ἔστω δὴ ἀγα(22)θὸν ὃ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα ᾖ αἱρετόν,
καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἄλλο (23) αἱρούμεθα,
καὶ οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν (24) ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν, καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ (25) ἀποδοίη,
καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ· (26) τοῦτό <γάρ> ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν,
καὶ οὗ παρόντος εὖ διάκει(27)ται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες,
καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ (28) φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ (29) τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά.
We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake;
or as that for the sake of which we choose something else;
or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason;
or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good;
or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self—sufficing condition; or as self—sufficiency;
or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites.