without its cause.  Thus Thrasybulus accused Leodamas of having had his name recorded as a criminal on the slab in the Acropolis, and of erasing the record in the time of the Thirty Tyrants: 
(37) ἄλλος, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο βέλτιον ἄλλως, ἢ ἐνδέχεται, ὧν ἢ (38) συμβουλεύει ἢ πράττει ἢ πέπραχε σκοπεῖν·  φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, (1400b1) εἰ [μὴ] οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ πέπραχεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν τὰ φαῦλα (2) καὶ γιγνώσκων προαιρεῖται.  ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· πολλάκις (3) γὰρ ὕστερον γίγνεται δῆλον πῶς ἦν πρᾶξαι βέλτιον, πρότερον (4) δὲ ἄδηλον. 
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to which Leodamas replied, ‘Impossible: for the Thirty would have trusted me all the more if my quarrel with the commons had been inscribed on the slab.’  25. Another line is to consider whether the accused person can take or could have taken a better course than that which he is recommending or taking, or has taken.  If he has not taken this better course, it is clear that he is not guilty, since no one deliberately and consciously chooses what is bad. 
(5) ἄλλος, ὅταν τι ἐναντίον μέλλῃ πράττεσθαι τοῖς πεπραγμένοις, (6) ἅμα σκοπεῖν,  οἷον Ξενοφάνης Ἐλεάταις ἐρωτῶσιν εἰ θύωσι (7) τῇ Λευκοθέᾳ καὶ θρηνῶσιν ἢ μή, συνεβούλευεν, εἰ μὲν θεὸν (8) ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δ’ ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θύειν. 
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This argument is, however, fallacious, for it often becomes clear after the event how the action could have been done better, though before the event this was far from clear.  26. Another line is, when a contemplated action is inconsistent with any past action, to examine them both together. 
(9) ἄλλος τόπος τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτηθέντων κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπο(10)λογεῖσθαι,  οἷον ἐν τῇ Καρκίνου Μηδείᾳ οἱ μὲν κατηγοροῦσιν (11) ὅτι τοὺς παῖδας ἀπέκτεινεν, οὐ φαίνεσθαι γοῦν αὐτούς (12) (ἥμαρτε γὰρ ἡ Μήδεια περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παίδων),  (13) ἡ δ’ ἀπολογεῖται ὅτι οὐ [ἂν] τοὺς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τὸν Ἰάσονα (14) ἂν ἀπέκτεινεν·  τοῦτο γὰρ ἥμαρτεν ἂν μὴ ποιήσασα, εἴπερ (15) καὶ θάτερον ἐποίησεν.  ἔστι δ’ ὁ τόπος οὗτος τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος (16) καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη. 
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Thus, when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they should or should not sacrifice to Leucothea and mourn for her, he advised them not to mourn for her if they thought her a goddess, and not to sacrifice to her if they thought her a mortal woman.  27. Another line is to make previous mistakes the grounds of accusation or defence.  Thus, in the Medea of Carcinus the accusers allege that Medea has slain her children; ‘at all events’, they say, ‘they are not to be seen’—Medea having made the mistake of sending her children away.  In defence she argues that it is not her children, but Jason, whom she would have slain;  for it would have been a mistake on her part not to do this if she had done the other. 
(17) ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος,  οἷον ὡς ὁ Σοφοκλῆς
σαφῶς σιδήρῳ καὶ φοροῦσα τοὔνομα,  (18) καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπαίνοις εἰώθασι λέγειν,  καὶ ὡς (19) Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκάλει,  καὶ Ἡρόδικος Θρασύ(20)μαχον “ἀεὶ θρασύμαχος εἶ”, καὶ Πῶλον “ἀεὶ σὺ πῶλος εἶ”, (21) καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ [ἂν] ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι (22) ἀλλὰ δράκοντος (χαλεποὶ γάρ)·  καὶ ὡς ἡ Εὐριπίδου Ἑκάβη εἰς (23) τὴν Ἀφροδίτην “καὶ τοὔνομ’ ὀρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἄρχει θεᾶς”,  (24) καὶ ὡς Χαιρήμων Πενθεὺς ἐσομένης συμφορᾶς ἐπώνυμος.  (25) εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν (26) ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν μὲν ἐναντίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ (27) τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παρ’ ἄλληλα δὲ φανερὰ εἶναι τῷ (28) ἀκροατῇ μᾶλλον.  πάντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλεγκτικῶν καὶ τῶν (29) δεικτικῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα (30) ἀρχόμενα προορῶσι μὴ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι  (ἅμα γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφ’ (31) αὑτοῖς χαίρουσι προαισθανόμενοι),  καὶ ὅσων τοσοῦτον ὑστε(32)ρίζουσιν ὥσθ’ ἅμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν. 
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This special line of argument for enthymeme forms the whole of the Art of Rhetoric in use before Theodorus.  28. Another line is to draw meanings from names.  Sophocles, for instance, says, O steel in heart as thou art steel in name.  This line of argument is common in praises of the gods.  Thus, too, Conon called Thrasybulus rash in counsel.  And Herodicus said of Thrasymachus, ‘You are always bold in battle’; of Polus, ‘you are always a colt’; and of the legislator Draco that his laws were those not of a human being but of a dragon, so savage were they.  And, in Euripides, Hecuba says of Aphrodite, “Her name and Folly’s (aphrosuns) lightly begin alike,”  and Chaeremon writes “Pentheus—a name foreshadowing grief (penthos) to come.”  The Refutative Enthymeme has a greater reputation than the Demonstrative, because within a small space it works out two opposing arguments, and arguments put side by side are clearer to the audience.  But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are most applauded of which we foresee the conclusions from the beginning, so long as they are not obvious at first sight  —for part of the pleasure we feel is at our own intelligent anticipation; 
24. (33) Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὲν εἶναι συλλογισμόν, τὸν δὲ μὴ (34) εἶναι μὲν φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνθύμημα τὸ μὲν εἶναι, τὸ (35) δὲ μὴ εἶναι ἐνθύμημα φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἐπείπερ τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλ(1401a1)λογισμός τις. 
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or those which we follow well enough to see the point of them as soon as the last word has been uttered. 
τόποι δ’ εἰσὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων (2) εἷς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, 
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Part 24. Besides genuine syllogisms, there may be syllogisms that look genuine but are not; and since an enthymeme is merely a syllogism of a particular kind, it follows that, besides genuine enthymemes, there may be those that look genuine but are not. 
καὶ τούτου ἓν μὲν μέρος, ὥσπερ (3) ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερα(4)σματικῶς τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν, “οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη (5) ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό”,  ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ (6) ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα (ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη (7) λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος)·  καὶ ἔοικε τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι (8) παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως.  ἔστι δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλ(9)λογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια (10) λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δ’ ἑτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς (11) δ’ Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρωσε·  ἕκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐξ ἄλλων (12) ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνε(13)σθαι. 
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1. Among the lines of argument that form the Spurious Enthymeme the first is that which arises from the particular words employed.  (a) One variety of this is when—as in dialectic, without having gone through any reasoning process, we make a final statement as if it were the conclusion of such a process, ‘Therefore so—and—so is not true’, ‘Therefore also so—and—so must be true’  —so too in rhetoric a compact and antithetical utterance passes for an enthymeme, such language being the proper province of enthymeme,  so that it is seemingly the form of wording here that causes the illusion mentioned.  In order to produce the effect of genuine reasoning by our form of wording it is useful to summarize the results of a number of previous reasonings: as ‘some he saved—others he avenged—the Greeks he freed’. 
(14) ἓν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν,  τὸ φάναι σπου(15)δαῖον εἶναι μῦν, ἀφ’ οὗ γ’ ἐστὶν ἡ τιμιωτάτη πασῶν τελετή· (16) τὰ γὰρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμιωτάτη τελετή.  ἢ εἴ τις κύνα (17) ἐγκωμιάζων τὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνοι,  ἢ τὸν Πᾶνα, (18) ὅτι Πίνδαρος ἔφησεν
ὦ μάκαρ, ὅν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα παντοδαπὸν
(19) καλέουσιν Ὀλύμπιοι,  (20) ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύν’ ἀτιμότατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ κύνα (21) δῆλον ὅτι τίμιον.  καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν φάναι τὸν Ἑρμῆν εἶναι (22) μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν· μόνος γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς.  καὶ τὸ (23) τὸν λόγον εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, ὅτι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οὐ χρημά(24)των ἀλλὰ λόγου εἰσὶν ἄξιοι· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἄξιον οὐχ ἁπλῶς (25) λέγεται. 
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Each of these statements has been previously proved from other facts; but the mere collocation of them gives the impression of establishing some fresh conclusion.  (b) Another variety is based on the use of similar words for different things; e.g.  the argument that the mouse must be a noble creature, since it gives its name to the most august of all religious rites—for such the Mysteries are.  Or one may introduce, into a eulogy of the dog, the dog—star;  or Pan, because Pindar said:
O thou blessed one!
Thou whom they of Olympus call
The hound of manifold shape
That follows the Mother of Heaven:  or we may argue that, because there is much disgrace in there not being a dog about, there is honour in being a dog.  Or that Hermes is readier than any other god to go shares, since we never say ‘shares all round’ except of him. 
ἄλλος τὸ <τὸ> διῃρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ (26) τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα·  ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι (27) οὐκ ὂν ταὐτὸ πολλάκις,  ὁπότερον χρησιμώτερον, τοῦτο δεῖ (28) ποιεῖν.  ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λόγος, οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι (29) ὅτι τριήρης ἐμ Πειραεῖ ἐστίν· ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν.  καὶ τὸν τὰ (30) στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτό (31) ἐστιν.  καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, μηδὲ τὸ ἓν φάναι (32) ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἓν κακόν ἐστιν.  (33) οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐλεγκτικόν, ὧδε δὲ δεικτικόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἓν (34) ἀγαθὸν δύο κακά· ὅλος δὲ ὁ τόπος παραλογιστικός.  πάλιν τὸ (35) Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ὅτι τριάκοντα τυράννους (36) κατέλυσε· συντίθησι γάρ.  ἢ τὸ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τῷ Θεοδέκτου· (37) ἐκ διαιρέσεως γάρ ἐστιν·
δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἥτις ἂν κτείνῃ πόσιν, (38) ἀποθνῄσκειν ταύτην,
καὶ τῷ πατρί γε τιμωρεῖν τὸν υἱόν,
(1401b1) οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πέπρακται·  συντεθέντα γὰρ ἴσως οὐκέτι (2) δίκαιον.  εἴη δ’ ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ (3) τίνος. 
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Or that speech is a very excellent thing, since good men are not said to be worth money but to be worthy of esteem—the phrase ‘worthy of esteem’ also having the meaning of ‘worth speech’.  2. Another line is to assert of the whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole.  A whole and its parts are supposed to be identical, though often they are not.  You have therefore to adopt whichever of these two lines better suits your purpose.  That is how Euthydemus argues: e.g. that any one knows that there is a trireme in the Peiraeus, since he knows the separate details that make up this statement.  There is also the argument that one who knows the letters knows the whole word, since the word is the same thing as the letters which compose it;  or that, if a double portion of a certain thing is harmful to health, then a single portion must not be called wholesome, since it is absurd that two good things should make one bad thing.  Put thus, the enthymeme is refutative; put as follows; demonstrative: ‘For one good thing cannot be made up of two bad things.’ The whole line of argument is fallacious.  Again, there is Polycrates’ saying that Thrasybulus put down thirty tyrants, where the speaker adds them up one by one.  Or the argument in the Orestes of Theodectes, where the argument is from part to whole:
’Tis right that she who slays her lord should die.
‘It is right, too, that the son should avenge his father.
Very good: these two things are what Orestes has done.’  Still, perhaps the two things, once they are put together, do not form a right act. 
ἄλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀνασκευά(4)ζειν·  τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ὅταν, μὴ δείξας ὅτι ἐποίησεν <μηδ’ ὅτι (5) οὐκ ἐποίησεν>, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα·  ποιεῖ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ὡς οὐ (6) πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων αὔξῃ, ἢ ὡς πεποίηκεν, (7) ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν αὐξῇ.  οὔκουν ἐστὶν ἐνθύμημα· παρα(8)λογίζεται γὰρ ὁ ἀκροατὴς ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐ (9) δεδειγμένου. 
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The fallacy might also be said to be due to omission, since the speaker fails to say by whose hand a husband—slayer should die.  3. Another line is the use of indignant language, whether to support your own case or to overthrow your opponent’s.  We do this when we paint a highly—coloured picture of the situation without having proved the facts of it:  if the defendant does so, he produces an impression of his innocence; and if the prosecutor goes into a passion, he produces an impression of the defendant’s guilt. 
ἄλλος τὸ ἐκ σημείου· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ (10) καὶ τοῦτο·  οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι “ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρουσιν οἱ (11) ἐρῶντες· ὁ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως κατέλυσε (12) τὸν τύραννον Ἵππαρχον”,  ἢ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι κλέπτης Διονύ(13)σιος· πονηρὸς γάρ·  ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς (14) πονηρὸς κλέπτης, ἀλλὰ κλέπτης πᾶς πονηρός. 
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Here there is no genuine enthymeme: the hearer infers guilt or innocence, but no proof is given, and the inference is fallacious accordingly.  4. Another line is to use a ‘Sign’, or single instance, as certain evidence; which, again, yields no valid proof.  Thus, it might be said that lovers are useful to their countries, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton caused the downfall of the tyrant Hipparchus.  Or, again, that Dionysius is a thief, since he is a vicious man 
ἄλλος (15) διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός,  οἷον ὃ λέγει Πολυκράτης εἰς τοὺς μῦς, (16) ὅτι ἐβοήθησαν διατραγόντες τὰς νευράς·  ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ (17) ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθῆναι τιμιώτατον·  διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι (18) ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐμήνισε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν Τενέδῳ·  ὁ δ’ ὡς ἀτι(19)μαζόμενος ἐμήνισεν, συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι. 
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—there is, of course, no valid proof here; not every vicious man is a thief, though every thief is a vicious man.  5. Another line represents the accidental as essential.  An instance is what Polycrates says of the mice, that they ‘came to the rescue’ because they gnawed through the bowstrings.  Or it might be maintained that an invitation to dinner is a great honour,  for it was because he was not invited that Achilles was ‘angered’ with the Greeks at Tenedos? 
(20) ἄλλος τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον,  οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι (21) μεγαλόψυχος·  ὑπεριδὼν γὰρ τὴν πολλῶν ὁμιλίαν ἐν τῇ Ἴδῃ (22) διέτριβεν καθ’ αὑτόν·  ὅτι γὰρ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι, καὶ (23) οὗτος μεγαλόψυχος δόξειεν ἄν.  καὶ ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστὴς καὶ (24) νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός· τοιοῦτοι γάρ.  ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ὅτι (25) ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς οἱ πτωχοὶ καὶ ᾄδουσι καὶ ὀρχοῦνται, καὶ (26) ὅτι τοῖς φυγάσιν ἔξεστιν οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν θέλωσιν·  ὅτι γὰρ (27) τοῖς δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς ταῦτα (28) ὑπάρχει δόξαιεν ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς·  (29) διὸ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἐμπίπτει. 
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As a fact, what angered him was the insult involved; it was a mere accident that this was the particular form that the insult took.  6. Another is the argument from consequence.  In the Alexander, for instance, it is argued that Paris must have had a lofty disposition,  since he despised society and lived by himself on Mount Ida:  because lofty people do this kind of thing, therefore Paris too, we are to suppose, had a lofty soul.  Or, if a man dresses fashionably and roams around at night, he is a rake, since that is the way rakes behave.  Another similar argument points out that beggars sing and dance in temples, and that exiles can live wherever they please,  and that such privileges are at the disposal of those we account happy and therefore every one might be regarded as happy if only he has those privileges. What matters, however, is the circumstances under which the privileges are enjoyed. 
ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ (30) ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον,  οἷον τῷ ἅμα ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο γεγονέναι·  (31) τὸ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ μάλιστα (32) οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις,  οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν Δημοσθένους (33) πολιτείαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν· μετ’ ἐκείνην γὰρ συνέβη (34) ὁ πόλεμος. 
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Hence this line too falls under the head of fallacies by omission.  7. Another line consists in representing as causes things which are not causes,  on the ground that they happened along with or before the event in question.  They assume that, because B happens after A, it happens because of A. Politicians are especially fond of taking this line. 
ἄλλος παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς,  (35) οἷον ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἑλένην·  αἵρεσις γὰρ (36) αὐτῇ ἐδόθη παρὰ τοῦ πατρός.  οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσως, ἀλλὰ τὸ (1402a1) πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι τούτου κύριος.  ἢ εἴ τις φαίη (2) τὸ τύπτειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὕβριν εἶναι·  οὐ γὰρ πάντως, (3) ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἄρχῃ χειρῶν ἀδίκων. 
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Thus Demades said that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all the mischief, ‘for after it the war occurred’.  8. Another line consists in leaving out any mention of time and circumstances.  E.g. the argument that Paris was justified in taking Helen,  since her father left her free to choose:  here the freedom was presumably not perpetual; it could only refer to her first choice, beyond which her father’s authority could not go.  Or again, one might say that to strike a free man is an act of wanton outrage; 
ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς (4) παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος (5) συλλογισμός,  οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν (6) [ὄν], ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄν,  καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον, (7) ἔστιν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον ὅτι ἄγνωστον,  οὕτως καὶ (8) ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἐστιν φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ (9) ἁπλῶς εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός.  ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ (10) καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει
τάχ’ ἄν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ εἶναι λέγοι,
(11) βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα.  (12) γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ (13) εἰκός,  εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκός.  ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, (14) ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ (15) πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν,  καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ (16) τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός.  ἔστι δ’ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ (17) τόπου ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη·  “ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ᾖ τῇ (18) αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενὴς ὢν αἰκίας φεύγει (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός),  κἂν ἔνοχος (19) ᾖ, οἷον ἰσχυρὸς ὤν (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι εἰκὸς ἔμελλε δόξειν)”.  (20) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ γὰρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ (21) ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ·  φαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀμφότερα εἰκότα, (22) ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἴρηται·  (23) καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν.  καὶ (24) ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέραινον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου (25) ἐπάγγελμα·  ψεῦδός τε γάρ ἐστιν, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινό(26)μενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλ’ <ἢ> ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ (27) ἐριστικῇ. 
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but it is not so in every case—only when it is unprovoked.  9. Again, a spurious syllogism may, as in ‘eristical’ discussions, be based on the confusion of the absolute with that which is not absolute but particular.  As, in dialectic, for instance, it may be argued that what—is—not is, on the ground that what—is—not is what—is—not:  or that the unknown can be known, on the ground that it can be known to he unknown:  so also in rhetoric a spurious enthymeme may be based on the confusion of some particular probability with absolute probability.  Now no particular probability is universally probable: as Agathon says,
One might perchance say that was probable—
That things improbable oft will hap to men.  For what is improbable does happen, and therefore it is probable that improbable things will happen.  Granted this, one might argue that ‘what is improbable is probable’.  But this is not true absolutely. As, in eristic, the imposture comes from not adding any clause specifying relationship or reference or manner;  so here it arises because the probability in question is not general but specific.  It is of this line of argument that Corax’s Art of Rhetoric is composed.  If the accused is not open to the charge—for instance if a weakling be tried for violent assault—the defence is that he was not likely to do such a thing.  But if he is open to the charge—i.e. if he is a strong man—the defence is still that he was not likely to do such a thing, since he could be sure that people would think he was likely to do it.  And so with any other charge: the accused must be either open or not open to it:  there is in either case an appearance of probable innocence, but whereas in the latter case the probability is genuine, in the former it can only be asserted in the special sense mentioned.  This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse argument seem the better.  Hence people were right in objecting to the training Protagoras undertook to give them. 
25. (28) Καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων, καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν φαινο(29)μένων, εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ λύσεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν τῶν εἰρημένων (30) εἰπεῖν.  ἔστιν δὲ λύειν ἢ ἀντισυλλογισάμενον ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγ(31)κόντα.  τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀντισυλλογίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν (32) τόπων ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν·  οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐν(33)δόξων, δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν·  αἱ δ’ ἐνστά(34)σεις φέρονται καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ (35) ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἢ ἐκ τῶν κεκρι(36)μένων. 
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It was a fraud; the probability it handled was not genuine but spurious, and has a place in no art except Rhetoric and Eristic.  Part 25. Enthymemes, genuine and apparent, have now been described; the next subject is their Refutation.  An argument may be refuted either by a counter—syllogism or by bringing an objection.  It is clear that counter—syllogisms can be built up from the same lines of arguments as the original syllogisms:  for the materials of syllogisms are the ordinary opinions of men, and such opinions often contradict each other. 
(37) λέγω δὲ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μέν, οἷον εἰ περὶ ἔρωτος εἴη (1402b1) τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὡς σπουδαῖος, ἡ ἔνστασις διχῶς·  ἢ γὰρ καθόλου (2) εἰπόντα ὅτι πᾶσα ἔνδεια πονηρόν, ἢ κατὰ μέρος ὅτι οὐκ ἂν (3) ἐλέγετο Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ πονηροὶ ἔρωτες. 
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Objections, as appears in the Topics, may be raised in four ways—either by directly attacking your opponent’s own statement, or by putting forward another statement like it, or by putting forward a statement contrary to it, or by quoting previous decisions.  1. By ‘attacking your opponent’s own statement’ I mean, for instance, this: if his enthymeme should assert that love is always good, the objection can be brought in two ways, 
ἀπὸ (4) δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἔνστασις φέρεται, οἷον, εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἦν (5) ὅτι ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖ, <ὅτι> ἀλλ’ (6) οὐδ’ ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς. 
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either by making the general statement that ‘all want is an evil’, or by making the particular one that there would be no talk of ‘Caunian love’ if there were not evil loves as well as good ones. 
ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου, οἷον, εἰ ἦν (7) τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἀεὶ μισοῦσιν, ὅτι (8) ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ οἱ εὖ πεπονθότες ἀεὶ φιλοῦσιν. 
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2. An objection ‘from a contrary statement’ is raised when, for instance, the opponent’s enthymeme having concluded that a good man does good to all his friends, you object, ‘That proves nothing, for a bad man does not do evil to all his friends’. 
αἱ δὲ κρίσεις (9) αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀνδρῶν, οἷον εἴ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν (10) ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρτά(11)νουσιν,  ἔνστασις ὅτι οὔκουν ὁ Πιττακὸς αἰνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν (12) μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ. 
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3. An example of an objection ‘from a like statement’ is, the enthymeme having shown that ill—used men always hate their ill—users, to reply, ‘That proves nothing, for well—used men do not always love those who used them well’.  4. The ‘decisions’ mentioned are those proceeding from well—known men; for instance, if the enthymeme employed has concluded that ‘that allowance ought to be made for drunken offenders, since they did not know what they were doing’, 
(13) ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων, τὰ δὲ τέτ(14)ταρα ταῦτ’ ἐστίν, εἰκὸς παράδειγμα τεκμήριον σημεῖον,  ἔστι δὲ (15) τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ὄντων ἢ δοκούντων συνηγμένα (16) ἐνθυμήματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων,  τὰ δὲ δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς ἐκ τοῦ (17) ὁμοίου, ἢ ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ὅταν λαβὼν τὸ καθόλου εἶτα συλ(18)λογίσηται τὰ κατὰ μέρος, διὰ παραδείγματος,  τὰ δὲ διὰ ἀναγ(19)καίου καὶ <ἀεὶ> ὄντος διὰ τεκμηρίου,  τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου [ἢ] (20) τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, ἐάν τε ὂν ἐάν τε μή, διὰ σημείων, 
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the objection will be, ‘Pittacus, then, deserves no approval, or he would not have prescribed specially severe penalties for offences due to drunkenness’.  Enthymemes are based upon one or other of four kinds of alleged fact: (1) Probabilities, (2) Examples, (3) Infallible Signs, (4) Ordinary Signs.  (1) Enthymemes based upon Probabilities are those which argue from what is, or is supposed to be, usually true.  (2) Enthymemes based upon Example are those which proceed by induction from one or more similar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and then argue deductively to a particular inference.  (3) Enthymemes based upon Infallible Signs are those which argue from the inevitable and invariable. 
τὸ δὲ (21) εἰκὸς οὐ τὸ ἀεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ (22) τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἔνστασιν,  (23) ἡ δὲ λύσις φαινομένη ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἀεί·  οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ (24) εἰκός λύει ὁ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον·  διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ (25) ἔστι πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπολογούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ κατηγοροῦντα διὰ (26) τοῦτον τὸν παραλογισμόν·  ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν διὰ εἰκό(27)των ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸ λῦσαι ἢ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς (28) ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον,  ἀεὶ δ’ ἔχει ἔνστασιν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (29) (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ ἅμ’ ἀεὶ εἰκός, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον),  ὁ δὲ κριτὴς (30) οἴεται, ἂν οὕτω λυθῇ, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὑτῷ κριτέον, (31) παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν  (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγ(32)καίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων·  (33) τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν),  οὔκουν ἱκανὸν (34) ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός.  (35) τοῦτο δὲ συμβήσεται ἐὰν ᾖ ἡ ἔνστασις μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (36) πολύ.  ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἢ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς (37) πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δὲ εἰ ἀμφοῖν·  εἰ γὰρ τὰ <πλείω καὶ> (1403a1) πλεονάκις οὕτως, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον. 
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(4) Enthymemes based upon ordinary Signs are those which argue from some universal or particular proposition, true or false.  Now (1) as a Probability is that which happens usually but not always, Enthymemes founded upon Probabilities can, it is clear, always be refuted by raising some objection.  The refutation is not always genuine: it may be spurious:  for it consists in showing not that your opponent’s premiss is not probable, but only in showing that it is not inevitably true.  Hence it is always in defence rather than in accusation that it is possible to gain an advantage by using this fallacy.  For the accuser uses probabilities to prove his case: and to refute a conclusion as improbable is not the same thing as to refute it as not inevitable.  Any argument based upon what usually happens is always open to objection: otherwise it would not be a probability but an invariable and necessary truth.  But the judges think, if the refutation takes this form, either that the accuser’s case is not probable or that they must not decide it; which, as we said, is a false piece of reasoning.  For they ought to decide by considering not merely what must be true but also what is likely to be true:  this is, indeed, the meaning of ‘giving a verdict in accordance with one’s honest opinion’.  Therefore it is not enough for the defendant to refute the accusation by proving that the charge is not bound to be true: he must do so by showing that it is not likely to be true.  For this purpose his objection must state what is more usually true than the statement attacked.  It may do so in either of two ways: either in respect of frequency or in respect of exactness. It will be most convincing if it does so in both respects; 
(2) λύεται δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμήματα (3) εἰρημένα, κἂν ᾖ ὑπάρχοντα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις·  (4) ὅτι γὰρ ἀσυλλόγιστόν ἐστιν πᾶν σημεῖον, δῆλον ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν (5) Ἀναλυτικῶν. 
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for if the thing in question both happens oftener as we represent it and happens more as we represent it, the probability is particularly great  (2) Fallible Signs, and Enthymemes based upon them, can be refuted even if the facts are correct, as was said at the outset. 
(6) πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματώδη ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις καὶ τὰ (7) εἰκότα·  ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν <ἕν> τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται, ὅτι οὐκ (8) ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις ἄλλως,  ἐάν τε καὶ τὰ (9) πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι τὸ παρὸν οὐχ (10) ὅμοιον ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἢ διαφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει. 
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For we have shown in the Analytics that no Fallible Sign can form part of a valid logical proof.  (3) Enthymemes depending on examples may be refuted in the same way as probabilities.  If we have a negative instance, the argument is refuted, in so far as it is proved not inevitable, even though the positive examples are more similar and more frequent. 
(10) τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια (11) καὶ τεκμηριώδη ἐνθυμήματα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον οὐκ (12) ἔσται λῦσαι (δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦθ’ ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν),  (13) λείπεται δ’ ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λεγόμενον δεικνύναι.  εἰ δὲ (14) φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅτι τεκμήριον, ἄλυτον ἤδη γίγνε(15)ται τοῦτο·  πάντα γὰρ γίγνεται ἀπόδειξις ἤδη φανερά. 
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And if the positive examples are more numerous and more frequent, we must contend that the present case is dissimilar, or that its conditions are dissimilar, or that it is different in some way or other.  (4) It will be impossible to refute Infallible Signs, and Enthymemes resting on them, by showing in any way that they do not form a valid logical proof: this, too, we see from the Analytics.  All we can do is to show that the fact alleged does not exist.  If there is no doubt that it does, and that it is an Infallible Sign, refutation now becomes impossible: 
26. (16) Τὸ δ’ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθυμήματος στοιχεῖον·  (17) τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον·  ἔστιν γὰρ στοιχεῖον (18) καὶ τόπος εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμήματα ἐμπίπτει.  τὸ δ’ αὔξειν καὶ (19) μειοῦν ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, (20) ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, καὶ τῶν (21) ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν. 
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for this is equivalent to a demonstration which is clear in every respect.  Part 26. Amplification and Depreciation are not an element of enthymeme.  By ‘an element of enthymeme’ I mean the same thing as a line of enthymematic argument  —a general class embracing a large number of particular kinds of enthymeme. 
ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν πάντα περὶ ἃ οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ (22) τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὥστ’ εἰ μηδὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ἐνθυμήματος (23) τόπος, οὐδὲ τὸ αὔξειν καὶ μειοῦν.  (24) οὐδὲ τὰ λυτικὰ ἐνθυμή(25)ματος εἶδός τί ἐστιν [ἄλλο τῶν κατασκευαστικῶν]·  δῆλον γὰρ (26) ὅτι λύει μὲν ἢ δείξας ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκών, ἀνταποδείκνυσι (27) δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον,  οἷον εἰ ἔδειξε ὅτι γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι οὐ (28) γέγονεν, εἰ δὲ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι γέγονεν·  ὥστε αὕτη (29) μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη [ἡ] διαφορά (τοῖς αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρῶνται ἀμφότεροι·  (30) ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν, ἐνθυμήματα φέρουσιν)·  ἡ δ’ ἔνστασις (31) οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθύμημα,  ἀλλά, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τὸ εἰπεῖν (32) δόξαν τινὰ ἐξ ἧς ἔσται δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συλλελόγισται ἢ ὅτι ψεῦ(33)δός τι εἴληφεν. 
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Amplification and Depreciation are one kind of enthymeme, viz. the kind used to show that a thing is great or small; just as there are other kinds used to show that a thing is good or bad, just or unjust, and anything else of the sort.  All these things are the subject—matter of syllogisms and enthymemes; none of these is the line of argument of an enthymeme; no more, therefore, are Amplification and Depreciation.  Nor are Refutative Enthymemes a different species from Constructive.  For it is clear that refutation consists either in offering positive proof or in raising an objection. In the first case we prove the opposite of our adversary’s statements.  Thus, if he shows that a thing has happened, we show that it has not; if he shows that it has not happened, we show that it has.  This, then, could not be the distinction if there were one, since the same means are employed by both parties,  enthymemes being adduced to show that the fact is or is not so—and—so.  An objection, on the other hand, is not an enthymeme at all, 
(34) ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον,  (35) ὑπὲρ μὲν παραδειγμάτων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ (1403b1) ὅλως τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅθεν τε εὐπορήσομεν καὶ ὡς αὐτὰ (2) λύσομεν,  εἰρήσθω ἡμῖν τοσαῦτα, λοιπὸν δὲ διελθεῖν περὶ λέξεως (3) καὶ τάξεως.(4) (5) 
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as was said in the Topics, consists in stating some accepted opinion from which it will be clear that our opponent has not reasoned correctly or has made a false assumption.  Three points must be studied in making a speech;  and we have now completed the account of (1) Examples, Maxims, Enthymemes, and in general the thought—element the way to invent and refute arguments. 
 
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