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11. (33) Ὑποκείσθω δὴ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς (34) ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρ(35)χουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον. 
Part 11. We may lay it down that Pleasure is a movement, a movement by which the soul as a whole is consciously brought into its normal state of being; and that Pain is the opposite. 
εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ (1370a1) τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης (2) διαθέσεως,  τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως (3) ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν. 
If this is what pleasure is, it is clear that the pleasant is what tends to produce this condition,  while that which tends to destroy it, or to cause the soul to be brought into the opposite state, is painful. 
ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ (4) φύσιν ἰέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ,  καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειλη(5)φότα ᾖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα,  καὶ τὰ (6) ἔθη (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται·  (7) ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει·  ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις (8) τῷ ἀεί, ἔστιν δ’ ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολ(9)λάκις),  καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον  (παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία, διὸ τὸ (10) ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν,  καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται
(10) πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ’ ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ), 
(11) τὰς δ’ ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς·  (12) ἀναγκαῖα γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐθισθῶσιν·  οὕτω δὲ τὸ (13) ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδύ. 
It must therefore be pleasant as a rule to move towards a natural state of being,  particularly when a natural process has achieved the complete recovery of that natural state.  Habits also are pleasant; for as soon as a thing has become habitual, it is virtually natural;  habit is a thing not unlike nature;  what happens often is akin to what happens always, natural events happening always, habitual events often.  Again, that is pleasant which is not forced on us;  for force is unnatural, and that is why what is compulsory, painful,  and it has been rightly said: All that is done on compulsion is bitterness unto the soul.  So all acts of concentration, strong effort, and strain are necessarily painful;  they all involve compulsion and force, unless we are accustomed to them,  in which case it is custom that makes them pleasant. 
τὰ δ’ ἐναντία ἡδέα·  διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμίαι καὶ αἱ (14) ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ (15) ὁ ὕπνος τῶν ἡδέων·  οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων. 
The opposites to these are pleasant;  and hence ease, freedom from toil, relaxation, amusement, rest, and sleep belong to the class of pleasant things;  for these are all free from any element of compulsion. 
καὶ οὗ (16) ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ, ἅπαν ἡδύ·  ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος (17) ἐστὶν ὄρεξις.  τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλογοί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ (18) μετὰ λόγου. 
Everything, too, is pleasant for which we have the desire within us,  since desire is the craving for pleasure.  Of the desires some are irrational, some associated with reason. 
λέγω δὲ ἀλόγους ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπο(19)λαμβάνειν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν  (εἰσὶν δὲ τοιαῦται ὅσαι εἶναι λέ(20)γονται φύσει,  ὥσπερ αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχουσαι, οἷον (21) ἡ τροφῆς δίψα καὶ πεῖνα, καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον εἶδος τροφῆς (22) εἶδος ἐπιθυμίας,  καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ (23) ὅλως τὰ ἁπτά, καὶ περὶ ὀσμὴν [εὐωδίας] καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ (24) ὄψιν),  μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσας ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν·  (25) πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (26) ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες. 
By irrational I mean those which do not arise from any opinion held by the mind.  Of this kind are those known as ‘natural’;  for instance, those originating in the body, such as the desire for nourishment, namely hunger and thirst, and a separate kind of desire answering to each kind of nourishment;  and the desires connected with taste and sex and sensations of touch in general; and those of smell, hearing, and vision.  Rational desires are those which we are induced to have;  there are many things we desire to see or get because we have been told of them and induced to believe them good. 
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ (27) αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους,  ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις (28) ἀσθενής,  ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ (29) ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει·  εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον (30) ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ (31) καὶ αἴσθησις·  ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθά(32)νεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν (33) τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα·  αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, (34) μέμνηνται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα. 
Further, pleasure is the consciousness through the senses of a certain kind of emotion;  but imagination is a feeble sort of sensation,  and there will always be in the mind of a man who remembers or expects something an image or picture of what he remembers or expects.  If this is so, it is clear that memory and expectation also, being accompanied by sensation, may be accompanied by pleasure.  It follows that anything pleasant is either present and perceived, past and remembered, or future and expected,  since we perceive present pleasures, remember past ones, and expect future ones. 
τὰ (1370b1) μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρ(2)όντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἂν ᾖ (3) ὕστερον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο·  ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἴρηται,
ἀλλ’ ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνῆσθαι πόνων,
(4) καὶ
(5) μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνὴρ
(6) μνημένος ὅστις πολλὰ πάθῃ καὶ πολλὰ ἐόργῃ· 
(7) τούτου δ’ αἴτιον ὅτι ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κακόν·  τὰ δ’ ἐν (8) ἐλπίδι ὅσα παρόντα ἢ εὐφραίνειν ἢ ὠφελεῖν φαίνεται μεγάλα, (9) καὶ ἄνευ λύπης ὠφελεῖν. 
Now the things that are pleasant to remember are not only those that, when actually perceived as present, were pleasant, but also some things that were not, provided that their results have subsequently proved noble and good.  Hence the words Sweet ‘tis when rescued to remember pain, and Even his griefs are a joy long after to one that remembers All that he wrought and endured.  The reason of this is that it is pleasant even to be merely free from evil.  The things it is pleasant to expect are those that when present are felt to afford us either great delight or great but not painful benefit. 
ὅλως δὲ ὅσα παρόντα εὐφραίνει, καὶ (10) ἐλπίζοντας καὶ μεμνημένους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ·  διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀργί(11)ζεσθαι ἡδύ,  ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησε περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ
(12) ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο 
(13) (οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀργίζεται τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ φαινομένῳ τιμωρίας τυχεῖν,  (14) τοῖς δὲ πολὺ ὑπὲρ αὑτοὺς τῇ δυνάμει ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ (15) ἧττον)·  καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκολουθεῖ τις (16) ἡδονή·  ἢ γὰρ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔτυχον ἢ ἐλπίζοντες ὡς τεύξονται (17) χαίρουσίν τινα ἡδονήν,  οἷον οἵ τ’ ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς ἐχόμενοι (18) ταῖς δίψαις καὶ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔπιον καὶ ἐλπίζοντες πιεῖσθαι (19) χαίρουσιν,  καὶ οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες (20) καὶ ποιοῦντές τι ἀεὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαίρουσιν·  ἐν ἅπασι (21) γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι οἴονται τοῦ (22) ἐρωμένου. 
And in general, all the things that delight us when they are present also do so, as a rule, when we merely remember or expect them.  Hence even being angry is pleasant  — Homer said of wrath that Sweeter it is by far than the honeycomb dripping with sweetness —  for no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance,  and we feel comparatively little anger, or none at all, with those who are much our superiors in power.  Some pleasant feeling is associated with most of our appetites  we are enjoying either the memory of a past pleasure or the expectation of a future one,  just as persons down with fever, during their attacks of thirst, enjoy remembering the drinks they have had and looking forward to having more.  So also a lover enjoys talking or writing about his loved one, or doing any little thing connected with him;  all these things recall him to memory and make him actually present to the eye of imagination. 
καὶ ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὕτη γίγνεται πᾶσιν, (23) ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρόντος χαίρωσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντος (24) μεμνημένοις [ἐρῶσιν] λύπη προσγένηται τῷ μὴ παρ(25)εῖναι,  καὶ ἐν πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ὡσαύτως ἐπιγίγνεταί τις (26) ἡδονή·  ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡδονὴ δ’ ἐν (27) τῷ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν πως ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἃ ἔπραττεν καὶ (28) οἷος ἦν·  διὸ καὶ τοῦτ’ εἰκότως εἴρηται
(29) ὧς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ’ ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο. 
Indeed, it is always the first sign of love, that besides enjoying some one’s presence, we remember him when he is gone, and feel pain as well as pleasure, because he is there no longer.  Similarly there is an element of pleasure even in mourning and lamentation for the departed.  There is grief, indeed, at his loss, but pleasure in remembering him and as it were seeing him before us in his deeds and in his life.  We can well believe the poet when he says He spake, and in each man’s heart he awakened the love of lament. 
(30) καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἡδύ.  οὗ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν λυπηρόν, τὸ (31) τυγχάνειν ἡδύ·  οἱ δ’ ὀργιζόμενοι λυποῦνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μὴ (32) τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπίζοντες δὲ χαίρουσιν. 
Revenge, too, is pleasant;  it is pleasant to get anything that it is painful to fail to get,  and angry people suffer extreme pain when they fail to get their revenge; but they enjoy the prospect of getting it. 
καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, οὐ (33) μόνον τοῖς φιλονίκοις ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν·  φαντασία γὰρ ὑπεροχῆς (34) γίγνεται, οὗ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ μάλα.  ἐπεὶ (35) δὲ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς ἡδείας εἶναι τὰς (1371a1) μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἐριστικάς  (πολλάκις γὰρ ἐν ταύταις (2) γίγνεται τὸ νικᾶν),  καὶ ἀστραγαλίσεις καὶ σφαιρίσεις καὶ (3) κυβείας καὶ πεττείας. 
Victory also is pleasant, and not merely to ‘bad losers’, but to every one;  the winner sees himself in the light of a champion, and everybody has a more or less keen appetite for being that.  The pleasantness of victory implies of course that combative sports and intellectual contests are pleasant  since in these it often happens that some one wins  and also games like knuckle—bones, ball, dice, and draughts. 
καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐσπουδασμένας δὲ (4) παιδιὰς ὁμοίως·  αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖαι γίγνονται ἄν τις ᾖ (5) συνήθης,  αἱ δ’ εὐθὺς ἡδεῖαι, οἷον κυνηγία καὶ πᾶσα θηρευ(6)τική·  ὅπου γὰρ ἅμιλλα, ἐνταῦθα καὶ νίκη ἔστιν·  διὸ (7) καὶ ἡ δικανικὴ καὶ ἡ ἐριστικὴ ἡδέα τοῖς εἰθισμένοις καὶ (8) δυναμένοις. 
And similarly with the serious sports;  some of these become pleasant when one is accustomed to them;  while others are pleasant from the first, like hunting with hounds, or indeed any kind of hunting.  For where there is competition, there is victory.  That is why forensic pleading and debating contests are pleasant to those who are accustomed to them and have the capacity for them. 
καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εὐδοξία τῶν ἡδίστων διὰ τὸ γί(9)γνεσθαι φαντασίαν ἑκάστῳ ὅτι τοιοῦτος οἷος ὁ σπουδαῖος,  (10) καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν φῶσιν οὓς οἴεται ἀληθεύειν.  τοιοῦτοι δ’ (11) οἱ ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον τῶν πόρρω,  καὶ οἱ συνήθεις καὶ οἱ πολῖ(12)ται τῶν ἄπωθεν,  καὶ οἱ ὄντες τῶν μελλόντων,  καὶ οἱ φρό(13)νιμοι ἀφρόνων,  καὶ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων·  μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰκὸς (14) ἀληθεύειν τοὺς εἰρημένους τῶν ἐναντίων·  ἐπεὶ ὧν τις πολὺ (15) καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἢ θηρίων, οὐδὲν μέλει τῆς τού(16)των τιμῆς ἢ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς γε τῆς δόξης χάριν, ἀλλ’ (17) εἴπερ, δι’ ἄλλο τι. 
Honour and good repute are among the most pleasant things of all; they make a man see himself in the character of a fine fellow,  especially when he is credited with it by people whom he thinks good judges.  His neighbours are better judges than people at a distance;  his associates and fellow—countrymen better than strangers;  his contemporaries better than posterity;  sensible persons better than foolish ones;  a large number of people better than a small number:  those of the former class, in each case, are the more likely to be good judges of him.  Honour and credit bestowed by those whom you think much inferior to yourself — e.g. children or animals — you do not value: not for its own sake, anyhow: if you do value it, it is for some other reason. 
καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων·  τό τε γὰρ (18) φιλεῖν ἡδύ (οὐδεὶς γὰρ φίλοινος μὴ χαίρων οἴνῳ)  καὶ τὸ (19) φιλεῖσθαι ἡδύ·  φαντασία γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ὑπάρχειν (20) αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὗ πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι·  (21) τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἀγαπᾶσθαί ἐστιν αὐτὸν δι’ αὑτόν. 
Friends belong to the class of pleasant things;  it is pleasant to love — if you love wine, you certainly find it delightful:  and it is pleasant to be loved,  for this too makes a man see himself as the possessor of goodness, a thing that every being that has a feeling for it desires to possess:  to be loved means to be valued for one’s own personal qualities. 
καὶ τὸ (22) θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδὺ διὰ <τὸ> αὐτὸ τῷ τιμᾶσθαι. 
To be admired is also pleasant, simply because of the honour implied. 
καὶ τὸ κολακεύε(23)σθαι καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἡδέα·  φαινόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστὴς καὶ (24) φαινόμενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἐστίν.  καὶ τὸ ταὐτὰ πράττειν (25) πολλάκις ἡδύ·  τὸ γὰρ σύνηθες ἡδὺ ἦν. 
Flattery and flatterers are pleasant:  the flatterer is a man who, you believe, admires  and likes so do the same thing often is pleasant,  since, as we saw, anything habitual is pleasant. 
καὶ τὸ μετα(26)βάλλειν ἡδύ·  εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίγνεται <τὸ> μεταβάλλειν·  τὸ γὰρ (27) αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τῆς καθεστώσης ἕξεως,  ὅθεν εἴρηται
μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ. 
And to change is also pleasant:  change means an approach to nature,  whereas invariable repetition of anything causes the excessive prolongation of a settled condition:  therefore, says the poet,Change is in all things sweet. 
(28) διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὰ διὰ χρόνου ἡδέα ἐστίν, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ (29) πράγματα·  (30) μεταβολὴ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστίν,  ἅμα δὲ καὶ (31) σπάνιον τὸ διὰ χρόνου. 
That is why what comes to us only at long intervals is pleasant, whether it be a person or a thing;  for it is a change from what we had before,  and, besides, what comes only at long intervals has the value of rarity. 
καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ (32) ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ·  ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μα(33)θεῖν ἐστιν,  ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν,  ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν (34) <τὸ> εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι. 
Learning things and wondering at things are also pleasant as a rule;  wondering implies the desire of learning,  so that the object of wonder is an object of desire;  while in learning one is brought into one’s natural condition. 
καὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ (35) εὖ πάσχειν τῶν ἡδέων·  τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πάσχειν τυγχά (1371b1) νειν ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσι,  τὸ δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν καὶ ὑπερ(2)έχειν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίενται. 
Conferring and receiving benefits belong to the class of pleasant things;  to receive a benefit is to get what one desires;  to confer a benefit implies both possession and superiority, both of which are things we try to attain. 
διὰ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ εἶναι τὸ (3) εὐποιητικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθοῦν ἡδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν τοὺς (4) πλησίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν. 
It is because beneficent acts are pleasant that people find it pleasant to put their neighbours straight again and to supply what they lack. 
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθά(5)νειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη (6) ἡδέα εἶναι, οἷον τό τε μιμούμενον,  ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ (7) ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημέ(8)νον ᾖ, κἂν ᾖ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον·  οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ (9) τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε (10) μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει. 
Again, since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant  — for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry and every product of skilful imitation; this latter, even if the object imitated is not itself pleasant;  for it is not the object itself which here gives delight; the spectator draws inferences (‘That is a so—and—so’) and thus learns something fresh. 
καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ παρὰ (11) μικρὸν σώζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων· πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ (12) ταῦτα. 
Dramatic turns of fortune and hairbreadth escapes from perils are pleasant, because we feel all such things are wonderful. 
καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ (13) φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὅμοια ἡδέα (14) ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ,  οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ (15) καὶ νέος νέῳ,  ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, [ὡς] “ἧλιξ ἥλικα (16) τέρπει”, καὶ “ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον”, καὶ “ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ θῆρα”, (17) “καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν”, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. 
And since what is natural is pleasant, and things akin to each other seem natural to each other, therefore all kindred and similar things are usually pleasant to each other;  for instance, one man, horse, or young person is pleasant to another man, horse, or young person.  Hence the proverbs ‘mate delights mate’, ‘like to like’, ‘beast knows beast’, ‘jackdaw to jackdaw’, and the rest of them. 
(18) ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἑαυτῷ ἡδὺ ἅπαν, μά(19)λιστα δὲ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη (20) πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον·  πάντα γὰρ (21) τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστα. 
But since everything like and akin to oneself is pleasant, and since every man is himself more like and akin to himself than any one else is, it follows that all of us must be more or less fond of ourselves.  For all this resemblance and kinship is present particularly in the relation of an individual to himself. 
ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλ(22)αυτοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι πᾶσιν, οἷον (23) ἔργα καὶ λόγους·  διὸ καὶ φιλοκόλακες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (24) καὶ φιλερασταὶ καὶ φιλόμαιμοι καὶ φιλότεκνοι· αὐτῶν γὰρ (25) ἔργον τὰ τέκνα.  καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν ἡδύ· αὐτῶν γὰρ (26) ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται.  καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἥδιστον, καὶ τὸ (27) σοφὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι ἡδύ·  ἀρχικὸν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν, ἔστιν δ’ (28) ἡ σοφία πολλῶν καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἐπιστήμη.  ἔτι ἐπεὶ φιλό(29)τιμοι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέ(30)λας ἡδὺ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν,  καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ δοκεῖ βέλτιστος (31) αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ εἶναι, ἐνταῦθα διατρίβειν,  ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ποιη(32)τής φησι κἀπὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπείγει,
νέμων ἑκάστης ἡμέρας πλεῖστον μέρος,
(33) ἵν’ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν. 
And because we are all fond of ourselves, it follows that what is our own is pleasant to all of us, as for instance our own deeds and words.  That is why we are usually fond of our flatterers, [our lovers,] and honour; also of our children, for our children are our own work.  It is also pleasant to complete what is defective, for the whole thing thereupon becomes our own work.  And since power over others is very pleasant, it is pleasant to be thought wise,  for practical wisdom secures us power over others. (Scientific wisdom is also pleasant, because it is the knowledge of many wonderful things.)  Again, since most of us are ambitious, it must be pleasant to disparage our neighbours as well as to have power over them.  It is pleasant for a man to spend his time over what he feels he can do best;  just as the poet says, To that he bends himself, To that each day allots most time, whereinHe is indeed the best part of himself. 
(34) ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα ἄνεσις, καὶ (35) ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων,  ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ (1372a1) ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα·  διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων (2) χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς. 
Similarly, since amusement and every kind of relaxation and laughter too belong to the class of pleasant things,  it follows that ludicrous things are pleasant, whether men, words, or deeds.  We have discussed the ludicrous separately in the treatise on the Art of Poetry. 
περὶ μὲν οὖν ἡδέων εἰρήσθω (3) ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις φανερά. 
So much for the subject of pleasant things: by considering their opposites we can easily see what things are unpleasant. 
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Enhet: Det humanistiske fakultet   Utviklet av: IT-seksjonen ved HF
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