τὸ δὲ (21) εἰκὸς οὐ τὸ ἀεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ (22) τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἔνστασιν,
(23) ἡ δὲ λύσις φαινομένη ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἀεί·
οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ (24) εἰκός λύει ὁ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον·
διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ (25) ἔστι πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπολογούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ κατηγοροῦντα διὰ (26) τοῦτον τὸν παραλογισμόν·
ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν διὰ εἰκό(27)των ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸ λῦσαι ἢ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς (28) ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον,
ἀεὶ δ’ ἔχει ἔνστασιν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (29) (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ ἅμ’ ἀεὶ εἰκός, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον),
ὁ δὲ κριτὴς (30) οἴεται, ἂν οὕτω λυθῇ, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὑτῷ κριτέον, (31) παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν
(οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγ(32)καίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων·
(33) τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν),
οὔκουν ἱκανὸν (34) ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός.
(35) τοῦτο δὲ συμβήσεται ἐὰν ᾖ ἡ ἔνστασις μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ (36) πολύ.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἢ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς (37) πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δὲ εἰ ἀμφοῖν·
εἰ γὰρ τὰ <πλείω καὶ> (1403a1) πλεονάκις οὕτως, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον.
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(4) Enthymemes based upon ordinary Signs are those which argue from some universal or particular proposition, true or false.
Now (1) as a Probability is that which happens usually but not always, Enthymemes founded upon Probabilities can, it is clear, always be refuted by raising some objection.
The refutation is not always genuine: it may be spurious:
for it consists in showing not that your opponent’s premiss is not probable, but only in showing that it is not inevitably true.
Hence it is always in defence rather than in accusation that it is possible to gain an advantage by using this fallacy.
For the accuser uses probabilities to prove his case: and to refute a conclusion as improbable is not the same thing as to refute it as not inevitable.
Any argument based upon what usually happens is always open to objection: otherwise it would not be a probability but an invariable and necessary truth.
But the judges think, if the refutation takes this form, either that the accuser’s case is not probable or that they must not decide it; which, as we said, is a false piece of reasoning.
For they ought to decide by considering not merely what must be true but also what is likely to be true:
this is, indeed, the meaning of ‘giving a verdict in accordance with one’s honest opinion’.
Therefore it is not enough for the defendant to refute the accusation by proving that the charge is not bound to be true: he must do so by showing that it is not likely to be true.
For this purpose his objection must state what is more usually true than the statement attacked.
It may do so in either of two ways: either in respect of frequency or in respect of exactness. It will be most convincing if it does so in both respects;
